Judgment :- The second appeal has been filed by the 7th defendant in the suit which for partition of plaint A and B Schedule items into 16 shares and for allotment of five to the plaintiff. 2. The short facts are these: One Veeraraghava Gounder, the father of the plaintiff, second defendant and defendant, and the husband of the first defendant was the head of the joint family consisting of himself and his sons. Veeraraghava Gounder has four sons. The eldest son by Ramabiran who was examined as P.W.3 in the suit had relinquished his interest in the properties. The second defendant was the second son. The plaintiff and third defendant younger to him. Veeraraghava Gounder died sometime in 1961. The second defendant admittedly managing the properties after the father ’ s death. The case set out in the plaint that the second defendant was a drunkard and he was leading a wayward life concubines. According to the plaint, the debts incurred by the second defendant are binding on the plaintiff or the other members of the family. It is also case of the plaintiff decrees passed against the second defendant and further proceedings taken in execution such decrees will not bind the plaintiff and the other members of the family. 3. The suit was contested mainly by the alienees and the court auction purchasers. In second appeal, I am concerned only with the sixth defendant and the 7th defendant sixth defendant was a usufructuary mortgagee under Ex.B-10 dated 14.10.1963 mortgage was executed by defendants 1 and 2. As per the recitals of the mortgage the debt was for family purposes. The sixth defendant also lent money under promissory note to the second defendant and filed Small Cause Suit No.759 of 1968, on the file of District Munsif’s Court, Arni. The suit was decreed, and in execution of the decree, Items and 2 of the B Schedule property were brought to sale. They were purchased by the defendant himself and the sale certificate is marked as Ex.B-11 dated 30.1.1971. By a deed dated 10.12.1973 (Ex.B-13), the sixth defendant sold items 1 and 2 of the B Schedule property to the appellant/7th defendant. On the footing of the said purchase, the defendant contested the suit. They were purchased by the defendant himself and the sale certificate is marked as Ex.B-11 dated 30.1.1971. By a deed dated 10.12.1973 (Ex.B-13), the sixth defendant sold items 1 and 2 of the B Schedule property to the appellant/7th defendant. On the footing of the said purchase, the defendant contested the suit. According to the 7th defendant, the mortgage in favour of sixth defendant as well as the court auction sale are binding on the plaintiff and the members of the family of the plaintiff and they will not be entitled to claim any right in 1 and 2 of the B Schedule property. 4. The trial Court granted a decree for partition of the properties mentioned in A Schedule the plaint only and dismissed the suit in other respects. On appeal by the plaintiff, Subordinate Judge of Vellore reversed the decree in so far as it related to B Schedule passed a preliminary decree with regard to both the Schedules in favour of the plaintiff the third defendant. Aggrieved by the said decree, the 7th defendant has preferred second appeal. 5. The only question is, whether the debts incurred under Ex.B-10 usufructuary mortgage and the sale held in court auction in execution of the decree in S.C.No.759 of 1968 binding on the plaintiff and the other sharers. The Appellate Judge has taken the view the position of debts incurred by a brother manager will be different from the debts incurred by a father manager under the Hindu Law. The Appellate Judge has held that the debts not been proved to be for the benefit of the family and, therefore, the mortgage as well the sale are not binding on the plaintiff. ] 6. Unfortunately, the lower Court has not discussed the relevant evidence on pertaining to the debts in question. The sixth defendant has examined himself as D.W.3. has given evidence to the effect that the mortgage was for the purpose of family expenses. He has also deposed that the amount lent under the promissory note to the second defendant was also for the common benefit of the members of the family. In the examination nothing has been elicited from the sixth defendant to warrant an interference that the debts were incurred for illegal or immoral purposes. He has reiterated in the examination that the debts were incurred for the purpose of purchase of cattle and expenses. 7. In the examination nothing has been elicited from the sixth defendant to warrant an interference that the debts were incurred for illegal or immoral purposes. He has reiterated in the examination that the debts were incurred for the purpose of purchase of cattle and expenses. 7. On the side of the plaintiff, he was examined himself as P.W.1. Except him ipso dixit his brother (2nd defendant) was addicted to drinks and was keeping concubines, there acceptable evidence before the Court to prove the same. No member of the locality has examined to establish the said facts. In fact, P.W.2 who was examined by the plaintiff, deposed that the second defendant was managing the family in a responsible manner, that he performed the marriages of the plaintiff as well as the third defendant. Thus, evidence let in by the plaintiff is hardly sufficient to prove that the second defendant leading an immoral life and the debts were incurred for the purpose of enabling him to such a life. Nothing has been produced before the Court to connect the debts and alleged wayward life of the second defendants There is no presumption in law that second defendant was leading a wayward life. The positive evidence on record is sufficient show that the second defendant was managing the family as a responsible person. 8. The recitals in Ex.B-10 will also support the case of the appellant herein that the debt incurred for family purposes. There is absolutely no reason for rejecting the evidence D.W.3 and the documents referred to earlier. Hence I hold that the debt incurred by second defendant under the mortgage as well as the promissory note was for family purpose and binding on the plaintiff and other members of the family. It follows therefore, that the usufructuary mortgage Ex.B-10 and the court auction sale held in execution of the decree in S.C.No.759 of 1968, the file of the District Munsif ’ s Court, Arni, are binding on the plaintiff. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant invites my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Amrit Sugar Gupta v, Sudesh Behari Lal, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 5, in support contention that a suit filed against a manager of a Hindu joint family need not describe as such and the decree passed against him will certainly bind the other members of the family. The ruling will apply to the present case and the decree obtained against the defendant who was admittedly managing the family properties will be binding on the and the other members of the family. 10. I Learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 4 placed reliance on a judgment of Bench of this Court in S.Maruthamuthu Naicker v. Kadir Basha Rowther, I.L.R. 1938 568. The only question considered in that case was whether the indorsee of a promissory note executed by the managing member of a joint Hindu Family was limited to his remedy the note. The question was answered by the Full Bench that unless the endorsement worded as to transfer the debt as well, and the Stamp Law was complied with, in the an ordinary endorsement, the indorsee cannot sue the non-executant coparceners ground of their liability under the Hindu Law. That ruling has no bearing on the present The Full Bench had to consider only the position of the indorsee yis-a-vis the members joint Hindu Family. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 4 drew my attention to a judgment another Full Bench in Sivagurunatha Pillai v. Padmavathi Ammal, I.L.R. 1941 Mad that case, a promissory note was signed by a person without adding any words indicating capacity in which he had signed. In a suit filed on the promissory note against the promisee and another person, it was found that the promisee had authority to execute the promissory note on behalf of the other person also and that the suit promissory note was a renewal previous promissory note executed by the promisee with the knowledge and at the of the other. The Full Bench held that the Court cannot look beyond what was said instrument and in deciding the implications of the language used in vernacular documents, the Judge should put himself in the position of the writer so far as the language concerned. That has no relevancy to the present one. That was not a case of a Hindu Family. Here, admittedly, the second defendant was a member of the joint family. Any transaction entered into by the second defendant for the benefit of the family will bind the other members of the family. That has no relevancy to the present one. That was not a case of a Hindu Family. Here, admittedly, the second defendant was a member of the joint family. Any transaction entered into by the second defendant for the benefit of the family will bind the other members of the family. On the evidence, the only conclusion possible the usufructuary mortgage under Ex.B-10 and the promissory note which led to the suit in S.C.No.759 of 1963 were for the benefit of the joint family and were binding the members of the family. 12. The judgment of the Appellate Judge is clearly vitiated inasmuch as it has not referred the relative evidence on record. The lower Appellate court has gone on a tangent and misunderstood the position in law. No doubt, the debts incurred by brother manager stand on a different plane from the debts incurred by a father manager, but only limited extent, namely, in the case of a brother manager, the debts have to be for the of the family before they are said to be binding on the other members of the family. case of a father manager, even if the debts are not for the benefit of the family, they binding on the members of the family if they are antecent debts which are not tainted illegality or immorality. But for that, there is no other difference between the two debts. In this case, on the finding that the debts were incurred for the benefit of the they are certainly binding on the plaintiff and the other members of the family. 13. This second appeal has been filed only by the seventh defendant. The other creditors have not chosen to file any second appeal challenging the decree passed by the appellate Court. Hence the second appeal is confined to items 1 and 2 of the Schedule properties. Consequently, the second appeal is allowed, and the judgment decree of the Subordinate Judge, Vellore, in A.S.No.383 of 1978 are set aside and the dismissed in so far as they relate to items 1 and 2 of the plaint B Schedule properties other respects the judgment and decree are confirmed. There will be no order as to costs. V.K. --- Appeal allowed.