JUDGMENT 1. - By this writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, petitioner Nizamudeen has challenged the order of the learned Member, Board of Revenue for Rajasthan at Ajmer (for short the Board of Revenue' herein) dated 7.9.1988 passed in Revision Petitions No. 473/87 and 476/87 whereby the revision petitions filed by petitioners Anupsingh and Sardul Singh were accepted and the allotment and regularisation of the land made in favour of petitioner Nizamuddin and the patta issued in pursuance thereof by the Authorised Officer were cancelled and set aside. Two applications were filed to grant permission to file special appeals against this common order passed in these two revision petitions. They were separately registered as leave to special appeal applications No. 91/88 and 92/88 and were decided by a common order dated 15.5.1989. The applications seeking permission to file special appeals were rejected. 2. The facts necessary to be noticed for the disposal of this writ petition briefly stated are that the petitioner's shop is situated in village Bilara on Bilara- Banganga Road in Khasra No. 1979. Earlier, this shop was in possession of Rawatram son of Poonaram and Bhanwarlal son of Rawatram Patel, residents of Bilara, who were carrying on the business of sale of Sweets and Namkin etc. Rawatram and Bhanwarlal were in possession of this shop from the year 1965. However, they agreed to sell this shop to petitioner Nizamuddin on 22.1.1980 for a sum of Rs. 2100/- and put the petitioner in possession of this shop. The agreement to sell was duly executed. Thereafter, it is alleged that on 15.4.1982, petitioner Nizamuddin filed an application under r. 6(1) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Allotment, Conversion and Regularisation of Agricultural Land for Residential and Commercial Purposes in Urban Areas) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as as Rules of 1981'), before the Authorised Officer, Jodhpur claiming that he is in possession of 38.75 sq. yds. of Govt. land of Chak No. 1, Khasra No. 1979, situated in village Bilara since Juanuary 1980 and has been using it for commercial purposes. He deposited the land conversion fee and penalty amounting to Rs. 574.30P. He also submitted copy of Khasra Parivartan Sheel of Smt. 2037 and 2038. In column No. 4 of that Khasra Parivartan Sheel, his name has been shown as occupant of the land and this land has been classified as 'gair Mumkin gova'. He deposited the land conversion fee and penalty amounting to Rs. 574.30P. He also submitted copy of Khasra Parivartan Sheel of Smt. 2037 and 2038. In column No. 4 of that Khasra Parivartan Sheel, his name has been shown as occupant of the land and this land has been classified as 'gair Mumkin gova'. 3. It is alleged that the Inspector, Land Records, however, made a report that the petitioner is in possession of 40.44 sq. yds. of land, which has been classified as 'Gair Mumkin Gova'. The Tehsildar, Land Conversion, Jodhpur in his report has stated that it is a govt. land of Siway Chak and the petitioner has already constructed a shop on it before 20.8.1981. The Chairman, Municipal Board, Bilara also issued a No Objection Certificate for the conversion of the land in question into Abadi land on depositing the prescribed development charges. In this view of the matter, the Authorised Officer, by his order dated 30.11.1984 accepted the application of the petitioner under r. 10(3) of the Rules of 1978, regularised his unauthorised occupation for the conversion of the said Govt. land for commercial purposes and the petitioner was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 1104.98 P. which he deposited on the same day. .The patta of the said land was issued in favour of the petitioner by the Authorised Officer on the same day i.e. 30.11.1984. 4. It is alleged that after regularisation and conversion of this Govt. land in favour of the petitioner, the petitioner has spent about Rs. 14,000/- for the improvement of this shop. It is further alleged that some constructions have been raised by Shri Jagdish Acharya and Habib Ahmed on this very Khasra No. 1979 and their applications for regularisation have also been accepted. 5. It was submitted that adjacant to khasra No. 1979, there was a `JAAV' of one Jogaram Sirvi bearing Khasra No. 1978, which was purchased by respondent No. 3 Shri Sardul Singh some where in February-March, 1982. It is alleged that when this encroachment was made, Goparam son of Jogaram Sirvi, the original owner of Khasra No. 1978 filed an application before the Municipal Board, Bilara praying therein that the petitioner be restrained from making any encroachment on Khasra No. 1979. It is alleged that when this encroachment was made, Goparam son of Jogaram Sirvi, the original owner of Khasra No. 1978 filed an application before the Municipal Board, Bilara praying therein that the petitioner be restrained from making any encroachment on Khasra No. 1979. He also filed a suit in the court of learned Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, Bilara, which was later transferred to the Court of Civil Judge, Jodhpur, where it is still pending. However, when the petitioner filed an application for regularisation of the land in question, the Municipal Board, Bilara issued a No Objection Certificate in favour of the petitioner. 6. It may be stated here that the respondent No. 3 only challenged the order of regularisation and conversion passed in favour of the petitioner. He also filed a review petition before the Authorised Officer, which came to be decided on 21.12.1987. The learned Authorised Officer has held that although the pleas raised by applicant Sardul Singh are quite weighty but in view of the orders of the State Govt. dated 2.1.1984, this regularisation becomes legal and, therefore, it does not deserve to be set aside. Aggrieved against the order of the learned Authorised Officer dated 21.12.1987, revision petitions No. 473/87 and 476/87 were filed by Anupsingh son of Sardul Singh and Sardul Singh son of Khetdan and they came to be decided by a common order of the learned Board of Revenue dated 7.9.1988. The learned Board of Revenue has set aside the order of the Authorised Officer regularising this land. It has held that the land in question forms part of Chair Mumkin Rasta and so, it cannot be said to be an agricultural land and, therefore, it cannot be regularised under the Rules of 1981. It was further held that the order of regularisation was clearly without jurisdiction and illegal. 7. Aggrieved against this common order dated 7.9.1988 passed in these two revision petitions, two applications seeking permission to file special appeals were filed by the petitioner and they came to be decided by a common order dated 15.5.1989. 8. It was further held that the order of regularisation was clearly without jurisdiction and illegal. 7. Aggrieved against this common order dated 7.9.1988 passed in these two revision petitions, two applications seeking permission to file special appeals were filed by the petitioner and they came to be decided by a common order dated 15.5.1989. 8. It has been asserted by the petitioner that Tehsildar, Bilara in his order dated 15.12.1987 passed in case No. 11/87 on an application filed under section 251 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Act') has categorically opined that this litigation between the petitioner and respondent No. 3 is unnecessary. Reference has also been made to the order of the Tehsildar, Bilara dated 30.7.1988 passed in case No. 11 /88 wherein it has been observed that in spite of this encroachment, sufficient way still exists and, therefore, the application filed by applicant Anopsing is rejected. 9. It is alleged that the petitioner Nizamuddin also made an encroachment on Khasra No. 1982 end 1979 for construction of a residential house. Out of this the major portion of that land which was encroached upon by the petitioner forms part of Khasra No. 1982, which has been recorded in the settlement records as Gair Mumkin. Its area was 5321/2 sq. yds. The rest of the land which was included in that encroachment forms part of Khasra No. 1979. For that encroachment also, an application for regularisation was filed on 1.5.1982 and that came to be regularised vide order dated 26.7.1984 of the learned Addl. Collector, Land Conversion, Jodhpur. In that matter also, Anop Singh son of Sardul Singh filed Revision Petition No. 474/87, which came to be decided on 20.7.1988. In that revision petition, the learned Board of Revenue has held that the land in question being a Gair Mumkin land, it is not an agricultural land and, therefore, it cannot be converted and regularised under r. 10(3) of the Rules of 1981. Against that revisional order, petitioner Nizamuddin filed an application seeking permission to file special appeal and that application came to be decided by order dated 22.6.1989 of the learned Board of Revenue. Against that revisional order, petitioner Nizamuddin filed an application seeking permission to file special appeal and that application came to be decided by order dated 22.6.1989 of the learned Board of Revenue. It was held that whether Gair Mumkin land can be allotted or cannot be allotted for residential and commercial purposes is an important legal question, which is certainly debatable and hence, it is a fit case to be heard by a Division Bench of the Board of Revenue in special appeal and, therefore, permission to file special appeal was granted. That special appeal bearing No. 80/88 was decided by a Division Bench of the Board of Revenue vide its order dated 5.10.90. The Division Bench of the Board of Revenue has held that Gair Mumkin land is also an agricultural land and it cannot be allotted for residential and commercial purposes. In deciding that appeal, certain decisions of the Board of Revenue were noticed and one of those decisions was distinguished on the ground that that was a case of conversion of land forming part of the road and, therefore, the conversion was set aside. However, the case was remanded back to the learned single Member of the Board of Revenue for deciding the matter afresh. 10. The petitioner has submitted that the facts of that case are in pari materia with the facts of the present case and, therefore, this case should also be remanded back for decision of this important question as to whether the land Q forming part of the way can be allotted and regularised in favour of a private person. A plea of discrimination based on Articles 14 of the Constitution has also been raised on the basis of the decision of the learned Board of Revenue dated 22.6.1989. 11. It was also submitted that no revision was maintainable before the Board of Revenue because r. 20 of the Rules of 1981 was repealed prior to the filing of the revision petition. Even Section 83 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 is not applicable to this case and, therefore, revision petitions filed before the Board of Revenue were liable to be dismissed. It was submitted that the Board of Revenue could not have set aside the order of regularisation as also grant of Patta on the groung that the land in question has been classified as Gair Mumkin. It was submitted that the Board of Revenue could not have set aside the order of regularisation as also grant of Patta on the groung that the land in question has been classified as Gair Mumkin. It was further submitted that this view taken by the learned Board of Revenue is contrary to the provisions of section 103 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. 12. It has been admitted by the petitioner that the land in question forms part of Khasra No. 1979, which consists of 3 bighas and 3 biswas and has been classified as Gair Mumkin in the settlement records as also in the Khasra Parivartansheel but the road Banganga-Bilara, which is a public way is situated only on a part of this Khasra and the rest of the land is not lying vacant but certain constructions have been raised on it. According to him five shops have been constructed on the other side of the road and they are still existing there and this important fact has not been taken into consideration by the learned Board of Revenue. According to the petitioner, such land cannot be excluded from conversion under the Rules of 1981 on the basis of the definition of land' provided in Chapter VI of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. It was submitted that revision petitions were filed out of spite against the petitioner. Respondent No. 3 has not claimed any relief against Shri Jagdish Acharya and Shri Habib Ahmed. This conversion was clearly covered by Govt. Circular No. P.6(109) Raj./4/83/1 dated 2.1.1984. He has, therefore, prayed that this writ petition be allowed and the orders of the learned Board of Revenue dated 7.9.1988 passed in revision petitions and dated 15.5.1989 passed on applications seeking permission to file special appeals be set aside and the case be remanded back to the learned Board of Revenue for redecision of the matter. 13. A reply to the writ petition has been filed on behalf of respondent No. 3 Sardul Singh, who has submitted that the petitioner is guilty of suppressing material facts before this Court. His battery repairing shop in the name and style of Nizam Electronics is situated in some other shop which forms part of Khasra No. 1588/4722 of Chak No. 1 situated in village Bilara. His battery repairing shop in the name and style of Nizam Electronics is situated in some other shop which forms part of Khasra No. 1588/4722 of Chak No. 1 situated in village Bilara. The shop constructed on the land in question has been let out to one M/s Qureshi Transport Company and M/s Datar Auto Repairs. Photos showing these two shops have been filed and marked as Annexure R. 3/1 and R. 3/2. It was submitted that when he wanted to construct this shop on the land in question, Goparam son of Jogaram filed an application before the Municipal Board, Bilara. Copy of that application has been filed and marked as Annexure R. 3/3 and the copy of the stay order passed by the Municipal Board, Bilara has been filed and marked as Annexure R. 3/4. These material facts have been concealed from the Court. It was further submitted that the respondent No. 3 filed a suit in the court of Munsif, Bilara against the petitioner on 5.2.1982 and the notices of that suit were served on him before 15.4.1982, but in the application for conversion, he withheld the disclosure of the fact about pendency of the suit against him in regard to the land in question. He also withheld the production of Jamabandi and instead produced Khasra Parivartansheel and misled the authority and obtained conversion in his name. 14. It was submitted that the writ petition is delayed because the impugned order was passed by the learned Board of Revenue on 7.9.1988. The petitioner should not have waited for the decision on his application seeking permission to file a special appeal. In para wise reply, all the contentions raised by the petitioner have been controverted and it has been submitted that the decisions rendered by the learned Board of Revenue are absolutely correct and legal because the land forming part of the public way simply cannot be allotted to anybody. The land in question being a part of public road could not belong to anybody except the public at large and the petitioner had no right, title or interest over the land in question so as to make an application for conversion. The land in question being a part of public road could not belong to anybody except the public at large and the petitioner had no right, title or interest over the land in question so as to make an application for conversion. The entire public has a right to use every inch of land and the persons whose lands abut the land in question has a right to ingress and egress from every corner or every inch of their land. That road cannot be abridged on the ground that sufficient space is still available for the way. The land which has been shown as a Public Way in the settlement records is the prima facie proof of the fact that this land forms part of the way and cannot be allotted to anybody because it is not an agricultural land, which is available for conversion or allotment. Gair Mumkin land has to be distinguished from the land forming part of the Gair Mumkin Rasta because that land which forms part of the Rasta is not available for any allotment or conversion. It has been claimed that the view taken by the learned Board of Revenue as regards regularisation of the land in question was that the Gair Mumkin cannot be classified as an agricultural land and when it was brought to its notice that Gair Mumkin land is also an agricultural land which can be allotted or regularised by the Govt. for residential and commercial purposes, the learned Board of Revenue felt that it is a debatable point and, therefore, it granted permission to file special appeals. In this case, the land in question forms part of Gair Mumkin Gova (Rasta) and therefore, no part of it can be allotted to anybody and no encroachment made on such a land can be regularised under the Rules of 1981. It has also been claimed that the petitioner has filed a false affidavit that he has acquired legal right to hold this land. 15. A detailed rejoinder has been filed on behalf of the petitioner, in which it has been claimed that the petitioner is not at all guilty of supressing any material facts before the Court. It has also been claimed that the petitioner has filed a false affidavit that he has acquired legal right to hold this land. 15. A detailed rejoinder has been filed on behalf of the petitioner, in which it has been claimed that the petitioner is not at all guilty of supressing any material facts before the Court. The mention of application by Goparam, the stay order passed by the Municipal Board, Bilara as also filing of a suit against the petitioner by respondent No. 3 are not relevant and, therefore, they have not been mentioned in this writ petition. It has been claimed that it is wrong to suggest that the petitioner is not carrying on his battery repairs shop in these premises but he is carrying on this work in some other shop and this shop has been let out to somebody else. According to the petitioner, between public way and the land in question, there is a Nala and Chabutra and, therefore, it does not form part of the public way. Moreover, the land in dispute is a Govt. land and, therefore, it can be allowed to be regularised. 16. We have heard Mr. L.R. Mchta, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, M/s M.M. Singhvi and K. Murari for respondent No. 3, Sardulsingh respondent No. 3 himself, Mr. Bhim Arora for respondent No. 4 and Mr. B.S. Bhati for respondents No. 1, 2 and 5. We have carefully gone through the record of the case. 17. It was contended by Mr. L.R. Mehta,the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that 'agriculture land' has not been defined anywhere. The definition of land' is contained in section 5(24) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, which provides that 'land' shall mean land which is let or held for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient thereto or as grove land for pasturage including land occupied by houses or enclosure situated on a holding, or land covered with water which may be used for the purpose of irrigation or growing singhara or other similar produce but excluding abadi land; it shall include benefits to arise out of land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. Section 3(vii) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 provides that the words and expressions defined in Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act III of 1955) shall wherever used herein, be construed to have the meaning assigned to them by the said Act. 'Land' or 'Land used for agricultural purposes' has not been defined in the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and, therefore,we have no option but to adopt the definition of the 'Land' provided in Rajasthan Tenancy Act. 18. It was argued by Mr. Mehta, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the term 'land' can be divided into two categories : (a) the land used for agricultural purposes; and (b) the land used for urban purposes. It was submitted that the word 'land' has to be given broad meaning. Land is presumed to be agricultural land unless the same has been put to nonagricultural use by construction of forts, palaces or has specifically been set apart as building plots and the same has been recognised as such the Central Govt. To bring the case within the exception it is not sufficient for the land holder to only prove that the land in dispute contains a fort, palace, buildings or building plots. He is further required to prove that the same had been specified as such in the inventory. Unless both the above noted conditions are fulfilled, the land owner cannot save the land from its acquisition under the Act. In support of this submission, Mr. Mehta drew our attention to a Division Bench decision of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani Singh former His Highness Jaipur and Others ( 1980 WLN 295 ) . We have no quarrel about this principle. Although, the law nowhere defines 'agricultural land' or 'the land used for agricultural purposes' but on the basis of this authority, we can safely say that every land has to be presumed to be an agricultural land unless it is proved to be otherwise or has been recorded as such in the settlement records. 19. The Rules of 1981 provide for allotment, conversion and regularisation of agricultural land for residential and commercial purposes in an urban area. Now, this has to be decided whether the land which has been recorded in the revenue records as land forming part of the public way can be held to be an agricultural land ? 19. The Rules of 1981 provide for allotment, conversion and regularisation of agricultural land for residential and commercial purposes in an urban area. Now, this has to be decided whether the land which has been recorded in the revenue records as land forming part of the public way can be held to be an agricultural land ? Our considered view is that it cannot be Section 140 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act provides for presumption as to entries in the revenue records. It says that all entries made in the record of rights shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. In this case, it has been admitted by both the parties that the land in dispute bearing Khasra No. 1979 has been recorded as Gair Mumkin Gova in the revenue records. When this land forms part of Gair Mumkin Rasta and has been certified to be so by the Inspector, Land Records, then it is surprising how the Tehsildar (Conversion) has reported that this land forms part of Siway Chak. The land which forms part of the way can only be utilised as a way and not otherwise because the General Public has a right to use that land as public path and no encroachment can be permitted on that public path. Even if any encroachment has been made,that encroachment on public path cannot be regularised and that has to be removed. The persons whose land abut that way have a right of ingress and egress through that public way and that right cannot be defeated by a private citizen by making encroachment upon the public way. A person whose land abuts the public way comes into the category of persons, who have suffered special damages on account of that encroachment. It may be that certain other encroachments might have been made on the other side of the public way and abut those encroachments, no grievance has been made by the complainant,but does not mean that the complainant cannot get any relief against the person, whose encroachment has been challenged by him. It may be that certain other encroachments might have been made on the other side of the public way and abut those encroachments, no grievance has been made by the complainant,but does not mean that the complainant cannot get any relief against the person, whose encroachment has been challenged by him. In this respect, respondent No. 3 Shri Sardul Singh has placed reliance on a catena of decisions of this Court and other High Courts of the Country to show that the every citizen or even the persons whose land abuts that public way, has a right of way to use that public way and it cannot be denied by encroachments made on the public way. He has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Poosaram V. Ghasiram & Ors. 1984 WLN (UC) 217 , wherein it has been held by a learned single Judge of this Court that every citizen has a right of way to use the public way for ingress and egress. This right cannot be defeated by a private citizen by making encroachment upon the public way. 20. He has further placed reliance on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mst. Bhagwanti V. Mst. Jiuti and another AIR 1975 Allahabad 341 , wherein it has been held that every person who has a house abuting on a public road or lane is entitled to access to the road or lane from the house and no person or authority can destroy that right. This right does not emanate from prescription or long user but from the fact that the house abuts on the public way. Hence, if an obstruction is made by any person or authority of such public way which affects the ingress and egress, special damage to the owner of the property must be presumed. Reliance was next placed on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Manglaur Municipality V. Mahadeoji. AIR 1965 SC 1147 , wherein their lordships of the Supreme Court have observed : "that inference of dedication of a highway to the public may be drawn from a long user of the highway by the public. The width of the highway so dedicated depends upon the extent of the user. The side lands are ordinarily inluded in the road, for they are necessary for the proper maintenance of the road. The width of the highway so dedicated depends upon the extent of the user. The side lands are ordinarily inluded in the road, for they are necessary for the proper maintenance of the road. In the case of a pathway used for a long time by the public, its topographical and permanent land marks and the manner and mode of its maintenance usually indicate the extent of the user." Reliance was also placed on a single Bench decision of this Court in Smt. Kishna Devi V. Vishnu Mitra and Another AIR 1982 Raj. 281 = 1982 RLR 505 . That was a case where the respondent encroached upon the sanitary lane. Permission was granted by the Urban Improvement Trust for construction. It was held to be an invasion on civic rights in general and right to use sanitary lane by the plaintiff in particular. 21. Our attention was next drawn to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh 5 High Court in Butchamma V. Venkateswararao AIR 1969 AP 136 . That was a case where the suit was filed for removal of obstruction to public street and for restraining defendant from interfering with plaintiff's right to use street for passage of cattle,carts etc. Permanent injunction restraining defendant from interfering with plaintiff's right to use street was granted but mandatory injunction was refused on the ground that notwithstanding obstruction placed by the plaintiff street was wide enough to afford passage to cattle and carts and that plaintiff had not proved special damage. On those facts, it was held that the right of public to pass and repass extended over every inch of street and plaintiff was entitled to mandatory injunction for removal of obstructions without proof of special damage. 22. He further drew our attention to a decision of this Court in Prabhat V. The Board of Revenue 1986 RLW 747 , wherein it was held that the villager has a right to use the Gair Mumkin Rasta and can file an application for cancellation of allotment of the land. It was further held that no khatedari right can accrue on land in dispute which was recorded as Gair Mumkin Rasta meant for public purpose. In Ladhuram V. Municipal Board, Ganganagar 1967 RLW 255 , it was held that the public is entitled to use of whole width of the public road. It was further held that no khatedari right can accrue on land in dispute which was recorded as Gair Mumkin Rasta meant for public purpose. In Ladhuram V. Municipal Board, Ganganagar 1967 RLW 255 , it was held that the public is entitled to use of whole width of the public road. Though, a highway or road may be dedicated subject to obstables such constructions to be cosval, the subsequent obstructions are not justifiable. It was further observed "that the plaintiff's shops or Nohras abut on the public ways and are being used, or are capable of use, as business premises. It is admitted that there are doors in those premises which open on the public ways. The site plan shows that, to say the least, the plaintiffs would have to take a longer route to reach the main road every time they desired to leave their premises and reach the centre of the road (which alone is available for traffic at present) or its opposite extremely. They are, therefore, justified in pleading that the obstructions deprived them of the use of the full width of the roads for the free and full enjoyment of their properties. For instance, the rows of stalls would prevent easy and convenient access to the plaintiffs and their customers, the passage of the vehicles on a narrow strip of 2 or 3 feet is out of the question and as is obvious,the premises become less prominent from the centre of the public roads because of the intervening stalls. So, when the plaintiffs are shown to suffer direct and substantial particular or special damage beyond that suffered by the general public, there is no reason why they should not be entitled to maintain their suits....." 23. It was argued on the strength of a Division Bench decision of this Court in Pyarelal Satpal V. Santlal 1972 RLW 51 that construction of stalls on highway does not amount to dispossession of persons from land. That case related to the Bikaner Municipal Act, 1923 and section 99 of that Act authorised the Municipal Board to lay out and make new public streets and section 100 provides for temporary closure of, streets. In that context, it was held that temporary closure of the streets was not an infringement of the right of public way. That case related to the Bikaner Municipal Act, 1923 and section 99 of that Act authorised the Municipal Board to lay out and make new public streets and section 100 provides for temporary closure of, streets. In that context, it was held that temporary closure of the streets was not an infringement of the right of public way. In Pyarelal Satpal's case, Laduram's case (1967 RLW 255) and Dwarka Prasad V. Patna City Municipality AIR 1938 Patna 423 were cited but they were distinguished on the ground that the provisions of the Act authorise the Municipal Board to act in a particular manner. 24. Section 88 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act provides that all public roads, lanes, paths, bridges and ditches, all fences on or beside the same, all rivers, streams, nallas, lakes and tanks, all canals and water courses, all standing and flowing water and all lands wherever situated which are not the property of individuals or of bodies of persons legally capable of holding property are except in so far as any rights of such persons or bodies may be established in or over the same and except as may be otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force, and are hereby declared to be with all rights in or over the same or appertaining thereto, the property of the State and it shall be lawful for the Collector subject to the order of the State Govt. to dispose them of in such manner as may be prescribed subject always to the rights of way and all other rights of the public or of individuals legally subsisting. Thus, all Government Nazul land can be allotted but such an allotment will be subject always to the rights of way and all other rights of the public or of individuals legally subsisting. 25. Section 90-A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act provides that no person holding any land for purpose of agriculture, and no transferee of such land or any part thereof shall use the same or any part thereof by the construction of buildings thereon or otherwise for any other purpose except with the written permission of the State Govt. obtained in the manner hereinafter laid down and otherwise than in accordance with the terms and conditions of such permission.... obtained in the manner hereinafter laid down and otherwise than in accordance with the terms and conditions of such permission.... It may be stated here that the Rules of 1981 have been framed under the provisions of sections 9C-A, 102 and clauses (a) and (b) of sub-s. (1) of section 260 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 and all other powers enabling it in this behalf. Clauses (a) and (b) of section 260 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act authorise the State Govt. to delegate its powers. Clause (xi-A) of section 261(2) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act authorises the State Govt. to prescribe the manner in which permission unifier section 90A for conversion of agricultural land into non-agricultural land shall be applied for, the Officer or authority to whom such application shall be given, the particulars to be given in such application,the manner in which enquiry is to be made, the terms and conditions on which the permission may be given, the rate and manner of levy of urban assessment, the rate and manner of levy of the premium to be charged by the State Govt. on such conversion and the fine to be imposed under sub-s. (5) of section 90-A. Section 102 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act authorises the State Govt. to allot land for purposes other than agricultural as well as on special terms. It lays down that notwithstanding any thing herein fore contained, the State Govt. shall have power to allot land for the purposes of an industry or for any purposes of public utility on such conditions as it deems fit. 26. R. 3(3) of the Rules of 1981 provides that if any agricultural land including govt. unoccupied agricultural land has already been used for residential or commercial purposes before the commencement of these rules without permission of the Govt. in accordance with provisions of sub-section 3(3) of section 90-A of the Land Revenue Act such use may on an application so regularised by the Authorised Officer by charging the price of land, conversion charges and penalty as provided in these rules and such development charges, peripheral development charges and compounding and other charges as may be prescribed under any other law or rules applicable. R.4 provides for restrictions on the use of agricultural land for residential or commercial purposes. R.4 provides for restrictions on the use of agricultural land for residential or commercial purposes. Clause (a) of r.4 provides that if the use to which the land has been put or is proposed to be put does not conform to the land use indicated in the Master Plan of the area and the rules and regulations of the competent local body having jurisdiction in the area; provided that if in any case in which the land use does not conform to the Master Plan if notified or in other cases to the rules and bye-laws of the competent local body, regularisation of such use shall not be permitted unless permission to alter the land use has been accorded. In this case, the land in question has been set apart for public way and unless that use is altered by the competent authority, it cannot be allowed to be used for residential and commercial purposes. 27. R. 5 of the Rules of 1981 provides for the circumstances in which conversion of the land cannot be permitted or regularised. R. 5(2) provides that the land which has been allotted for a special non-agricultural purpose, or on special terms, under the Land Revenue Act or the rules framed thereunder, cannot be permitted to be regularised. In this case, the land in question has been allotted under the Land Revenue Act for the purpose of Gair Mumkin Rasta and, therefore, this land which has been allotted for special purposes cannot be allowed to be regularised. It may be stated here that the Jaipur-Jodhpur road is a State High-way road. It passes through Bilara-Banganga road. Bilara-Banganga road is a part of the State High-way road. Clause (b) of sub-r. (4) of r. (3 of the Rules of 1981 provides that the land which is situated within the following limits will not be regularised : (a) 30 metres from a railway boundary, without the prior written consent of the Railway Department. (b) with the distances indicated from the centre lines on the following roads : (i) National Highways and State Highways .... 15 metres (ii) Major District Roads and Main City thorough-fares..10 Metres (iii) Other District Roads and main colony roads .... 7-5 Metres. (iv) Other roads ..... 3 Metres. (b) with the distances indicated from the centre lines on the following roads : (i) National Highways and State Highways .... 15 metres (ii) Major District Roads and Main City thorough-fares..10 Metres (iii) Other District Roads and main colony roads .... 7-5 Metres. (iv) Other roads ..... 3 Metres. As stated above, in this case, the land in dispute forms part of a Gair Mumkin Rasta and this road is a part of the State High-way. The encroachment made on this land in question by the petitioner abuts that very high-way and, therefore, even on this account, the encroachment of the petitioner on this road could not have been regularised. Although, this particular plea was not raised by respondent No. 3 but a general notice of this fact can be taken that Bilara-Banganga road is the part of Jaipur-Jodhpur State High-way road and any encroachment on this road which is within 15 metres from the centre of this State High-way road cannot be permitted. 28. It is a concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts below that the land in question forms part of the public way and it has been recorded as such in the revenue records and this fact has not been controverted by both the parties. Thus, this concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts below cannot be interfered. In this respect, we may place reliance on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Aarina Saadut Ali V. Bahraich Municipality AIR 1980 Allahabad 376 , wherein it has been observed that findings that land in dispute a public street is a finding of fact and it cannot be interfered with in second appeal. 29. In Devi V. State of Rajasthan 1984 RLR 938 = 1984 RLW 528 , a learned single Judge of this Court has observed that the Collector may be justified in holding that the land which forms part of the public way cannot be sold by the Gram Panchayat because those lands which form part of the public streets and pathways are vested in the Gram Panchayat only as a trustee thereof and the Gram Panchayat has no right to dispose of the same by way of sale or otherwise. It was further held that if there is a dispute about the fact whether the land in dispute forms part of the public way or not, an enquiry has to be held and parties must be afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing and of producing such material as may be relevant for the purpose. As stated above, in this case, there is no dispute about the fact that in the settlement records khatoni etc. and even in the khasra Parivartansheel, this land has been shown as Gair Mumkin Rasta. Gair Mumkin Rasta cannot form part of agricultural land. It cannot be put to any agricultural or semi- agricultural or any other use and every citizen and the person whose land abuts this Gair Mumkin Rasta has a right to use every inch of this public way and, therefore, we hold that on account of this encroachment on the public way, the respondent No. 3 suffers special damage and hence, he has a right to seek the relief for removal of that obstruction from the public way. As stated above, the land which forms part of the public way is not available for any agricultural use and,therefore, when it is not available for agricultural use, it cannot be regularised. In this view of the matter,the view taken by the learned Board of Revenue deserves to be sustained. 30. It has been held by this Court in Phusaram V. State AIR 1975 Raj. 66 that if an order is based on two grounds and if it is sustained on one ground then the other ground need not be looked into. 31. It was next contended by Mr. L.R. Mehta, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that r. 20 of the Rules of 1981 was repealed prior to the filing of the revision petition and, therefore, these revision petitions could not have been entertained. It is true that revision petitions were filed after the repealment of r. 20 of the Rules of 1981 but that hardly matters. It was argued before the learned Board of Revenue that the revision petitions can be entertained under section 83 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, which lays down that the State Govt. may call for the record of any non-judicial proceeding not connected with settlement held by any officer subordinate to it and may pass thereon such orders as it thinks fit. may call for the record of any non-judicial proceeding not connected with settlement held by any officer subordinate to it and may pass thereon such orders as it thinks fit. It has been admitted by both the parties that it is not a judicial matter but it is an administrative matter. The judicial matter is one where rights and liabilities of both the parties are decided by the competent court including the matters which relate to settlements, and for those matters, revision has been provided in section 84 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. It is an admitted case of the parties that it is an administrative matter and for this matter, a revision under section 83 of the Act can be preferred to the State Govt. and the State Govt. has delegated all its powers to the Board of Revenue vide its notification No. F.6(46) Gr. Rev./4/72 dated 22.8.1972. The scope of section 83 is unlimited. The State Govt. can hear any revision against any order passed by any Authorised Officer as regards regularisation. 32. It was contended by Mr. Mehta that under section 23 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, the controlling power as regards non-judicial matters connected with the revenue of the State vests in the State Govt. and when that controlling power is vested in the State Govt., revision can be filed before the State Govt. We are unable to accept this contention. Section 83 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act contains special provisions as regards filing of a revision against administrative matters connected with such matters whereas section 23 of the Act contains general provision conferring over all powers on the State Govt. as regards any non judicial matters relating to the Revenue of the State. There is no conflict between these two provisions. If a revision petition can be heard in administrative matters under section 83 of the Act by the State Govt. then it can as well be heard by the Board of Revenue in view of Notification dated 22.8.1972 and, therefore, there is nothing wrong in hearing these revision petitions by the Board of Revenue. To this extent, this objection raised by Mr. Mehta cannot be sustained. 33. then it can as well be heard by the Board of Revenue in view of Notification dated 22.8.1972 and, therefore, there is nothing wrong in hearing these revision petitions by the Board of Revenue. To this extent, this objection raised by Mr. Mehta cannot be sustained. 33. It may be stated here that earlier,a provision was made in r. 20 of the Rules of 1981 that revisionary authority will hear the revision petitions but later on, that rule was deleted and, therefore, the general provisions of section 83 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act will come into operation. Thus, the revision petitions were rightly treated to be filed under section 83 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and they were rightly heard and decided. 34. It was claimed that it is a writ of certiorari and, therefore, the High Court can exercise its powers only for correcting the errors of jurisdiction committed by the inferior courts and it cannot sit as an appellate court. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to be exercised jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice. In this respect, reliance has been placed on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Swam Singh V. State of Punjab AIR 1976 SC 232 , Jhunta V. Board of Revenue AIR 1954 Raj. 30 and Maina Devi V. State, AIR 1971 Allahabad 241 In this case regularisation has been done by the authority concerned against the Rules and it has acted beyond the jurisdiction vested in it and it was because of this that revision petitions were filed before the learned members of the Board of Revenue. We have already stated that the State Govt. has conferred its powers to hear and decide the revision petitions filed under section 83 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act on the Board of Revenue vide its notification dated 22.8.1972 and, therefore, it is not a case where the Board of Revenue has exercised its jurisdiction which was not vested in it and, therefore, to this extent, the contention of Mr. Mehta cannot be sustained. 35. Mehta cannot be sustained. 35. It was next submitted that while deciding the application under section 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act in Special Appeal No. 80/88, the learned Board of Revenue has taken a different view than the view taken in this case. That was a case in which major portion of the land form part of Piyau. Only a part of the land form part of public way i.e. of khasra No. 1979. It was brought to the notice of that court that this land can be allotted or regularised by the State Govt. under the Rules of 1981 and, therefore, the learned Board of Revenue has felt that it is an important question, which has to be enquired into. The decision in that case is of no assistance sofaras this case is concerned. 36. It was argued that some other persons have also made encroachments but no relief has been sought against them. Shri Jagdish Acharya and Habib Ahmed or any other person who have constructed shops on the opposite side of the road, that, of course, results in encroachment on the public way and it is for the appropriate authority to take action about it and if any regularisation has been done, and some body has any grouse, he can always knock the doors of the court for removal of encroachment but simply because relief has not been sought against them, it does not mean that respondents No. 3 who has suffered special damages on account of this encroachment on the public way, which abuts his land could not file revision petitions and, therefore, the revision petitions that have been filed by respondent No. 3 and Shri Anopsingh are neither malafide nor actuated out of spite towards the petitioner. Thus, this contention raised by Mr. Mehta has no force. 37. No other point has been pressed before us in this writ petition. 38. For the reasons stated hereinabove, we find no force in this writ petition and it is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******