JUDGMENT - M.F. SALDANHA, J.:---This writ petition raises an issue of some importance relating to the interpretation of Order XVIII, Rule 17-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is contended by the petitioner herein, that the two orders passed by the Court of Small Causes, the first of them dated 16-2-1983 and the second of them dated 8-4-1983 are liable to be set aside. The facts that are material for the purposes of the determination of this petition are briefly recounted below: The present petitioner is the landlord in respect of a building known as Ranade Prasad Niketan situated at Lady Hardings Road, Mahim, Bombay. It is contended that one Gajanan Narayan Adivarekar was the monthly tenant in respect of Room No. 1 in the building. The present petitioner became the owner of the building in the year 1966. It is alleged the respondent No. 1 (since deceased) was the original tenant in respect of the said room and furthermore, that he was in arrears of rent from 1-8-1970. The further allegation is to the effect that respondent No. 2 was found in illegal possession of the suit premises in 1973. The petitioner, therefore, after the termination of the tenancy of the defendant No. 1 filed RAE and R Suit No. 189/701 of 1974 in the Court of Small Causes at Bombay for possession of the suit premises and for recovery of arrears of rent from 1-8-1970 to 31-112-1973 and for mesne profits. The suit was resisted by the defendants, who filed separate written statements. During the pendency of the suit, original defendant No. 1 died leaving behind defendants Nos. 1-a to 1-g who are the legal representatives and who have been brought on record. 3. The suit came up for trial and issues were framed in the year 1981. The plaintiff entered the witness box and gave evidence after which the second defendant who is respondent No. 2 before me was examined. It is material to point out that the heirs and legal representatives of the original tenant did not participate in the proceedings. 3. The suit came up for trial and issues were framed in the year 1981. The plaintiff entered the witness box and gave evidence after which the second defendant who is respondent No. 2 before me was examined. It is material to point out that the heirs and legal representatives of the original tenant did not participate in the proceedings. According to the petitioner, when the second defendant was being cross-examined, he came across two letters, one dated 13-4-1969, alleged to have been written by the deceased (defendant No. 1) to the plaintiff and the second was a cyclostyled letter, sent by the plaintiff to the defendant No. 1 and other tenants who had signed the receipt thereof by putting signatures on the said copy of the letter on 10-11-1971. The petitioners case is that the two letters were tracted in the file of another tenant of a similar name Gopinath Ganpat Adivarekar and that the same had wrongly been filed there. The petitioner contended that the two documents would disprove the contention of the present defendant that he was in exclusive possession of the suit premises from April 1958 as was his evidence before the Court. The petitioner, therefore, filed an application dated 21-1-1983, before the trial Court containing a prayer that the two documents should be sent to the Government Handwriting expert along with the agreement (Exhibit 3) which bears the date of April 1958 and the signature of original defendant No. 1. It was his case that though he knew and could identify the signature of defendant No. 1 on the two letters, that he found these two documents after his evidence was over, that he could not get the signatures identified by any of the heirs of original defendant No. 1 as they were not appearing consequently, that it was very essential to get the opinion of the hand-writing expert. This application was opposed by respondent No. 2 and the learned Judge by order dated 16-2-1983 rejected the application in question. This is one of the two orders that are impugned through the present petition. I need to point out, that Mr. This application was opposed by respondent No. 2 and the learned Judge by order dated 16-2-1983 rejected the application in question. This is one of the two orders that are impugned through the present petition. I need to point out, that Mr. Rane, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has stated before me that as far as this order is concerned, that he does not desire to press his challenge to the same and, therefore, I do not consider it necessary to deal with the order in question at all. 4. Thereafter, on 24-2-1983, the plaintiff filed another application praying that he should be permitted to give evidence in Court in respect of the two documents which had been marked Exhibit X-1 and X-2 and that he should be recalled as a witness for this purpose. This application was also opposed by respondent No. 2 and the learned Judge by his order dated 8-4-1983 rejected the application. It is this order that has been challenged and Mr. Rane has seriously contended that the order in question ought to be set aside and that the plaintiff be permitted to give further evidence. He essentially contends that such a procedure would be within the framework of Order XVIII Rule 17-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. A perusal of the petition will indicate that there is a subsidiary prayer viz., that the petitioner has also contended that according to him, while searching through the Municipal files, he came across several other documents which are relevant and which he has annexed to the present petition. It is his contention that if his plea is to be accepted, and he is permitted to give further evidence, that he should also be permitted, in the interest of justice, to rely on those documents because they are essential for purposes of establishing his case. 6. As far as this aspect is concerned, though Mr. Rane sought to make some submissions in passing that if he is essentially granted permission to lead evidence in respect of the earlier 2 documents, that he should not be shut out from producing the remaining ones. It needs to be pointed out that such a procedure would be wholly impermissible. As far as this aspect is concerned, though Mr. Rane sought to make some submissions in passing that if he is essentially granted permission to lead evidence in respect of the earlier 2 documents, that he should not be shut out from producing the remaining ones. It needs to be pointed out that such a procedure would be wholly impermissible. The present petition is confined to evidence in relation to the documents X-1 and X-2 alone and the petitioner cannot, under any circumstances be permitted to add to that list and even if he was to be permitted to produce the earlier two documents, there can be no question of considering the documents in relation to any more documents which were not even mentioned when the proceeding was before the trial Court. To this extent, therefore, I have confined the submissions of Mr. Rane to the documents, X-1 and X-2 alone. 7. In support of his submissions, Mr. Rane has pointed out that the rules and procedures are essentially meant for advancing justice. He has relied on a decision reported in A.I.R. 1980, Punjab and Haryana, page 160, in the case of (Kaura Ram v. Gobind Ram and others)1, wherein the ambit and scope of Rule 17-A has been discussed. Mr. Rane has also sought to place reliance on a decision reported in 1988 Company Cases, Vol. 63 at page 595. Mr. Rane submits that essentially, the ratio of these two judgments will indicate that the rules and procedures, are meant to be for the advancement of justice and not to act as obstacles. He states that the procedures have been carved out for purposes of assisting a fair and proper decision in a trial and that technical objections should not come in the way of that objective. Mr. Rane has further stated that the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure do indicate that even at an appellate state in appropriate cases, it is opened for a Court to permit the reception of additional evidence. Mr. Rane states that prior to the amendment, Order XVIII, Rule 17 did make specific provision for a situation in which a Court can recall a witness. Mr. Rane states that prior to the amendment, Order XVIII, Rule 17 did make specific provision for a situation in which a Court can recall a witness. The case law under that rule, however, indicates that it is a provision which circumscribe the power of recall in a situation where the Court considers it essential in the course of a trial for the purpose of obtaining clarification or elucidation of the material placed before the Court or where a Court considers it absolutely essential for the purpose of a fair decision, to recall a witness and record further evidence. That Rule did not permit parties to pray for recall of a witness for the purpose of leading additional evidence. Mr. Rane contends that Rule 17-A is considerably wide and that it has been specifically put on the statute book for the purpose of enabling parties before the conclusion of a trial in appropriate cases, to lead additional evidence so that the object of achieving a fair result is not frustrated. Mr. Rane points out, that instances are not unknown, where due to an error or due to situation of the present type where a party discovers the document at a later point of time, and it was not possible for the evidence to be adduced while the witness was in the box, that a Court should permit before the trial is concluded for such additional evidence to be brought on record. Mr. Rane contends that no prejudice is caused to the other side because that party is always in a position to cross-examine the witness and deal with or demolish the effect of that evidence. 8. As far as the facts of the case are concerned, Mr. Rane points out that admittedly, the matter had not been concluded before the trial Court. He states that good enough reason has been adduced by the petitioner who has stated that the documents were found by him in the file belonging to another tenant and that these documents are very material as far as the defence put forward by the present respondent No. 2 goes viz. that he was in exclusive possession of the premises since the year 1958. To this extent, Mr. that he was in exclusive possession of the premises since the year 1958. To this extent, Mr. Rane points out that if he is not permitted to prove the 2 documents, he would not be in a position to rely on them because they have not been exhibited and consequently, the interests of justice require that the application be granted. 9. As against this position, Mr. Shetye has pointed out that while on the concept of doing justice, the Court has got to take an absolutely balanced view of the matter in so far as this Court will have to consider whether in doing justice to the petitioner, as he claims, it would amount to injustice to the respondent No. 2 whose case would be prejudiced as a result of the grant of the application. Mr. Shetye submits, that the reasons put forward by the applicant are unsustainable, that the stand taken by him contradicts itself from time to time and that in so far as there is no just and sufficient ground adduced by the petitioner for purposes of indicating as to how and under what circumstances he came across these documents at belated stage, that this Court should not lossely or leniently sanction the reception of any additional evidence at this point of time. 10. Order XVIII, Rule 17-A reads as follows : "17-A. Where a party satisfies the Court that, after the exercise of due diligence, any evidence was not within his knowledge or could not be produce by him at the time when that party was leading his evidence, the Court may permit that party to produce that evidence at a later stage on such terms as may appear to it to be just." The essence of this provision is to the effect that if certain evidence which is of consequence comes to the knowledge of a litigant at a point of time subsequent to the reception of the earlier evidence, and if that party satisfies the Court that inspite of due diligence, this material Court not have been produced at the earlier point of time, only in that event, does the section confer upon a Court the jurisdiction to permit the introduction of such evidence at a later point of time. Mr. Shetye has submitted, and to my mind with considerable justification, that the first aspect is purely a matter of facts. Mr. Shetye has submitted, and to my mind with considerable justification, that the first aspect is purely a matter of facts. He has placed reliance on the contradictions that appear in the record and has further pointed out to me the very low credibility with regard to the statement that the documents had got mixed-up in the file of another tenant. Mr. Shetyes criticism is that this statement is inherently false and unbelievable. He essentially submits that, and obviously, in retrospect, the plaintiff realised that he has not so much as event met the case made out by the defendant No. 2 who was then before the Court, with regard to the subletting pleaded in the year 1958 and, therefore, in order to try and get over that lacuna, that the application was made. He submits that initially, the effort was made to ask for evidence of the hand-writing expert and when that application failed, that the next one proceeded on an ever stranger footing viz., that the plaintiffs should be permitted to adduce further evidence. Mr. Shetye contends that a Court under the guise of being fair to a litigant cannot permit breach of statutory provisions and he contends that if a plaintiff were to be allowed to step into the witness box for a second time after the evidence of his client was completed, that irreparable damage would be done to the case of the defendant No. 2 to the extent that it cannot be rectified merely by affording his client the opportunity of cross-examining the plaintiff. It is the further submission of Mr. Shetye that there would be virtually no end to trials, if witnesses were to be permitted to produce documents and records at belated stages and that there would also be respectable explanations as to why they were not forthcoming earlier which, a defendant would find extremely difficult to refute and in this view of the matter, the trial would virtually go on endlessly. 11. I have had occasion to consider in some detail the ambit and scope of Order XVIII, Rule 17 while deciding Writ Petition No. 5115 of 1981. In my judgment dated 22nd November, 1991, I have had occasion to consider the principles governing the permission for re introduction of evidence at a subsequent point of time. 11. I have had occasion to consider in some detail the ambit and scope of Order XVIII, Rule 17 while deciding Writ Petition No. 5115 of 1981. In my judgment dated 22nd November, 1991, I have had occasion to consider the principles governing the permission for re introduction of evidence at a subsequent point of time. The settled position in law that emerges from the various decisions of courts under Order XVIII, Rule 17 is that the Court may exercise its discretion of recalling a witness in a situation where due to default an essential ingredient of a case has remained to come on record such as, for instance, in a case where an attesting witness was not asked to identify a particular document. It is only in instances of this type that the Court would exercise the power of recall under Rule 17. As far as Rule 17-A is concerned, undoubtedly, a Court does have the power to recall a witness and to permit parties to lead further evidence, provided the Court is fully and genuinely satisfied about the bona fides of the circumstances that are pleaded. 12. Coming to the facts of the present case, it is necessary for me to point out that this is a litigation that had been commenced in the year 1974 and that 9 years had elapsed before the present application came to be made. It is rather difficult for a Court to accept the fact that during the long period of time and particularly, when the matter came up for trial that the plaintiff would not have taken necessary steps to look for, locate and hand over to his Counsel all documents that are material for purposes of the trial. In the present instance, what is sought to be done is to meet the case made out by the defence. Undoubtedly, it is very necessary for a plaintiff while adducing his evidence to deal with the defence that has been pleaded, but if this has not been done and after the defence has concluded its evidence, the Court were to permit through such a procedure for the undoing of the defence, to my mind, it would be total misuse of the provisions of Rule 17-A. In the instant case, Mr. Shetye is right in pointing out that even the reasons that are pleaded are not only wholly and thoughly unconvincing but that there are contradictions between what has been stated in the application and what has been stated in the present petition. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that no case has made out for permission to recall the plaintiff and that the trial Court was duly justified in having rejected the application in question. 13. It is not only a matter of discretion that is required to be judicially exercised by a Court while dealing with such applications but it is equally necessary for a Court to take cognizance of a slightly different aspect of the matter. One of the submissions canvassed by Mr. Rane was that no prejudice whatsoever would be caused to the defence if the plaintiff were to be permitted to produce the documents in question because, it was always open to the defence to cross-examine the plaintiff thereafter and to demolish the effect of those documents or whatever evidence the plaintiff led on the basis of those documents. That no prejudice would be caused to the defence is a matter of speculation and it is difficult to accept in the circumstances indicated by me. However, what is of greater importance is not the aspect of prejudice but the question as to whether the party who has applied to the Court can permitted such a course of action on the basis of a right that flows from the provisions of law. While dealing with this aspect of the matter, this Court in the case of (Union of India v. N.K. C. Kutty), reported in 1976, Bombay Law Reporter, page 332, has very clearly observed that the question of prejudice being caused to a party is secondary because the paramount issue is as to whether the course of action is sanctioned by law or not. Thus, viewed at from this angle, there can no two opinions on the fact that in the circumstances put forward by the present petitioner, the learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes was fully justified in having rejected the application in question. 14. In this view of the matter, the petition fails. Rule is accordingly discharged. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Rule discharged. -----