S. K. DHAON, J. ( 1 ) THESE four petitions are inter-related. They relate to the office of the President of the Municipal Board, Moradabad (hereinafter referred to as the Board ). In the three writ petitions Sri Lakshman Prasad Agarwal (hereinafter referred to as Shri Agarwal), who claims himself to be the duly elected President of the Board, is the petitioner. In the contempt case Sri Agarwal is the sole opposite party, and the allegation is that he has wilfully disobeyed the interim order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990, which was passed at his instance. It will be convenient to dispose of the three writ petitions and the contempt petition by a common judgment. ( 2 ) ON 26/05/1990, the District Magistrate, Moradabad, issued a notice stating therein that a meeting of the Board will be held in the office of the Board on 4/06/1990 at 11. 00 a. m. to be presided over by Sri K. P. Singh, Civil Judge, Moradabad, to consider the motion of no-confidence against the President of the Board. This notice was addressed to Sri Agarwal and 47 other persons, who were considered by the District Magistrate to be the members of the Board. ( 3 ) ON 29/05/1990, Writ Petition No. 1593 of 1990 was presented by and on behalf of Sri Agarwal in this Court along with an application for interim relief. The principal prayer claimed in the petition was that the aforesaid notice issued by the District Magistrate may be quashed. The prayer made in the application for interim relief was that the order of the District Magistrate convening a meeting of the Board to consider the motion of no-confidence on 4/06/1990, may be stayed during the pendency of the petition. As the said petition was presented during the vacations, it was entertained by a learned single Judge. The order-sheet indicates that on 29th May, 199o, the learned Judge directed that the petition be put up before him on 30/05/1990 as unlisted. The order-sheet of 1/06/1990, indicates that on that date the learned Judge reserved his orders. ( 4 ) ON 4/06/1990, the motion of no confidence was considered and put to vote. The Presiding Officer (Civil Judge, Moradabad) declared that the motion had been duly carried. The order-sheet of 1/06/1990, indicates that on that date the learned Judge reserved his orders. ( 4 ) ON 4/06/1990, the motion of no confidence was considered and put to vote. The Presiding Officer (Civil Judge, Moradabad) declared that the motion had been duly carried. On 6/06/1990 Writ Petition No. 15962 of 1990 was presented in this Court by and on behalf of Sri Agarwal and on that date another learned single Judge admitted the writ petition and passed an interim order to the following effect : -"issue notice. Until order otherwise, the operation of the impugned resolution of no-confidence dated 4/06/1990, passed against the petitioner shall remain suspended. " ( 5 ) ON 8/06/1990, the learned Judge, who had heard Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 and had reserved his orders thereon on 1/06/1990, passed an interim order in the following words : "after having considered the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that until further orders of the Court, in case the motion of no-confidence has been passed against the petitioner, the same shall not be given effect to. However, it is ordered that the petitioner may continue to function as Chairman in case the motion of no-confidence has been passed but he shall not sanction or pass orders regarding financial matters exceeding Rs. 1,000. 00. The aforequoted order was pronounced by another learned single Judge on 8/06/1990, in accordance with Chapter VII, R. 1 (3) of the Rules of the Court. It is pertinent to note that a certified copy of the aforequoted order was obtained by and on behalf of Sri Agarwal on 8/06/1990, itself. ( 6 ) ON 11/07/1990, an application dated 9/07/1990, was filed by and on behalf of Sri Agarwal in Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 before a Division Bench of this Court praying that the stay application be dismissed as having become infructuous and the stay order dated 8/06/1990, be vacated. The Division Bench directed this application to be listed with previous papers in the week commencing 30/07/1990 However, the application was disposed of on 18/07/1990 This Court recorded the statement of the counsel for Shri Agarwal that the stay application had become infructuous and be dismissed as not pressed. Accordingly, this Court dismissed the application for stay as not pressed. The Division Bench directed this application to be listed with previous papers in the week commencing 30/07/1990 However, the application was disposed of on 18/07/1990 This Court recorded the statement of the counsel for Shri Agarwal that the stay application had become infructuous and be dismissed as not pressed. Accordingly, this Court dismissed the application for stay as not pressed. ( 7 ) ON 8/08/1990, Contempt Application No. 636 of 1990 was presented in this Court by two persons alleging themselves to be the members of the Board with the allegation that Sri Agrwal had between 9th June and 17/07/1990 issued innumberable cheques of diverse amounts exceeding Rs. 1000. 00 On 10/08/1990, a learned Judge issued notice to Sri Agarwal in the contempt proceedings. ( 8 ) ON 2/02/1991, the State Government in the purported exercise of powers under sub-sec. (2) of S. 48 of the U. P. Municipalities Act,1916 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) issued a notice to Sri Agarwal and called upon him to show cause as to why he should not be removed from the office of the President of the Board. By an order of the same date, purported to have been passed under sub-sec. (3) of S. 48, it placed Sri Agarwal under suspension. On 23rd Febwary, 1991, the District Magistrate, Moradabad passed an order directing Sri Agarwal to hand over the charge of the office of the President to the Senior Vice-President of the Board. On 26/02/1991, Writ Petition No. 5350 of 1991 was presented in this Court by and on behalf of Sri Agarwal with the prayer that the order of suspension and the order calling upon him to hand over the charge of the office of the President may be quashed. A direction was also sought against the respondents not to remove him (Sri Agarwal) from the office of the President. On 27/02/1991, this Court granted time to the parties to exchange their respective affidavit and directed that the writ petition should be listed for admission along with Writ Petitions Nos. 15962 and 15963 of 1990 on 1/04/1991 and on that day all the writ petitions were to be disposed of finally. This Court also passed an interim order to the following effect :". . . . . . . . 15962 and 15963 of 1990 on 1/04/1991 and on that day all the writ petitions were to be disposed of finally. This Court also passed an interim order to the following effect :". . . . . . . . Meanwhile we suspend the operation of the order dated 22/02/1991 passed ed by the State Government suspending the petitioner as President of the Municipal Board, Moradabad. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent stated that the newly added respondent had taken over charge as Acting President of the Board. If it is so, we direct that he shall forthwith hand over the charge to the petitioner. This interim order shall continue for a period of five weeks from today. It is directed that the petitioner shall not draw the amount of more than Rs. 1000. 00. So far as the payment of salary to the employees is concerned, same shall be disbursed by the District Magistrate. It is further directed that the proceedings for removal of the petitioner before the State Government shall continue and it will be open to the respondents to pass appropriate order. In case any order of removal is passed, this order shall cease to be effective. " ( 9 ) ON 1/04/1991, Writ Petitions Nos. 5350 of 1991,15962 of 1990 and 15963 of 1990 were listed before us. We commenced hearing in them on that date. On 2/04/1991, we expressed the view that, while dealing with the submission of the contesting respondents that the conduct of Sri Agarwal disentitled him to a discretionary relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution, we may have to record a finding which may have some bearing upon the merits of the contempt petition. Thereupon, counsel for the parties made a joint request that the contempt petition may also be heard and disposed of by us. We asked them to make a joint application in that behalf. That was done on 3/04/1991. Even Sri Agarwal made an endorsement on the said application that he had no objection to the contempt petition being heard and disposed of by us. ( 10 ) WE propose to deal with the contempt petition first. We have already extracted above the interim order dated 6/06/1990 passed in Writ Petition No. 15962 of 1990 and the interim order dated 8/06/1990 passed in Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990. ( 10 ) WE propose to deal with the contempt petition first. We have already extracted above the interim order dated 6/06/1990 passed in Writ Petition No. 15962 of 1990 and the interim order dated 8/06/1990 passed in Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990. It is admitted by Sri Agarwal that between 9/06/1990 and 17/07/1990 he countersigned no less than 75 cheques on the Punjab and Sindh Bank of diverse amounts exceeding Rs. 1,000. 00. It appears that the cheque of the lowest amount was of Rs. 1,040/ - and that of the highest amount was of Rupees 3,53,618. 36 p. The total amount for which the cheques were issued by Sri Agarwal was Rs. 34,48,741. 51 P. ( 11 ) THE material averments made by Sri Agarwal in his counter-affidavit in the contempt proceedings are these. He has highest regard for the orders of the law Courts and can never even think of violating any order of this Court. Notwithstanding the reply given, he tenders unqualified apology, if ultimately he is found guilty of any inadvertent act or omission constituting violation of any order of this Court. In view of the prayers made in Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 and the prayer contained in the application for interim relief in that petition and in view of the fact that the meeting of the Board had taken place on 4/06/1990 and a motion of no-confidence had been passed therein, Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 had become infructuous as the cause of action for filing the said petition ceased. After Writ Petition No. 15962 of 1990 had been admitted and the operation of the resolution dated 4/06/1990 had been stayed on 6/06/1990, by this Court, he continued to function and discharge his duties as before. Under the law, after the interim order dated 6/06/1990, he was entitled to function as full-fledged President of the Board without any condition whatsoever. He, in accordance with the legal advice, continued to discharge the duties of the President of the Board as provided in the Act. As no orders were passed in Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 on or before 4/06/1990, that petition had become infructuous, and in those circumstances"it was not advisable to state about the filing of Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 while moving Writ Petition No. 15962 of 1990 on 6-6-1990". As no orders were passed in Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 on or before 4/06/1990, that petition had become infructuous, and in those circumstances"it was not advisable to state about the filing of Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 while moving Writ Petition No. 15962 of 1990 on 6-6-1990". According to law and as per the legal advice to him, the order passed by this Court on 6/06/1990 being unqualified and without any condition, was to remain in force unless modified or vacated. As the cause of action for filing Writ Petition blot 15963 of 1990 came to an end on 4/06/1990, that petition became infructuous and the order passed therein was inoperative. Uender the law he is entitled to function "without any condition or restriction financially or otherwise". However, at the first opportunity, on 18/07/1990, Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990, on the statement of his counsel, was dismissed as not pressed (wrongly averred ). There was no question of the disobedience of the order dated 8/06/1990 as he was discharging his duties and functions on the basis of the order dated 6/06/1990. No case of wilful disobedience is made out against him. The contempt petition has been filed to harass him. In spite of the facts and circumstances mentioned in the counter-affidavit, he tenders his unconditional and unqualified apology. ( 12 ) ON 4/04/1991, when arguments in contempt petition were resumed, an application was moved by and on behalf of Sri Agarwal praying that the supplementary counter-affidavit accompanying it may be accepted and be brought on record. We accepted the application and passed an order thereon that we shall take into account the averments made in the supplementary counter-affidavit while preparing our judgment. ( 13 ) THE material averments in the supplementary counter-affidavit are these. Sri Agarwal was not aware as to when and what order would be passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990. At the time when no-confidence motion was put to vote there was no order of this Court staying the meeting of the Board. Since the view taken by the Presiding Officer that the motion of no confidence would be deemed to have been, carried was patently erroneous, Sri Agarwal had to file a writ petition in this Court. At the time when no-confidence motion was put to vote there was no order of this Court staying the meeting of the Board. Since the view taken by the Presiding Officer that the motion of no confidence would be deemed to have been, carried was patently erroneous, Sri Agarwal had to file a writ petition in this Court. The proceedings of 4/06/1990, gave an absolutely independent and separate cause of action to him to file a fresh writ petition. This subsequent fact was an absolutely independent fact which had nothing to do with the facts and circumstances of the Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990. He did not think it necessary to mention that this Court had reserved its orders in Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990. He was not only advised but it also appeared to him that the effect of the order passed by this Court on 6/06/1990 was that no motion of no-confidence had been passed against him. In spite of the dismissal of the Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 he would have continued to be the President of the Board on the basis of the blanket stay order passed by this Court on 6/06/1990. In the facts and circumstances and the legal advise taken on these facts and circumstances, he was of the definite view that Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 having been rendered infructuous, the order passed by this Court on 8/06/1990, after the order of this Court dated 6/06/1990, was of no effect. The provisions of the Act do not provide for the sanction or the passing of an order of the President in financial matters exceeding a sum of Rs. 1,000. 00. Such a power belongs to the Board. He did not sanction or pass any order relating to matters of finance after the order of this Court dated 8/06/1990. He only counter signed the cheques, which were sent by the Executive Officer in accordance with Rule 99 of the Municipal Account Code. ( 14 ) THE burden of the song of Sri Agarwal in the two affidavits, according to our understanding is that upon the passing of the motion of non-confidence on 4/06/1990, the Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990, which was pending in this Court, had become infructuous, and the order dated 8/06/1990, having been passed in an infructuous writ petition was inoperative. We may assume that, by necessary implication, Sri Agarwal has taken the plea that on 8/06/1990, this Court had no jurisdiction to pass the interim order, which it did, in Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990. ( 15 ) IN Writ petition No. 15963 of 1990 a number of prayers had been made. One was to quash the notice issued by the District Magistrate convening the meeting of the Board to consider the motion of non-confidence as against Sri Agarwal. The other was to direct the District Magistrate to produce the alleged notice of intention to move a motion of no-confidence and the same may be quashed and the last was that this Court may issue any other suitable direction or writ as deemed fit and proper. We have already referred to the prayer made in the application for the interim relief. We may emphasise that, according to the case set up by Sri Agarwal himself, for one reason or the other the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 15962 of 1990 on 6/06/1990 was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge who was in seizin of Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990. We may also take note of the fact that in Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990, in paragraph 71, no less than two interim orders passed in two different Writ Petitions by a Division Bench of this Court were quoted. One of the orders was passed in Writ Petition No. 5778 of 1990 to the following effect :"having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Advocate General, we direct that the meeting which is scheduled to be held on 24-3-90 may be held and the motion of no-confidence against the petitioner may also be considered. The result of no-confidence motion shall be recorded, but the same shall not be given effect to till further orders of this Court. We further make it clear that during this period the petitioner may continue to function as the Chairman. The petitioner No. 2 who is a nominated member may also participate in the meeting of no confidence motion has not been given effect to, the effect of this participation in the said meeting and subsequent declaration of the result of no-confidence motion shall be considered when the case is next taken up. The petitioner No. 2 who is a nominated member may also participate in the meeting of no confidence motion has not been given effect to, the effect of this participation in the said meeting and subsequent declaration of the result of no-confidence motion shall be considered when the case is next taken up. It is further ordered that the petitioner may continue to function as already ordered as Chairman. However, he shall not sanction or pass orders, regarding financial matters exceeding Rs. 1000. 00. The other order passed in Writ Petition No. 6781 of 1990 was to the following effect :"meanwhile meeting for considering the motion of no-confidence fixed for 31-3-1990 shall be held and "no-confidence motion" shall be considered and resolution shall be passed but its result shall not be given effect to till further orders of this Court. However, any financial transaction of more than 1000/- shall not be made by the petitioner till further orders. "it is to be noted that in both the aforesaid petitions the President of the Board concerned had approached this Court on a date prior to the date of the meeting of the Board concerned to consider the motion of no confidence. This Court, therefore, consciously passed interim orders in the aforesaid two cases to keep alive the writ petitions. This Court, on 8/06/1990, while passing the interim order in Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 was aware that the meeting of the Board must have taken place on 4/06/1990 and, therefore, in order to safeguard the interest of Sri Agarwal and to keep alive the said writ petition passed the order on 8/06/1990. By quoting the earlier orders of this Court in paragraph 71 of the writ petition and Agarwal clearly gave an indication that he would be satisfied if a similar order was passed in his case. Keeping in view the interest of justice and also observing the principle of comity of orders, this Court on 5/06/1990, passed the order consciously. Sri Agarwal too did not consider the interim order passed on 8/06/1990 in Writ Peetition No. 15963 of 1990 either as infructuous or ineffective or having been passed without jurisdiction otherwise there was no necessity to file an application on 11/07/1990 with the averment in paragraph 2 thereof :". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IN view of the facts that stay application has become infructuous, the petitioner does not want to press his application" and with the prayer : t is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the application be dismissed as having become infructious and the stay order dated 8th June, vacated. "furthermore, in paragraph 13 of the supplementary counter- affidavit Shri Agarwal has averred that had he been present at Allahabad on 8/06/1990 "it was quite possible that he would have got his writ petition No. 15963 of 1990 dismissed as not pressed on 7-5-1990". This assertion belies the case of Sri Agarwal that, according to his understanding the Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 had become infructuous on 4/06/1990 when the motion of no-confidence had been passed and, therefore, any order passed in that petition subsequent to 4/06/1990 was of no consequence. ( 16 ) THIS Court could dismiss the writ petition No. 15963 of 1990 after 4/06/1990 with the liberty to Shri Agarwal to file a fresh petition. It could also keep it alive by passing an appropriate interim order therein. Shri Agarwal could have challenged the legality of the decision of the presiding officer given on 4/06/1990, that the motion of no-confidence had been passed, in the Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 by seeking an amendment of the writ petition. Indisputably the interim order passed on 8/06/1990, could be passed prior to 4/06/1990. Therefore, the meeting of the Board could take place on 4/06/1990 and the motion of no-confidence could be passed on that day. Yet it could not be possibly urged that the writ petition became infructuous. We have no hesitation in taking the view that the plea taken by Shri Agarwal that the writ petition No. 159653 of 1990 had become infructuous on or after 4/06/1990 and the interim order passed in that petition after that date was an ineffective one, is neither genuine nor bona fide. It is a clear afterthought. ( 17 ) THE plea of Shri Agarwal that he acted on legal advice has no legs to stand upon. Normally, in such crucial matters, one would expect a contemner to file the affidavit of his legal adviser in support of his plea. That has not been done in the present case. It is a clear afterthought. ( 17 ) THE plea of Shri Agarwal that he acted on legal advice has no legs to stand upon. Normally, in such crucial matters, one would expect a contemner to file the affidavit of his legal adviser in support of his plea. That has not been done in the present case. Curiously enough, even the name of the counsel who gave the advice to Shri Agarwal has been withheld from us. We are not inclined to accept the averment of Shri Agarwal that he acted upon such a legal advice. Even it be accepted that such an advice was given, in our opinion, the counsel who gave such an advice did not act diligently. On the contrary, he acted recklessly. The contemner, therefore, cannot derive any advantage from any such advice. ( 18 ) WE may now deal with the plea of the contemner that while countersigning the cheques of an amount exceeding Rs. 1000. 00he did not"sanction or pass orders regarding financial matters exceeding Rs. 1000. 00". Section 50 of the Act provides that certain powers, duties and functions of a Board may be exercised by the President. Clause (d) of that provision is relevant. A reading of S. 50 and S. 112 of the Act coupled with Schedule 1 shows that certain powers of the Board are exercisable by the President. Some of them, which may have relevance to the present controversy are : (a) to empower the engineer to execute a contract; and (c) to transfer movable property of the Board. Section 51 empowers the President to watch over the financial administration of the Board. Section 127 provides that the matters referred to therein shall be regulated and governed by the rules made by the State Government under S. 296. They are : (a) the authority on which money may be paid from the municipal fund (b) the conditions on which property may be acquired by the board or on which property vested in the board may be transferrred by sale, mortgage, lease, exchange, or otherwise; and (c) any other matter relating to the municipal fund or municipal property in respect of which the Act makes no provision or insufficient provision and provision is necessary. Under the said provision, it appears, the Municipal Account Code has been brought into force. Under the said provision, it appears, the Municipal Account Code has been brought into force. In it Rule 5 reads : Subject to the provisions of the following rule money shall not be paid from the Municipal Fund except on a cheque signed by the President, or by the Vice-President or an ordinary member of the board duly authorised by the President, and by the Executive Officer or the Secretary". Rule 99 reads : The bill or other voucher presented as a claim for money shall be received and examined by the Secretary and, if the claim be admissible, the authority good, and the signature true and in order, he shall make an order for payment at the foot of the voucher, and sign it. The officer making a payment order is personally responsible that the voucher is complete and affords sufficient information as to the nature of the payment being made". The note appended to Rule 99 reads : The officer should also be required to satisfy himself that the payee actually received the sum passed". The expression "secretary" has been defined in the rules to mean "the Executive Officer". Apart from the aforementioned provisions of the Act and the Rules, our attention has not been drawn to any other material which may have bearing on the exercise of financial power by the President of a Board. A combined reading of Rules 5 and 99, as contained in the Municipal Account Code, makes it clear that the duty of the Secretary or the Executive Officer is only to prepare a bill or voucher presented as a claim for money after satisfying himself of the genuineness of the document presented and also of the correctness of the claim for money. In Rule 5 it is made clear that no payment shall be made from the municipal fund except on a cheque and that cheque has to be countersigned primarily by the President. It is apparent that the Vice-President will be required to sign the cheque only in the absence of the President. The President, however, has been empowered to authorise an ordinary member of the Board to sign a cheque. It is apparent that the Vice-President will be required to sign the cheque only in the absence of the President. The President, however, has been empowered to authorise an ordinary member of the Board to sign a cheque. It is true that the Executive Officer or the Secretary of the board is also required to sign the cheque but such a cheque will not be , valid and no money will be paid on its basis unless and until it has been signed by the President. The signature of the President on the cheque is a sine qua non for its being encashed and the amount debited from the municipal fund. While acting under Rule 5 aforequoted, the President is not expected to act as a mere rubber stamping authority. He is also not expected to act mechanically and without any application of mind. It is his duty to examine a particular cheque presented to him for being signed along with the voucher etc. objectively and also to satisfy himself that a cheque is being issued for a genuine purpose. Factually and legally the President sanctions the payment of the amount mentioned in the cheque when he countersigns the same. The plea of the contemner, therefore, that while countersigning the cheques he did not sanction any financial matter is untenable. We are, therefore, convinced that the contemner did sanction payments exceeding Rs. 1000. 00 and such sanctions related to financial matters of the Board. ( 19 ) THE contemner has neither averred nor proved that he was, in fact, under misapprehension as to the scope of the order of this Court. The material before us does not show that the contemner understood the order dated 8/06/1990 in a particular manner and he conducted himself in accordance with such a construction. We cannot, therefore, attribute an innocent intention or presumption. ( 20 ) THE crucial words in the order dated 6/06/1990, passed in Writ Petition No. 15962 of 1990, as quoted by us above, were "until ordered otherwise" (underlining by us ). These words could and did not mean that the order of 6/06/1990 was sacrosanct in so far as it could not be modified or varied by any other order except the one passed in that petition alone. These words could and did not mean that the order of 6/06/1990 was sacrosanct in so far as it could not be modified or varied by any other order except the one passed in that petition alone. The words clearly meant that either in proceedings in the same writ petition or in any other appropriate proceedings this Court could either rescind or vary or modify the order of 6/06/1990. If the orders dated 6/06/1990 and 8/06/1990, are placed together and are read together, it will be apparent that both the orders kept intact the right of Shri Agarwal to function as President of the Board, in spite of the passing of the motion of no-confidence. The effect of the order dated 8/06/1990, however, was that Sri Agarwal had to work as President under some constraints in relation to the exercise of financial powers. No attempt has been made in the counter-affidavits filed by Shri Agarwal to explain as to what did he understand by the words underlined by us or as to what was the alleged legal advice given to him with regard to those words. On the contrary, the stand taken is that irrespective of the order of 8/06/1990 he (Sri Agarwal) was entitled to function as the President of the Board without any restriction whatsoever on the basis of the order dated 6/06/1990. ( 21 ) SECTION 2 (b), of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines "civil contempt" to, inter alia, mean wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court. An act of disobedience in doing what has been prohibited, will be civil contempt. Whatever is intentional, is wilful. Therefore, deliberate disobedience is culpable. For discerning deliberate disobedience, the matter should be examined objectively. The inquiry, therefore, is : the contemner have a clear intention to flout? Was his act intentional and deliberate? The order passed by this Court on 8/06/1990 is to be read not only in context with the relevant statutory provision but also in conjunction with the memorandum of the Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 and the application for interim relief made therein. Was his act intentional and deliberate? The order passed by this Court on 8/06/1990 is to be read not only in context with the relevant statutory provision but also in conjunction with the memorandum of the Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 and the application for interim relief made therein. We may indicate that it is not the defence of the contemner that the order of this Court was ambiguous and was reasonably capable of more than one interpretation and that he did not intend to disobey the order but conducted himself in accordance with his interpretation of the same. He has contented himself merely by the plea taken in the supplementary counter-affidavit that while countersigning the cheques he did not sanction or pass orders regarding financial matters exceeding Rupees 1000/ -. It is implicit in the said plea that the contemner was in no doubt as to what the order really meant. He has not taken the plea that he had countersigned the cheques on the understanding and belief that he was neither sanctioning nor ordering payment of a sum exceeding Rs. 1000/ -. ( 22 ) WE are satisfied that the contemner intentionally gave no respect to the aforequoted underlined words in the order of 6/06/1990 passed by this Court with the avowed object of deliberately disobeying the directions contained in the order dated 8/06/1990. We have already noted that the certified copy of the order dated 8/06/1990 was obtained by and on behalf of the contemner on that very day. We may also take note of the fact that the contemner commenced countersigning cheques exceeding a sum of Rs. 1000. 00 with effect from 9/06/1990. We may emphasise that it is not the case of the petitioner that he had not acquired knowledge of the order passed by this Court on 8/06/1990, on 9/06/1990 and even thereafter. We, therefore, have no hesitation in recording a finding that the contemner wilfully disobeyed the order dated 8/06/1990. ( 23 ) A mistake or omission is made not by design but by mischance. A foolish mistake or a careless mistake may be a bona fide mistake. The attribute of a bona fide action is that the same is done in good faith or with sincerity or genuineness. Such an action conveys absence of intent to deceive. What is done dishonestly cannot be said bona fide. A foolish mistake or a careless mistake may be a bona fide mistake. The attribute of a bona fide action is that the same is done in good faith or with sincerity or genuineness. Such an action conveys absence of intent to deceive. What is done dishonestly cannot be said bona fide. If a person knows that it is wrong to do a particular act and yet deliberately does it, he cannot assert that he is acting bona fide. Therefore, the chief element of a bona fide act is honesty. A bona fide mistake must be a genuine mistake and not an erroneous view of the law which has been deliberately adopted. No contemner can be allowed to get away by setting up the camouflage of a bona fide action or understanding. We have given a thoughtful consideration to the defence set up by the contemner in this case in the light of the aforementioned tests. We are satisfied that the pleas of the contemner that the order dated 8/06/1990 was an ineffective one, as the same had been passed in infructuous proceedings and by countersigning the cheques he did not sanction payment exceeding Rs. 1000. 00 cannot be considered to be bona fide. ( 24 ) SECTION 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act may now be considered. This is not a case of technical contempt. The words "due course of justice" used in the section have wider amplitude than the words "due course of any judicial proceeding" or "administration of justice" used in sub-clause (ii) or (iii) of Section 2 (c ). The words "due course of justice", therefore, have a wide import. If the act complained of substantially interferes or tends to interfere with the broad stream of administration of justice that will be punishable in spite of Section 13. If an act undermines the prestige of the court, it is certainly substantially interfering with due course of justice. Punishment is awarded in the interest of administration of justice. The impairment of the dignity and the authority of the court is to be eschewed. The purpose of contempt proceedings is to preserve and maintain the flow of the stream of justice in its unsullied form and purity. We feel that by disregarding the order dated 8/06/1990 the contemner undermined the prestige of this Court and his act has substantially interfered with the due course of justice. The purpose of contempt proceedings is to preserve and maintain the flow of the stream of justice in its unsullied form and purity. We feel that by disregarding the order dated 8/06/1990 the contemner undermined the prestige of this Court and his act has substantially interfered with the due course of justice. Section 13, therefore, cannot give any protection to the contemner. ( 25 ) THE apology tendered by the contemner is"notwithstanding the reply given, he tenders unqualified apology, if ultimately he is found guilty of any inadvertent act or omission constituting violation of any order of this Court". Apparently, the apology tendered is conditional and not an abject surrender. The contemner has not thrown himself at the mercy of the Court without any pre-condition. Even if the contemner has tendered an unqualified apology, this, in our opinion, is not a fit case where the same should be accepted and treated as a conviction. We are also satisfied that the apology tendered is not bona fide. ( 26 ) NOW we come to the question of sentence. Section 12, and sub-section (3) thereof in particular, conveys the idea that the normal rule is that a contemner should be punished by being fined and conviction of sentence should be passed in exceptional cases. It is, therefore, apparent that if a court decides to award a sentence of imprisonment to a contemner, it must record its reason for doing so. In our opinion, in spite of the contumacious conduct of the contemner, the normal rule should not be departed from. ( 27 ) ON 4/04/1991 we reserved our judgment in these petitions and directed that the same may be listed for delivery of judgment on 11/04/1991. On 8/04/1991 Shri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Senior Advocate, who appeared on behalf of Shri Agarwal, made a statement at the Bar that Writ Petition No. 15963 of 1990 may be dismissed as not pressed. We accordingly dismiss the same. Now we come to writ petition No. 15962 of 1990. It is to be remembered that on 28/05/1990 writ petition No. 15963 of 1990 was presented in this Court by Shri Agarwal. We accordingly dismiss the same. Now we come to writ petition No. 15962 of 1990. It is to be remembered that on 28/05/1990 writ petition No. 15963 of 1990 was presented in this Court by Shri Agarwal. In that petition one of the grievances was that the three nominated members of the Board, namely, Smt. Sushila Chauhan, Smt. Mahzabeen and Shri Vikal Balmiki had not been administered oath in accordance with law and, therefore, they were not members of the Board and even then the District Magistrate had sent notices to the said three members to participate in the meeting scheduled to be held on 4/06/1990 to consider the motion of no-confidence against him (Shri Agarwal ). In the said writ petition Smt. Mahzabeen, Smt. Sushila Chanhan and Sri Vikal Balmiki were arrayed respectively as respondents Nos. 27, 28 and 29. Ground No. 1 to the said writ petition was also to the effect that the nomination of Smt. Mahzabeen, Smt. Sushila Chauhan as members of the Board was contrary to law. ( 28 ) THE writ petition No. 15962 of 1990 was presented in this Court on 6/06/1990. The presiding officer, it will be remembered, has declared the motion of no-confidence as having been carried in the meeting of the Board held on 4/06/1990. The presiding officer has recorded a finding that 48 members were present and 24 of them had voted in favour of the motion. In the petition Shri Agarwal has made a grievance that the District Magistrate acted illegally in not sending a notice of the meeting to Smt. Sushila Chauhan. In main, the plea raised is that the presiding officer having recorded a finding that there were 48 members of the Board and only 24 voted in favour of the motion, the same could not be declared to have been carried as the requirement of sub-section (12) of Section 87-A of the Act was that a motion shall be deemed to have been carried only when it has been passed by a majority of one half of the total members of the Board. It is thus evident that Shri Agarwal took contradictory stands in writ petitions Nos. 15963 of 1990 and 15962 of 1990. It is thus evident that Shri Agarwal took contradictory stands in writ petitions Nos. 15963 of 1990 and 15962 of 1990. ( 29 ) IT is significant to note that in writ petition No. 15962 of 1990 there is not even a whisper about the filing of the writ petition No. 15963 of 1990 on 28/05/1990. Shri Agarwal, for reasons best known to him, completely suppressed the information from this Court in writ petition No. 15962 of 1990 that he had already filed a writ petition No. 15963 of 1990 and the orders therein had been reserved. Had this fact been brought to the notice of the learned Judge who entertained and heard the writ petition No. 15962 of 1990, he would have. in all probability, directed the said writ petition to be placed before the learned Judge who was in seizin of writ petition No. 15963 of 1990. Had Shri Agarwal invited the attention of this Court to the fact of the filing of the writ petition No. 15963 of 1990, two different orders as passed on 6/06/1990 and 8/06/1990 would not have been passed. We note that in writ petition No. 15962 of 1990 there is no reference at all to the two earlier orders passed by this Court in similar matters, which have been quoted in the memorandum of writ petition No. 15963 of 1990, wherein blanket stay orders were not given to the Presidents of the Board and constrain on the exercise of financial powers by them had been put. We are satisfied that Shri Agarwal deliberately suppressed material facts from this Court in writ petition No. 15962 of 1990 and he did so with the intention of obtaining a more favourable interim order. ( 30 ) THERE is yet another aspect of the matter. After obtaining interim order on 6/06/1990 in writ petition No. 15962 of 1990 Shri Agarwal could have made an application in writ petition No. 15963 of 1990 seeking the withdrawal of the writ petition and praying that the same may be dismissed. At any rate, his counsel could have brought the fact of the filing of the writ petition No. 15962 of 1990 and the interim order passed therein to the notice of the learned Judge immediately after 6/06/1990. At any rate, his counsel could have brought the fact of the filing of the writ petition No. 15962 of 1990 and the interim order passed therein to the notice of the learned Judge immediately after 6/06/1990. ( 31 ) AS equitable remedies are at the discretion of the Court, the Court before granting one will inquire whether the conduct of the party seeking the remedy in the matter before it has been conscientious. If the conduct be offensive it would be a sound exercise of discretion to deny the relief. Misconduct need not be punishable as a crime. Any wilful act in regard to a matter in litigation which would be considered wrongful by honest and fair minded men will be sufficient to make the hands of the applicant unclean so as to deprive him of equitable relief. There can be no escape from the conclusion that Shri Agarwal came to this Court in Writ petition No. 15962 of 1990 with unclean hands. Furthermore, the conclusion is inevitable that the conduct of Shri Agarwal both at the time of the filing of the writ petition No. 15962 of 1990 and even thereafter far from being conscientious was offensive. Therefore, he has disentitled himself to get any relief from us in proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution. ( 32 ) THE fact that we have found him guilty for having committed the contempt of this Court by disobeying the order dated 8/06/1990 may be an additional ground to refuse him the relief as claimed in writ petition No. 15962 of 1990. ( 33 ) WE have already referred to the relevant facts which necessitated the filing of the writ petition No. 5350 of 1991 by Shri Agarwal. We have examined the impugned order dated 22/02/1991 whereby the State Government on 22/02/1991 purported to suspend him as the President of the Board. It is to be remembered that on the said date Shri Agarwal was functioning as the President of the Board on the basis of the interim order dated 6/06/1990 passed by this Court in Writ petition No. 15962 of 1990. Since we are dismissing the writ petition No. 15962 of 1990,a view can be taken that no useful purpose will be served now in passing any orders in this petition. Since we are dismissing the writ petition No. 15962 of 1990,a view can be taken that no useful purpose will be served now in passing any orders in this petition. This, however, will not be a correct approach as, on account of the dismissal of the writ petition No. 15962 of 1990, Shri Agarwal will not automatically cease to be the President of the Board. Under S. 47-A of the Act Shri Agarwal is entitled to receive a communication as envisaged in sub-section (11) of Section 87-A and thereafter under S. 47-A within three days of the receipt of the communication, it will be open to Shri Agarwal to either resign his office or represent to the State Government to supersede the Board stating his reason therefor. We are, therefore, proceeding to consider the petition on merits. ( 34 ) SUB-SECTION (3) of Section 48 of the Act provides that the State Government may place under suspension a President who is called upon to show cause in respect of any ground mentioned in clause (a) or sub-clause (VI), (VII) and (VIII) of clause (b) of sub-section (2 ). It will be remembered that a show cause notice was given to Shri Agarwal as to why he should not be removed from the office of the President and those proceedings were pending when the impugned order was passed. In the impugned order it is recited that it is being passed in exercise of powers under sub-section (3) of Section 48. We have examined sub-section (3) of Section 48 and have found that clause (a) of sub-section (2) and various sub-clause of clause (b) of sub-section (2) deal with different situations. The impugned order does not disclose the precise reason for suspending the petitioner. It appears that the order was passed mechanically by merely referring to sub-section (3) of S. 48. On the face of it, it discloses a non application of mind. It is, therefore, liable to be set aside on this short ground. ( 35 ) THE Contempt Petition No. 636 of 1990 succeeds. The contemner (Shri Agarwal) is convicted and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 1000/which he shall deposit in this Court within a period of three weeks from today. In default of the payment of the fine, the contemner will be sent to the civil prison for a period of two weeks. The contemner (Shri Agarwal) is convicted and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 1000/which he shall deposit in this Court within a period of three weeks from today. In default of the payment of the fine, the contemner will be sent to the civil prison for a period of two weeks. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Writ Petitions Nos. 15962 of 1990 and 15963 of 1990 are dismissed but without any order as to costs. Writ Petition No. 5350 of 1991 succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 22/02/1991 passed by the State Government suspending Shri Agarwal from the office of the President of the Municipal Board, Moradabad, is quashed. The consequential order dated 23/02/1991 directing Shri Agarwal to hand over the charge of the office of the President to the Vice-President is also quashed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Order accordingly. .