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Allahabad High Court · body

1991 DIGILAW 589 (ALL)

Ram Krishna Das v. Krishna Das Agarwal

1991-04-11

H.C.MITTAL

body1991
JUDGMENT 1. Both the parties are real brothers. The revisionist has been a tenant of the plaintiff of a building in which the business of commission agency is carried on. The accommodation has also a big hall, being used as a godown. In the year 1989 the plaintiff filed a suit against the revisionist with the allegation that he had without any permission in writing in the godown has constructed a room and latrine after taking sewer and water connections and that the floor of the godown has also been damaged and thereby the value and utility of the accommodation has been diminished and it has also been disfigured. On behalf of the revisionist it was alleged in the written statement that with the oral consent of the plaintiff this construction was made, which was absolutely temporary and can be removed at any moment without leaving any trace of it; that neither the utility and value has been reduced nor it has disfigured and, therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The learned court below, however, held in favour of the plaintiff, hence this revision. 2. Counter and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged between the parties and the revision was heard finally on merits. On behalf of the revisionist it was urged that the onus was on the plaintiff to prove, besides a written permission in writing of the landlord that such constructions or structural alterations in the building are likely to diminish its value or utility, or disfigure it as provided under Sec. 20 (2) (c) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 It was further urged that it is necessary that such constructions must be of a permanent nature. On the other hand learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent argued that it was not necessary that the constructions as prohibited under Sec. 20 (2) (c) should be of a permanent nature. The case of Om Prakash v. Amar Singh, AIR 1987 SC 617 was a case of course under the U. P. Cantonments (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1952. On the other hand learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent argued that it was not necessary that the constructions as prohibited under Sec. 20 (2) (c) should be of a permanent nature. The case of Om Prakash v. Amar Singh, AIR 1987 SC 617 was a case of course under the U. P. Cantonments (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1952. Section 14 (c) of that Act provided as follows : "Sec. 14 : Restrictions on eviction-No suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate, be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds, namely ; (a) to (b) x x x x x x x x x x x x (c) that the tenant has without the permission of the landlord, made or permitted to be made any such construction as in the opinion of the court has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value". Section 20 (2) (c) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 reads as follows : Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified ground. (1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall bar a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed term was entered into by or in pursuance of a compromise or adjustment arrived at with reference to a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceeding, which is either recorded in court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by the tenant. (2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds, namely :....... (c) that the tenant has without the permission in writing of the landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction or structural alteration in the building as is likely to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it. 3. (c) that the tenant has without the permission in writing of the landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction or structural alteration in the building as is likely to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it. 3. It is apparent that the provision regarding construction in the building which may materially alter the accommodation or cause structural alteration in the building as is likely to substantially diminish its value are common in both the aforesaid provisions and, therefore, the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case though pertaining to Section 14 (c) of the U. P. Cantonments (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1952 would also be applicable to the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. In that case their Lordships specifically laid down as under : "The nature of constructions, whether they are permanent or temporary, is a relevant consideration in determining the question of 'material alteration'. A permanent construction tends to make changes in the accommodation on a permanent basis, while a temporary construction is on temporary basis which do not ordinarily affect the form or structure of the building, as it can easily be removed without causing any damage to the building. IT is, therefore, necessary that the alieged construction must be of a permanent character. In the present case the learned court below has not given any finding that the alleged construction is that of a permanent nature. Its finding is only that the tenant has made construction without the written permission of the landlord and as a result of which it has diminished the utility of the accommodation. 4. As regards the permission of the landlord before construction, admittedly there has not been any written permission. The case of the revisionist, however, has been that the parties are real brothers and after partition in between them the accommodation in suit came to the share of the plaintiff and the revisionist continued tenant thereof, that the alleged construction was made with the oral permission of the landlord and he being his brother any written permission was not necessary. The present suit was filed in the year 1989, while according to the statement of the defendant, relied upon by the learned Court below in its judgment, the construction was made in the year 1984-85. The present suit was filed in the year 1989, while according to the statement of the defendant, relied upon by the learned Court below in its judgment, the construction was made in the year 1984-85. Since thereafter no objection was raised by the plaintiff except for the first time in the notice dated 19-1-1989, i.e. after about five years of the construction. It was, therefore, urged that from the conduct of the plaintiff- respondent it is clear that written permission was waived. The law is well settled as laid down in the case of Niaz Ahmad v. The III Additional District Judge, Aligarh, 1982 (1) ARC 231 that the waiver of the notice can be inferred from the conduct of the party and the party who had full knowledge of his rights and of facts enabling him to take effectual action for enforcement of such rights. It is clear that the parties are real brothers and there is uncontroverted statement of the defendant that the accommodation was built in the year 1984 85. Inspite of that no action was for taken for so many years. Hence it can be safely inferred that the plaintiff did not press for a written consent for making the constructions. Regarding the question whether the constructions in dispute have reduced the utility of the accommodation as alleged. On behalf of the respondent it was stated that it is a construction of the bath-room and latrine for the convenience of its occupant and so it is also to new other occupant and it has not in any manner reduced the utility or value of the accommodation. On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent reliance has been placed in the case of Raja Ram v. Chandra Bhan Singh, 1989 AWC 103 , wherein also he had converted a room into latrine and it was held that the construction had certainly diminished its value and utility. in that case two rooms together with a triangular portion including a Chabutra infront thereof was let out to the tenant. The triangular portion was let out for running a sweet meat shop. The allegation made in the plaint was that the tenant had constructed a latrine inside the front room of his tenanted portion by digging and damaging the floor of the room and the Chabutra. The triangular portion was let out for running a sweet meat shop. The allegation made in the plaint was that the tenant had constructed a latrine inside the front room of his tenanted portion by digging and damaging the floor of the room and the Chabutra. He had also raised a partition wall and other constructions by fixing water pipe, sewer fittings etc. Thus, the front room was converted partialy in the latrine and the other corner part was being used as sweetmeat shop Under those circumstances it was held -hat conversion of a room into a latrine is clearly a construction which would diminish its valu- and utility In the present case the front portion has not been converted into a latrine, but inside the corner of the godown a small bath-room and latrine have been made for the convenience of the customers of the revisionist who is a commission agent and engaged the godown for storing the food-grains etc. Thus, the facts of the present case and that of the case of Raja Ram v. Chandra Bhan Singh and another (Supra) are totally different. 5. As regards allegation of the landlord that by making the constructions of the latrina and bath-room the building has been disfigured. The word 'disfigure' has not been denied in the Act. In the absence of any legislative definition of the word, it will be useful to refer to the meaning given in the dictionary. 'Disfigure' has been explained in the Webster's dictionary to mean :- "To make less complete, perfect or beautiful or deface, deform or disguise by changing the figure or appearance". 93-Rep.-1991 Now we have to look into the scope of words 'deface' and 'deform' :- 'deform'-to spoil the form or shape of, to distort, mar the excellence or perfection 'deface'-to destroy or mar the face or external appearance, injure, spoil or mar by effecting important features or portions. 6. Apart from the dictionary meaning the word 'disfigure' even if given the popular meaning, it would mean that it spoils the external appearance of the building. This word 'disfigure' has got nothing to do with diminishing its value or utility. It is an independent phrase having its separate field of operation. It confines only to the limited question that the show of building is spoiled or marred. This word 'disfigure' has got nothing to do with diminishing its value or utility. It is an independent phrase having its separate field of operation. It confines only to the limited question that the show of building is spoiled or marred. In the present case the landlord himself has admitted that from outside the latrine and the bath-room were not visible and hence in that view of his admission it cannot be said that the alleged construction has disfigured the building. 7. Before concluding it would not be out of place to refer to the argument raised on behalf of the opposite-party that this court in revision must not interfere with the finding of. fact of the court below. The question whether the changes made by the tenant amount to structural alterations in the building under tenancy within the meaning of Section 20 (2) (c) of the Act, is not a pure question of fact. The inference whether the alterations made by the tenant amounts to structural alterations from the facts established on the record is certainly an inference of law and not of fact. Hence there is no force in this contention that this court in revision is not entitled to consider the facts whether the alterations made by the tenant amounted to structural alteration within the meaning of Section 20 (2) (c) of the Act. 8. The conclusion, therefore, is that the revision is allowed and the impugned judgment and decree of the learned court below regarding the eviction of the revisionist from the accommodation in suit are set aside. Under the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Revision allowed.