D. P. WADHWA,j. ( 1 ) THESE references numbering fourteen, all consolidated, under section 256 (2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for brevity the Act ) raise a common question if the provisions of section 144-B of the Act (since repealed) are applicable to proceedings initiated under sections 147/148 of the Act. ( 2 ) THE questions of law which have been referred arc three and are as under: "1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that provisions of sec. 144-B were not applicable to assessments made pursuant to the provisions of sec. 147 in the case of J. Dalmia, HUF, for assessment years 1947-48 and 1948-49 and in the case of ADP for assessment year 1947-48 ? 2. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunat was justified in holding that the provisions of sec. 144-B are procedural and apply to all assessments pending at the time when the said provision was introduced by "taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 w. e. f. 1-1-1976 ? 3. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, Tribunal was right in law in holding that assessments in the case of J. Dalmia (HUF) for A. Ys. 1947-48 and 1948-49 and in the case of ADP for A. Y. 1947-48 were barred by time limitation ?" ( 3 ) QUESTIONS I and 3 have been referred at the instance of the revenue- and question 2 at the instance of the assessee. ( 4 ) AT the beginning of the arguments it was submitted before us that question No. 2 was not being pressed. However, in the written submissions of the assessee it was submitted that question No. 2 as framed failed to bring out the real controversy between the parties and needed to be reframed. It was suggested that question No. 2 be reframed as follows : "whether the Appellate Tribunal is right in law in holding that the provisions of sec. 144 B are purely procedural and are not substantive in nature and are, therefore, applicable to Income tax assessment proceeding (other than proceedings initiated u/s 147) pending at the time when the said provision was introduced by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, w. e. f. 1. 1. 144 B are purely procedural and are not substantive in nature and are, therefore, applicable to Income tax assessment proceeding (other than proceedings initiated u/s 147) pending at the time when the said provision was introduced by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, w. e. f. 1. 1. 1976, ( 5 ) UNDER section 260 of the Act, this Court has power to reframe a question so as to bring out the real issue between the parties. However, as we proceed to answer questions I and 2 and hold that provisions of section 144b. of the Act are procedural in nature, we find that question No. 2 becomes quite irrelevant and there is no necessity to reframe the question as proposed. ( 6 ) WE may note that it was submmitted before us that the assessment years involved are 1947-48, 1948-49, 1949-50, 1950-51 and 1951-52. But the matters relating to the years 1949-50, 1950-51 and 1951-52 have become infrucouous and hence need not be considered. The matters relating to the assessment years 1947-48 and 1948-49 in the case of J. Dalmia (HUF) are suviving, though the matter relating to the assessment year 1948-49 has become academic in that case as well. The matters for the assessment year 1947-48 are still alive in respect of both assessees viz. J. Dalmia (HUF) and the A. O. P. M/s R. Dalmia, J. Dalmia and S. P. Jain and hence the questions have to be considered with reference to that assessment year 1947-48 substantially. ( 7 ) FACTS are brief and not in dispute. To understand the controversy between the parties it is stated that for the assessment year 1947-48 in the case of association of persons (A. O. P.) proceedings under Section 147 (a) of the Act were initiated and a notice under section 148 was served on 24 March, 1984. A return of income was filed on 3 June, 1984 though it was filed underprotest. The Income-tax Officer framed draft assessment order under section 144-B on 10 March, 1978 which was received by the assessee on 13 March, 1978 who filed objections on I April, 1978 which were forwarded to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and on receiving directions from him on 4 September, 1978, the income-tax Officer completed the assessment on the same date on an income of over Rs. 4. 52 crores. 4. 52 crores. Now, if the provisions of section 144-B are applicable, the assessment would be within the limitation prescribed under section 153 of the Act and if section 144-B is not applicable to the proceedings initiated under sections 147 and 148 of the Act, the assessment would be barred. The contention of the revenue is that section 144-B is applicable, the assessee contending to the contrary. The revenue is supported by a decision of the Kerala High Court in Keraia Kaumudi (P) Ltd. v. C. I. T. . 181 I. T. R. 30, and the assessee by that of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Usha Aggarwal, 178 I. T. R. 406. ( 8 ) UNDER sub-section (1) of section 153, no order of assessment shall be made under section 143 or, section i44 after expiry of contain period as prescribed therein. Under sub-section (2) of this section, no order of assessment, reassessment, or recomputation shall be made under section 14, where it is to be made under clause (a) after expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year in which the notice under section 148 was served. Then under explanation 1 to this section in computing the period of limitation, the period (not exceeding 180 days) commencing from the date on which the Income-tax Officer forwards the draft order under sub-section (1) of section 144 B to the assessee and ending with the date on which the Income-tax Officer receives the directions from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under sub-section (4) of that section, or in a case where no objections to the draft order are received from the assessee, period of thirty days, shall be excluded If the period in the present case is excluded the assessment will be within limitation otherwise not. ( 9 ) SECTION 144 B was inserted in the Act w. e. f. 1-1-1976. ( 9 ) SECTION 144 B was inserted in the Act w. e. f. 1-1-1976. Sub-sections (1) to (5) of this section, which are relevant, are as under : "144b, Reference to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner in certain cases- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where, in an assessment to be made under sub-section (3) of section 143, the Income-tax Officer proposes to make any variation in the income or loss returned which is prejudicial to the assessee and the amount of such variation exceeds the amount fixed by the Board under sub-section (6), the Income-tax Officer shall, in the first instance, forward a draft of the proposed order of assessment (thereafter in this section referred to as the draft order) to the assessee. (2) On receipt of the draft order, the assessee may forward his objections, if any, to such variation to the Income-lax Officer within seven days of the receipt by him of the draft order or within such further period not exceeding fifteen days as the Income-tax Officer may allow on an application made to him in this behalf. (3) If no objections are received within the period or the extended period aforesaid, or the assessee intimates to the Income-tax Officer the acceptance of the variation, the Income-tax Officer ahall complete the assessment on the basis of the draft order. (4) If any objections are received, the Income-tax Officer shall forward the draft order together with the objections to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner shall, after considering the draft order and the objections and after going through (wherever necessary) the records relating to the draft order, issue, in respect of the matters covered by the objections, such directions as he thinks fit for the guidance of the Income-tax Officer to enable him to complete the assessment; Provided that no directions which are prejudicial to the assessee shall be issued under this sub-section before an opportunity is given to the assessee to be heard. (5) Every direction issued by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under sub-section (4) shall be binding on the Income-tax Officer. xx xx xx ( 10 ) IT was stated before us that the amount prescribed by the Board under sub-section (1) of this section is rupees one lakh. Relevant provisions of sections 147 and 148 may also be set out at this stage;- "147. xx xx xx ( 10 ) IT was stated before us that the amount prescribed by the Board under sub-section (1) of this section is rupees one lakh. Relevant provisions of sections 147 and 148 may also be set out at this stage;- "147. If- (a) the Income-tax Officer has reason to believe that, by reason of the omission or failure on the) part of an assessee to make a return under section 139 for any assessment year to the Income-tax Officer or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that year, income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for that year, or xx xx xx he-may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year ). xx xx xx 148. (1) Before making the assessment, reassessment or recomputation under section 147, the Income-tax Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 139 and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice issued under that sub-section. (2) The Income-tax Officer shall, before issuing any notice under this section, record his reasons for doing so. " ( 11 ) UNDER clause (8) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Act, "assessment" includes reassessment, and under clause (40) "regular assessment , means the assessment made under section 143 or section 144. Since a lot has been said on the applicability of section 144-B with reference to various provisions relating to procedure for assessment, it may be useful at this stage to refer to the history of this section, its insertion in the statute w. e. f. 1. 4. 1976 and its omission therefrom w. e. f. 1. 4. 1989. The section was introduced following the recommendation of the Wanchoo Committee and then deleted on the recommendation of the Chokshi Committee. 4. 1976 and its omission therefrom w. e. f. 1. 4. 1989. The section was introduced following the recommendation of the Wanchoo Committee and then deleted on the recommendation of the Chokshi Committee. Both these recommendations are as under, respectively:- "as regards disputed additions in assessments, a point has been made before us that often decisions are taken by Income- tax Officer behind the assessee s back and the assessee comes to know of additions and disallowances only after the assessment has been made and order is received by him. In many cases, the dispute could have been avoided if adequate opportunity had been given to the taxpayer to explain the position. We are aware that such situations do frequently arise to ensure that the assessee gets a reasonable opportunity of meeting the objections of the Income-tax Officer before an assessment is finalised, we recommend that there should be a provision in the law requiring the Income-tax Officer to send a draft assessment order to the assessee, to start with, in all cases where the additions of disallowances proposed to be made in an assessment under sub-section (3) of Sec. 143 exceed in the aggregate Rs. 25,000. 00. Where the taxpayer objects to the assessment being made on the basis of the draft order he should intimate his objections within 7 days to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who will, after hearing the assessee and the Income-tax Officer, pass the final order of assessment himself. For this purpose, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner should have the power to accept, reduce, or enhance the income proposed in the draft order, such a measure will also ensure that major disputes with the taxpayer are setted or dealt with at a level higher th that of the Income-tax Officer. " (Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee, Final Report, December 1971) Section 144-B introduces a new concept of issue of a draft order by the Income-tax Officer to the assessee setting forth additions which he proposes to make to the returned income, followed by consideration of the assessce s objections ana issue of directions to the Income-tax Officer by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. The impression which we have gathered from our discussions with the departmental officers and assessees is that this section has merely resulted in delays in completion of assessments and duplication of proceedings without substantially curing highpitched assessment or reducing the scope for litigation. The impression which we have gathered from our discussions with the departmental officers and assessees is that this section has merely resulted in delays in completion of assessments and duplication of proceedings without substantially curing highpitched assessment or reducing the scope for litigation. We have, elsewhere in this Report, recommended that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner should be closely associated in the process of assessment on a continuing basis in all scrutiny cases. Implementation of that recommendation would render the existing procedure for issue of draft orders and consideration of the assessee s objections by Inspecting Assistant Commissioner unecessary. Besides, Sec. 144-A itself (with some amendments, if necessary) can effectively achieve the purpose of Sec. 144-B. We, accordingly recommend that the provisions of Sec. 144-B may be deleted. We would like to make it clear that, in recommending the deletion of the procedure for issue of a draft order, it is not our intention to detract in any way from the existing well-established legal position that the assessing officer, who exercises quasi judicial functions, should Act fearlessly and without bias, conduct himself in accordance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience and give sufficient opportunity to the assesee to place his case before the Department. Further, the Income- tax Officer cannot rely on any material in arriving at his conclusions, without first placing it before the assessee and giving him a reasonable opportunity of controverting it. If these principles ate scrupulously kept in mind by all assessing officers and followed while completing assessments, an assessee can have no cause for grievance. " (Direct tax Laws Enquiry Committee, Final Report, September 1978 ). ( 12 ) THE Board explained the introduction of section 144 B by its circular as under:- "5. The amending Act has inserted another provisions, namely. Sec. 144-B which empowers the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to issue pre-assessment directions to the Income- tax Officer. Under the provisions of this section, the Income-tax Officer is required to send a draft order of assessment to the assessee in a case where be proposed to make an assessment under Sec. 143 (3) and the proposed addition or disallow ance is in excess of the amount fixed by the Board in this behalf. Under the provisions of this section, the Income-tax Officer is required to send a draft order of assessment to the assessee in a case where be proposed to make an assessment under Sec. 143 (3) and the proposed addition or disallow ance is in excess of the amount fixed by the Board in this behalf. If the assessee objects to such addition or disallo- wances he will have to forward his objection to the Income-tax Officer within seven days of the receipt of the draft order. The time available for filing of the objection can, on application by the assessee, be extended by the Income-tax Officer by a further period not exceeding 15 days. If the assessee intimates acceptance of the variation proposed by the Income-lax Officer or an objection thereto is received from him, the Income-tax Officer shall complete the assessment on the basis of the draft order. Where, on the other hand, any objections are received from him by the Income-tax Officer, he will be required to forward the draft order together with the assessee s objections to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. After considering the draft assessment order and the objections raised by the assessee and after examining the assessment record, if necessary, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner shall issue in respect of the matters covered by the objections such directions as he thinks fit to enable the Income-tax officer to complete the assessment. While issuing any direction which are prejudicial to the assessee, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner will have to give an opportunity of being heard to the assessee. The directions issued by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner shall be binding on the Income-tax Officer. The Board is empowered to fix the amount (which shall not be less than Rs. 25,000), variations in excess whereof proposed by the Income-tax Officer will attract the provisions of this section. The Board is also empowered to fix different amount for different areas. . . . " ( 13 ) IN Kerala Kaumudi (F) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 181 ITR 30, a question which came up for consideration before the Kerala High Court was whether the Tribunal was right in holding that section 144-B of the Act was applic. ible while making reassessment under section 147 and whether the reassessment was barred by limitation. . " ( 13 ) IN Kerala Kaumudi (F) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 181 ITR 30, a question which came up for consideration before the Kerala High Court was whether the Tribunal was right in holding that section 144-B of the Act was applic. ible while making reassessment under section 147 and whether the reassessment was barred by limitation. The Court, after examining various provisions of the Act and certain decisions of the Courts, observed that there could be only one assessment for each year and that once proceedings under section 147 of the Act were initiated by issuing a notice under section 139 (2) of the Act, the assessment proceedings started afresh and that the proceedings for assessment for that year would be pending and would continue until a final order of assessment was rendered. The court held that when the assessment was reopened, section 143 (3) was attracted and if the intended addition to the returned income was more than one lakh rupees, the Income-tax Officer must act in accordance with the provisions of section 143 and in computing limitation in such a case, the time taken to comply with the provisions of section 144-B must be excluded. ( 14 ) IN Joseph Kuruvlla v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 179 I. T. R. 139* the Income-tax Officer completed the assessment on a total income of over Rs. 1. 83 lakhs. It was contended before the Commissioner of Income-tax. (Appeals) by the assessee that since the variation in the returned income and the- assessed income was more than rupees one lakh, the Income-tax Officer should have issued a draft assessment order under section 144-B to the assessee and after receiving the objections, if any be should have referred the matter to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner for giving directions for completion of the- assessment. Though the Commissioner (Appeals) accepted the contention and set aside the assessment but be directed the I. T. O. to complete the Assessment afresh. On appeal before the Tribunal the assessee again contended that the assessment made ignoring the provisions of section 144-B was void and so the assessment order should have been annulled and the matter not remanded back to the I. T. O. by the Commissioner (Appeals ). The Tribunal held that section 144 B was a procedural provision. On appeal before the Tribunal the assessee again contended that the assessment made ignoring the provisions of section 144-B was void and so the assessment order should have been annulled and the matter not remanded back to the I. T. O. by the Commissioner (Appeals ). The Tribunal held that section 144 B was a procedural provision. On reference, the High Court of Kerala held that section 144-B was only the procedural provision and a breach of that provision was not a fundamental or jurisdictional infirmity which would render the assessment void or nullity. ( 15 ) IN Orient Trading Company v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat Ahmedabad, 152 I. T. R. 26, the question before the Gujarat High Court was whether the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the service of notice under section 148 of the Act prior to the commencement of proceedings under section 283 did not make the Commissioner s order legally infirm. While examining this question the court observed that there was no substance in the argument that a notice under section 139 (2) could not be issued when assessment was already made and consequently on issuance of notice under section 148 which was deemed to be a notice under section 139 (2), the assessment made under section 143 stood set aside. It held that notice which was issued under section 148 was not a notice under section 139 (2) and all that section 148 said was that a notice issued under that section shall contain all or any of the requirements which might be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 139. The court also observed that the assessment or reassessment contemplated under section 147 was confined to income which had escaped assessment and the section did not empower the I. T. O. to reopen the assessment of income which had already been assessed. The court, thus, did not accept the argument of the assessee that the notice issued by the I. T. O. under section 148 became a notice under section 339 (2] and consequently the assessment made under section 143 stood set aside. The court, thus, did not accept the argument of the assessee that the notice issued by the I. T. O. under section 148 became a notice under section 339 (2] and consequently the assessment made under section 143 stood set aside. Further, examining the provisions of section 246 of the Act which specifically provided for appeals separately against an order made under section 143 (3) and section 147 of the Act, and sub-section (2) of section 152, the court held that the scheme of the Act clearly indicated that the assessment made under section 143 and reassessment made under section 147 were distinct and independent of each other and that section 147 contemplated a separate order and such an order was not and could not be said to have been made under section 143 and that the original assessment order made under section 143 and reassessment order made under section 147 could co-exist. In this judgment, the Gujarat High Court referred to a decision, of this Court in Enarda Trading Company v. C. I. T. (1984) 149 I. T. R. 19, which had taken the view that merely by reopening the assessment or by issue of the notice the entire assessment was not set aside and that the order of reassessment would take the place of the original order of assessment and till that was done the original order of assessment would still be operative. The Gujarat High Court did not wholly agree with the view expressed by this Court. It did not agree to the extent that the reassessment was made by the I. T. O. in pursuance to proceedings initiated under section 147 and/ or section 148 then on reassessment the entire original assessment was set aside and ceased to exist with the result that the original order of assessment which the Commissioner was seeking to revise became non est. The Gujarat High Court was ofthe view that the assessment order made under section 143 and reassessment order made under section 147 were independent and separate orders. ( 16 ) IN Commissioner of Income-fax v. Usha Aggarwal, (1989) 178 I. T. R. 406, the Punjab and Haryana High Court dealt with a question similar to that one arises in the present case. ( 16 ) IN Commissioner of Income-fax v. Usha Aggarwal, (1989) 178 I. T. R. 406, the Punjab and Haryana High Court dealt with a question similar to that one arises in the present case. The Court was of the view that there was a clear distinction between the assessment under section 143 and that under section 147 read with section 148 and that assessment under section 147 did not depend upon the authority of section 143 for its completion. It held that section 147 itself authorised the Income-tax Officer to assess, reasseas or recompute the income as section 143 (3) enabled the Income-tax Officer to make the assessment. The court was of the view that the assessment under section 147 was thus a species different from the assessment under section 143 (3) and both had been treated differently, in the Act. It was further of the view with reference to the provisions of section 144b that these would show that they specifically mention section 143 (3) and not section 147 which showed the intention of the Legislature that applicability of section 147 was excluded. The court answered the question in favour of the assessee. ( 17 ) IN Commissioner of Income-tax v. Simson and MC Correchy Limited, (1989.) 177 I. T. R. 526, the question that was raised before the Madras High Court was whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that section 153 (2) applied and not section 153 (1) and consequently cancelling the reassessment made by the Income-tax Officer for the assessment year 1967-68 as time barred ?" In this case, the assessment which was initially completed was subsequently reopened under section 147 (a) and a notice under section 148 issued. The assessee filed the return. The I. T. O. proposed to make an addition of over Rs. 4 lakhs and in accordance with section 144b of the Act he prepared a draft of the proposed order of assessment and forwarded it to the assessee. After receiving the directions from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner the I. T. O. completed the assessment. The assessee contended that the assessment was barred by limitation. The Tribunal held this to be so. The court examined the provisions of section 153 and also referred to sections 139 to 158 dealing with the procedure for assessment commencing with section 139 relating to the filing of the return. The assessee contended that the assessment was barred by limitation. The Tribunal held this to be so. The court examined the provisions of section 153 and also referred to sections 139 to 158 dealing with the procedure for assessment commencing with section 139 relating to the filing of the return. The court held that in case where a notice under section 148 of the Act had been issued as was the case before it, the limitation as provided under section 153 (2) would apply and that being so the assessment was time barred. The court also noted that under section 2 (8) assessment included reassessment, bat was of the view that that definition would apply unless the context otherwise required and the provisions of section 153 (1) and 153 (2) maintained a clear cut distinction between the respective cases contemplated by it which showed that the expression "assessment" occuring in section 153 (1) could not be understood as including a reassessment as defined in section 2 (B ). The court was also of the view that opening words of section 153 (1) could not be construed as including an order of reassessment as contemplated under section 147 with reference to which a separate or independent provision had been made under section 153 (2 ). It also held that the power to assess or reassess such income or recompute the same, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned conferred by section 147 when exercised, could not be interpreted to mean an assessment under section 143 or section 144 of the Act. It further held that by reason of section 148 of the Act, the other provisions of the Act were made applicable in making an assessment or a revised assessment, as the case may be, under section 147 of the Act. But from that it was not possible to infer that where an assessment or revised assessment was made under section 147 of the Act, it was one falling under section 143 or section 144 of the Act, as the case might be. It will be. thus, seen that though in this case the question referred to did not per se mention section 144 of the Act, but when the court held the assessment to be barred by limitation, it would appear that time extended by Explanation I (iv) to section 153 did not come to be considered. It will be. thus, seen that though in this case the question referred to did not per se mention section 144 of the Act, but when the court held the assessment to be barred by limitation, it would appear that time extended by Explanation I (iv) to section 153 did not come to be considered. ( 18 ) IN Commissoner of Income-Tax, Bihar v. Ram Chandra Singh. 104 (1976) ITR 77 (Patna), the question raised was whether the levy and demand of penalty under section 273 (b) of the Act on the basis of reassessment under section 34 of the old Act (Income-tax Act, 1932) after giving deduction, for penalty levied under section 18a (9) of the old Act on the basis of the original assessment under section 23 (3) of the old Act was legal and valid. The court after examining the provisions of the old Act and the relevant provisions of the 1961 Act held that an assessment or reassessment contemplated under section 34 (1) of the old Act was not a regular assessment and that a similar provision bad been made in section 147 of the 1961 Act. The court then observed that in section 273 also the words regular assessment had been used and that it was clear from various provisions of the 1922 Act as well as 1961 Act that a penalty could be imposed for non-furnishing of estimates of advance tax only in connection with the regular assessment under section 143 or 144 of the 1961 Act, and that a proceeding for assessment or reassessment under section 147 of the Act was not a proceeding in connection with the regular assessment and so no penalty could be imposed. ( 19 ) IN M. R. Jayaram v. Commissioner afincome-tax, Madras. 147 (1984) I. T. R. 807 (Madras), one of the contentions, raised was regarding the construction of the provisions of section 187 of the Act and it was said that there was no mention made in that section of reassessment proceedings on a firm under section 147 of the Act. It was contended that in some other sections of the Act special provision had been made for proceeding under section 147 and reference in this connection was made to section 159 wherein a special provision was made for assessment on legal representatives. It was contended that in some other sections of the Act special provision had been made for proceeding under section 147 and reference in this connection was made to section 159 wherein a special provision was made for assessment on legal representatives. Under section 187 where at the time of making an assessment under section 143 or section 144 it is found that a change had occurred in the constitution of a firm, the assessment shall be made on the firm as constituted at the time of making the assessment. The court held that absence of any reference to section 147 did not disentitle or disable to I. T. O. from applying section 187 even to reassessment proceedings. The court observed as under - "after all section 147 is not what may be called as assessment provision, lt is only an enabling provision, which gives the I. T. O. additional power to make an assessment on escaped income-income which was not brought to his notice in the original assessment. There is, therefore, no need to refer specially to the provisions of section 147 wherever it is intended to cover not merely the original assessment proceedings but also the reassessment proceedings. The fact that the Legislature has made special reference to section 147 in the contex of section 159 does not mean that we will have to read the provisions of section 187 in a different manner for fact of reference to section 147 in that provision. The Tribunal in its order had held that section 187 is large enough in its scope to take in not only an original assessment under section 143 but also reassessment proceedings against a firm under section 147 of the Act and the same consequences will flow following the reassessment of the firm as they flow following an original assessment on it. We feel that this is the correct view of section 147 of the Act forreasons which we have discussed above. This diposes of the first question of law which has been referred to us. Our answer, shortly stated, is in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. " ( 20 ) IN Gates Foam and Rubber Co. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Kerala 90 (1973) I. T. R. 422 (Kerala), the question was whether the reassessmeat mad. This diposes of the first question of law which has been referred to us. Our answer, shortly stated, is in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. " ( 20 ) IN Gates Foam and Rubber Co. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Kerala 90 (1973) I. T. R. 422 (Kerala), the question was whether the reassessmeat mad. under section 147 (a) of the Act was not a regular assessment and, therefore, the provisions of section 273 (b) could not be validly applied to such a case. Sectioe 273 (b) uses the expression "regular assessment". It says if the Income-tan Officer, in the course of any proceedings in connection with the regular assessmeat for any assessment year, is satisfied that any assessee has without reasonable cause failed to furnish an estimate of the advance tax payable by him in accordance with the provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 209a, he may direct payment of penalty. The court referred to the definition of "regular assessment" under section 2 (40) and to the provisions of sections 147 and 148 of the Act. It observed as under :- "a notice issued under section 148, which may includes the requirements under sub section (2) of section 139, is really not a notice under section 139, because section 148 itself states that the provisions of the Act will apply as if the notice issued was under sub-section (2) of section 139. So, the assessment that follows cannot strictly be said to be an assessment under section 143 of the Act. Apart from this, sections 147, 148, 253, 271 and 246 specifically refer to assessment under section 147. Assessments made after resort to the provisions in section 147 appear under the scheme of the Act to be assessments under section 147 and therefore not assessments under section 143. If this be so, such assessments are not "regular assessments" because the definition of "regular assessment" In section 2 (40) specifically states that "regular assessments" are those made under section 143 or section 144. When an expression is defined in the Act and when that expression again occurs in that statute it is axiomatic that the meaning of the definition must be given to that expression wherever it occurs in the Act. When an expression is defined in the Act and when that expression again occurs in that statute it is axiomatic that the meaning of the definition must be given to that expression wherever it occurs in the Act. So it seems to us to be evident that the expression "regular assessment" in section 273 can only mean assessments made under section 143 or 144. In this case the section-section 273-cannot apply to the reassessment that has been made on September 11, 1987 which was under section 147. " ( 21 ) IN B. B. Ameeruddin v. Income-tax Officer, 92 (1973) I. T. R. 300 (Madras), the contention raised was if the assessment of a partner could be reopened after his retirement even when there was reassessment of the firm. The court observed as under :- "section 187 of the Act provides that where, at the time of making an assessment under section 143 or 144, it is found that a change has occurred in the constitution of the firm, the assessment shall be made on the firm as constituted at the time of making the assessment, provided that the income of the previous year shall for the purposes of inclusion in the total incomes of the partners, be apportioned between the partners who. in such previous year, were entitled to receive the same, under section 189 (1 ). Where any business or profession carried on by a firm has been discontinued or where a firm is dissolved, the Income-tax Officer shall make an assessment of the total income of the firm as if no such discontinuance or dissolution had taken place. Section 2 (8) defines "assessment" as including "reassessment". The reassessment proceedings also could, therefore, be initiated in respect of a firm in which there has been a change in the constitution of a firm or where the firm is dissolved or discontinued at the time when the proceedings were initialed. We do not find anything in the context of these provisions requiring not to give effect to the definition of "assessment". We do not find anything in the context of these provisions requiring not to give effect to the definition of "assessment". On a plain reading of section 187, therefore, the reassessment could be made on the reconstituted firm and if the firm s reassessment relates to an accounting period in which the petitioner had continued as a partner of the partnership firm, his assessment, could be corrected or amended in respect of that assessment year to include the correct share income under section 155. It is immaterial whether on the day when the reassessment was made against the firm or on the day when recoification of the order under section 155 was made, the partner continued in the partnership or not". ( 22 ) IN Income-tax Officer, Azamgarh, and Anr. v. Mewalal Dwarka Prasad, (1989) 176 ITR 529, there was challenge in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by the assessee to notices issued under section 148 read with section 142 (1) and 143 (2) of the Act relating to the assessment years 1965-66, The Court approved the Bench decisions of the Punjab High Court in C. l. T. v. Jagan Nath Maheshwary, (1957) 32 ITR 418 , and of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Pulavarthi Viswanadhan v. C-I. T. , (1963) 50 ITR 463, wherein the courts there considered the provisions of sections 22 (2) and 34 of the old Act of 1922 which are quite akin to section 139 and sections 147 to 153 of the present Act. The Supreme Court observed that the view taken by these two High Courts had been supported by the Supreme Court in V. Jaganmohan Rao v. CIT and CEPT,1970) 75 ltr 373, and in that connection referred to the following paragraph of that judgment at page 380) :- "this argument is not of much avail to the appellant because once proceedings under section 34 are taken to be validly initiated with regard to two-thirds share of the income, the jurisdiction of the Income-tax officer cannot be confined only to that portion of the income. Section 34 in terms states that once the Income-tax Officer decides to reopen the assessment he could do so within the period prescribed by serving on the person liable to pay tax a notice containing all or any of the requirements which may be included in a notice under section 22 (2) and may proceed to assess or reassess such income, profits and gains. It is, therefore, manifest that once an assessment is reopened by issuing a notice under sub-section (2) of section 22 the previous under-assessment is set aside and the whole assessment proceedings start afresh. When once valid proceedings are started under section 34 (l) (b) the Income-tax Officer had not only the jurisdiction but it was his duly to levy tax on the entire income that had escaped assessment during that year. " ( 23 ) REFERENCE was also made to the following paragraph as well of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Perimisetti Seetharamamma v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1963) ITR 450 :- ". . . . . . WHEN once an assessment is reopened under section 34, the Income-tax Officer proceeds de novo under the relevant sections of the Income-tax Act, i. e. , he issues notices under section 22 (2) and proceeds to assess the assessee. He has to follow the same procedure as in the case of the first assessment as is clear from the clause in section 34 and the provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice under that sub-section. The proceedings under section 34 must be deemed to relate to proceedings which commence with publication of notice under section 22 (1 ). "( 24 ) THE Supreme Court, however, in the case before it set aside thee notice issued under section 148 of the Act on the ground that the notice was issued beyond the period prescribed by law. ( 25 ) A Special Bench (Delhi Bench A) of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in Bela Singh Pabia v. Income-tax Officer, (1982) I ITD 370 (Delhi), considered the question which is involved in the present case. In a detailed order rendered by Shri E. M. Narayanan Unni, Vice President, the Tribunal held that provisions of section 144b were applicable to an assessment made pursuant to provisions of section 147 of the Act. In a detailed order rendered by Shri E. M. Narayanan Unni, Vice President, the Tribunal held that provisions of section 144b were applicable to an assessment made pursuant to provisions of section 147 of the Act. Sampath lyengar in his book Law of Income Tax (Eighth Edition) (Revised by Justice S Ranganathan, Judge, Supreme Court of India) said as under on the applicability of section 144b ;- "section 144b, being a provision enacted entirely for the benefit of the assesses and with a view to lessening the propect of harassment in the course of assessment, it will be unreasonable to hold that such a beneficial provision is not applicable to additions and disallowance proposed in the course of an assessment or reassessment, pursuant to the provisions of section 147. A reasonable construction of the provisions of that section would yield the result that the section applies to all assessments made under section 143 (3), whether by way of original assessment or as a result of a reopening of the assessment under section 147. " ( 26 ) RELIANCE was placed on the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in Bela Singh Pabla s case. ( 27 ) KANGA and Palkhivala in their book "the Law and Pratice of income Tax (8th Edition) have said that section 147 would apply if at the time of making an assessment under section 143 or 144 (which would include reassessment under section 147) it was found that a change had occurred in the constitution of the firm. That section 147 would apply to reassessment proceedings as well. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Ameerudin (92 ITR 366) and Jayaram s (147 ITR 807) cases. Relying on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C i. T. v. Usha, 178 I. T. R. 406, the learned authors have said that provisions of section 144b were not applicable to an assessment made under section 147. ( 28 ) A great deal of arguments had been addressed by the parties relying on one judgment or the other in support of their submissions. Reference has also been made to various treaties on the interpretation of statutes. At this stage, however, we may briefly refer to some of the sections falling in Chapter XIV of the Act relating to procedure for assessment as these existed at the relevant time. Reference has also been made to various treaties on the interpretation of statutes. At this stage, however, we may briefly refer to some of the sections falling in Chapter XIV of the Act relating to procedure for assessment as these existed at the relevant time. Section 139 requires furnishing of return of income. A person is bound to furnish voluntarily a return of his total income if such income during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income tax. Under sub-section (2) of section 139, in case of any person who, in the opinion of the Income-tax Officer, is assessable under the Act on his own total income during the previous year, the Income-tax Officer may, before the end of the relevant assessment year issue him a notice requiring him to furnish within thirty days from the date of service of the notice a return of his income in the form prescribed and verified in the prescribed manner and setting foroh such other particulars as may be prescribed. Under section 140a (self assessment), where any tax Is payable on the basis of any return required to be furnished under section 139 or section 148, after taking into account the amount of tax, if any, already paid under any provision of the Act, the assessee shall be liable to pay such tax before furnishing the return and the return shall be accompanied by proof of payment of such tax. Under sub-section (2) of this section, after the regular assessment under section 143 or section 144 has been made, any amount paid under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to have been paid towards such regular assessment. Under section 142 (Enquiry before assessment), for the purpose of making an assessment under the Act, the Income-tax Officer may serve on any person who has made a return under section 139, or to whom a notice has been issued under sub-section (2) thereof (whether a return has been made or not) a notice requiring him to produce accounts and documents and, furnish such other information as income tax Officer may require. Section 143 deals with assessment. Section 143 deals with assessment. Under sub-section (1) of this section, where a return has been made under section 139 of the Act, the Income-tax Officer may, without requiring the presence of the assessee or the production by him of any evidence in support of a return, make an assessment of the total income of loss of the assessee after making certain prescribed adjustments. Then, under subsection (2), where a return has been made under section 139 and an assessment has been made under sub-section (1) of section 143, the assessee may object to the assessment within the stipulated period. Income-tax Officer is also authorised, whether or not he has made assessment under sub-section (1), where he considers necessary or expedient to verify the correctness and completeness of the return by requiring the presence of the assessee or the production of evidence in this behalf. In both these cases, the Income-tax officer is to serve a notice on the assessee for the purpose. The under sub-sect ion (3) of se:tion 143, after hearing the assessee and considering the evidence that he may produce or such other evidence as the lacome-tax Officer may require, the Income-tax Officer shall make an assessment of the total income orlops of the assessee and determine the sum payable by him or refundable to him on the basis of such assessment. This is where the assessment has not been made under sub section (1) of section 143. Under section 144 (Best judgment assessment), where the assessee defaults in filing the return when required to do so under section 139 (2) or in filing the revised return under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) of that section, or fails to comply with the terms of the notice under section 142 (1) or fails to comply with other directions issued under sub-section (2) (a) of that section, or having made a return fails to comply with all the terms of a notice issued under sub-section (2) of section 143, The Income-tax Officer can make assessment of ths total income or loss tothe best of his judgment and determine the same payable by the assessee or refundable to him on the basis of such assessment. Under section 144a, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner has been authorised to issue directions to the locome-tax Officer in certain cases. Under section 144a, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner has been authorised to issue directions to the locome-tax Officer in certain cases. This section is as under:- " (1) An Inspecting Assistant Commissioner may, on his own motion or on a reference being made to him by the Income-tax Officer or on the application of an assessee, call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which assessment is pending and, if he considers that, having regard to the nature of the case or the amount involved or for any other reason, it is necessary or expedient so to do, he may issue such directions as he thinks fit for the guidance of the Income-tax Officer to enable him to complete the assessment and such direction shall be binding on the Income-tax Officer: Provided that no directions which are prejudicial to the assessee shall be issued before an opportunity is given to the assessee to be heard. Explanation : For the purposes of this sub-section, no direction as to the lines on which an investigation connected with the assessment should be made, shall be deened to be a direction prejudicial to the assessee. ( 29 ) SECTION 144b deals with reference to Inspecting Assistant Commissioner in certain cases and has already been set out earlier in the judgment. Section 147 (Income escaping assessment) and section 148 (Issue of notice where income has escaped assessment have also been set out above. Section 149 prescribe the time limit for notice under section 148 in cases falling under section 147 of the Act. Under section 150, irrespective of the period prescribed for issue of notice under section 148 or section 149, notice can be issued any time under section 148 for the purpose of making an assessment, or reassessment, or recomputation in consequence of, or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order passed in an appeal, reference or revision under the Act. Under section 151 only after the Board has given sanction that notice can be issued under section 148 after expiry of eight years from the end of the relevant assessment year. Then, under sub-section (1) of section 152, in an assessment, reassessment or recomputation made under section 147, the tax shall be chargeable at the rate or rates at which it would have been charged bad the income not escaped assessment. Then, under sub-section (1) of section 152, in an assessment, reassessment or recomputation made under section 147, the tax shall be chargeable at the rate or rates at which it would have been charged bad the income not escaped assessment. Section 153 prescribes the time limit for completion of assessments and reassssments Sub-section (1) prescribes the period for an order of assessment to be made under section 143 or section 144. Sub-section (2) is as under :- No order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation shall: be made under section 147- (a) where the assessment, reassessment or computation is to be made under clause (a) of that section, after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year in which the notice under section 148 was served : (b) where the assessment, reassessment or recomputation is to be made under clause (b) of that section, afier- (i) the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable, or (ii) the expiry of one year from the date of service of the notice. under section 148. whichever is later. ( 30 ) CLAUSE (iv) of Explanation to this section is also relevant and is as under:- "in computing the period of limitation for the purposes of this section- xx xx xx (iv) the period (not exceeding one hundred and eighty days) commencing from the date on which the Income-tax Officer forwards the draft order under sub-section (. 1) of section 144b the assessee and ending with the date on which the Income-tax Officer receives the directions from the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under sub-section (4) of that section, or in a case where no objections to the draft order are received from the assessee, a period of thirty days, or xx xx xx shall be excluded. " ( 31 ) WE have considered the judgments referred to above, the arguments of the parties and the relevant provisions of the Act and we are of the opinion that provisions of section 144b are applicable to an assessment made under section 147 of the Act. Section 144b is merely procedural in nature and has been enacted for the benefit of the assessse or in other words provisions of this section are beneficial to the assessee. Section 144b is merely procedural in nature and has been enacted for the benefit of the assessse or in other words provisions of this section are beneficial to the assessee. There cannot be any dispute on this and for this, we can refer to the report of the Wanchoo Committee reproduced above which led to the enactment of sections 144a and 144b. In Mithilesh Kumari and Anr. v. prem Behari Khare, (1989) 177 I. T. R. 97 (SC), the Supreme Court has observed that where a particular enactment or an amendment was a result of the recommendation of the Law Commission of India it was permissible to refer to the relevant report of the Commission. The court referred to its earlier decrsion in Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, (1977) 1 SCR 229 , where it was considered necessary to trace the historical background and social setting under which a particular section in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was inserted for the first time and reference was made in that connection to the research done by the Law Commission which had made several recommendations in its report for changes in the provision. ( 32 ) IN the Halsbury s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, (Vol. 44, para 901, it has been observed that on the other hand, reports of Commissions or Committees preceding the enactment of a statute may be considered as showing the mischief aimed at and the state of law as it was understood to be by the legislature when the statute was passed. ( 33 ) THERE appears to us to be no reason as to why section 144b which is procedural in nature and beneficial to the assessee cannot be applied to proceedings initiated under sections 147 and 148 of the Act. Section 147 does not create any charge. Under this section, the income can be assessed, reassessed or recomputed subject to provisions of section 148 to 153. These sections have been referred to above- The principal contention pertains to the- proceedings after notice under section 148. Assessee has contended that section 144b specifically refers to assessment made under sub-section (3) of section 143 of the Act. We arc of the opinion that assessment has to be made under section 143 (3) after the proceedings are initiated under sections 147 and 148 of the Act. Assessee has contended that section 144b specifically refers to assessment made under sub-section (3) of section 143 of the Act. We arc of the opinion that assessment has to be made under section 143 (3) after the proceedings are initiated under sections 147 and 148 of the Act. A notice under section 148 may contain all or any of the requirements of notice under section 139 (2) and then the provisions of the Act shall. so far as may be, apply accordingly as if the notice were a notice under that sub-section. Thus, a notice under section 148 is in effect a notice under section 139 (2) of the Act. The expression "so far as may be" has always been construed to mean that those provisions may generally be followed to the extent possible. In order to give full meaning to this expression, section 148, to our mind, should be interpreted to mean that broadly the procedure relating to. assessment as enacted in sub. section (3) of section 143 shall be followed. There appears to be no justification for deviation from the procedure of assessment contemplated under section 14. " (3 ). Otherwise, an anomalous situation boarding on absurdity may result. Section 144a does not use the expression"in an assessment to bemade under sub-section (3) of section 143" and confers- the power upon the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to give directions in a case in which an assessment is pending. The assessment here cannot be confined to that under sub-section (3) of section 143 of the Act only and it will include that under sections 147 and 148 of the Act. We have also noticed above that the expression an assessment under section 143" has been used in section 187 as well and wherein it has been held, that that would include that under section 147 of the Act as well. We have not have been given any cogent reason as to why a different procedure could be said to have been contemplated while making assessment under section 143 (3) and that making under section 147 of the Act. la fact all these provisions must be interpreted to mean that section 144b would also be applicable to assessment under section 147 of the Act and that in the circumstances appears to be the only correct interpretation. la fact all these provisions must be interpreted to mean that section 144b would also be applicable to assessment under section 147 of the Act and that in the circumstances appears to be the only correct interpretation. Explanation I to section 153 has reference to the computation of the period of limitation for the purpose of section 143 itself and not particularly to sub-section (2) of section 153 thereof. If we refer to the commentary on the Law and Practice of Income Tax by Kanga and Palkhivala (Eighth Edition,. Vol. I, page 1127), this is how it save about the word assessment: "the word "assessment" is used in this Act as meaning sometimes the computation of income, sometimes the determination of the amount of tax payable, and sometimes the whole procedure laid down in the Act for imposing liability on the taxpayer. The word assessment" must be understood in each section of this Act with reference to the context in which it is used : in some sections it has a comprehensive meaning and includes reassessment (e. g. 265) and in some sections it has a restricted meaning and is used as distinct from reassessment (e g. s. 147 ). As the Privy Council pointed out in Badrida Dada v. CJ. T. (17 ITR 109), in this section acd the: next the words "assess" and "assessment" refer primarily to computation of the amount of income, and "assessce" means primarily a person the amount of whose income is being computed. " ( 34 ) AN argument was raised that the fiscal and revenue statute should be strictly construed. This principle does not apply here. In fact there is no scope for play of such a rule. It is not that any duty is being claimed by the revenue under the statute and there is any ambiguity about it that it should be construed in favour of the assessee. The construction which we are placing is in fact in favour of an assessee but may be not in the case of the present assessee before us, because he wants to take advantage of the law of limitation prescribing time limit for completion of assessment and reassessment. A fair and reasonable construction is to be given to the language used without leaning to one side or the other. A fair and reasonable construction is to be given to the language used without leaning to one side or the other. Present is not a case of taxation but of tax administration confined only to the procedural aspect of the matter. Long drawn arguments in the present cane do suggest ambiguity. As stated by Halsbury (para 158), if the words of the statute are ambiguous the intention of the Parliament must be sought first in the statute itself, then in the other legislation and contemporaneous circumstances and finally in the general rules laid down long ago and often approved, normally by ascertaining (1) what was the "common" law before the making of the Act. (2) what was the mischief and defect for which the "common" law did not provide. (3) what remedy Parliament resolved and appointed to counter the disease of the common-wealth and (4) the true reason of the remedy. It has also been the principle of construction that statute must be construed so as to make them operative and they are also to be construed as a whole. Construction should be such as is most agreeable to justice and reason. Language of section 148 of the Act may appear to raise some difficulty but we are of the firm opinion that it was never intended that provision of section 144b would not apply. If it is not so, it results in apparent contradiction. How can it be that Parliament would have applied the provisions of section 144b to assessment under section 143 (3) of the Act and not to that sections 147 and 148 of the Act. It is well established that "where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical con truction, leads to a manifest contradaction of the apparent parpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftman s unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractiability of the language used. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftman s unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractiability of the language used. Nevertheless, the courts are very reluctant to substitute words in a Statute or to add words to it, and it has been said that they will only do so where there is a repugnancy to good sense. " see Maxwell on Statutes (10th ed.) p. 229. In Seaford Court Eitate, Ltd v. Asner, (1949) 2 All E. R. 155, 164, Denning, L. J. , said. When a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftman. He must set to work on the constructive test of finding the intention of Parliament. . . . . . . . . . . . and then he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life" to the intention of the legislature. . . . . . . . . . . . A judge should ask himself the question bow, if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have strightened it out ? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases. " (See in this connection judgment of Sarkar, J. in M. Pentiah and others v. Muddala Veeramalloppa and others, (1961) 2 S. G. R. 295. ( 35 ) NO doubt, the provisions of sections 139 to 143 relate to normal assessment and those of section 147 operate into different fields, but section 147 is merely a machinery section and enables the I. T. O. to reopen an assessment which had already been completed or even to bring to charge, for the first time, income which had escaped assessment. Theassessment, therefore, has to be completed either under section 143 or section 143 (3) or under section 144 of the Act. Section 147 cannot be said to be a self contained section. Theassessment, therefore, has to be completed either under section 143 or section 143 (3) or under section 144 of the Act. Section 147 cannot be said to be a self contained section. As noted above, Income-tax Officer has to exercise his power under section 147 subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153 of the Act. When section 148 says that notice shall contain all or any of the requirements that may be included in a notice under sub-section (2) of section 139 and thereafter provisons of the Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly as if a notice is one under sub-section (2) of section 135 of the Act, the provisions as contained in the Act after issue of notice under section 139 (2) of the Act would apply in the same manner as in a normal assessment and resultant assessment would, therefore, has to be one made either under section 143 (3) or 144 of the Act. Provisions of section 144b, therefore, in any case, shall apply. ( 36 ) CONSIDERING the diverse arguments of the parties, various authorities cited at the Bar and principles of construction of statute, we are of the opinion that Delhi Bench A (Special Bench) of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in Bela Singh Pabla v. Income-tax Officer, (1982) I ITD 370 (Delhi), has taken correct view of the matter. We are also of the opion that a provision for separate appeal against an order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation under section 147 as provided under section 240 of the Act is of no consequence while interpreting the provisions of section 144b as to its applicability, to the proceedings under sections 147 and 148 of the Act. Further, sub-section (2) of section 263 of the Act prohibits the Commissioner from making any order under sub-section (1) to revise an order of reassessment made under section 147 and not to assessment or recomputation and does not conflict with the view that section 144 B would be applicable to proceedings under section 147 and 148 of the Act. We note, however, that this bar on the power of the Commissioner has been deleted by an amendment made in 1984. We note, however, that this bar on the power of the Commissioner has been deleted by an amendment made in 1984. For the purpose of answering the questions referred to we do not consider it n ecessary to refer to the arguments with reference to sections 214 and 215 of the Act relating respectively to payment of interest by the Central Government and by the assessee on the basis of the date of the regular assessment, the provisions as these existing at the elevant time and the subsequent amendments thereto. We, therefore, answer the reference in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs.