Judgment :- The invasion, and occupation of Kuwait on 2nd August, 1990, and the subsequent annexation of the same as a province of Iraq leading to the gulf crisis raise many questions of fundamental importance to the world, the offshoot of which, in the national plane, is the one I am concerned in this. This petition, a public interest litigation, is by an Advocate practising in this Court, filed as 'Deseeya President' of 'May¬dina Thozhilali Kendram', seeking to quash the decision of the 1st respondent permitting U.S. Aircrafts to land at Bombay Sagar International Airport and to refuel from c-1-1991 onwards. By a supplementary affidavit filed on 4-2-1991, it is stated that the refuelling is done also at Meenambakkam Airport and at Agra Airport. Petitioner also prays for a writ of prohibition restraining the respondents from allowing the refuelling of U.S. Aircrafts in Sagar International Airport, Bombay, or from any other Airports in India. 2. Petitioner's case is that there is acute shortage of fuel in India and permitting U.S. Military Aircrafts for refuelling in India is detrimental to the interests of this Country. It is also stated that the entire operation of refuelling is carried on in top secret and nobody is permitted to see the fuelling operations. The decision of the Government of India extending refuelling facilities to U.S. Military aircrafts has been characterised as unfriendly act by the Government of India towards Gulf countries including Palestine. The matter was argued elaborately before me, emphasising the effect it will have in the international relations, and the established relationship with the gulf countries. Petitioner by himself is not an aggrieved party. But he represents an organization which condemns the decision of the Government of India as anti-national. The so called decision, which the petitioner seeks to quash, has not been produced by the petitioner, and that by itself is a ground for denying the relief, for it was held by the Supreme Court in Surinder Singh v. Central Government ((1986) 4 SCC 667) at 675, para.9) as follows: "Normally whenever an order of Government or some authority is impugned before the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution, the copy of the order must be produced before it. In the absence of the impugned order, it would not be possible to ascertain the reasons which may have impelled the authority to pass the order. In the absence of the impugned order, it would not be possible to ascertain the reasons which may have impelled the authority to pass the order. It is therefore improper to quash an order which is not produced before the High Court in a proceeding under Art.226 of the Constitution." 3. The Supreme Court very recently emphasised the legitimate purpose for which public interest litigation should be used. Such legal proceedings should be used only to vindicate the fundamental and other rights of the group of persons who financially and socially backward. It should not be used to advance any private rights, or even public rights of any group of persons subscribing to any particular view points. In such cases, it is the duty of the Courts to discourage such petitions. The said decision of the Supreme Court is in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar G.T. 1991 (1) sc 78). The operative portion of the decision at page 83 reads as follows: "Public interest litigation cannot be invoked by a person or body of persons to satisfy his or its personal grudge and enmity. If such petitions under Art.32, are entertained, it would amount to abuse of process of the Court preventing speedy remedy to other genuine petitioners from this Court. Personal interest cannot be enforced through the process of this Court under Art.32 of the Constitution in the garb of public interest litigation. Public interest litigation contemplates legal proceeding for vindication or enforcement of fundamental rights of a group of persons or community which are not able to enforce their fundamental rights on account of their incapacity, poverty or ignorance of law. A person invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Art.32 must approach this Court for the vindication of the fundamental rights of affected persons and not for the purpose of vindication of his personal grudge or enmity. It is duty of this Court to discourage such petitions and to ensure that the course of justice is not obstructed or polluted by unscrupulous litigants by invoking the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court for personal matter under the garb of public interest litigation. See Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India; Sachindanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal; Ramsharan Autyanuprasi & Anr v. Union of India & Ors. and Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U.P. & Ors." 4. See Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India; Sachindanand Pandey v. State of West Bengal; Ramsharan Autyanuprasi & Anr v. Union of India & Ors. and Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U.P. & Ors." 4. In this case, we are not concerned with the legal or other rights of any socially or economically backward class of persons, but we are concerned with a policy decision which the Government of India is supposed to have taken, and opposition thereto by persons holding a different point of view. People are governed by the executive Government and the judiciary is concerned with the adjudication of disputes regarding infringement of rights. A detailed discussion in this regard, warning the judiciary not to interfere with policy decisions taken by the Government is contained in the decision in Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti v. Union of India (J.T.1990 (1) sc 359), and it reads as follows: " It is difficult to contend that the actions following from non-acceptance of any policy perspective, amount to direct and casual violation of the fundamental right of the citizens guaranteed under the Constitution of India. Court is not the forum to adjudicate upon the questions of policy unless such a policy is the direct mandate of the Constitution. 8. It is well-settled that judicial review, in order to enforce a fundamental right, is permissible of administrative, legislative and governmental action or non-action, and that the rights of the citizens of this country are to be judged by the judiciary and judicial forums and not by the administrators or executives. But it is equally true that citizens of India are not to be governed by the judges or judiciary. If the governance is illegal or violative of rights and obligations, other questions may arise but whether as mentioned hereinbefore, it has to be a policy decision by the Government or the authority and thereafter enforcement of that policy, the Court should not be, and we hope would not be an appropriate forum for decision." Therefore, my concern only be the rights of the parties involved in these proceedings. 5. The decision alleged to have been taken by the Government of India is not before me. There is no clear picture as to what exactly is the decision taken by the Government. 5. The decision alleged to have been taken by the Government of India is not before me. There is no clear picture as to what exactly is the decision taken by the Government. If there is a decision taken by the Government of India to extend refuelling facilities to U.S. Military aircrafts, it is a decision taken between two sovereign states, and this Court cannot interfere with such decisions. To that effect is the decision reported, in B.K. Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, (AIR 1988 SC 24). In paragraph 5 of the said decision this aspect has been dealt with as under: An'act of State' is an act done in relation to a foreigner by the sovereign power of a country or its agent either previously authorised or subsequently ratified. Such an act cannot be questioned or made the subject of legal proceedings in any Court of law." Whether refuelling facilities should be given to U.S. aircrafts not, and what will be its implications and impact, will have to be considered by the State or the Executive Government. This is a policy matter in which this Court will not normally interfere. More so when the matter is governed by the decision taken between two sovereign States. The petitioner referred to the Paris Convention governing the matter. He also referred to Art.51 in Part IV of the Constitution of India laying down the Directive Principles of State Policy. In B. Krishna Bhat v. Union of India (1990) SCC 652 the Supreme Court held that the Directive principles of State Policy are not enforceable by any Court of law, and observed as follows: "Article 37 enjoins that the provisions of this part shall not be enforceable by any Court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws. It has to be borne in mind that Art.32 of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court power to enforce rights which are fundamental rights. Fundamental rights are justiciable, Directive Principles are not. Directive Principles are aimed at securing certain values or enforce certain attitudes in the law making and in the administration of law. Directive Principles cannot in the very nature of things be enforced in a court of law. Fundamental rights are justiciable, Directive Principles are not. Directive Principles are aimed at securing certain values or enforce certain attitudes in the law making and in the administration of law. Directive Principles cannot in the very nature of things be enforced in a court of law. See in this connection the observations of this Court in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Rly.) v. Union of India. Whether a law should be made embodying the principles of Directive Principles depends on the legislative will of the legislation. What the petitioner seeks to achieve by this application is to inject a sense of priority and urgency in that legislative will. Determining the choice of priorities and formulating perspective thereof, is a matter of policy. Article 32 is not the machinery through which policy preferences or priorities are determined and this Court is not the forum where the conflicting claims of policies or priorities should be debated. See the observations of this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India". Article 37 lays down that the Directive Principles of State Policy shall not be enforceable by any Court, but the principles are nevertheless fundamental in the governance ofthe country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply those principles in making laws. In Union of India v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754 at page = 765 para. 7 the Supreme Court held as follows: 7. India is governed by a judicial system identified by a hierarchy of courts, where the doctrine of binding precedent is a cardinal law. Today, it is no longer a matter of doubt that a substantial volume of the law governing the lives of citizens and regulating the functions of the Stage flows from the decisions of the Superior courts. "There was a time", observed Lord Reid, "When it was thought almost indecent to suggest that judges make law - they only declare it But we do not believe in fairy tales any more". It is, therefore, argued that judiciary is bound to take into consideration the Directive principles as the judiciary is also involved in the process of law making. But in this case, I am not convinced that even Article 51 ofthe Constitution of India has any application on the facts of the case. 6. It is, therefore, argued that judiciary is bound to take into consideration the Directive principles as the judiciary is also involved in the process of law making. But in this case, I am not convinced that even Article 51 ofthe Constitution of India has any application on the facts of the case. 6. Counsel for the Central Government submitted that no refuelling is done in violation of the Paris Convention, as the refuelling is done only to enable the U.S. Government to carry on evacuation operations on humanitarian grounds. He also challenged the correctness of the newspaper reports in relation to the refuelling of U.S. Aircrafts. I need not go into the correctness of the newspaper reports. Acts of State which are governed by agreements entered into between two sovereign states are beyond-the jurisdiction of this Court. 7. A decision is stated to be taken by the Government of India to extend refuelling facilities to U.S.Military aircrafts and it is stated to be carried out as a closely guarded secret. Going by the averments in this Original Petition, it is seen that the Air Port Authorities at Bombay, Madras and Agra are permitting the U.S. aircrafts to refuel at the airports. These authorities are not amenable to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, there is no territorial jurisdiction to prevent the refuelling operations. 8. Petitioner also refers to the Indian Aircraft Act and the Rules framed thereunder preventing supply of fuel to aircrafts which carries explosives, and also to the power of the Director General of Civil Aviation to inspect any aircraft and to issue directions to any person engaged in aircraft operation in the interest of the security of India. Since the questions are to be examined are subject matters governed by treaties and decisions at inter-national level, it is not necessary for me to examine this matter in detail. If any right of the Director General of Civil Aviation is violated, it is for him to approach the appropriate forum. In view of all the above, I find no merit in this Original Petition, and the same is hereby dismissed.