Judgment :- Kanakaraj, J. The writ petitioner challenges the validity of the award made by the Court in I.D.No.571 of 1989, dated 112. 1990. The charge against the second respondent who is the typewriter mechanic in the petitioner company, in the domestic enquiry he submitted false claims. It is alleged that he had not visited certain customers nor their machines but he had claimed conveyance and lunch allowance. The Labour whom the dispute was ultimately referred to, has substantially found that the charges been established. However, the Labour Court ultimately held that the backwages worked out to Rs.97,500 and, if the petitioner is deprived of the same, it would sufficient punishment. in this view of the matter, the Labour Court directed the reinstatement of the second respondent without backwages. 2. I admitted the writ petition and granted an interim order of stay on 21. 1991. second respondent worker has now come up with an application under Sec.17 Industrial Disputes Act. Though a perusal of Sec.17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act that pending disposal of a proceeding in the High Court against the award, the should be directed to pay full wages last drawn by the worker inclusive of allowances long as the worker is not employed elsewhere, Mr.Sanjaymohan, learned counsel petitioner in the writ petition, has brought to my notice certain judgments of this Court also a judgment of the Bombay High Court to the effect that in a fit and proper open to the High Court to deny the benefit of Sec.l7-B of the Industrial Disputes worker. I will only quote the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in The Management of Chitram and Co. Ltd. represented by its Senior Manager, Finance and Administration Union of India represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi and W.A.No.1156 of 1984, dated 3. 1990, which is as follows: "Despite the introduction of Sec.17-B into the Act, this Court is not denuded of its make appropriate orders and give directions depending on the facts and circumstances each case. Sec. 17-B of the Act by its specific terms, does not even refer to the powers this Court under Art.226, much less restrict the same which is permissible for Legislation short of Constitutional amendment. Sec. 17-B of the Act by its specific terms, does not even refer to the powers this Court under Art.226, much less restrict the same which is permissible for Legislation short of Constitutional amendment. We are not prepared to hold that Sec.l7-B of the made an inroad into the powers of this Court under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution India which are wide enough to take note of specific contingencies in each case and reliefs and give directions appropriate, in such" case......" Per contra, Mr.Fenn Walter, learned counsel, brings to my notice, the judgment Supreme Court in Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, 1986 S.C. 842: (1986) 2 S.C.C. 614 : (1986)3 Serv.L.J. 63. (1986)2 S.C.J. 129: F.J.R 129: 1986 Lab.I.C. 850: (1986)2 Lab.L.J. 217. The said judgment of the Supreme Court had also been considered by the Division Bench referred to above. There is another Division Bench of this Court which is brought to my notice by Mr.Fenn Walter. W.ANo.1009 of 1988, dated 5. 1989. The relevant portion of the said judgment Division Bench reads as follows: "All these contentions are irrelevant when this statutory right crystallises on the refusal Management to reinstate a worker as ordered by a Labour Court, and if the validity said award is pending disposal either in the High Court or in the Supreme Court. Once said pre-condition comes into existence, the liability to pay under Sec.17-B is foisted Management. This it could avoid only if it is able to show that the workman is otherwise gainfully employed during the relevant period. No material had been placed before court he is anywhere gainfully employed during this period. If he gets employment in spite order under Sec.17-B, then certainly, the Court can be moved for revoking the order for relevant periods. But, in the instant case, when 1st respondent had not filed any counter, appellant is entitled to the relief as prayed for." .3. I am of the opinion that there is an apparent conflict between the said two Division decisions of this Court. But, in the instant case, when 1st respondent had not filed any counter, appellant is entitled to the relief as prayed for." .3. I am of the opinion that there is an apparent conflict between the said two Division decisions of this Court. The point which has to be decided is whether, if all the conditions referred to by the Supreme Court and as adumbrated in Sec.17-B are satisfied, it mandatory for the management to pay last drawn wages, or has the Court still a discretion under Art.226 of the Constitution of India to go into the question and award a lesser amount than the quantum of last drawn wages, I feel that it is better if a Division Bench or a Fuller considers this issue according to My Lord the Chief Justice. I therefore place this miscellaneous petition before My Lord The Chief Justice, to be posted for an appropriate Bench. Sanjay Mohan for M/s.Rama Subramaniam and Associates, for Petitioner in W.M.P.No.1257 of 1991 and for Respondent No.2 in W.M.P.No.3821 of 1991. T.Fennwalter, for Respondent No.2 in W.M.P.No.1257 of 1991 and for Petitioner W.M.P.No.3821 of 1991. The Order of the Full Bench was made by Mishra, J.: A learned single Judge of this Court has referred a question whether and if three conditions referred to by the Supreme Court and as adumbrated in Sec.17 Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (inserted therein by Central Act 46 of 1982) are satisfied, mandatory for the management to pay last drawn wages, or has the Court still a discretion under Art.226 of the Constitution of India to go into the question and award a lesser than the exact quantum of last drawn wages? 2. A Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.1009 of 1988 (order dated 5. 1989) has said, “All these contentions are irrelevant when this statutory right crystallises on the refusal Management to reinstate a worker as ordered by a Labour Court, and if the validity said award is pending disposal either in the High Court or in the Supreme Court. Once said precondition comes into existence, the liability to pay under Sec.17-B is foisted Management. This it could avoid only if it is able to show that the workman is otherwise gainfully employed during the relevant period. No material has been placed before Court he is anywhere gainfully employed during this period. Once said precondition comes into existence, the liability to pay under Sec.17-B is foisted Management. This it could avoid only if it is able to show that the workman is otherwise gainfully employed during the relevant period. No material has been placed before Court he is anywhere gainfully employed during this period. If he gets employment in spite order under Sec.17-B, then certainly, the Court can be moved for revoking the order relevant periods. But, in, the instant case, when 1st respondent had not filed any counter, the appellant is entitled to the relief as prayed for”. 3. The Bench has thus found that the statutory right of the workman under Sec.17 Act cannot be avoided by the Management except in the case of the workman otherwise gainfully employed during the relevant period. .4. In Chitram and Company Limited v. Secretary, Ministry of Labour, (1990)1 M.L.J. (W.ANo.1156 of 1984), however, another Division Bench of this Court has said, “It is not as if that only by virtue of the introduction of Sec.17-B into the Act this Court vested with the jurisdiction to make appropriate orders for the benefits of the workman facing a challenge by the employer of the award that has ensured to the benefit workman at the hands of the Industrial Forum. This Court always exercised and continue to exercise its powers taking note of the relevant facts and circumstances of case and it always endeavoured and shall endeavour to give amelioration and reliefs to workman, despite the pendency of the challenge over the award in his favour at the instance of theemployer. This power was always there before and continues to be there even the introduction of Sec.17-B and if at all what Sec.17-B could be said to have done codification of the entitlement and rights of the workman. But, the section cannot construed as in any manner taking away or fettering the plenary powers of this Court Arts.226 and 227, to make apprppriate orders taking note of the relevant facts. The outlines for the entitlement and rights of the workman have been etched out by the section, but working out the same in an appropriate manner could be only by this Court Despite introduction of Sec.17 B of the Act, this Court is not denuded of its power to appropriate orders and give directions depending on the facts and circumstances of case. Sec.17-B of the Act by its specific terms, does not even refer to the powers of Court under Art.226, much less restrict the same which is not permissible for Legislation, short of Constitutional amendment. We are not prepared to hold that Sec. 17-B of the has made an inroad into the powers of this Court under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution of India which are wide enough to take note of specific contingencies in each case provide reliefs and give directions appropriate, in such case. Hence, we are not persuaded countenance the first contention, put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant. 5. We can say straightaway that the judgment of this Court in W.A.No.1009of 1988 proceeded on the assumption that there could have been no denial of relief to the workman, who filed a petition claiming that he was entitled to be paid monthly the last drawn during the pendency of the writ petition when the Management failed to implement questioned the validity of the award. The Bench rejected the contention of the counsel for the employer/Bank that when the employer had lost confidence for the that he had misappropriated funds of a co-employee and had absented unauthorisedly following that act, it would not be in the interest of the Bank to reinstate him as well when a sum of Rs.17,500 had been already paid, a relief of this nature was unavailable him. The Bench did in so saying about the effect of the provision in Sec. 17-B of the quoted above even though the sum already paid that is to say Rs.17,500 did cover the involved in Sec.17-B. In the case of Chitram and Co. Ltd., (1990)1 M.L.J. 551 , made the above quoted observation after examining whether Sec.17B was ultra vires and 19(1) (g) of the Constitution or ultra vires on ground of irrecoverabil-ity of the amounts disbursed under it in case final orders went in favour of the management as well as question whether this provision made inroads into the powers of High Court under Arts.226 of 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. 6. Sec.17-B of the Act reads as follows: “Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher courts: Where in any a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court; Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this section for such period or part, as the case may be.” 7. In the case of Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, A.I.R. S.C. 842: (1986)2 S.C.C. 614 : (1986)3 Serv.L.J. 63: (1986)2 S.C.J. 129: (1986)69 129: 1986 Lab.I.C 850: (1986)2 Lab.L.J. 217, the Supreme Court examined the scope Sec.17-B on the basis of the rival contentions of the parties to say in a case where the had become final prior to 21st August, 1984 that Sec.17-B could not be pressed into to re-open the same, but when the award was challenged and the challenge was pending, the section became operative. While interpreting Sec.17-B, the Supreme Court said, . “The three necessary ingredients for the application of this Section are (i) the Labour should have directed reinstatement of the workman, (ii) the employer should have preferred proceedings against such award in the High Court or in the Supreme Court, (iii) that workman should not have been employed in any establishment during such period. The Supreme Court adverted to the objects and reasons for enacting the section to notice, “When Labour Courts pass award of reinstatement, these are often contested by an employer in the Supreme Court and High Courts. It was felt that the delay in the implementation the award causes hardship to the workman concerned. The Supreme Court adverted to the objects and reasons for enacting the section to notice, “When Labour Courts pass award of reinstatement, these are often contested by an employer in the Supreme Court and High Courts. It was felt that the delay in the implementation the award causes hardship to the workman concerned. It was, therefore, proposed to provide the payment of wages last drawn by the workman concerned, under certain conditions, the date of the award till the case is finally decided in the Supreme Court or High Courts. and observed. The objects and reasons give an insight into the background why this section was introduced. Though objects and reasons cannot be the ultimate guide in interpretation of statutes, oftentimes aids in finding out what really persuaded the legislature to enact a particular provision. The objects and reasons here clearly spell out that delay in the implementation the awards is due, to the contests by the employer which consequently cause hardship workmen. If this is the object then it would be in keeping with this object and consistent the progressive social philosophy of our laws to deny to the workmen the benefits of this Section simply because the was passed, for example just a day before the section came into force? In our view be not only defeating the rights of the workman but going against the spirit enactment. A rigid interpretation of this Section as is attempted by the learned counsel the respondents would be rendering the workman worse off after the coming into this Section. This section has in effect only codified the rights of the workmen to wages which they could not get in time because of the long drawn out process caused methods employed by the Management. This section, in other words, gives a mandate Courts to award wages if the conditions in the Section are satisfied. “The Supreme Court also noticed that the Courts awarded wages to workmen when such a direction was necessary even before Sec.17-B was enacted but observed.” That was only a discretionary remedy depending upon Court to Court. Instances are where workmen have been dragged by the employers in endless litigation with preliminary objections and other technical pleas to tire them out. A fight between a workman employer is oftentimes an unequal fight. Instances are where workmen have been dragged by the employers in endless litigation with preliminary objections and other technical pleas to tire them out. A fight between a workman employer is oftentimes an unequal fight. The legislature was thus aware that because long pendency of disputes in Tribunals and Courts, on account of the dilatory tactics by the employer, workmen had suffered. It is against this background that the introduction of this section has to be viewed and its effects considered.“ .8. While going into the vires of Sec.17-B and holding that it is wholly reasonable been enacted to achieve the avowed object of protecting the employees from the resultant from unemployment, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court International Ltd. v. L.B.Joshi, (1987)2 L.L.J. 210, said. ” Such a provision has been made so as to enable the employees to survive during pendency of the litigation and reap the fruits of the order of reinstatement. These to be paid if certain conditions are satisfied. Sec.17-B read with proviso in clearest lays down as to when workman is entitled to get these wages. Therefore it cannot that the said provision is either vague or arbitrary. It operates within the specified and, therefore, in our view the challenge to the said section based on Art.14 Constitution must fail. It is no doubt true that no provision is made as to what will happen to the amount under Sec.17-B, if ultimately the employer succeeds in the litigation. In our view such a provision will not make the Section either vague or arbitrary. “The Court found a parallel to this in Sec.10-A of the Industrial Employment Orders) Act, 1946 and observed,” The amount paid towards subsistence allowance is neither refundable nor recoverable irrespective of the result of the enquiry. The reason is obvious. The allowance contemplated to be paid under the said section is nothing but a subsistence allowance. Similarly be paid under Sec.17-B is also in the nature of subsistence allowance. The “inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule” is indicative legislative intent. The wages payable during the pendency of the proceedings in Courts or Supreme Court are at the rate of the wages last drawn by him. Similarly be paid under Sec.17-B is also in the nature of subsistence allowance. The “inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule” is indicative legislative intent. The wages payable during the pendency of the proceedings in Courts or Supreme Court are at the rate of the wages last drawn by him. The proviso lays down that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be under this Section for such period or part thereof as the case may be. The payment will be obviously on month to month basis, or on the basis of the practice followed concerned Industry or Factory and, therefore, on that ground, it cannot be said provision is in any way vague or arbitrary and, therefore, in our view the challenge that court also must fail. “Coming to the question whether Sec.17-B interfered or encroached upon the constitutional powers of the High Court or the Supreme Court under Arts. 226 or 136 of the Constitution India, the Bombay Court said. ” So far as the challenge to Sec.17-B of the Act based on the ground that it either or encroaches upon the Constitutional powers of the High Courts or the Supreme Court is concerned, from the bare leading of this Section clear that it does not even remotely refer to the powers of the Courts under Arts.136 much less of restricting the said powers. This section only guarantees to the workman payment of wages by the employer during the pendency of the proceedings before Court or the Supreme Court, and that too subject to the conditions laid down by section and the proviso, irrespective of the result of the proceedings. It also imposes obligation upon the workman concerned to file an affidavit before the Court stating has not been employed in any establishment during the pendency of the proceedings. absolves the employer of his obligation to pay such wages, if he is able to prove satisfaction of the Court that the workman had been otherwise employed and Bad receiving adequate remuneration. As already observed, Sec.17-B operates within sphere. Its operation is subject to conditions laid down by the section itself. absolves the employer of his obligation to pay such wages, if he is able to prove satisfaction of the Court that the workman had been otherwise employed and Bad receiving adequate remuneration. As already observed, Sec.17-B operates within sphere. Its operation is subject to conditions laid down by the section itself. Section lays down that in extreme cases where it is demonstrated that the award passed without jurisdiction or is otherwise a nullity, or grossly erroneous or perverse the High or the Supreme Court is debarred from exercising its powers under. Arts.226 and 136 Constitution. Therefore it is not possible for us to accept the contention that Sec.17 as it encroaches upon or overrides the powers of the High Court or the Supreme India under Arts.226 and 136 of the Constitution of India. The powers of the High the Supreme Court under Arts.226 and 136 of the Constitution are paramount and does not interfere nor restrict the said Constitutional powers.“ .9. A Division Bench of this Court in Unnis v. The Management of M.A.Khizar Hussain 1987 Writ.L.R. 302, like the judgment in W.A.No.1009 of 1988 of course, without there any other contention as to the constitutional vires of the section or whether it interfered the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution or that of the Court under Art.136 of the Constitution, made some observations as to the effect section in a case in which a learned single Judge of this Court had directed the workman work out his remedies in the light of Sec.l7-B of the Act saying that there was nothing suggest that the High Court should direct the Management to pay full wages last the workman. The Bench observed.” Obviously, the learned Judge had in mind the proceedings under Sec.33(C)(2) of Forcing the employee to workout his rights by a separate proceeding would be contrary the spirit and the purpose of Sec.17-B of the Act which is introduced by Act 46 brought into force with effect from 21st August, 1984. The Bench observed.” Obviously, the learned Judge had in mind the proceedings under Sec.33(C)(2) of Forcing the employee to workout his rights by a separate proceeding would be contrary the spirit and the purpose of Sec.17-B of the Act which is introduced by Act 46 brought into force with effect from 21st August, 1984. A bare reading of the provision Sec.17-B of the Act will show that in a case where an award directing reinstatement workman, is challenged by the employer, the employer shall be liable to pay such during the period of pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme full wages last drawn by him inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such court. Sec.17-B the liability of the employer during the pendency of the proceeding in she High Court Supreme Court. The affidavit stating that the workman had not been employed during period of pendency of the proceeding in the High Court or the Supreme Court has to in the High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. The purpose of being to file such an affidavit is to enable the High Court to make an order of payment of full last drawn by the employee during the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court. provision in Sec.17-B is, therefore, intended to be invoked in the course of the proceedings the High Court and the High Court is entitled to make an order as contemplated by in the proceedings, taken by the employer challenging the order of the Labour Court High Court. It is thus clearly permissible for the High Court to make an order requiring employer to comply with the provisions of Sec.17-B of the Act. It would be extremely and contrary to the spirit of Sec.17-B to force an employee to seek remedy elsewhere separately to recover wages permitted to be claimed under Sec.17-B of the Act by an application under Sec.33 the Act. In our view, the employee was clearly entitled to an order under Sec.17 Act." 10. It would be extremely and contrary to the spirit of Sec.17-B to force an employee to seek remedy elsewhere separately to recover wages permitted to be claimed under Sec.17-B of the Act by an application under Sec.33 the Act. In our view, the employee was clearly entitled to an order under Sec.17 Act." 10. We have noticed some of the judgments of the Court as well as other Courts in India the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Singh’ s case, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 842: (1986)2 S.C.C. 614 : (1986)3 Serv.L.J. 63: (1986)2 S.C.J. 129: (1986)69 F.J.R. 129: 1986 Lab.I.C. 850: (1986)2 Lab.L.J. 217, to convince ourselves that it would be wholly incorrect say that this Court’ s jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution is in any way inhibited the provision in Sec.17-B of the Act. If the award of the Tribunal or a court is to result in reinstatement of the workman and the same is challenged before the High Court and employer seeks avoidance of the implementation of the award on some grounds, the Court will have the competence and the power to stay the implementation of the award. Courts India have been interfering with the orders of reinstatement on the basis of certain known principles of law such as ‘ no unwanted employee should be thrust upon the employer but always taking notice of the hardship and the plight of the workman who, in spite of award, is made to wait for a long period due only to the litigation raised in the proceeding under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. If the implementation of the award is stayed the Court, the workman is left with no employment and, consequently emoluments including the salary. The hardship he often times suffers, if immense, though measurable in terms money, yet not worthy of compensation, for on emoluments received each month, depended his life and his family’s survival; with no money paid, the workman will have ho means procure provisions for himself and his family, provisions essential for their survival sustenance. The hardship he often times suffers, if immense, though measurable in terms money, yet not worthy of compensation, for on emoluments received each month, depended his life and his family’s survival; with no money paid, the workman will have ho means procure provisions for himself and his family, provisions essential for their survival sustenance. Sec.17-B takes notice of all these and states in no uncertain terms that employer shall be liable to pay such workman during the period of pendency of such proceeding in the High Court or the Supreme Court wages last drawn by him inclusive any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule with the exception that during this period or any part thereof he was gainfully employed elsewhere, he would not entitled to such wages for the period of gainful employment. In recognising the liability employer to pay to the workman wages at the rate last drawn by him, it has recognised the right of the workman under his contract of service to receive adequate remuneration, a right no Court can ever afford to ignore. It is in that sense, we think, Supreme Court in Bharat Singh’s case, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 842: (1986)2 S.C.C. 614 : Ser.L.J. 63: (1986)2 S.C.J. 129: (1986)69 F.J.R. 129:1986 Lab.I.C. 850: (1986)2 217, has said, "This section in other words, gives a mandate to the Courts to award wages if the conditions in the Section are satisfied." 11. Consensus of judicial opinion is that there is no vice in the rule enshrined in Sec.17 the Act inasmuch as it is not unconstitutional and although it does not infringe or inroad any manner this Court ’ s power under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, it creates a upon the employer and conversely a right in the workman to pay and receive wages drawn by him inclusive. of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any during the period of pendency of the proceedings in the court with the exception during this period or any part thereof, he was gainfully employed elsewhere, he would entitled to such wages for the period of gainful employment. In Chitram and Co. of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any during the period of pendency of the proceedings in the court with the exception during this period or any part thereof, he was gainfully employed elsewhere, he would entitled to such wages for the period of gainful employment. In Chitram and Co. Ltd (1990)1 M.L.J. 551 , it has been rightly stated by a Division Bench of this Court that Sec.17 cannot be construed as in any manner taking away or fettering the plenary powers High Court under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, to make appropriate taking note of the relevant facts. That appropriate order will invariably be to the aid workman for payment of full wages pending proceedings in the Court unless the award demonstrated to be a nullity or made without jurisdiction. The unfettered power of the under Art.226 of the Constitution cannot be used to destroy the statutory right granted workman under Sec.17-B of the Act, i.e., a right pendente lite which has been recognized we have seen, to. remove the hardship and to protect the interests of the workmen. workman cannot be left uncared to suffer a total deprivation of wages merely because employer has chosen and accordingly initiated a proceeding under Art.226 or Art.227 Constitution of India. This beneficial legislation that operates within a limited sphere subject to conditions laid down by the section itself and that the section nowhere lays down that on extreme cases where demonstrated that the award passed is either without jurisdiction or is otherwise a the High Court or the Supreme Court is debarred from exercising its powers under Arts.226 and 136 of the Constitution. 12. Before we conclude and answer the reference, we feel constrained to observe that challenge to the award on the ground that it is without jurisdiction or is otherwise a alone will not be sufficient to suspend the operation of Sec.17-B of the Act. The adjudication in a case where the award is without jurisdiction or is otherwise a nullity ordinarily meet the ends of justice. The workman, who shall be waiting for implementation of the award during the pendency of the proceedings, however, shall only the wages at the rate last paid for the period of the pendency of the proceeding Court. The adjudication in a case where the award is without jurisdiction or is otherwise a nullity ordinarily meet the ends of justice. The workman, who shall be waiting for implementation of the award during the pendency of the proceedings, however, shall only the wages at the rate last paid for the period of the pendency of the proceeding Court. It is not a burden of any serious consequence upon the employer, but will deprivation of a sort which may cause havoc to the workman and his family. If we proceed on the footing that the Court’s power to make the final order includes the power to make interim order, then we may say the power will’ extend to suspending the liability employer under Sec.17-B of the Act and accordingly the right of the workman to wages pendente lite. But this will be possible in the rarest of the rate cases. Otherwise, defeat the very purpose for which this section has been introduced in the Act. There shall any number of employers/ managements, who shall successfully contrive petitions proceedings challenging the award on some such grounds as the award being without jurisdiction or a nullity. Courts cannot afford to be manipulated and allow management/employer to use the interim order as a weapon to avoid such ‘a statutory liability. Some error of fact or even some error of law alone will not thus be enough to any interim order. If however, the error is such that goes to the root of the jurisdiction Tribunal and the Court has got sufficient materials to ignore the effect of Sec.17-B of the Court may decline to order payment of wages pendente lite. The Bombay High Court the case of Elpro International Ltd.’s case, (1987)2 L.L.J. 210, and a Division Bench of Court in Unnis v. The Management of M.A.Khizar Hussain and Sons, 1987 Writ L.R. 302, indicated this caution in the words that “ in extreme cases where it is demonstrated that award passed is either without jurisdiction or is otherwise a nullity..... ” the Court can to make an order in terms of Sec.17-B of the Act. The words “ or grossly erroneous perverse” in that judgment and in the judgment, of the Division Bench of this Court Chitram and Co. ” the Court can to make an order in terms of Sec.17-B of the Act. The words “ or grossly erroneous perverse” in that judgment and in the judgment, of the Division Bench of this Court Chitram and Co. Ltd ’ s case, (1990)1 M.L.J. 551 , has to be understood only to illustratively when the Court may treat the award a nullity. 13. We thus answer the reference as follows: (1) Sec.17-B of the Act does not in any manner impair or interfere with the powers High Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India and the Court still possesses discretion to go into the question and award a lesser amount than the exact quantum drawn wages. The Court shall, however, honour the statute and if the three conditions, namely (1) the Labour Court directed reinstatement of the workman (2) the employer preferred proceedings against the award of reinstatement in the court and (3) the workman had not been employed in any establishment during the pendency of the proceedings, satisfied, the Court shall exercise its power under Art.226 of the Constitution of India order that the employer would pay to the workman during the period of pendency proceedings in the Court full wages last drawn by him inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule. This, however, will be subject to the workman filing an affidavit that he had not been gainfully employed during such period. In case found gainfully employed in any other establishment, the Court shall accordingly order wages to be paid for such period of gainful employment or less wages to be paid depending upon the nature of the gainful employment. (2) The Court may make a different order and depart from the above rule only in extreme cases where it is demonstrated that the award is passed either without jurisdiction otherwise a nullity. The Court, however, shall be slow and cautious in accepting allegations of the employer and except in the rarest of the rate cases, it shall implement law and grant to the workman wages at the rate last drawn by him inclusive of maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule except for the period during which he is found to have been gainfully employed elsewhere. Reference answered.