JUDGMENT - DHANUKA D.R., J.:---This petition raises an interesting and important question of law concerning legal efficacy of 'partition' for purposes of Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 where the lands were cultivated by the tenant on 1st April, 1957 as a result whereof all the lands are allotted to the minor coparcener in the landlord's joint family so as to affect the right of the tenant to make statutory purchase of the lands is question. 2. The impugned partition was purportedly effected by and between respondent No. 1-Shrikant Vithalrao Joshi, who was then a minor and his father Shri Vithalrao Joshi. The said impugned partition is supposed to have been effected on 28th November, 1956. The Tenancy Aval Karkun, Ajara, held in the impugned proceedings for exemption of the petition lands initiated by Respondent No. 1 under section 88-C of the Act (being the proceedings referred to in later part of the order) that partition deed dated 28th November, 1956 could not be recognised for the purposes of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 as the said purported partition deed did not satisfy the conditions prescribed by proviso to section 31 of the Act. The Tenancy Aval Karkun further held that the impugned partition was not genuine as the objective of the said partition appeared to be to evade the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. In appeal preferred by respondent No. 1, the Special Land Acquisition Officer (i.e. the Appellate Authority under the Tenancy Act) held that the impugned partition shall have to be treated as a genuine transaction as there was a clear distinction between the concept of evading the provisions of the Act and avoidance thereof. According to the abovereferred appellate authority, the respondent No. 1 landlord and his father did not evade the provisions of the Act while executing the deed of partition dated 28th November, 1956, but had merely 'avoided' the provisions of the said Act, which exercise was permissible to the coparceners of joint family under the law of the land. 2-A. The relevant facts having bearing on the subject-matter of the petition are as under : "(a) The petitioners are the tenants of various pieces of lands described in para one of the petition. The petitioners Nos. 2-A. The relevant facts having bearing on the subject-matter of the petition are as under : "(a) The petitioners are the tenants of various pieces of lands described in para one of the petition. The petitioners Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 and original petitioner No. 4 were cultivating their respective lands lawfully as tenants on and prior to 1st April 1957. Shri Vithalrao Waman Joshi and his newly born minor son-Shrikant Vithalrao Joshi (age 2 at the time of the impugned partition) formed a Joint Hindu Family. The said joint family was the owner of the said piece of agricultural lands. Particulars of the 'petition lands' are reproduced hereinafter for sake of ready reference : "Village Tenants R.S. No. Area A. G. Kasarkandgaon 1. Appa Dhondi Parkhe. 119 7-13 2. Shri Ali Ismail Murad 148-0-9-P.K. 1-28-1 3. Suleman Ismail Murad 138 Kolindre 1. Dhondi Ganga Ji Karade 4 1-14 2. Kalu Appa Undage (b) On 28th of November, 1956, Shri Vithalrao Waman Joshi executed a deed of partition between himself and his minor son Shri Vithal Waman Joshi wherein all the abovereferred lands were allotted to respondent No. 1 Shrikant alone, who was then a newly born minor aged about 2 years. The respondent No. 1 Shri Vithal Waman Joshi allotted two houses at Kolhapur to himself towards his share in all the assets of the joint family. (c) On 13th April ,1973, the respondent No. 1 Shrikant attained majority. (d) On 8th October, 1973, the respondent No. 1 filed an application for issue of an exemption certificate before the Court of the Tenancy Aval Karkun, Ajara, as contemplated under section 88-C of the Act. Section 88-C of the Act enables a small landlord to obtain an exemption in respect of his lands subject to the conditions prescribed therein. The respondent No. 1 could make the said application only if the abovereferred deed of partition dated 28th November, 1956 was valid and only if the transaction of partition allotting the lands in question to respondent No. 1 was valid and in conformity with the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The respondent No. 1 could make the said application only if the abovereferred deed of partition dated 28th November, 1956 was valid and only if the transaction of partition allotting the lands in question to respondent No. 1 was valid and in conformity with the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. One of the basic questions which arose before the Court of the Tenancy Aval Karkun, Ajara, was as to whether the impugned partition deed dated 28th November, 1956 could be considered as a genuine document or whether the said deed of partition could be recognised in law for the purposes of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The petitioners-tenants assailed the impugned partition deed on at least two separate and distinct grounds before the Tenancy Aval Karkun, Ajara, viz. (i) that the impugned partition deed was not in conformity with the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and the same could not be, therefore, recognised for the purposes of the said Act, (ii) that the impugned partition deed was not genuine one as it was made in haste and in an unusual manner with the sole object of evading the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, as amended by Bombay Act XIII of 1956 i.e. with the object of depriving the tenants of their right to become statutory purchasers of the lands under cultivation on 1st April, 1957. It is well settled that the right of statutory purchaser could not be availed of by the tenants on 1st April, 1957 if the landlord concerned was a widow or a minor or a person under disability as specified in section 32-F(1) of the Act and other connected provisions thereof. It is also well known that on the eve of the Tillers' Day several partitions were effected in order to deprive the tenants of their right to become statutory purchasers of the land on the 'Tillers' Day'. The Tenancy Aval Karkun, Ajara, held that the impugned partition deed dated 28th November, 1956 was effected with a view to evade the provisions of the Act and the said partition was, therefore, not genuine. The Tenancy Aval Karkun, Ajara, held that the impugned partition deed dated 28th November, 1956 was effected with a view to evade the provisions of the Act and the said partition was, therefore, not genuine. The said statutory authority also held that the impugned partition deed was not in conformity with the mandatory conditions prescribed by proviso to section 31 of the Act and the same could not be, therefore, recognised in any of the proceedings under the Act including proceedings under section 88-C thereof. In the result, the Tenancy Aval Karkun rejected the application made by respondent No. 1 Shrikant for grant of exemption certificate under section 88-C of the Act as the respondent No. 1 could not be treated as the landlord of the said lands in view of the finding recorded to the effect that the impugned partition deed dated 28th November, 1956 was not valid and could not be in any event recognised for purposes of the Act. (e) The respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal in the matter numbered as Tenancy Appeal No. 16 of 1974. By the impugned order dated 15th July, 1981, the said appeal was allowed. The Appellate Authority held that there was a clear distinction between the concept of 'evasion of the Act' and 'avoidance of the Act'. The Appellate Authority held that the impugned partition effected on 28th November, 1956 was valid and the transaction of partition was not executed with an object to evade the tenancy legislation. The Appellate Authority held that the impugned transaction was effected to avoid the tenancy legislation. The same was, therefore, valid. The Appellate Authority did not address itself to another important question viz. whether the impugned partition was in conformity with the provisions contained in the proviso to section 31 of the Act?" 3. Having regard to the complexity of this matter, the Court appointed Shri G.B. Karandikar, Advocate as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court. Shri Karandikar was good enough to accede to the request of the Court and assist the Court. I have received considerable assistance from the learned Counsel Shri Karandikar, who very fairly argued the matter, and also Shri Abhyankar, learned Counsel for the petitioners, I am thankful to both the learned Counsel and particularly to Shri Karandikar who has acted as Amicus Curiae in this matter. 4. I have received considerable assistance from the learned Counsel Shri Karandikar, who very fairly argued the matter, and also Shri Abhyankar, learned Counsel for the petitioners, I am thankful to both the learned Counsel and particularly to Shri Karandikar who has acted as Amicus Curiae in this matter. 4. Before I deal with the relevant authorities cited at the bar, it is necessary to refer to the legislative history of the Bombay Act No. XIII of 1956, the same having been exhaustively and accurately set out in the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Shri Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay)1, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 459, Bombay Act XIII of 1956 i.e. the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1956 received the assent of the President of India on 16th of March, 1956. The Amending Act was published in the Bombay Government Gazette on March 29, 1956 and came into force throughout the State on August 1, 1956. In para 8 of the abovereferred judgment, N.H. Bhagwati, J., speaking for the Bench of the Supreme Court, traced the history of litigation concerning Bombay Act XIII of 1956 and observed that land-holders from Kolhapur and Sholapur districts in the State of Bombay had filed petitions in the Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the constitutional validity of the Bombay Act XIII of 1956 in November 1956. It must be stated in the passing that the impugned partition between Shri Vithalrao Joshi and his two years' old minor son Shrikant was effected on 28th November, 1956 i.e. on the eve of Tillers' Day. 5. Section 31(3) of the Act makes special provisions in a situation where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability. 5. Section 31(3) of the Act makes special provisions in a situation where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to mental or physical disability. Proviso to section 31(3) of the Act provided that where a person falling in the specified category is a member of the Joint Hindu Family, the provisions of section 31(3) of the Act shall not apply, if at least one member of the joint family did not belong to the categories specified in the said sub-section, unless before the 31st day of March 1958 the share of such person in the joint family had been separated by metes and bounds and the Mamlatdar, on enquiry, was satisfied that the share of such person in the land was separated, having regard to the area, assessment, classification and value of the land in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property and not in larger proportion. 6. Section 32-F(1) of the Act makes special provisions for postponement of the right of the tenant to make statutory purchase of the land where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to disabilities specified therein. Proviso to section 32-F(1) of the said Act is identical with the proviso to section 31(3) of the said Act. The said proviso also prescribes in identical terms that the partition of the joint family shall not be recognised by the Mamlatdar unless each of the conditions precedent prescribed by the said proviso is satisfied. Such conditions precedent, inter alia, are as under : (a) lands in question must have been partitioned by metes and bounds before the 31st day of March, 1958, (b) the share allotted to the widow, minor or other disabled landlord, under the deed of partition must be in the same proportion as his/her share in the entire joint family property and not in a larger proportion, having regard to the area, assessment, classification and value of the land. In other words, it is not permissible to the coparceners to allot all the agricultural lands to the minor or to the widow or one of the coparceners in the joint family. In other words, it is not permissible to the coparceners to allot all the agricultural lands to the minor or to the widow or one of the coparceners in the joint family. It is not permissible to provide in the deed of partition pertaining to the landlord's family that all the lands under cultivation by the tenant on the relevant date shall be allotted to the minor coparcener. It is obvious from the scheme of the Act that the right of the tenant to become statutory purchaser of the lands on Tiller's Day is very much postponed where the landlord/landlady of the land on the Tillers' Day is a widow or a minor or a person under disability. 7. It is well settled that special law prevails over general law. Almost an identical question arose before the Supreme Court in the case of (Balkrishna Somnath v. Sada Devram Koli)2, reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 894. This leading case was decided by the Hon'ble Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of V.R. Krishna Iyer and A.C. Gupta, JJ. In this case, our High Court had held that the abovereferred proviso to section 32-F(1)(a) of the Act was not satisfied unless the share of the landlord in special category referred to hereinabove in all the joint family properties was separated by metes and bounds and unless the agricultural lands allotted to the disabled landlord like minor or the widow corresponded to his or her share in the entire joint family property and was not in excess thereof. The aggrieved landlords had impugned the correctness of this view expressed by the Bombay High Court before the Supreme Court. In para 10 of his judgment, Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Bench of the Supreme Court, analysed the relevant provisions of tenancy law and, in terms, observed as under "... .... And the legislature, anxious to inhibit such abuse, while willing to exempt genuine, total separations, conditioned the proviso under consideration by insisting that the separation should be from the whole joint family assets and not a tell-tale transaction where agricultural lands alone are divided and secondly, even where there is a total partition, only a fair proportion of the lands is allotted to the disabled person". (the italics is done to supply emphasis.) In para 12 of its Judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the legislature insisted on effecting of a whole partition in order to reduce the evasion and it had stipulated various conditions in that behalf with the same objective. It was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that case that but for the special provisions made by the legislature in this Act, there would have been a sudden fancy for allotting all the good lands to the share of widows and minors depriving the tenants of their legitimate expectations. In my judgment, this case is directly on the point and concludes the issue in favour of the petitioners and against respondent No. 1. The same principles must govern the question of legal efficacy of partitions for the purpose of section 88-C of this Act. In this case "all the lands" were allotted to the minor Shashikant contrary to the mandate of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. It is well settled law that as far as possible the courts must construe that various provisions of the Act harmoniously and must prefer integrated construction of the statute. If the impugned partition is not in conformity with the proviso to section 31(3) of the Act or the Proviso to section 32-F(1) of the Act, such partition cannot be recognised even for the purposes of section 88-C of the Act. If this aspect is kept in mind, it will become unnecessary to enquire into the question as to whether the partition deed dated 28th November, 1956 was effected with the object of evading the provisions of Bombay Act XIII of 1956 or not. If the impugned partition cannot be recognised by the authorities administering the Tenancy Act for the purposes of the Tenancy Act, on the ground that the same is not in conformity with the provisions of Act, there is an end of the matter. The distinction between 'evasion of the Act' and 'avoidance of the Act' is too well known in the sphere of tax laws and other subjects. However, for the purpose of this case, it does not appear to be necessary to examine this question in depth and decide as to whether the partition deed dated 28th November 1956 was effected by the father of respondent No. 1 with the object of evading the Tenancy Act. However, for the purpose of this case, it does not appear to be necessary to examine this question in depth and decide as to whether the partition deed dated 28th November 1956 was effected by the father of respondent No. 1 with the object of evading the Tenancy Act. If it would have been necessary to record a finding on this aspect, I would have agreed with the view that the impugned partition deed dated 28th November, 1956 was effected with an object of evading the provisions of the Act. The inference to be drawn appears to be far too obvious. 8. Shri Karandikar invited my attention to the view expressed by Chainani C.J., in the case of (Sandu Subhana v. Chandrakant N. Kale)3, Special Civil Application No. 1099 of 1964, decided on 13th July, 1965. In this case, the learned Chief Justice, sitting singly, observed in the passing as under : "This provision (meaning thereby the Proviso to section 31) will, however, only apply in the case of partitions effected after 1-4-1957". Shri Karandikar, the learned Counsel appearing as amicus curiae also invited my attention to the Judgment of Chandrachud, J., (as he then was) in the case of (Kisan Mahadu Kolhe v. Hastimal)4, Special Civil Application No. 986 of 1964, decided on 1st April, 1965. In this case, the learned Judge, sitting as a Judge of our High Court, held that the proviso to section 31 of the Tenancy Act would govern all partitions which took place after 1st August 1956. Having regard to the legislative history of the Act, I have no hesitation in concurring with the view taken by the Chandrachud, J., and hold that all partitions effected after 1st August, 1956 must conform to the Act. The Bombay Act XIII of 1956 came into force with effect from 1st August, 1956. 9. Shri Karandikar invited my attention to the Division Bench Judgment of our High Court in the case of (Arwindlal Bhukandas Shah v. Khandu Jaina Patil)5, 1962 Nag.L.J. 65. In this case, the Division Bench held that the Tenancy Court was not concerned with the reasons on account of which partition was effected. In this case it was held by the Division Bench that it was not necessary for the landlord to prove that partition was made bona fide. In this case, the Division Bench held that the Tenancy Court was not concerned with the reasons on account of which partition was effected. In this case it was held by the Division Bench that it was not necessary for the landlord to prove that partition was made bona fide. In this case, it was further held that all that was necessary for the Tenancy Court was to find that the partition had really taken place. The real question that arises for consideration of this Court in this petition is as to whether the impugned partition is in conformity with the provisions of the Tenancy Act and whether the said partition can be recognised for the purposes of Tenancy Act. In the case of Arwindlal v. Khandu, cited supra, the question of construing the proviso to section 31(3) or the proviso to section 32-F(1) of the Act did not arise. Accordingly, with respect, this case is not of any relevance for our purpose. If the question arising in our case was identical with the question which arose in Arwindlal v. Khandu, I would have perhaps disagreed with the view taken by the Division Bench of our High Court and recommended constitution of a larger Bench. I do not share the view that the partition need not be bona fide. However, in this case, the impugned partition has no legal efficacy as tenancy law prohibits effecting or partition so as to allot all lands to one coparcener or to allot land to a coparcener in excess of his share in entire joint family assets. In this case, the respondent No. 1 adopted proceedings under section 88-C of the Act without any locus standi and without any authority of law, the impugned partition being not valid. 10. In the result, the petition succeeds. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). Certificate of exemption, if already issued, shall stand rejected. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. Petition succeeds. -----