Judgment :- The tenant in rent control proceedings is the petitioner in this C.R.P. The respondent filed H.R.C.O.P.No.72 of 1979, on the file of the Rent Controller-cum Munsif, Coimba-tore, a petition for eviction of the tenant, namely, the petitioner herein, the grounds that he wilfully defaulted in payment of rents, that the premises in occupation of the tenant is required for own use and occupation, namely, for the use son who is a Medical Doctor, as a consulting room, and on the ground that the tenant sub-let the premises without the written authorisation of the landlady. 2. The petitioner herein resisted the eviction petition inter alia contending that there was subletting at all. The second respondent herein is his own son-in-law and looking after (petitioner’s) business, and that the premises in his (petitioner’s) occupation was suitable for a Medical Doctor to use it as a consulting room, and the requirement was not bona fide. Regarding the default in payment of rents, the petitioner has stated that was let in as a tenant by the previous owner by name Rajana Bai who has sold that premises to the 1st respondent under a registered sale deed dated 30.8.1978. According to petitioner, the vendor of the 1st respondent has borrowed a sum of Rs.5,500 and in interest, there was an agreement between the vendor of the 1st respondent and petitioner to enjoy the suit premises without actual payment of rent. Therefore, the question of payment of rent will not arise. Consequently, there cannot be any wilful default payment of rents. 3. As regards the claim of the landlady that the tenant has sub-let the premises occupation without the written consent of the landlady, both the authorities below concurrently found that the landlady has not made out a case, and the landlady has not any appeal or revision. Therefore, that point need not detain us. 4. The next point is, on the question of default, the learned Rent Controller found that in registered sale, deed, there was no indication at all about the alleged arrangement between the petitioner (tenant) and the vendor of the 1st respondent. Therefore, that point need not detain us. 4. The next point is, on the question of default, the learned Rent Controller found that in registered sale, deed, there was no indication at all about the alleged arrangement between the petitioner (tenant) and the vendor of the 1st respondent. The 1st respondent was not party to the alleged arrangement and as per the ruling of this Court in Kesarichand Sankunni Maistty, 84 L. W. 852, any arrangement of this nature between the landlady the tenant will not be a covenant running with the land and, therefore, will not be binding the purchaser. On that ground, the learned Rent Controller held that the default in payment of rents inspite of notice issued by the 1st respondent was wilful and, therefore, petitioner was liable to be evicted. This finding was confirmed by the Appellate Authority. Likewise, on the question of own use, both the authorities below have found that the claim the landlady that the premises in question was required by her son to be used as consulting room, was established, and on that ground also, the petitioner was liable to evicted. 5. Mr.G.Masilamani, learned senior counsel appearing for the tenant/petitioner, elaborately argued on the question of wilful default and submitted that the ratio laid down in Kesarichand v. Sankunni Maistry, 84 L.W. 852, requires reconsideration. According to the learned counsel, that judgment followed the principle laid down by English Courts, which cannot be applied Indian conditions. 6. Mr.N.Varadarajan, learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent/landlady, submitted that on facts, it is established beyond doubt that the landlady has nothing to do with alleged arrangement between the petitioner and the vendor of the 1st respondent. Even otherwise, the alleged arrangement was only for three months, and there was no registered lease deed, to bind the purchaser, namely, the 1st respondent herein. A perusal of registered sale deed, namely, Ex.A-1 clearly shows that the sale was for a consideration Rs.10,000 out of which Rs.8,000 was paid before the Sub Register and Rs.2,000 was earlier for discharging debts incurred by the vendor from the petitioner herein. The husband of the 1st respondent as P.W.I has categorically denied any knowledge about the arrangement. That was criticised by Mr.Masilamani stating that the landlady ought to made enquiries about the terms of that tenancy as the tenant was there was at the time purchase. The husband of the 1st respondent as P.W.I has categorically denied any knowledge about the arrangement. That was criticised by Mr.Masilamani stating that the landlady ought to made enquiries about the terms of that tenancy as the tenant was there was at the time purchase. In the evidence, P.W.I has clearly stated that the sale consideration was Rs.10,000 and the allegation in the reply notice by the tenant that a sum of Rs.5,500 retained by the 1st respondent to be paid to the petitioner at the time of vacating premises is not correct. This was correctly noted by the learned Rent Controller. But I from the judgment of the Appellate Authority that he has, on a misreading of the evidence, stated as if P.W.I admitted in his evidence that the landlady has agreed to pay a sum of Rs.5,500 to petitioner (tenant) at the time of his vacating the premises. This is not a correct understanding of the evidence of P.W.I. I do not find any compelling reason to differ from view taken by Ismail, J. (as he then was) in Kesarichandv. Sankunni Maistry, 84 L.W.852. The learned Judge has held in that case as follows: “A refundable advance like the present one was merely a loan advanced by the respondent the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant herein, and the obligation to repay cannot said to be a covenant running with the land or one touching upon the land or pertaining the land which was the subject-matter of the lease and which has subsequently transferred to bring the same within the scope of Sec.109 of the Transfer of Property Hence, the appellants herein are not under an obligation to pay the sum of Rs.1,000 to respondent herein, as a condition precedent for obtaining recovery of possession of the site from the respondent herein. The plain language of this section is that once the lessor tranfers the property leased, transferee of the property practically becomes subrogated to the position of the transferor in respect of the rights and liabilities as to the property so transferred. This based on the general equitable principle that a man cannot assign his obligation, that cannot substitute someone else as the performer of his duty, without the consent authority of those to whom the duty is owing. However, one thing is clear and definite. This based on the general equitable principle that a man cannot assign his obligation, that cannot substitute someone else as the performer of his duty, without the consent authority of those to whom the duty is owing. However, one thing is clear and definite. Whether they are the rights or obligations they must pertain to rights and obligations though resulting from a contractual relationship between the lessor and the lessee, do concern with or touch upon or pertain to the property demised or transferred, they will be covered by Sec.109 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is in this context, we have to what exactly was the nature of the payment of Rs.1,000 made by the respondent herein the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants. The crucial point with reference to Sec.109 of the Transfer of Property Act is that rights liabilities must be” as to the property that has been transferred”. If the rights and liabilities do not refer to or concern with or touch upon the property transferred, they will be outside Sec.109 of the Act and there will be no obligation on the assignee or transferee from lessor to discharge the obligation or return the amount to the original lessee and the will have to look to his own lessor, namely, the transferor, for repayment of the amount. addition to this, the general principle on which Sec.109 is based also clearly shows that regard to a sum like the present one, the appellants are under no obligation to pay the to the respondent herein. ” Therefore, I concur with the views taken by the authorities below, that the tenant was justified in not paying the rents even after receiving the notice from respondent/landlady and thereby committed wilful default in payment of rents. 7. Regarding own use, Mr. G. Masilamani, learned senior counsel for the petitioner/tenant, pointed out that there was no pleading to the effect that the landlady’s son had residential premises of his own for using the same as consulting room and that the failure give that information is fatal to the claim of the landlady. He also submitted that even evidence of P.W.I, there was nothing to indicate that the son does not own nonresidential property of his own to run the consulting room. He also submitted that even evidence of P.W.I, there was nothing to indicate that the son does not own nonresidential property of his own to run the consulting room. He further submitted son being a government servant, is liable to be transferred from place to place and, there was no justification in the landlady claiming the premises in question for the use son. 8. Mr.N.Varadarajan, learned counsel, for the 1st respondent/landlady submitted ground has been raised doubting the fact that the son had no non-residential premises own, and both the parties proceeded as if the landlady and her son had no other residential premises of their own for the purpose of running the consulting room. Therefore, there is no point in raising this issue at the stage of revision even though there is some in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, in view of the fact that parties proceeded on the basis that both the landlady and her son did not own any nonresidential premises for the purpose of running a consulting room, it is too late in for the petitioner-tanant to raise such a plea at this stage. Even otherwise, the eviction can be sustained on the ground of wilful default in payment of rents. 9. In the result, the civil revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. However, will be no order as to costs. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/tenant reasonable time for vacating the premises occupied by the petitioner. Having regard fact that the tenant had been in the premises for a long time, four months time is for vacating the premises. Petition dismissed.