JUDGMENT 1. - In all these petitions a common question has been raised against the termination of the petitioners from the post of Sweepers coupled with the relief of payment of arrears of salary. It has been alleged by the petitioners that they are registered for employment in the Social Welfare Department as they all belong to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes. They were appointed from the dates noted against their names as under: Sr.No. Name of petitioner Date of appointment 1 Laddu 04/08/90 2 Mahaveer 19/2/1990 3 Sita 19/2/1990 4 Munna Lal 07/03/90 5 Smt. Shyama 6 Smt. Surnitra 08/02/90 7 Vishnu 02/07/90 8 Kanhaiyalal 02/07/90 9 Rakesh 04/01/90 10 Smt. Lad 02/07/90 11 Smt. Meera 02/07/90 12 Smt. Gayatri 04/01/90 13 Smt. Arti, 19/2/1990 14 Kuldeep 04/01/90 15 Kishore Kumar 05/03/90 16 Smt. Minakshi 19/2/1990 17 Mehar Chand 04/01/90 18 Smt. Shanti 19/2/1990 19 Ram Swaroop 19/2/1990 20 Smt. Vidya 01/01/90 21 Prem Shankar 19/2/1990 22 Guddu 02/07/90 23 Suresh 19/2/1990 24 Pravesh Kumar 25 Smt. Sandhya 02/07/90 26 Raja 02/07/90 27 Indra 02/07/90 28 Nand Kishore 02/07/90 2. It has been submitted in the writ petitions that the post of Sweeper falls in the schedule appended to the Rajasthan Municipalities (Class IV Service) Rules, 1964. Rule 6 provides for reservation for SC/ST and the procedure for direct recruitment has been given in Rule 10. There were 169 posts of Harijans in the Municipal Council, Tonk and names were called from the Social Welfare Department and after holding the interviews, the appointment orders on the post of Sweepers were issued on 4th Jan., 1990 and on different dates in case of different petitioners appointing them as Sweepers in the pay scale of 750-940 on probation for a period of one year. It has been stated by one of the petitioners that he was not allowed to attend his duty on 4th and 5th August, 1990. He was told that on 4th Aug., 1990, termination order had already been passed in the case of the petitioner Laddu in S.B. Civil Writ Petitioner No. 3523/1990. Such termination order had also been passed against the other petitioners on 26th July, 1990 and 4th Aug. 1990 and in one case of Indra (S.B.C.W. No. 3231/90) on 7th August, 1990. He was told that on 4th Aug., 1990, termination order had already been passed in the case of the petitioner Laddu in S.B. Civil Writ Petitioner No. 3523/1990. Such termination order had also been passed against the other petitioners on 26th July, 1990 and 4th Aug. 1990 and in one case of Indra (S.B.C.W. No. 3231/90) on 7th August, 1990. It is against these termination orders that the present writ petitions were filed before this court and show cause notices were issued as to why the writ petitions be not admitted/disposed of. 3. On behalf of the respondents reply to the writ petition has been filed and the stand has been taken that the impugned termination orders had been passed in pursuance of the order issued by the Local Self Government Department on 26th Aug., 1989 and 4th April, 1990 when the fact of illegal appointments was brought to the knowledge of the higher authorities. While replying to the con- tents of Ground No. C, it has been stated in the reply that though the vacancies existed, there was a ban imposed by the Government for making appointment on any post and that the said ban was imposed by the State Government because the financial position was bad. As such, the impugned order is legal and had been passed to meet the financial crises. It has also been submitted that the respondent is unable to pay the salaries in time even to its permanent employees due to non- availability of funds. It has also been stated that only Scheduled Castes candidates are appointed as Harijans and that the appointments given to the petitioners were not in accordance with the rules and the procedure. A reference has been made to circular dated 26th August, 1989 and it has been argued that the appointment letter does not disclose that it was in conformity with the circular and the appointments,of the petitioners were in contravention of the circular rendering the appointment to be illegal and, therefore, in pursuance of the circular dated 26th August, 1989 and 4th April, 1990, the services of the petitioners were terminated and the Commissioner had issued the appointment letters unauthorisedly and for extraneous considerations and that the petitioner is guilty of obtaining illegal appointment which is revealed from his own conduct inasmuch as he did not raise any voice for the salary for a period of 8 months. It is also submitted that illegal appointments do not confer any right on the petitioners and, therefore, no grievance can be raised by the petitioner with regard to the breach of principle of natural justice and further that the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are applicable. 4. It has been further submitted that the Municipal Commissioners who had issued these orders of appointment have been subjected to disciplinary action. 5. I have considered the rival submissions made on behalf of the parties. First of all, it may be pointed out that the two circulars dated 26th August, 1989 and 4th April, 1990, form the basis for passing the impugned orders of termination. The circular dated 26th August, 1989 has been placed on record as annexure R/5 in S.B.C.W. No.3525/1990, which is an order issued by the Local Self Government Department, whereby the ban has imposed against appointments in the various municipal bodies of the State, in the back-ground of financial crisis which such bodies are facing. In the circular dated 26th August, 1989, even while imposing the ban on appointments to be made in the.municipal bodies because of financial crisis, it has been mentioned in para 3 that Sanitary works may be given on contract basis and for that purpose the society of Harijans may be contacted. The Circular dated 4th April, 1990 has been placed on record as Annx. R/3 in SBCW No. 3525/1990, Ladu v. Municipal Council , Tonk and, in this order the need to adhere to the ban has been reiterated and emphasised. The only ground which has been argued against the appointment of the petitioners is that these appointments are in contravention of the two Circulars dated 26th August, 1989 and 4th April, 1990. It is to be agreed on all hands that the Administrative Department can certainly issue the orders imposing ban looking to the financial crisis; but the question which is to be examined in these cases is as to what will be the effect in case any appointment orders are issued contrary to the ban so imposed. In my opinion, imposition of ban against appointments is an internal matter between the concerned department and the municipal bodies. In my opinion, imposition of ban against appointments is an internal matter between the concerned department and the municipal bodies. Whereas appointments are made under the appropriate rules, such orders imposing ban cannot impinge upon the continuance of the appointees, if such orders are otherwise proper; more so, because to make proper arrangement for Sanitary is the duty entrusted on the municipal bodies and in order to carry out such duties, it is essential to have appropriate regular staff with the municipal bodies to take care of the public health and the Sanitary conditions in the concerned areas. The employment of sweepers in the municipal bodies is essential for the purpose of proper conditions of public health and the Sanitary arrangements and, it is only in this back-ground that the mention has been made in the Circular dated 26th August, 1989 (para 3 thereof) that despite the ban the Sanitary works should be given on contract. After all, if the Sanitary work is to be given on contract, then also the municipal bodies will have to pay to the contractor and, therefore, if the employment has been provided to the sweepers even against the ban imposed vide Circulars dated 26th August, 1989 and 4th April, 1990, such appointments cannot be said to be uncalled for and, it cannot be said that the appointments given to the sweepers by the municipal bodies for maintaining proper health conditions and Sanitary arrangements, should be struck down merely because they are violative of the Circulars relating to the imposition of ban, nor it can be said that the officers of the municipal bodies who have taken steps to employ sweepers in order to maintain the proper health conditions in the municipal area have acted contrary to the objects sought to be achieved by the municipal bodies. If the circulars imposing ban themselves permit the Sanitary work to be given to the contractors, what exception of financial crisis could be pleaded if the municipal bodies straightway give employment to the sweepers. From the leadings of the parties, it appears that for the purpose of these appointments the names were called from the Social Welfare Department and the appointments were given to the sweepers after holding interviews. All these appointments have been given to members of scheduled caste. From the leadings of the parties, it appears that for the purpose of these appointments the names were called from the Social Welfare Department and the appointments were given to the sweepers after holding interviews. All these appointments have been given to members of scheduled caste. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Municipal Board has submitted that the appointment orders given to the petitioners also suffer from some other irregularities as per the nothings in the files. The controversy before me is not directly with regard to the question as to whether the appointments which were given to the petitioners are in accordance with the rules i.e. Rajasthan Municipalities (Class-IV) Service Rules, 1964, or not. It will be sufficient to say that all these appointments have been made in conformity with the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 inasmuch as the names have been called from the Social Welfare Department and appointments have been given after holding interview. Even if it is found that in certain cases appointments had been given on the basis of the lists which were already avail- able in the office of the Municipal Commissioner, as pointed out by Shri G.P. Sharma, counsel appearing for the respondents, it cannot be said that this could be a ground for passing termination order. So far as the impugned orders of termination before me are considered, as per the language used in the termination orders, the only ground is that the appointments had been given in violation of the circulars dated 26th August, 1989 and 4th April, 1990. 1 am not impressed that the appointment orders, as were given to the petitioners, were bad in the eye of law merely because they had been issued in contravention of the Circulars imposing ban. It is settled law that the validity of the impugned orders is to be examined on the basis of the reasons which have been given in the impugned orders and, the reasons which are given in the form of affidavit and, on the basis of the notings subsequently before the Court, to justify the impugned orders cannot be looked into in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 reiterated later in Mohinder Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851 . 6. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 reiterated later in Mohinder Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851 . 6. It is not disputed before me that vacancies were there and the vacancies are still there, and it is also not the case of the respondents that the petitioners were not discharging their duties properly. In this view of the matter, when the vacancies were available even at the time when the appointments were given, the termination orders cannot be justified merely on the basis of the orders imposing ban. 7. It is strange that a submission has been made that the petitioners did not raise any voice against the non-payment of salary for a period of 8 months be- cause they knew that their appointments were not legal. It is rather unfortunate that after giving appointments the salary was not paid to the petitioners who were working as sweepers in the municipal area for a period of about 8 months and, if they have not raised any voice for payment of salary, it cannot be presumed that they did not agitate for the payment of salary because they knew that their appointments were contrary to the Circulars imposing ban on appointments. The appointment orders, as have been given to the petitioners, also disclose that the appointments had been given on probation and, that further strengthens the case of the petitioners that these appointments had been with reference to the Rajasthan municipalities (Class IV) Service Rules. In this view of the matter, if the employees who had been appointed on probation were sought to be terminated on the ground that their appointments was contrary to the orders imposing ban, in my opinion, they were also entitled to an action instead of notice, as also the protection of such other provisions of law applicable in the cases of such employees and the minimum requirement of principle of natural justice ought to have been followed. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on Nand Lair Etc. v. State of Rajasthan, 1988(2) RLR 738 which is a Division Bench judgment of this court and has submitted that at least in 11 cases at hand, no ground with reference to the breach of natural justice has been taken. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on Nand Lair Etc. v. State of Rajasthan, 1988(2) RLR 738 which is a Division Bench judgment of this court and has submitted that at least in 11 cases at hand, no ground with reference to the breach of natural justice has been taken. Shri Narendra Jain appearing on behalf of the petitioners has submitted that the ground of breach of natural justice has been taken in all the cases and it is factually incorrect to say that in the eleven cases, the details of which are as under:- 1 3191/1990 Smt. Sandhya v. MC Tonk 2 3186/1990 Guddu v. MC Tonk 3 3233/1990 Smt. Lad v. MC Tonk 4 3187/1990 Vishnu v. MC Tonk 5 3231/1990 Indira v. MC Tonk 6 3235/1990 Raja v. MC Tonk 7 3232/1990 Nand Kishore v. MC Tonk 8 3234/1990 Meera v. MC Tonk 9 3193/1990 Smt. Sumitra v. MC Tonk 10 3190/1990 Kanhaiya v. MC Tonk 11 3192/1990 Smt. Shyama v. MC Tonk the ground of breach of natural justice has not been taken. Shri Jain has invited my attention to ground (d) at page 6, in the case of Lad, wherein it has been stated that no notice was served before passing the order and he has submitted that all these are identical matters and cyclostyled petitions have been filed. Be that as it may, the Division Bench in the case of Nand Lal, on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents, has held that even if the order of appointment is illegal, or void or bad in law, still an opportunity of hearing is to be given to the employee before passing the order of termination. In 3. 1998 (2) RLR 738 this view of the matter, while deciding several writ petitions by a common judgment, a few writ petitions cannot be rejected merely because the point regarding the breach of natural justice has not been taken specifically in such writ petitions. Once, the Division Bench has held that even if the appointment order is void in the eye of law, the opportunity has to be given, no differentiation can be made while deciding several writ petition by a common judgment if any of the point which arose out of the admitted facts has not been taken. Once, the Division Bench has held that even if the appointment order is void in the eye of law, the opportunity has to be given, no differentiation can be made while deciding several writ petition by a common judgment if any of the point which arose out of the admitted facts has not been taken. It is not the case of the respondents that any action instead of notice or opportunity of hearing was given in any of these cases. All that has been argued is that it was not necessary to give any notice and the principles of natural justice were not required to be followed. This proposition has been negatived in the aforesaid Division Bench judgment relying upon an earlier decision of this Court in Bhairon Singh v. Sawai Madhopur Via Tonk Zila Dugdh Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Ltd, (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 408/87. D/d. 23.03.1987 , which was based on the observations made by the Supreme Court in Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, ( 1985 (3) SCC 545 , wherein it was observed that even if the order is impregnable, the principles of natural justice have to be followed and that the other side has to be heard before any order is passed to its prejudice. In this view of the matter, I do not find any merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent in this regard and the same is rejected. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent still submits on the basis oo Supreme Court judgment in Dr. S.C. Verma v. Chancellor, Nagpur University (1990-II LLN 639) and he has invited my attention to para 16 of this judgment which reads as under: "16. When, therefore, the services of the appellants are to be terminated in view of the change in the position of law and not on account of the demerits or demeanour of individual candidates, it is not necessary to hear the individuals before their services are terminated. The rule of audialteram partem does not apply in such cases and, therefore, there is no breach of the principles of natural justice. In the result, we are of the view that there is no merit in this case. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs." 9. The rule of audialteram partem does not apply in such cases and, therefore, there is no breach of the principles of natural justice. In the result, we are of the view that there is no merit in this case. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs." 9. This was a case in which the termination orders had been passed on account of change in the position of law and the Supreme Court considered that the termination order had been passed by operation of law and not on account of demerits or demeanour of 1 individual candidate. In the cases before me, there is no pleading whatsoever that there was any change in the position of law. The Circulars dated 26th August, 1989 and 4th April, 1990 cannot be said to have the force of law and it may further be considered that the Circular dated 26th August, 1989 was already there when the petitioners were appointed and there are many cases in which appointments had been given even after 4th April, 1990, when the Circular dated 4th April, 1990 was already there. Moreover, Circulars imposing ban do not have the force of law. Thus, there was no change whatsoever in the position of law as was obtaining at the time when the appointments were made and the law as was obtaining when the termination orders were issued and, therefore, the proposition of law which has been laid down by the Supreme Court in S.C. Verma's case (supra) is of no help to the respondents. 10. In view of the findings arrived at by me, as above, I find that the termination orders with reference to all these petitioners are invalid. The termination orders cannot be sustained in the eye of law and the same are hereby quashed and set aside with the direction that in case no salary was paid to the petitioners, the due amount of salary may be paid to each of the petitioners. The petitioners shall be reinstated from the date of termination order with all consequential benefits as if their services had never been terminated. The petitioners shall be reinstated from the date of termination order with all consequential benefits as if their services had never been terminated. This order shall be carried out within a period of one month from the date the copy of this order is made available to the respondents for the purpose of reinstatement and the due amount of salary and arrears shall be paid within three months. 11. The writ petitions are allowed as indicated above with no order as to -RESULT- . *******