Mohd. Abdul Ghani v. State Of Bihar — 1991 DIGILAW 60 (PAT)

Judgment S.Ali Ahmad, J. 1. The validity of the Bihar Act 11 of 1990 called the Bihar Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1989, has been challenged in these four writ applications. By this amending Act the definition of the word "estate" in the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 has been amended. Prior to the amendment, the definition was as follows: 2(i) estate means any land included under one entry in any of the general registers of revenue paying lands and revenue free lands, prepared and maintained under the law for the time being in force by the Collector of a district, and includes revenue free land not entered in any register and a share in or of an estate. After amendment, it reads as such--2(i) estate means any land and several fishery and ferry rights included under one entry in any of the general registers of revenue paying lands and revenue-free lands, prepared and maintained under the law for the time being in force by the Collector of a district, and includes revenue free land and several fishery and ferry rights not entered into any register and a share in or of an estate. A comparison of the definition of estate before and after the amendment will show that several fishery and ferry rights were not included in the definition of estate which now finds mention in the amended definition of estate. 2. C.W.J.C. Nos. 3236, 5623 and 3262 of 1990 relate to the fishery right of the petitioners. The petitioners of C.W.J.C. No. 3262 of 1990 and the petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 3236 of 1990 are lessees from Tarak Nath Ghosh whereas the petitioners of C.W.J.C. No. 5623 of 1990 are the family deities and have filed this application through the sebaits Mahashay Rabindra Nath Ghosh, Mahashay Mahesh Ghosh, Mahashay Alikh Nath Ghosh and sons of Late Mahashay Amar Nath Ghosh and sons of Late Mahashay Jitendra Nath Ghosh. According to the petitioners, the Moghals in ancient past in exercise of their imperial rights had granted several fishery rights to the ancestors of Mahashay Tarak Nath Ghosh. The grant is a lost grant, The grantee and his successor in interest continued to hold the said Jalkars Gangapanth and Chanan free from revenue from generation to generation. According to the petitioners, the Moghals in ancient past in exercise of their imperial rights had granted several fishery rights to the ancestors of Mahashay Tarak Nath Ghosh. The grant is a lost grant, The grantee and his successor in interest continued to hold the said Jalkars Gangapanth and Chanan free from revenue from generation to generation. The validity of the grant was approved and confirmed by the Board of Revenue in the years 1808 and 1810 under the Regulations of 1793. Under the orders of the Governor General in council, two parwanas dated 18.11.1808 and 14.7.1808 were issued on the advice of the Member, Board of Revenue. The parwanas upheld the claims of the ancestors of Mahashay Tarak Nath Ghosh and declared that the revenue free grant of some lakharj land and the Jalkar in question was valid. The lakhraj lands were recorded under separate Tauzi No. 786-B which later included under Tauzi No. 984-C. But no entry, however, was made with respect to Jalkars Gangapanth and Chanan in any register prepared under the Bengal Land Registration Act. Mahashay Tarak Nath Ghosh by a deed of endowment dated 6.6.1930 endowed certain properties including jalkars Gangapanth and Chanan to the petitioner deities of C.W.J.C. No. 5623 of 1990. Mahashay Tarak Nath Ghosh became the first shebaits and after him, his son Amar Nath Ghosh. Amar Nath Ghosh is also dead and the present shebait of the trust have already been mentioned above through whom the deities have filed C.W.J.C. No. 5623 of 1990. The petitioners of C.W.J.C. No. 3262 of 1990 claim right to exclusive and several rights of fishing in the tidal water of the public navigable river Ganges between Kuppaghat in Mahaganj known as Dargah Hazrat Pir Shah Kamal near pirpainty. This right they claim on the basis of lease executed by the successor in interest of Mahashay Tarak Nath Ghosh. Likewise the petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 3236 of 1990 also claims fishery right on the basis of a deed of lease dated 8.8.1947 making permanent settlement of Maksoodpur at an annual rental of Rs. 1950 with the father of the petitioners, The fourth application, namely, C.W.J.C. No. 4673 of 1990 relates to the ferry right known as Rajghat ferry. Likewise the petitioner of C.W.J.C. No. 3236 of 1990 also claims fishery right on the basis of a deed of lease dated 8.8.1947 making permanent settlement of Maksoodpur at an annual rental of Rs. 1950 with the father of the petitioners, The fourth application, namely, C.W.J.C. No. 4673 of 1990 relates to the ferry right known as Rajghat ferry. The ferry rights claimed by the petitioners also relate back to the lost grant conferred by the Moghals in exercise of their imperial right on the ancestor of the petitioners. 3. There is no dispute with regard to the area covered by the lost grant. There is also no dispute, inter se, between the petitioners of the different writ applications. All of them were operating within their defined sub-areas as per different deeds. They say that in the year 1961, the Additional Collector of Bhagalpur, incharge of revenue, purporting to act under Sec. 4-B of the Bihar Land Reforms Act issued notices to Mahashay Amar Nath Ghosh and others to show cause as to why the State of Bihar should not resume direct possession of the said Jalkar. The matter was contested and this Court decided the dispute in M.J.C. Nos. 708 and 713 of 1961 in the case of Shree Thakur Basudeo Rai V/s. State of Bihar and Ors. 1965 BLJR 150. I shall have occasion to refer to this decision at later stages also but for the present it may be said that this Court held that where the exclusive right of fishery, severed from the subjacent soil, are granted in navigable rivers, it must be held that they are not land within the meaning of estate as defined in the Act and, as such, they did not vest in the estate of Bihar by special or general notification. The petitioners say that after this decision which was given in the year 1964, they were enjoying the right of fishery without any interference from the State and its authority. It is also said that the case reported in 1965 B.L.J.R. 150 (supra) was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 2039-40 of 1972 on 4.1.1989. It is further said that on account of political pressure and threat of unsocial elements, Bihar Act 11 of 1990 was passed amending the definition of estate. It is also said that the case reported in 1965 B.L.J.R. 150 (supra) was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 2039-40 of 1972 on 4.1.1989. It is further said that on account of political pressure and threat of unsocial elements, Bihar Act 11 of 1990 was passed amending the definition of estate. It is said that according to the amended definition several fishery and ferry rights have also been included in the definition of estate under the Bihar Land Reforms Act. The petitioners say that under the amended definition the State is trying to take possession of the fishery right in the area covered by the lost grant. It is said that at the beginning of the British rule, Roy Kripa Nath Chaudhury was the ancestor of these petitioners. He possessed a ferry called Rajghat Kasba Colgong which was in possession of the family since time immemorial and was recognised by the British Government also in the beginning of its administration. It is said that the petitioners were enjoying the right as their revenue-free property and were plying boats as of right in the river Ganges and its branches within the boundary of Barari ferry on the south and Pakarthalla ferry on the north, the river flowing therefrom south to north. There was, however, some trouble in the year 1935 with one Babu Naresh Mohan Thakur and others. The ancestors of the petitioners, therefore, had to file Title Suit No. 2 of 1947 in the court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Bhagalpur. The Additional Subordinate Judge, Bhagalpur by his judgment and decree dated 2.1.1951 decreed the suit holding as follows: (i) The ancestor of petitioners have exclusive right of ferry on the river Ganges and its branches between colgong and Budhu Chak and no one else has any right to ply boats on this line. (ii) The boundary of the petitioners ferry was held to be two miles. First Appeal No. 156 of 1951 was filed in the High Court by the ancestor of the petitioners who were aggrieved by the findings recorded in the suit that the boundary of the petitioners ferry was only two miles. During the pendency of the appeal Barari estate and others vested in the State of Bihar. In the circumstance, the State of Bihar was added as a party. During the pendency of the appeal Barari estate and others vested in the State of Bihar. In the circumstance, the State of Bihar was added as a party. An objection was taken on behalf of the State in appeal that the ferry had already vested in the State of Bihar and the appeal had become infructuous. This was objected to by the petitioners, then at the instance of the State counsel the State of Bihar was expunged from the memorandum of appeal with the following observation: The State of Bihar will have to take the risk as to the affect of the result of this appeal in the circumstances. The appeal was disposed of on 9.9.1958 and the area of the petitioners ferry was extended from two miles to six miles. It is said that the revenue authority of the district of Bhagalpur wanted to settle the ferry by auction with highest bidder on 6.11.1958. Objection was raised by the ancestor of the petitioners and matter was ultimately decided by this Court in M.J.C. No. 880 of 1938 in the following manner: In our opinion the petitioners (ancestor of petitioners) have made out a prima facie case for holding that the right of Rajghat Ferry is not appertained to any Zamindari right and it has not therefore vested in the Government of Bihar by virtue of any notification issued under Bihar Land Reforms Act. We, however, wish to make it clear that we do not pronounce any final opinion and it would be open to the opposite-parties if they so choose to get the matter finally adjudicated in the proper court of law. 4. After a lapse of 14 years Title Suit No. 50/1974 67/77 was filed by State of Bihar in the Court of the 4th subordinate Judge, Bhagalpur for a declaration that the aforesaid Rajghat ferry at Colgong and the ferry right concerning the said property have vested in the State of Bihar by virtue of proclamation dated 18.8.1955 under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. The suit was dismissed holding that (i) the defendants had got independant interest in the ferry unconnected with the interest in other property and (ii) the right of ferry cannot be characterised as Estate or part of Estate for the simple reason that the right of ferry is severed from soil and the right is a right in the water not right upon the land. The State of Bihar has filed an appeal against the decree passed in the title suit. The appeal is numbered as First Appeal No. 907 of 1980 and is pending disposal in this Court. 5. The facts I have mentioned above have not been denied by the respondents, The position, therefore, is that the fishery right as well as the right to ferry was conferred on the predecessor in interest of the petitioners of these four writ applications by Moghals under a lost grant. The right was subsequently recognised by the British Ruler in the early 19th Century. The exclusive right to carry on fishing and ferry which had its origin in the lost grant was finally held not to be included in the definition of estate under Sec. 2(i) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 and consequently it was held that these rights did not vest in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, Mr. Ghose appearing on behalf of the petitioners urged that by virtue of the Bihar Act 11 of 1990, Sec. 2(i) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 has been amended and as a result of that several fishery and ferry rights have been included in the definition of estate, it is said that under the amended definition several fishery and ferry right also vest in the State of Bihar. He challenges the validity of this amendment on the ground that it is violative of Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. He also urged that the State Legislature was not competent to make this amendment. 6. The Bihar Land Reforms Act came into force on 25.9.1950. The validity of the Act was challenged. With a view to save this Act, the Constitution by first Amendment Act, 1951, was amended for the first time inserting Articles 31-A, 31-B and 9th Schedule to the Constitution. The very first Act in the 9th Schedule is the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. The validity of the Act was challenged. With a view to save this Act, the Constitution by first Amendment Act, 1951, was amended for the first time inserting Articles 31-A, 31-B and 9th Schedule to the Constitution. The very first Act in the 9th Schedule is the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. Article 31-B provides that without prejudice to the provision of Article 31-A none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the 9th Schedule shall be deemed to be void on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with or take away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provision of Chapter III and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court or Tribunal to the contrary each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power or any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force. The first question, therefore, that arises for consideration is as to whether the amendment made to the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 which is the very first Act in the 9th Schedule is saved by Article 31-B of the Constitution. It can be usefully noted that the Bihar Land Reforms Act was earlier amended by Bihar Act 22 of 1954 and Bihar Act 5 of 1972. These two Acts were separately inserted at serial Nos. 25 and 70 of the 9th Schedule. If the intention was that the amendment to the Act included in the 9th Schedule is also protected under Article 31-B of the Constitution then there was no necessity of inserting these two Acts in the 9th Schedule. That apart the matter was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Sajjan Singh V/s. The State of Rajasthan, 1955 1 SCR 933. The Supreme Court held that Article 31-B of the Constitution will not provide protection to the Act amending a law which is included in the 9th Schedule and is not under the protective umbrella of Article 31-B. Mr. Ghose also rightly urged that Article 31-A of the Constitution also cannot be used as shield to save the amendment brought into the definition of estate by Bihar Act 11 of 1990. Ghose also rightly urged that Article 31-A of the Constitution also cannot be used as shield to save the amendment brought into the definition of estate by Bihar Act 11 of 1990. As noted above, the Bihar Land Reforms Act came into force on 25.9.1950 and Article 31-A(2)(a) provides that the expression estate shall, in relation to any local area, have the same meaning as that expression or its local equivalent has in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area. Existing law has been defined under Article 366(10) of the Constitution. According to it, existing law means any law, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or regulation passed or made before the commencement of the Constitution by any Legislature, authority or person having power to make such a law, Ordinance, Order, bye-law, rule or regulation. The Constitution came into force on 26th January, 1950. Therefore, any law, Ordinance, etc. that is sought to be saved under Article 31-A must be an existing law within the meaning of Article 366(10) of the Constitution of India. Since the Act in question is of the year 1990, the same cannot be an existing law and. as such, cannot get the protection under Article 31-A of the Constitution. The argument of Mr. Ghose, therefore, that neither Article 31-A nor Article 31-B of the Constitution can be used as a shield to save Bihar Act 11 of 1990, is quite correct. I may also mention here that Mr. Advovacte General frankly told us that he does not seek protection under Article 31-A or Article 31-B of the Constitution to save Bihar Act 11 of 1990. Relying on the decisions in the cases of Maharaj Umeg Singh and Ors. V/s. State of Bombay and Ors. -- . In re under Article 143, Constitution of India, -- and Nand Lal and Anr. V/s. State of Haryana and Ors. -- , Mr. Advocate General urged that no Act can be held to be ultra vires if it does not violate any provision of the Constitution and the Legislature was competent to enact the law. Mr. Advocate General also urged that the fishery right in tidal water and ferry right over river Ganges is property under Article 300-A of the Constitution and to hold it is no longer a right guaranteed under Chapter lit of the Constitution. Mr. Mr. Advocate General also urged that the fishery right in tidal water and ferry right over river Ganges is property under Article 300-A of the Constitution and to hold it is no longer a right guaranteed under Chapter lit of the Constitution. Mr. Ghose on the other hand, strongly urged that the right to fishery or the ferry right was not a property but it was a right within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as it was the profession of the petitioner to carry on fishing in the tidal water and to carry on ferry in the river Ganges. According to him, therefore, the amendment brought into the definition of estate in the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 by Act No. 11 of 1990 violated the right guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. 7. In view of the stand taken by the parties, two questions arise for determination, the first is as to whether the right of the petitioner to carry on fishing operation in tidal water of Ganges and the right to ferry in the Ganges are property rights or are rights as envisaged under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The second important question is as to whether the State Legislature was competent to amend the definition of estate by Bihar Act No. 11 of 1990. 8. The word property has not been defined in the Constitution. The General Clauses Act also has not defined it. Professor Willies in the Constitutional Law, 1936, Edition at page 815 observed as follows: What property may be taken by the power of eminent domain? In general it may be said that any and all property may be taken. Land, buildings, water, an easement as distinguished from general property, a contract, and a franchise may be taken. In Jones V/s. Skineer 5 LJ Ch the word Property has been described as being "the most comprehensive of all the terms which can be used inasmuch as it is indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which the party can have. Land, buildings, water, an easement as distinguished from general property, a contract, and a franchise may be taken. In Jones V/s. Skineer 5 LJ Ch the word Property has been described as being "the most comprehensive of all the terms which can be used inasmuch as it is indicative and descriptive of every possible interest which the party can have. In the case of J.K. Trust Bombay V/s. Commissioner Income Tax -- , the Supreme Court, while referring to the decision in the case of Sm Angurbala Mullick V/s. Debarata Mullick AIR 1951 SC 283, and in the case of The Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras V/s. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shriur Mutt -- , held as follows: even an office of trusteeship was held to be property especially when emoluments were attached to it, and that must a fortiori be the position in the case of office of managing agency, which is clearly one of profit and even alienable under certain circumstances. The Officer requires no doubt the performance of services, but there is no antithesis between service and business as there are several kinds of business, which involve the performance of services, such as insurance and commission agency. The true test is whether the services are a regular source of income. And if managing agency is business, as was held in -- , then there is no reason why it should not be property for of Sec. 4(3)(i) of the Act. The case of Sri Lakshmindra Theertha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt and Anr. V/s. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras and Ors. -- , quotes Weavers Constitutional Law as follows: The property includes not only real estate and personal property, but also incorporeal rights such as patents, copyrights, leases, accounts and choses in action, and every other thing of an exchangeable value which one may have. The case of Dwarkadas Shriniwas V/s. The Sholapur Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. and Ors. -- , is yet another case, in which Chagla, C.J., (as he then was, while considering the meaning of the expression property said as follows: When we find in Article 19(f) the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, property can only mean all the attributes and indicia which result in the legal conception of property. Ltd. and Ors. -- , is yet another case, in which Chagla, C.J., (as he then was, while considering the meaning of the expression property said as follows: When we find in Article 19(f) the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, property can only mean all the attributes and indicia which result in the legal conception of property. The right of dominion, the right of possession, the right of control would all be included in the expression property. One does not speak of acquiring, holding and disposing of one individual attribute of property. One acquires, holds or disposes of all these qualities which together and in combination constitute property in law. The Supreme Court again in the case of R.C. Cooper V/s. Union of India -- , had occasion to consider the sweep of the word property. It said as follows: In its normal connotation property means the highest right a man can have to anything, being that right which one has to lands of tenements, goods, are chattels which does not depend on anothers courtesy, it includes ownership, estates, and intesrests in corporeal things, and also rights such as trade marks, copyrights, patents and even rights inpersonam capable of transfer or transmission such as debts and signifies a beneficial right to or a thing consider as having a money value especially with reference to transfer or succession and to their capacity of being injured. Again the Supreme Court in the case of Ahmed G.H. Ariff, Etc. V/s. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Calcutta -- , while considering what constitutes property held: Now property is a term of the widest import and subject to any limitation which the context may requires it signifies every possible interest which a person can clearly hold or enjoy. Mr. Ghose faced with these decisions contended that the State was estopped from urging that the right in question was a property right on the principle of res judicata. His contention is that the dispute between the parties was finally determined by the decision reported in 1965 BLJR 150, (supra). In that connection ho drew our attention to several portions of the judgment. His contention is that the dispute between the parties was finally determined by the decision reported in 1965 BLJR 150, (supra). In that connection ho drew our attention to several portions of the judgment. Paragraph 8 of the judgment at page 154 reads as follows: In the case of Somerset against Fogwell, the fishing grant made before Magna Carta appeared not to be an ordinary fishery resulting to the owner of the adjoining land in respect of the land, but a fishery in a navigable river where the tide flows and reflows, and therefore in the nature of Royal franchise, which Sir W. Blackstone calls free fishery. It has been said by Rayley, J. at page 328. Such a franchise^ could not be created after Magna Carta but there was evidence in this case from which its existence from time beyond legal memory might be presumed. But says the learned Judge at page 329. If then a fishery only is granted nothing passes but a right to take the fish and to use means as are necessary for that purpose, which is in trust nothing more than a liberty to fish the grantee has no property in the water, none in the soil. Again Mr. Ghose referred to paragraph 9 of the judgment where the learned Judge on the basis of the observations of Viscount Haldane L.C. in the case of Attorney General for the Province of British Columbia V/s. Attorney General for the Dominion of Canada, 1914 Appeal Cases 153, observed as follows: In England the right of public to fish in tidal waters is very much akin to the right of navigation as observed by Viscount Haldane, L.C. in the judgment of the Privy Council referred to above. The nature of the right is in pari materia with the right of public ferry. Such a right is wholly unconnected with the ownership or occupation of land, and it is not necessary that a ferry owner should have any property in the soil of the river over which he has a right of ferry, or that he should be the owner of the landing places of the ferry, it being sufficient that they are in a public high way, or that otherwise he has a right to land upon them. I may refer to one more observation made by Viscount Maldance L.C. which was quoted with approval by this Court in the case reported in 1965 BLJR 150 (supra), which reads as follows: The general principle is that fisheries are in their nature mere profits of the soil over which the water flows and that the title to a fishery arises from the right to the solum. A fishery may, of course, be severed from the solum and it them becomes a profit apendre in alieno solo and an incorporal hereditament. 9. According to the petitioners themselves, their right originates on the basis of lost grant during the Moghal period. Thereafter the petitioners either by inheritance or by endowment and transfer acquired the right of fishery and ferry. It fully comes within the connotation of property as was said in Coopers case because the right to ferry or to fish is a beneficiary right having money value specially with reference to transfer or succession and also has the capacity of being injured. There is no reason why the word property should be given wide import. I have quoted the decision reported in AIR 1971 SC 1961 (supra), where it has been said that the property is a terms of widest import which signify every possible interest which a person can normally hold or enjoy. The right of fishery and ferry is certainly an interest which the petitioners are holding and enjoying. Mr. Ghose urged that not all enjoyments are proparties. To illustrate his point he says that man enjoys and derives pleasure by watching a good film or he enjoys walking in a park. This Mr. Ghose says, cannot be termed as a property. He is right. Such enjoyment cannot be termed as a property. But the enjoyment of the right to fish and ferry is not mental enjoyments. The enjoyment of fishery and ferry right give material benefits and advantage to the holders of such right. The analogy therefore, given by Mr. Ghose cannot be accepted. His argument that the State should be estopped from urging that the rights of fishery and ferry are property rights in view of the decision reported in 1966 BLJR 150 (supra) cannot also be accepted. The analogy therefore, given by Mr. Ghose cannot be accepted. His argument that the State should be estopped from urging that the rights of fishery and ferry are property rights in view of the decision reported in 1966 BLJR 150 (supra) cannot also be accepted. The point in issue in the aforesaid case was not as to whether the right of fishery was a property right or a right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The only question in issue in that case was whether such rights were covered by the definition of the word estate as it stood then in the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. There is no question, therefore either of estoppel or of res judicata. For these reasons, I am of the view that the right to ferry and the right to fish are property rights which arc recognised under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India and are not rights under Article 11(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. I may also hasten to add here that the right of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to carry on fishing or to ferry has not been taken away at all. The petitioners certainly can exercise these rights in accordance with law. What has been done is that the right to ferry and the right to fish has been included in the definition of the word estate by the amending Act. The effect of that is that such rights vest in the State of Bihar under Sec. 3 of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 10. Basing his argument on the decision in the case of Smt. Meneka Gandhi V/s. Union of India and Anr. -- . Mr. Ghose urged that the petitioners have right to live with dignity and by the Amending Act, their livelihood has been taken. He, therefore, says that the Amending Act (Act 11 of 1990) offends Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Here also I do not agree. Their right to carry on fishing and ferry as I have said above has not been taken away. They can certainly exercise their right. What has been taken away is their exclusive right to fish and ferry in specified area. There is, therefore, no question of their livelihood haying been taken away by the amendment incorporated in Section 2(i) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. If the argument of Mr. They can certainly exercise their right. What has been taken away is their exclusive right to fish and ferry in specified area. There is, therefore, no question of their livelihood haying been taken away by the amendment incorporated in Section 2(i) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. If the argument of Mr. Ghose is to be accepted then no property which yields income could be acquired because the acquisition will always be challenged on the ground that the holder has been deprived of his livelihood and as such the acquisition violates Article 71 of the Constitution. 11. The next question that arises for consideration is as to whether the State Legislature was competent to enact Bihar Act 11 of 1990. This Act amends the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. The object for which the Parent Act, namely, Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar V/s. Kameshwar Singh -- . It was held in that case that the substance of the legislation falls within the ambit of legislative head entry 36 of List II, and the Bihar Legislature was competent to make the law on the subject while holding so, the Supreme Court observed as follows: From this survey of the Act, it appears that the law enacted might be taken to relate to several items in the legislative lists, i.e. rights in or over land and land tenures, forests, fisheries mines and minerals acquisition of property and also principles on which compensation for property acquired is to be determined. The pith and substance of the legislation however, in my opinion, in the transference of ownership of estates to the State Government and falls within the ambit of legislative head entry 36 of List II. There is no scheme of land reforms within the framework of the statute except that a pious hope is expressed that the Commission may produce one. The Bihar Legislature was certainly competent to make the law on the subject of transference of estates and the Act as regards such transfers is constitutional. Prior to the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution Entry 33, List I of the Seventh Schedule stood as follows: Acquisition and requisition of properties for the purpose of State subject to the provision of Entry 42 of List III. Prior to the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution Entry 33, List I of the Seventh Schedule stood as follows: Acquisition and requisition of properties for the purpose of State subject to the provision of Entry 42 of List III. Entry 36 of List II reads as follows: Acquisition or requisition of property except for the purpose of Union subject to the provision of Entry 42 of List III. Entry 42 of this schedule, prior to the amendment of the Constitution stood as follows: Principle on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purpose of the Union or the State or any other public purpose is to be determined and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given. Entry 33 of List I, Entry 36 of List II and Entry 42 of List III empowered the Paliament and the State Legislature to make laws relating to acquisition and requisition of property. The entries in the three Lists at times created technical difficulties in enacting legislation. To avoid these difficulties and to simplify the Constitutional provisions, by seventh amendment of the Constitution, Entry 33 of List I, and Entry 36 of List II were omitted and Entry 42 of List III was substituted as acquisition and requisitioning of property I have held above that fishery and ferry rights of the petitioners are property and, as such, I do not feel any difficulty in holding that the State Legislature was competent to enact the law (Bihar Act II of 1990) by virtue of Entry 42, List III of Schedule VII. Mr. Ghose, however, urged that the Parliament by law has declared Ganges to be a national waterways and all laws regarding shipping and navigation on inland waterways as regards mechnically propelled vessels and the rule of the road on such waterways is covered by Entry 24 of List I. He also drew our attention to Entry 56 of List I which provided for regulation and development of inter-State rivers and river valleys to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. Mr. Ghose, therefore, contended that in view of Entry 24 and Entry 56 of List I, State Legislature was not competent. It is not possible to agree. Mr. Ghose, therefore, contended that in view of Entry 24 and Entry 56 of List I, State Legislature was not competent. It is not possible to agree. Entry 24 relates to enactment of law with regard to shipping and navigation or inland waterways which have been declared by the Parliament to be national waterways as regards mechanically propelled vesseles. Here there is no question of any law with regard to shipping and navigation as regards mechnically propelled vessels. Bihar Act 11 of 1990 only amends the definition of the expression Estate as a result of which several fishery and ferry rights are now included in the definition of the word estate. This amendment does not, in any manner, touch Entry 24. Likewise Entry 56 also is not touched as the amendment does not in any manner relate to regulation and development of inter-State rivers and river valleys to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament. Therefore, in my opinion, notwithstanding the national waterways as mentioned in the National Waterways (Allahabad Haldia Stretch of the Ganga Bhagirathi Hoogly River) Act, 1982 (Act No. 49 of 1982) and the Inland Waterways Authority of India Act, 1985 (No. 82 of 198ijthe State Legislature was competent to enact law as the area of this Legislation was not covered by any Central Legislature. 12 For the above reasons, I do not see any merit in these applications which are dismissed but without costs. R.N. Prasad, J. I agree.