N. Y. HANUMANTHAPPA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is landlords' revision petition. Petitioner 1 is the mother and petitioners 2 and 3 are her sons. They filed an eviction petition under Section 21 (1) (d), (h) and (o) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the act) alleging that the premises in question is a non-residential one; that the premises was leased out to one gangoji Rao who was the father of respondents 1 to 3 and husband of respondent 4; that gangoji Rao was carrying on a non-vegetarian restaurant; that after his death the lease in question lapsed; that the respondents who are the legal representatives of gangoji Rao instead of handing over vacant possession of the premises in question to the landlords continued to be in possession of the same by trespassing on the property and thus they are trespassers; that the premises in question is required by the landlords for their bona fide use and occupation to start silk saree and cut pieces goods business in the said premises, etc. The relevant paras of the eviction petition are paras 6,10 and 12 which are extracted below:"6. The petitioners recently came to know that the said p. Gangoji Rao passed away a few days back. The petitioners are not aware of the exact date of his death. The respondents have deliberately suppressed the factum of his father's death from the knowledge of the petitioners, with ulterior motives. The lease of the schedule premises for the commercial purpose of miming a vegetarian restaurant came to be automatically determined on the death of the said p. Gangoji rao. The petitioners have not recognised the respondents as their tenants in any manner. The respondents are in unlawful possession of the schedule premises. 10. The petitioners require the schedule premises for their own use and bona fide occupation for running their silk and allied business and industry. They are put to great hardship and inconvenience for want of space. If the respondents arc not evicted, the petitioners will be put to untold hardship and difficulties. On the other hand, the respondents who are not the tenants of the petitioners, will not be put to any hardship. 12. The lease in favour of the respondents stands determined on his death by operation of law. Ever since then the respondents are in lawful occupation of the same. On the other hand, the respondents who are not the tenants of the petitioners, will not be put to any hardship. 12. The lease in favour of the respondents stands determined on his death by operation of law. Ever since then the respondents are in lawful occupation of the same. The petitioners reserve their right to bring a suit for damages for illegal occupation against the respondents. The respondents are liable to be evicted from the schedule premises. Hence this petition". ( 2 ) AFTER service of notice on the respondents, they filed an application undersection 151, C. P. C. on 25-8-1981 requesting the trial court to consider the maintainability of the petition as a preliminary issue. On 11-9-1981 the trial court considered the application filed by the respondents to reject the eviction petition on the ground that the same was not maintainable as the said court had no jurisdiction to decide the eviction petition. After considering the same, the trial court held that the petition filed by the petitioners as maintainable. The order reads thus:"11-9-1981: petitioner files application under Section 29. Respondents' objection to main petition filed. The la. Filed on 25-8-1981 under Section 151, C. P. C. is dismissed as not maintainable having regard to the scope of Section 51 of the krc act. Objections to la. Filed today and to hear on 21-9-1981". ( 3 ) THE respondents had filed their objection statement also. They took a stand in the objection statement that they are not trespassers, but they were tenants along with their father gangoji Rao when he was alive. After his death, they are continuing as tenants and they are carrying on vegetarian restaurant instead of non-vegetarian restaurant. It is further alleged in the objection statement that the landlords inspite of they being aware of the fact that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondents filed the eviction petition with a view to harass the tenants as they did not accede to the illegal demand of the petitioners for higher rent. It is further alleged in the objection statement that the landlords inspite of they being aware of the fact that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondents filed the eviction petition with a view to harass the tenants as they did not accede to the illegal demand of the petitioners for higher rent. Apart from contending that the respondents are tenants and the petitioners arc landlords of the premises in question, the tenants also contended in the objection statement that the need as alleged in the eviction petition is a mere desire and, therefore, the landlords do not require the premises in question and even if it is required, the premises is not suitable for their purpose. Thus contending they requested the trial court to dismiss the petition. Paras 3, 5 and 8 of the objection statement are relevant for considering the stand of the respondents/tenants. The relevant paras read as under: "3. In regard to the averments in paragraph (5) of the petition, it is incorrect to state that the schedule premises was leased only for purposes of running the vegetarian restaurant. It is submitted the premises was leased to the respondents' late father p. Gangoji rao, for the purposes of running a non-vegetarian restaurant, a military hotel. Even though the lease was in the name of respondents' late father p, gangoji Rao the business was being carried on by these respondents along with the late p. Gangoji rao, who himself was of an advanced age the business that was being carried on in the schedule premises was a joint family business. 5. It is respectfully submitted the petitioners approached the respondents in or about the last week of July 1979 and demanded a further advance of Rs. 3,000/- from these respondents and also an enhancement of rent in a sum of Rs. 400/ -. These respondents expressed (heir willingness to pay a little increase in the rent and about Rs. 1,000/- as further advance but the petitioners being dissatisfied with this offer chose to get the quit notice issued with untenable please. 3,000/- from these respondents and also an enhancement of rent in a sum of Rs. 400/ -. These respondents expressed (heir willingness to pay a little increase in the rent and about Rs. 1,000/- as further advance but the petitioners being dissatisfied with this offer chose to get the quit notice issued with untenable please. As such the averment in the petition that these respondents concealed the fact of the death of their father to the petitioners and they have been in unlawful possession of the suit schedule premises are all contrary to the facts and averred only with (he sole intention of harassing these respondents. 8. These respondents submit that in view of what is stated supra the avennent that on the death of p, gangoji rao, the tenancy was automatically determined is preposterous and the same is denied as false. These respondents were recognised as tenants subsequent to the death of p. Gangoji rao. " ( 4 ) WHEN both parties completed their pleadings the respondents/tenants filed an application dated 25-8-1991, as stated above, to dismiss the eviction petition contending in paras 5 to 7 of the affidavit filed in support of the i. a. that the petition filed by the petitioners is outside the purview of the act on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the eviction petition. As mentioned earlier that the said application came to be dismissed by the trial court. ( 5 ) ON the pleadings the trial court formulated the following points for determination which read as follows :" (1) whether the petitioners prove the case under Section 21 (1) (d) of the act? (2) whether the petitioners prove the case under Section 21 (1) (o) of the act? (3) whether the petitioners prove that the petition property is reasonably and bona fide required by them for their own use and occupation? (4) whether the petitioners will be put to greater hardship in case of refusal of a decree for eviction? (5) whether the petition as brought by the petitioners is maintainable? (6) what decree or order?" ( 6 ) IN support of their contentions, both parties adduced both oral and documentary evidence. The landlords examined 3 witnesses. Petitioner-2 was examined as P. W. 1 and other 2 persons who were examined were d. g. shankarsa (p. w. 2) and m. r. vasantha kumar (p. w. 3 ). (6) what decree or order?" ( 6 ) IN support of their contentions, both parties adduced both oral and documentary evidence. The landlords examined 3 witnesses. Petitioner-2 was examined as P. W. 1 and other 2 persons who were examined were d. g. shankarsa (p. w. 2) and m. r. vasantha kumar (p. w. 3 ). In support of the contentions of the landlords, they produced 13 documents, viz. , Exhibits p.-1 to p.-13. The tenants in support of their case examined 2 witnesses, viz. , Respondents 1 was examined as r. w. 2 and one l. s. krishna murthy as r. w. 1. They also produced 8 documents, viz. , Exhibits r-1 to r-8. On the basis of the evidence that was made available, the trial court discussed each and every point that were raised for consideration. ( 7 ) ON point No. 5, i. e. , regarding jurisdiction and maintainability of the eviction petition,the trial court took into consideration the averments made in the pleadings and the evidence adduced and held that in view of order vii, Rule 11, C. P. C. the eviction petition brought by the petitioners as not maintainable. ( 8 ) REGARDING point Nos. 1 and 2, the trial court held the same against the petitioners. ( 9 ) HOWEVER the important points for consideration before the trial court were point Nos. 3 and 4, viz. , (i) whether the petitioners prove that they require the premises in question bona fide and reasonably and (ii) whether, in case the petitioners prove lhat their requirement is bona fide and reasonable, to whom greater hardship would be caused. ( 10 ) REGARDING point No. 3 the trial court took into consideration the evidence ofp. w. 1 who admitted in his evidence that respondent-1 has been paying rent from the beginning till the date of filing of the case and observed that demanding higher rent of Rs. 1,000/- per month and an additional advance of Rs. 3,000/-, as alleged by the respondents, as not proved. Regarding capacity to start silk saree and allied business, the trial court, after considering the availability of ready money in the hands of the petitioners and the possibility of getting funds through co-operative societies, observed that they are in a position to start the business intended. 3,000/-, as alleged by the respondents, as not proved. Regarding capacity to start silk saree and allied business, the trial court, after considering the availability of ready money in the hands of the petitioners and the possibility of getting funds through co-operative societies, observed that they are in a position to start the business intended. ( 11 ) REGARDING suitability of the premises, the trial court took into consideration the size of the premises in question which measures 9' x 22' and also the situation of the premises. The trial court observed lhat the petitioners contended that the premises is situated 60' away from balepet. Whereas the respondents contended that the premises is situated 150' away from balcpct. But the difference, according to the trial court, did not matter much. The finding of the trial court is to the effect that "the petition property measures 9'x 22' and the front portion can be made use of as a showroom and the hind portion can be used as a gowdown". Thus the trial court looking to the size of the premises in question and the nearness to balepet, held that the premises is suitable for running silk business. ( 12 ) REGARDING experience of the petitioners in the business intended to be started, the trial court took into consideration the statements of p. Ws. 1 and 2 and held that P. W. 1 acquired necessary experience in the business. ( 13 ) ON the question of income of the petitioners, the trial court's finding is that the petitioners monthly income is about Rs. 3,000/- and the strength of the family is 11 members. Accordingly, the trial court held that there is a need for the petitioners to start some other business to augment their income. While so holding, point No. 3 was held almost in favour of the petitioners. However, the trial court rejected the eviction petition on the basis of the subsequent events, namely, that the wives of the petitioners 2 and 3 and one shoba rani have started a partnership firm under the name and style "dongule glass and plywood" at No. 52/1, B. V. K. iyengar road, Bangalore, on 2-5-1985 and that the said firm is dealing in purchase and sales of plywood, etc. Petitioner-3 is the manager of the said firm. The trial court also observed that the said firm is doing very well. Petitioner-3 is the manager of the said firm. The trial court also observed that the said firm is doing very well. Thus, following the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in M. M. quasim v manohar lal sharma and others, AIR 1981 SC 1113 which dealt with the correctness of taking into consideration of subsequent events, held that the petitioners did not require the premises in question for their bona fide use and occupation. The relevant para of the order of the trial court reads thus:"from the above discussion, it becomes quite clear that petitioner No. 3 who is working as a manager of the dongule glass and plywoods at No. 52/1, b. v. k. iyengar road, Bangalore, has to look after that business because other partners are ladies. When it is so, petitioner No. 2 has to look after silk twisting business in the rented premises because petitioner No. 1 is a lady, and I have already held above that the son of P. W. 1 has no experience in running silk sarees and cut piece cloth business. So, there will be nobody to look after the business if started in the petition property. It is not the case of the petitioners that there will be somebody to look after it. In view of this fact and of the fact that they have also started a business under the name and style M/s. Dongule glass and plywoods, I hold that there is no necessity for the petitioners to start a business in silk sarees and cut-piece cloths in the petition property. Though there was necessity before starting of partnership business, M/s. Dongule glass and plywoods, that necessity has now gone". having held so, the trial court dismissed the eviction petition under Section 21 (1) (h) of the act also. ( 14 ) AGGRIEVED by the order of the trial court, the landlords have preferred this revision petition. ( 15 ) SRI S. K. V. Chalapathy, learned counsel for the petitioners/landlords, submits that the approach of the trial court in giving a finding on point No. 3 that the eviction petition as not maintainable is incorrect and the same was resultant of non-application of mind to the Provisions of Section 51 particularly to Section 51 (2) of the act which reads as follows:"51. Proceedings by or against legal representatives. Proceedings by or against legal representatives. (1) (2) where any application, appeal or other proceeding would have been made, preferred or taken under this act by or against any person such application, appeal or other proceeding may, in the event of his death, be made, preferred or taken by or against his legal representatives". further, the finding on bona fide requirement that merely because the wives of petitioners 2 and 3 have become partners of dongule glass and plywood along with one shoba rani and petitioner-3 is the manager of the said firm are not grounds to say that the need of petitioners which was subsisting at the time of filing the eviction petition has been taken away by subsequent events. According to Sri Chalapathy, learned counsel for the petitioners, when every aspect went in favour of the landlords, in other words, when they prove that they require the premises under Section 21 (1) (h) of the Act, the trial court was not justified in giving a finding on bona fide requirement and the comparative hardship against the petitioners. For the proposition that merely because the wives of petitioners 2 and 3 acquired some other business as partners with one shoba rani is not a ground to say that the need of the petitioners has been extinguished, Sri Chalapathy, learned counsel for the petitioners, rel ies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Chander kali bail and others v jagadish singh thakur and another, AIR 1977 SC 2262 wherein it is held thus:"apropos the second point it would be useful to point out that the act replaced an earlier act of 1955 entitled as the Madhya Pradesh accommodation control Act, 1955. In a similar provision as contained in Section 4 (h) of the 1955 Act, the expression used was that the landlord 'is not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city or town for that purpose'. There is a clear departure in the 1961 act where the phraseology is that the landlord 'has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned', in the second part of clause (f) of Section 12 (1 ). There is a clear departure in the 1961 act where the phraseology is that the landlord 'has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned', in the second part of clause (f) of Section 12 (1 ). A tenanted shop in mere occupation of the landlord filing a suit for eviction against his tenant was sufficient to deny him a decree on the ground of clause (h) of Section 4 of the 1955 act. But under the 1961 Act, mere occupation of another premises is not sufficient. The premises must be his own, meaning thereby that they must be owned by or belong to the landlord and he must be in occupation of the same. It is, therefore, plain that the tenanted shop in occupation of the plaintiff was not sufficient to deny him a decree for eviction against his tenant under Section 12 (1) (f) of the act". ( 16 ) THE next submission of Sri Chalapa thy is that the finding of the trial court on point No. 5 that the eviction petition is not maintainable is quite illegal, as the said issue was already considered by the trial court on 11-9-1981 on an application filed by the respondents tenants under Section 151, C. P. C. requesting the trial court to dismiss the eviction petition as not maintainable for the reason that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try an eviction petition under the act which contention was considered and negatived. ( 17 ) FOR the above reasons, Sri Chalapathy, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the latter portion of the order relating to extinguishment of need of the petitioners and the comparative hardship be set aside and the eviction petition be allowed. ( 18 ) AS an answer to the above contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Srinivasan, learned counsel for the respondents/tenants, submits as follows: the eviction petition of the petitioners/landlords not maintainable as nowhere in the petition it is averred that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and the respondents. When the petitioners themselves averred in the petition that the respondents are trespassers, the trial court was justified in giving its finding on point No. 5 in negative. When the petitioners themselves averred in the petition that the respondents are trespassers, the trial court was justified in giving its finding on point No. 5 in negative. According to him, merely because the respondents submitted lhat they were continuing as tenants inspite of their father's death, it will not ensure to the benefit of the petitioners to maintain an eviction petition under the act according to him, the averments made in the petition determine the forum. When the petitioners themselves averred that the respondents are not tenants, the landlords should have sued the respondents before civil court for possession and definitely not before rent control court, as the jurisdiction of rent control court is very much limited and the jurisdiction of civil court is very wide. For the proposition that the averments made in the petition determine the forum, Sri Srinivasan, learned counsel for the respondents/tenants relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in abdulla bi ali and others vgalappa and others, AIR 1985 SC 577 . Paras 4,5 and 6 of the judgment read as follows:4. It has already been pointed out that the plaintiffs-appellants had earlier initiated the proceedings for the recovery of the arrears of rent from the defendants-respodents and had also initiated a separate proceeding for the correction of the tenancy register. In both those proceedings defendant 2 had denied the title of the plaintiffs-appellants and the revenue court directed the plaintiffs to get their redress by filing a suit in the civil court. Accordingly, the plaintiffs-appellants had no option but to file the suit. Curiously enough this time the defendants took up the stand that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit when in the earlier proceedings before the revenue court too the defendants had raised an objection that the revenue court had no jurisdiction. Thus, the plaintiffs-appellants had been running from pillar to postto get relief on account of the unreasonable attitude taken by the defendants-respondents. 5. There is no denying the fact that the allegations made in plaint decide the forum. The jurisdiction does not depend upon the defence taken by the defendants in the written statement. On a reading of the plaint as a whole it is evident that the plaintiffs-appellants had filed the suit giving rise to the present appeal treating the defendants as trespassers as they denied the title of the plaintiffs-appellants. The jurisdiction does not depend upon the defence taken by the defendants in the written statement. On a reading of the plaint as a whole it is evident that the plaintiffs-appellants had filed the suit giving rise to the present appeal treating the defendants as trespassers as they denied the title of the plaintiffs-appellants. Now a suit against the trespasser would lie only in the civil court and not in the revenue court. The high court, however, took the view that the plaintiffs-appellants had not claimed a declaration of title over the disputed plots and all that has been set up by them in the plaint is the relationship of landlord and tenant. 6. In our opinion the high court was not quite correct in observing that the suit was filed by the plaintiffs-appellants on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant. Indeed, when the defendants denied the title of the plaintiffs and the tenancy the plaintiffs filed the present suit treating them to be trespassers and the suit is not on the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It is no doubt true that the plaintiffs had alleged that defendant 2 was a tenant but on the denial of the tenancy and the title of the plaintiffs-appellants they filed a suit treating the defendant to be a trespasser and a suit against a trespasser would lie only in the civil court and not in the revenue court". Regarding bona fide requirement of the premises in question by the petitioners/landlords, Sri Srinivasan submits that the trial court justified in taking into consideration the subsequent events, viz. , The wives of petitioners 2 and 3 starting separate partnership business with shoba rani and then holding that the petitioners did not require the premises in question for their bona fide use and occupation. According to him, the finding given by the trail court in para 32 of its order is quite correct. For these reasons, he submits that the revision petition be dismissed and the order of the trial court be confirmed. ( 19 ) SRI chalapathy, learned counsel for the petitioners/landlords, in the form of reply to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondents/tenants submits that as on the date of filing the eviction petition the original tenant died and his legal representatives continued in possession of the premises. ( 19 ) SRI chalapathy, learned counsel for the petitioners/landlords, in the form of reply to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondents/tenants submits that as on the date of filing the eviction petition the original tenant died and his legal representatives continued in possession of the premises. He submits that the law as on that day in view of the decision of this court in s. p. hamidsha chandshawala v seshagiri bhiku pai and drivers, 1973 (1) Mys. L. J. 127, wherein interpreting the scope of sections 3 (r) and 51 of the Act, this court had held that no eviction petition would lie against the legal representatives of the original tenant in respect of a non-residential premises. If such a position was not there, definitely the petitioners would have straightaway initiated eviction proceedings against the respondents alleging that they are the tenants. ( 20 ) ACCORDING to him, the factors which determine the forum are not mere considering allegation on its face value, but the substance of the allegation made in the pleadings, stand of the respondents and how both parties understood and led evidence. Thus, he submits that the approach of the trial court in understanding and proceeding with the case is important circumstance which determines the forum. He lastly submits that inspite of there being some confusion in the averments made in the eviction petition, the stand of the respondents/tenants that they are tenants and the relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the parties, supported by the earlier order of the trial court dated 11-9-1981 rejecting the respondents' application to dismiss the eviction petition as not maintainable is sufficient to allow the eviction petition. In support of this contention Sri Chalapathy, learned counsel for the petitioners/landlords, also relies on some of the authorities of this court and the Supreme Court which will be referred to a little later. In support of this contention Sri Chalapathy, learned counsel for the petitioners/landlords, also relies on some of the authorities of this court and the Supreme Court which will be referred to a little later. ( 21 ) IN order to decide the case on hand, it is proper to consider here the scope and effect of order vii, Rule 7, C. P. C. and sections 3 (r), 21 and 51 (1) and (2) of the act: order vii, Rule 7, C. P. C. reads as follows:"every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims either simply or in the alternative, and it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the court may think just to the same extent as if it had been asked for. And the same Rule shall apply to any relief claimed by the defendant in his written statement". sub-section (r) of Section 3 of the act reads thus:"3. Definition. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires (r) "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a premises and includes the surviving spouse or any son or daughter or father or mother of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the premises as a member of the tenant's family up to the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a premises by its tenant or a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rents for shops has been framed out or leased by a local authority". Section 21 (1) (h) of the act reads as under:"21. Protection of tenants against eviction. Section 21 (1) (h) of the act reads as under:"21. Protection of tenants against eviction. (1) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenant: provided that the court may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely : (h) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust, that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust;"section 51 of the act reads as follows:"51. Proceedings by or against legal representatives. (1) any application made, appeal preferred, or proceeding taken under this act by or against any person, may, in the event of his death be continued by or against his legal representative. (2) where any application, appeal or other proceeding would have been made, preferred or taken under this act by or against any person such application, appeal or other proceeding may, in the event of his death, be made, preferred or taken by or against his legal representatives". ( 22 ) LEGAL position on different propositions as follows: dealing with the position whether the averments made in the pleadings should be taken on their face value to determine the forum, as long back as in 1951 the Supreme Court held in the case of firm srinivas ram kumar v mahabir prasad and others, AIR 1951 (38) SC 177, as follows:" (9 ). As regards the other point, however, we are of the opinion that the decision of the trial court was right and that the h. c. took an undoubtedly rigid and technical view in reversing this part of the decree of the subordinate judge. It is true that it was no part of the plaintiff's case as made in the plaint that the sum of Rs. 30,000 was advanced by way of loan to the defendants second party. It is true that it was no part of the plaintiff's case as made in the plaint that the sum of Rs. 30,000 was advanced by way of loan to the defendants second party. But it was certainly open to the plaintiff to make an alternative case to that effect and make a prayer in the alternative for a decree for money even if the allegations of the money being paid in pursuance of a contract of sale could not be established by evidence. The fact that such a prayer would have been inconsistent with the other prayer is not really material. A plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the civil p. c. to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. The question, however, arises whether, in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to the court to give him relief on that basis. The Rule undoubtedly is that the court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant, in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plainliff based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant, in his pleadings. In such circumstances when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant, it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff, to a separate suit. As an illustration of this principle, reference may be made to the pronouncement of the judicial committee in Mohan Manucha V. Manzoor Ahmad, 70 I. A. 1: AIR 1943 (3) PC 29. This appeal arose out of a suit commenced by the plaintiff-appellant to enforce a mortgage security. The plea of the defendant was that the mortgage was void. As an illustration of this principle, reference may be made to the pronouncement of the judicial committee in Mohan Manucha V. Manzoor Ahmad, 70 I. A. 1: AIR 1943 (3) PC 29. This appeal arose out of a suit commenced by the plaintiff-appellant to enforce a mortgage security. The plea of the defendant was that the mortgage was void. This plea was given effect to by both the lower court as well as by the p. c. but the p. c. held that it was open in such circumstances to the plaintiff to repudiate the transaction altogether and claim a relief outside it in the form of restitution under Section 65, Contract Act. Although no such alternative claim was made in the plaint, the p. c. allowed it to be advanced and gave a decree on the ground that the respondent could not be prejudiced by such a claim at all and the matter ought not to be left to a separate suit. It maybe noted that this relief was allowed to the appellant, even though the appeal was heard ex parte in the absence of the respondent". likewise, the Supreme Court in l. Janakiraman iyer and others v p. m. nilakanta iyer and others, AIR 1962 SC 633 held as follows:"in construing the plaint the court must have regard to all the relevant allegations made m the plaint and must look at the substance of the matter and not its form. "again in kunju kesavan v mm. Philip and others, AIR 1964 SC 164 held that, if both parties understood what the issue in the case was, the absence of an issue, therefore, did not lead to a mis-trial sufficient to vitiate the decision. Similar question had croped up for consideration before various high courts. In nagayasami naidu and others v kochadai naidu and others, AIR 1969 Madras 329, the Madras High Court held as follows,"while dealing with the scope of order vii, Rule 7, C. P. C. and power of court to grant relief not covered by issues:"a party cannot be awarded relief on a basis not pleaded by him and on which there is no issue, merely taking advantage of some statements in the pleadings or in the evidence made or given for a different purpose and with reference to a different issue. Such deviation from the pleading is permissible, very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances, if it can be postulated that the other side has unambiguously and unequivocally admitted, completely the factual or the legal basis on which relief could be moulded. In other words, it is the clear admission of the opposite party in the pleadings that confers jurisdiction upon the court to award relief on a basis different from one covered by the issues on which parties went to trial". similar view was taken on 2 occasions by the Madhya Pradesh high court, viz. , (i) in indermal tekaji mahajan v ramprasad gopilal and another, AIR 1970 MP 40 wherein it is held thus :"it is now well established that where an alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, but did not make in the plaint, is admitted by the defendant in bis written statement, it is permissible to grant to the plaintiff relief on that basis. So, in firm shrinivas ram kumar v mahabir prasad, AIR 1951 SC 177 , mukherjee j. , As he then was held: 'the Rule undoubtedly is that the court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made hi the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and No. Question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings'. "and (ii) in kulsekarapatnam hand match workers' co-operative cottage industrial society Ltd. , Madras state v radhelal lalloolal and others, AIR 1971 MP 191 , wherein it is held as follows:"where the relief sought by the plaintiff is ascertainable from the pleadings of the parties and they were aware of the subject-matter of the litigation, relief can be granted on alternative basis even though on the literal construction of the plaint the suit may fail". a division bench of this court in k. Abdul subhan v a. k. satyanarayana setty, 1984 (2) KAR. L. J. 72, observed as follows:" (B) kaniataka Rent Control Act Section 51 and Rule 30 of Karnataka rent control rules r/w order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A legal representative brought on record on the death of a person, may be petitioner or a respondent, will have the same status as the legal representative contemplated in general law. Therefore, such a legal representative, has the right to continue the proceeding at least on the basis of the averments made by the deceased whom he represents legally. Under Section 51 (2) of the Act, a legal representative, has been conferred with an additional power or right over and above that of a legal representative in general law enjoys. A legal representative of a deceased person is, by virtue of Section 51 (2) of the act enables even to make an application, prefer an appeal or take any proceedings which would have been made by a deceased person, whether he be a landlord or a tenant. That is why he can initiate or institute proceedings which the deceased tenant could have done. In other words, that right is, in law, transmitted to the l. rs. , Just as there is transmission of tenancy to the specified person in regard to the residential premises as found in second portion of Section 3 (r) of the act. "earlier to the above, this court in an unreported decision of this court, while explaining the scope ofsection 51 of the act held in civil revision petition No. 1137 of 1975 decided on 4-9-1978 as follows:"section 51 of the act which provides for taking proceedings by or against the legal representatives of the deceased landlord or tenant reads as follows: 51. Proceedings by or against legal representatives. (1) any application made, appeal preferred or proceeding taken under this act by or against any person, may, in the event of his death be continued by or against his legal representatives. (2) where any application, appeal or other proceedings would have been made, preferred or taken under this act by or against any person such application, appeal or other proceedings may, in the event of his death, be made, preferred or taken by or against his legal representatives. ' sub-section (1) applies to pending proceedings. (2) where any application, appeal or other proceedings would have been made, preferred or taken under this act by or against any person such application, appeal or other proceedings may, in the event of his death, be made, preferred or taken by or against his legal representatives. ' sub-section (1) applies to pending proceedings. Sub-section (2) is an enabling provision which makes it clear that action can be taken under the Provisions of the act by the legal representatives of either the landlord or the tenant by or against such legal representatives as the case may be. There is nothing in this sub-section suggesting that action can be taken against the legal representatives of a tenant under Section 51 (2) only if the cause of action therefore had arisen during the life lime of the tenant. The Provisions in our opinion cannot be construed in such a narrow manner". ( 23 ) FROM the above, it is clear that the general Rule is that the averments in the pleadings determine the forum, but it can be said that if the stand of the respondents is not one of denial but both parties understood a particular issue and led evidence, it cannot be said that the trial court justified in giving a finding in negative on point No. 5 in the order under challenge and also it cannot be said that Sri Srinivasan, learned counsel for the respondents/tenants, is right in contending that the law laid down in abdulla bin ali's case, AIR 1985 SC 577 is applicable to the case on hand. On facts, the said decision is not applicable. Because, that was a case wherein the defendant had denied the title of tenants. Taking into consideration the different stand-points of both parties, the trial court said that the averments made in the petition determine the forum. ( 24 ) IN order to understand the effect of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, one has to bear in mind the facts and circumstances which had given rise as explained in para 4 of the decision in abdulla bin ali's case AIR 1985 SC 577 . Para 4 has been extracted above. ( 24 ) IN order to understand the effect of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, one has to bear in mind the facts and circumstances which had given rise as explained in para 4 of the decision in abdulla bin ali's case AIR 1985 SC 577 . Para 4 has been extracted above. ( 25 ) OFCOURSE, Sri Srinivasan, learned counsel for the respondents submits that not only the averments in the eviction petition but also the last ground made out in revision petition make it clear that the petitioners were not certain about their case that they were sucing in the capacity of landlords. ( 26 ) BUT, answer to the said contention is that the confusion which led the petitioners/landlords to file the eviction petition has been explained, namely, that the confusion was due to the law laid down by this court in hamidsha's case 1973 (1) Mys. L. J. 127, and in Vishnu Narnyan V. Paplal Baldev and others, 1978 (1) Kar. L. J. 212, including the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ganapat Ladha v Sashikant Vishnu Shinde, AIR 1978 SC 955 : 1978 (2) SCC 573 . The petitioners' confusion further increased at the time of filing the revision petition because of the subsequent decision of this court in lakshmi hardware stores and another v G. V. Srikantayya and another, 1983 (2) KAR. L. J. 161 wherein this court took a view to the effect that the legal representatives of the deceased tenant of a non-residential premises are not tenants within the meaning of Section 3 (r) of the act and they cannot be said to have any interest so as to enable them to contest or continue the revision against the order of the trial court. ( 27 ) IT has to be said that it is not mere averment in the petition which determines the forum though it is normally, but the court shall take into consideration other factors also in order to understand the object or purpose of filing a suit or an eviction petition. The court shall not ignore the object or purpose while moulding the relief. The court shall not brush aside the unambiguous and unequivocal admission on the part of the respondents/tenants. The court shall not ignore the object or purpose while moulding the relief. The court shall not brush aside the unambiguous and unequivocal admission on the part of the respondents/tenants. ( 28 ) FROM the above discussion, it is clear that the petitioners/landlords are entitled to maintain the eviction petition against the legal representatives of the original tenant. Because of the confusion which lurked in the mind of the petitioners/landlords as the law prevailing on the date of filing the petition, the petitioners/landlords requested the court to grant relief of eviction in an indirect way. This was the circumstance which made the petitioners to file an eviction petition under Section 21 (1) (d), (h) and (o) before the trial court also pleading that, if eviction is not granted great hardship would be caused to them. On the other hand, the tenants in the application filed seeking rejection of the eviction petition and also in their objection statement did not deny that they are not the tenants under the petitioners/landlords. All the circumstances including ihc evidence adduced would go to show that both parties understood the dispute between them as one for eviction on the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant. Hence, it has to be said that the finding given by the trial court on point No. 5 in the order under challenge is neither correct nor warranted, when that issue had already considered at the preliminary stage itseh while considering the application filed by the tenants under scclipn 151, C. P. C. ( 29 ) REGARDING bona fide requirement, the trial court gave its finding on all counts in favour of the landlords. But, it dismissed the petition because of the finding that the wives of petitioners 2 and 3 entered into a partnership firm with one shoba rani and started a partnership firm in the name "dongule glass and plywoods" of which P. W. 1 is the manager and the business is going on well. Starling of business in silk and allied goods or participation of the wives of petitioners 2 and 3 in another business are relevant factors to hold against the petitioners. Thus it has to be said that from the above discussion the reasoning given in para 32 of the order under chal- lenge is resultant of non-application of mind. Starling of business in silk and allied goods or participation of the wives of petitioners 2 and 3 in another business are relevant factors to hold against the petitioners. Thus it has to be said that from the above discussion the reasoning given in para 32 of the order under chal- lenge is resultant of non-application of mind. Because neither the mother of petitioners 2 and 3 is the manager nor any one of the petitioners is the partners of the said firm. Merely because the wives of petitioners 2 and 3 became the partners of the said partnership firm, that itself will not take away the need of the petitioners/landlords as the partners of the said firm are not parties to these proceed- ings. If this aspect was properly thought of by the trial court, its finding would have been otherwise. Hence, the finding given by the trial court regarding bona fide requirement of the premises in question of the petitioners/landlords is a perverse one. ( 30 ) REGARDING comparative hardship, the trial court did not consider the said issue as it observed that when the petition under Section 21 (1) (h) of the act itself is rejected, there is no necessity to consider comparative hardship. ( 31 ) WHEN all the findings went in favour of the landlords, viz. , Necessity, need, suitability of the premises, capacity, strength of the family, availability of funds, etc. , It has to be said that, if eviction is not ordered, greater hardship would be caused to the landlords. Nowhere it is said in the evidence of the tenant that subsequent to filing of the petition or even a little earlier to that, or immediately after the death of their father, they tried sincerely to secure alternative accommodation, but they failed in their efforts to get alternative accommodation. As such, it ha. , To be said that comparative hardship will be more for the landlords if eviction is not ordered. Hence, the request of Sri Srinivasan that, as the trial court has not given any finding on point No. 4 regarding comparative hardship, the matter be remitted to the trial court for fresh enquiry on this point, does not require to be considered, particularly when it has been shown that comparative hardship will be more to the petitioners in case eviction is not ordered. ( 32 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this revision petition is allowed and the order under challenge is set aside. The eviction petition under Section 21 (1) (h) of the act is allowed. ( 33 ) REGARDING the submission of Sri Srinivasan, learned counsel for the respondents/tenants, that his clients should be granted some more time to vacate and put the landlords in vacant possession of the premises as otherwise great inconvenience would be caused to them, in my view some reasonable time shall be granted to the respondents. Learned counsel for the respondents requests at least 3 years' time to be granted. Whereas Sri Chalapathy, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that 6 months' time is more than sufficient however, taking into, consideration the peculiar circumstances in which both parties are placed, I think, lime a little more than what Sri Chalapathy offered is required to be granted. Accordingly, time till the end of may 1993, is granted to the respondents to vacate and put the petitioners in vacant possession of the premises without any protest. The respondents shall not drive the petitioners to get possession of the premises through execution proceedings. During this period, the respondents shall be regular in payment of rents. They shall not cause any damage to the premises in question. They also shall not sublease the premises. --- *** --- .