Judgment :- The plaintiff is the appellant. The suit is one for permanent injunction restraining the first defendant from putting up any house or construction of the suit properly, without sanction and approval of the site plan from the Nagercoil Municipality. The Municipality the second defendant in the suit. The plaintiff is the owner of the house bearing No.M.M.C.No.26/6A (old No.N.M.C.No.26/3). The wall on the western side of the defendant’s house fell down and the first defendant had taken steps to re-erect the wall. applied for sanction to the Municipality on 1.12.1977. The suit was filed on 21.12.1977. Municipality refused to sanction the plan by an order dated 21.7.1978 after the filing suit. 2. The trial court held that the first defendant was not entitled to reconstruct the wall without the sanction of the Municipality. On appeal, the learned Judge reversed the conclusion trial court and held that there was no necessity for the first defendant to obtain the sanction of the Municipality for the purpose of reconstructing the wall. It is the correctness judgment that is challenged by the respondent. 3. The question turns on the interpretation of Secs.3(3), 3(24) and 197 of the Tamil District Municipalities Act, 1920, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Learned counsel for appellant placed reliance on the provisions of Sec.l97(1), which reads as follows: “ If any person intends to construct or reconstruct a building other than a hut, he shall to the executive authority. ” Learned counsel submits that the explanation to the section contains a special definition of the term ‘building’ for the purpose of Sec.197. According to him, a wall abutting a public street, irrespective of its height would fall within the definition of building and if a person wants to construct or reconstruct a wall abutting a public-street, he shall obtain prior sanction of the Municipal Authorities under Sec.197. 4. In order to understand the purpose of the explanation to Sec.l97(1), it is necessary to refer to the terms of Sec.3(3), in which a ‘building’ is defined as ‘including a house, out-house, stable, latrine, shed, hut, wall (other than a boundary wall not exceeding eight feet in height) and any other such structure, whether of masonry, bricks, wood, mud, metal or any other material whatsoever." In the definition under Sec.3 (3) an exception is made with reference to the boundary walls not exceeding 8 feet height. In order to cover boundary walls of lesser height also, explanation to Sec.197(1) has been introduced. Under that explanation if the wall abuts a public street, then would fall within the definition of building whatever may be the height thereof. Sec.197(1) will apply only to cases of construction or reconstruction of a building other than a hut. The expression "reconstruction of a building" is specifically defined under Sec.3(24) of the Act, which is under: "Reconstruction" of a building includes: (a) the re-erection wholly or partially of a building after more than one-half of its cubical contents has been taken down or burnt down, or has fallen down whether at one time not; (b) the re-erection wholly or partially of any building of which an outer wall has been taken down or burnt down or has fallen down to or within ten feet of the ground adjoining the lowest storey of the building, and of any frame building which has so far been taken down burnt down or has fallen down as to leave only the framework of the lowest storey; (c) the conversion into a dwelling-house or a place of public worship of any building not originally constructed for human habitation or for public worship, as the case may be, or the conversion into more than one dwelling house of a building originally constructed as one dwelling-house only or the conversion of a dwelling house into a factory; (d) the re-conversion into a dwelling-house or a place of public worship or a factory of any building which has been discontinued as, or appropriated for any purpose other than, dwelling-house or a place of public worship or factory as the case may be." When there is a specific definition of a particular expression, that definition should be applied unless there is anything repugnant to the context. The specific definition of the expression ‘ reconstruction of a building ’ shall be applied for the purpose of Sec.197. If that definition applied, the present building will not fall under Sec.197. Clause (a) of Sec.3(24) relates to re-erection, wholly or partially of a building after than one half of its cubical contents has been taken down or burnt down, or has fallen whether at one time or not. Certainly the case will not be covered by clause (a). If that definition applied, the present building will not fall under Sec.197. Clause (a) of Sec.3(24) relates to re-erection, wholly or partially of a building after than one half of its cubical contents has been taken down or burnt down, or has fallen whether at one time or not. Certainly the case will not be covered by clause (a). Clause relates to any building of which an outer wall has been taken down or burnt down or fallen down to or within ten feet of the ground adjoining the lowest storey of the building, and of any frame building which has so far been taken down or has fallen down as to only the framework of the lowest storey. Clause (b) will also not be applicable to the present case. Clauses (c) and (d) do not come anywhere in the picture and it relates to place public worship or any building not originally constructed for human habitation or for worship, as the case may be, or the conversion into more than one dwelling house building originally constructed as one dwelling house only or the conversion of a dwelling house into a factory. 5. Sec.3(3) and (24) of the Act have been considered by a Division Bench of this Court Eluru Municipality represented by the Commissioner v. Gamini Veeramanikyam, (1954)2 M.L.J. 556 . It is worthwhile to extract the relevant observations of the Division Bench, set out the law very clearly: "Sec.3, Clause (24) defines reconstruction as including the re-erection wholly or partially building after more than one-half of its cubical contents has been taken down or burnt or has fallen down, whether at one time or not. The other portions of the definition are material for this case. The argument of the appellants’ learned counsel was that according to the definition includes a ‘wall ’ and admittedly there has been a re- some of the walls in the building. It is true that the definition of a ‘building’ includes a but it must not be overlooked that this definition is subject to the condition "unless there anything repugnant in the subject or context." It is not as if wherever the work occurs, the entire definition can be substituted always. In clause 24(b), it is obvious that word is used as not including a wall, because there is a reference to "an outer wall" building. In clause 24(b), it is obvious that word is used as not including a wall, because there is a reference to "an outer wall" building. It is, therefore necessary that the definition should be appropriately applied according to the context. In Emperor v. B.H.De Souza, I.L.R. (1911)35 Bom. 412, the question arose on the construction of a similar provision in the District Municipal Act. Under Sec.96 of that Act, before beginning to erect any building, or to alter externally or add to an existing building, or re-construct any projecting portion of any building, the person intending to build, alter or add, should give the Municipality notice in writing, and if any one began or made any building or alteration without giving such notice, he was liable to be punished with fine, one of the side walls of house had fallen down and the owner re-built it upon its foundation without getting the permission of the Municipality. He was thereupon charged under the above section for having erected a building without the permission of the Municipality. There was a difference opinion between Chandavarkar, J. and Heaton, J., on the question whether the accused committed any offence, and there was a reference to a third Judge, Sir Basil Scott, C.J. who held, agreeing with Heaton, J., that the accused had committed no offence. The contention the Municipal Council in the case has based upon the definition of "building" which included "walls". It was held, however by a majority of the learned Judges that re-construction of small wall in the building did not constitute the erection of a building. Scott, C.J. observed: "Whether the reconstruction of a wall whatever importance forming part of a house necessarily the ‘erection of a building’ depends upon whether the interpretation Sec.3(7), is to be taken as substituting impliedly for the word (‘building’ wherever it in the Act not merely all erections falling within the ordinary comprehension of the ‘building’ but also all other things included within the definition. It is recognised in to be a rule with regard to the effect of interpretation-clauses of a comprehensive such as we have here that they are not to be taken as strictly defining what the meaning a word must be under the circumstances, but merely declaring what things may comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that they should". It is recognised in to be a rule with regard to the effect of interpretation-clauses of a comprehensive such as we have here that they are not to be taken as strictly defining what the meaning a word must be under the circumstances, but merely declaring what things may comprehended within the term where the circumstances require that they should". learned Chief Justice distinguished an earlier case of the same court in Emperor v. Kalekban Saradarkhan, I.L.R. 35Bom. 236, as being based on the particular facts of that case. respect-fully agree with the above observations of Scott, C.J. Another Decision of the court in Bandra City Municipality v. D.A.D.Monte, A.I.R. 1923 Bom. 407, was brought notice, but it contains no discussion whatever of the points. Nor is there any reference judgment to the earlier decision referred to above. Following the observations of Scott, in Emperor v. B.H. De Souza, I.L.R. (1911)35 Bom. 412, we hold agreeing with Subba J., that the mere demolition and reconstruction of the wall on new foundation would amount to reconstruction of a building. The reference in clause (a) of Sec.3(24) to "one of its cubical contents" also supports our conclusion." 6. The above ruling will apply on all fours to the present case. The lower appellate court also relied on the Judgment and has held against the plaintiff. I have no hesitation to the contention put forward by learned counsel for the appellant. Learned counsel contends that in the case before the Division Bench, there was no wall abutting the street and walls were inside the house. That fact does not make any difference in so far principles are concerned. In the case before the Division Bench, the building could not existed without those walls. Inspite of that, the Division Bench held that the re-erection the wall would not amount to re-erection of the building. Hence, the distinction, sought made by learned counsel has no substance and is rejected. 7. In the result, the second appeal fails and it is dismissed, but there will be no order costs. Appeal dismissed.