N. Y. HANUMANTHAPPA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is tenant's revision petition. ( 2 ) THE respondent herein filed an eviction petition under Section 21 (l) (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, (in short the 'act'), against these petitioner seeking eviction from the schedule premises, contending that she is the owner of the schedule premises which consists of both ground floor, first floor, second floor and third floor. Her case before the trial court was that she purchased the property in question from one O. S. gupta under a registered sale deed dated 25-10-1979. Her further case was that the petitioner informed the respondent of the purpose of purchase of the schedule property namely the same required for the self occupation of herself and other members of her family. She contended if eviction is not ordered great hardship would be caused to her and her sons. ( 3 ) THE said petition was opposed by the respondent. ( 4 ) LANDLORD also filed two more petitions for eviction against other two tenants. The petition under challenge was numbered as h. r. c. No. 2428/1982 whereas other two petitions were numbered as h. r. c. Nos. 2532/1982 and 1553/1987. H. r. . c. No. 2428/1982 was filed on 6-10-1982, later it was amended whereby a few more properties relating to schedule premises included to the petition. The same was objected by the petitioner by filing his objections on 20-1-1983. In the objection statement at paras 3 and 4, petitioner accepted the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and also the ownership of the schedule property by Smt. K. g. jayalakshmi the respondent. However, he disputed the need and requirement by taking a plea that (a) as the tenant did not accede for a demand to pay higher rents, petitioner filed the eviction petition : (b) if he is evicted, greater hardship would be caused to him. The relevant paras in the objection statement are at paras 3 and 4 which are as follows :"3. After issue of notice, the respondent entered appearance. He has filed his objection statement. The allegations made there in brief are as follows: it is true that the petitioner is the owner of the petition schedule premises. The respondent is tenant in respect of the premises on a monthly rent of Rs. After issue of notice, the respondent entered appearance. He has filed his objection statement. The allegations made there in brief are as follows: it is true that the petitioner is the owner of the petition schedule premises. The respondent is tenant in respect of the premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 50/- under one O. S. guptha, who was the owner of the premises. The petitioner purchased the premises from O. S. guplha. Subsequent to the purchase, the respondent attorned tenancy and offered rents to the petitioner. The petitioner received rents till february, 1981 and subsequently refused to receive rents contending that the rent in respect of the premises is Rs. 80. 00 and not 50. 00. The respondent sent rent by money order and thereafter, filed a petition under Section 19 of K. R. C. Act and that petition was allowed. The respondent deposited rents in court and the petitioner had received the same. Subsequent to the disposal of the petition filed by the respondent under Section 19 of K. R. C. Act, the petitioner come forward with the present petition. The petitioner has filed this petition since the respondent has failed to pay the higher rent of Rs. 350. 00 as demanded by the petitioner. The respondent denies that the petitioner is residing in a rented premises. There is no imminent necessity or need of the premises for bona fide use and occupation of the petitioner. The petition schedule premises is in a commercial building. It is not fit for residence of the petitioner. The respondent does not own any other premises in Bangalore. It is difficult to secure alternate accommodation. He will be put greater hardship if eviction order is passed. 4. The respondent has filed additional objection statement, in which he has denied that the petitioner is residing in a rented premises on a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000-00. It is alleged that all the married sons of the petitioner are living separately with the members of their family. The accommodation in occupation of the petitioner is more than sufficient for the petitioner and her family members. The petitioner does not require the 1st and 2nd floor of the premises bearing No. 17 and 17/1 of chodcshwari temple street, Bangalore, for her self-occupation. It is false that the petitioner is carrying a business of jewcllary in avenue road. The accommodation in occupation of the petitioner is more than sufficient for the petitioner and her family members. The petitioner does not require the 1st and 2nd floor of the premises bearing No. 17 and 17/1 of chodcshwari temple street, Bangalore, for her self-occupation. It is false that the petitioner is carrying a business of jewcllary in avenue road. The children of the petitioner are not at all living with her. There is no relationship of landlady and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner's vendor was only a rent collector and he was not at. All the owner. The alleged transaction in favour of the petitioner does not confer any right over the property. By mistake and on account of faith, the rents were paid to the petitioner for certain periods. There is serious dispute about the ownership between the department of muzrai and the purchasers from O. S. guptha. The muzrai department has filed original suits against the legal representatives of O. S. guptha and the purchasers including the petitioner in O. S. No. 1546/1988. " ( 5 ) WHEN these proceedings were pending before the trial court some developments took place namely, during the pendency of the proceedings, it appears a notice was sent to the petitioner herein by the muzrai department calling upon him not to pay the rents in respect of the schedule property to Smt. K. G. Jayalakshmi contending that Smt. K. G. Jayalakshmi is not the owner but it is the muzrai department who is the owner. Subsequently, the muzrai department filed a suit in O. S. No. 1546/1988 in the court of the city of civil judge, Bangalore. The said suit was filed on 25-10-1988 for declaration and possession and also for injunction. In the said suit, the parties to the present petition and other two tenants were made as 'defendants'. The department of muzrai represented by muzrai assistant was made as 'plaintiff. The said suit was filed on 25-10-1988 for declaration and possession and also for injunction. In the said suit, the parties to the present petition and other two tenants were made as 'defendants'. The department of muzrai represented by muzrai assistant was made as 'plaintiff. ( 6 ) IT is better to extract here under the relief sought in the said suit :-" (1) to declare that the sale deed dated 25-10-1979 alleged to have been executed by O. S. Guptha in favour of K. G. Jayalakshmi was neither valid nor binding on the department of muzrai; (2) directing the tenants including the petitioner not to pay rents to Smt. K. g. jayalakshmi; (3) to declare that the eviction proceedings are null and void. "6. The petitioner herein again sought amendment to file additional objection statement. The amendment was allowed. Accordingly, he filed additional objection statement on 13-1-1989, i. e. , nearly after 10 months from the date of filing the suit. In the suit it was pleaded that Smt. K. G. Jayalakshmi as not the owner of the schedule properly. Her vendor Sri O. S. Guplha had not right or tile to transfer the schedule property to Smt. K. g. jayalakshmi. It was that muzrai department as the owner. Thus contending in the said objection statement the relationship of Smt. K. g. jayalakshmi and the petitioner as landlord and tenant denied. ( 7 ) ON the basis of the denial of title and denial of need and bona fide requirement and comparative hardship, trial court framed following points for its consideration which are extracted hereunder:1) whether there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent? 2) whether petitioner requires the petition schedule premises reasonably and bona fide for her own use and occupation? 3) whether greater hardship will be caused to the petitioner if eviction order is refused?" ( 8 ) IN support of rival contentions, both the parties entered the witness box. They also examined the their witness. Also produced some documents in support of their case. As far as landlord is concerned, she examined herself as P. W. 1 and examined another a. o. dhanashankar as p. w-2. She produced altogether 9 documents which were marked as exs. P-l to p-9. Whereas the tenant alone was examined as r. w. 1 and he produced 4 documents. They were marked as exs. As far as landlord is concerned, she examined herself as P. W. 1 and examined another a. o. dhanashankar as p. w-2. She produced altogether 9 documents which were marked as exs. P-l to p-9. Whereas the tenant alone was examined as r. w. 1 and he produced 4 documents. They were marked as exs. R-1 to r-4. On the basis of the evidence so adduced, taking into consideration the subsequent events, trial court held all the points in favour of the landlord and against the tenant. Aggrieved by the said Order, the tenant has preferred this petition. ( 9 ) SRI h. b. datar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner attacks the order under challenge on the following grounds:- (1) trial court was not right in proceeding with the case and deciding and determining the need and requirement of the landlord namely Smt. K. g. jayalakshmi in her favour when her title to the property itself denied. On the other hand, when title itself disputed, should have directed both the parties to get resolved about controversy of the title and then to seek for eviction. (2) in respect of different portions of the schedule property which Smt. K. g. jayalakshmi purchased under a registered sale deed dated 25-10-1979, 3 tenants were in occupation of 3 different portions she filed h. r. c. No. 2428/1982 which related to the present c. r. p. and h. r. c. Nos. 2432/1982 and 1553/1987 filed against other two tenants to avoid unnecessary litigation and confusion, the trial court should have clubbed all the 3 eviction petitions and should have passed a common order. Having not done so, namely disposing of eviction petition pertaining to these petitioner and keeping pending other two petitions, the same has caused great prejudice to the present petitioner and any finding now this court gives in the present petition, will definitely prejudice the case of other two tenants; (3) regarding bona fide requirement and comparative hardship, reasoning adopted by the trial court not at all convincing. ( 10 ) IN support of the first contention, Sri H. B. Datar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner relies upon following 3 authorities:- (1) ILR 1987 (4) Karnataka page 3464, pratap singh v jaibunnisa; (2) 1988 (3) KAR. Lj. ( 10 ) IN support of the first contention, Sri H. B. Datar, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner relies upon following 3 authorities:- (1) ILR 1987 (4) Karnataka page 3464, pratap singh v jaibunnisa; (2) 1988 (3) KAR. Lj. 437 : ILR 1988 (4) kaniataka 3374, mangalamba @ papula and others v sulochana bai and others; (3) AIR 1982 Supreme Court 1213, devidas v mohanlal in the first case, after taking into consideration the plea relating to dispute to the title to the property and reasonableness in proceeding with the case, division bench of this court held as follows;"karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, (kaniataka act No. 22 of 1961) - Section 21 - question of title - whether complicated one or not, mixed question of law and fact - factors for consideration - nature of plea, facts and genuineness thereof, materials placed and circumstances of the case - if complicated one raised bona fide, not to be resolved in summary proceedings - no exclusive jurisdiction to court under the act to decide question of title - plea of title going to root of jurisdiction, high court can entertain contentions provided plea raised and relevant materials support plea. ""15. Whether question raised about the title of the petitioners is a complicated one or not, will be a mixed question of fact and law. The nature of the plea, facts give rise to such a plea, genuineness of the plea, material placed by the parties and various circumstances of the case, will go into the consideration of this question. " ( 11 ) IN the above case, from the facts it is clear that after the disposal of original petition, when appeal was pending, the plea relating to dispute to the title was taken. ( 12 ) IN the said case a division bench of this court took a view when complicated, question relating to title is raised, not proper to decide the case for eviction. ( 13 ) PLACING reliance on the above decision, Sri H. B. Datar submits that whenever implicated question of title is raised, it is but appropriate for the court to refer that issue to the civil court for adjudication and it will be unfair to resolve in a summary proceeding. As scope under Rent Control Act and the jurisdiction of the civil court altogether different. As scope under Rent Control Act and the jurisdiction of the civil court altogether different. ( 14 ) IT has to be said that on facts the said decision has no application to the case on hand. The reason being that, that was a case where it was made out, the dispute relating to title was raised and which dispute was a bona fide one. In fact in the said rase, the respondent raised a specific plea denying tide. ( 15 ) WHERE as in para 9 of its judgment, the trial court has held as follows:-"9. From the evidence of the respondent, it is clear that he took the premises on lease from O. S. guptha. O. s. guptha and others have sold the property to the petitioner under a registered sale deed, the copy of which is at ex. P-3 (a ). It shows that O. S. guptha and others have sold the first floor and 2nd floor and the stair case in the ground floor to the petitioner. The respondent took the premises on lease from O. S. guptha in 1953. He was paying rents to O. S. guptha till 1979. It is also in the evidence of the respondent that he has paid rents to the petitioner after O. S. guptha wrote a letter staling that he has sold the property to the petitioner and asking him to pay the rents to the petitioner. The respondent began paying rents to her till 1985. From this evidence, it is abundantly clear that the petitioner is the landlord and the respondent is the tenant. Infact, in the objection statement filed earlier also, the respondent had admitted the ownership of the premises to be of the petitioner. He has also admitted that the petitioner is the landlord. It is only subsequently when he filed the additional objection statement he denied not only the title of the petitioner, but also of her vendor. The respondent has stated that at the time of lease, he asked as to who was the owner of the premises to O. S. guptha and that O. S. guptha told him that it is a charity building. This statement appears to be incorrect. Subsequently, the respondent himself has stated that from 1953 till he received notice from muzrai department, nobody told him that the building belongs to the temple. This statement appears to be incorrect. Subsequently, the respondent himself has stated that from 1953 till he received notice from muzrai department, nobody told him that the building belongs to the temple. From this evidence, it appears that the respondent took the premises on lease from O. S. guptha acknowledging him to be the owner of the property. It is not open to the respondent to deny the title of his landlord having taken the premises on lease from him, acknowledging him to be the owner". ( 16 ) THIS court also made a reference to the earlier case of this court repotted in 1964 (2), Mys. L. J. page 356, b. Thammiah v K. V. Subba Rao while explaining the scope in a summary proceeding, held that if there is bona fide dispute between the parties as to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant, while exercising the powers under special jurisdiction court cannot decide that question so also cannot proceed with petition for eviction. However, it further observed as follows:"it is not every denial by the tenant of the title of the landlord that prevents the court from exercising its special jurisdiction under Section 9 of the act. If such denial by the tenant is found to be frivolous or obviously untenable, the court is not precluded from exercising its special jurisdiction under Section 8 of the act. "from this, it is clear, if a denial is not bona fide or otherwise frivolous or vexatious, the jurisdiction of the special court is not taken away or ousted. ( 17 ) FROM the material now produced, it has to be seen whether the plea taken by the tenant that Smt. K. g, jayalakshmi is not the owner and that she has no title to the property, a bona fide plea or just invented to deprive her just claim. To give a finding on this point, it is better to take into consideration the conduct of the party namely the petitioner-tenant. In the objection statement filed earlier, he admitted that he is the tenant and paying the rents to Smt. K. g. jayalakshami and as he failed to pay the higher rents demanded the eviction has been filed. Not specifically denied that said guptha had no title. It was never contended that it was the muzrai department who is the owner. In the objection statement filed earlier, he admitted that he is the tenant and paying the rents to Smt. K. g. jayalakshami and as he failed to pay the higher rents demanded the eviction has been filed. Not specifically denied that said guptha had no title. It was never contended that it was the muzrai department who is the owner. The second circumstance is that in the year 1985, petitioner received a notice from the muzrai department. But he did not take any objection as to the jurisdiction or title. But he made an attempt to deny title of Smt. K. g. jayalaksbmi only in the month of January 1989 that too nearly after 10 months after the date of filing of the suit by the muzrai department against himself and others including smt k. g. jayalakshmi. Thus, all these circumstances clearly establish that the plea of denial of title and relationship taken by the tenant is a frivolous one and made with a view to either protract the proceedings or to make profits in an unjust way. Hence the law laid down by this court in pratap singh's case has no application to the facts of this case. ( 18 ) THE principles laid down in mangalamba @ papula and others v sulochana bai and others, 1988 (3) KAR. Lj. 437 : ILR 1988 (4) KAR. 334 wherein it is held as follows:" (A) Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, (Karnataka act No. 22 of 1961), Section 21 (1) - jurisdiction under act only where there is no dispute in regard to relationship between parties - if relationship denied or disputed, no jurisdiction to court under act to decide, particularly where complicated questions are raised, - tenant denying title of landlord and landlord driven to civil court to establish title and consequently seek possession, tenants not entitled to protection under act"on facts the same is distinguishable. Likewise the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of devadas v mohanlal, AIR 1982 Supreme Court 1213. That was a case where the title to the property was denied at earliest, point of time. But neither the courts-below or the high court took that fact into consideration while deciding the case. Likewise the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of devadas v mohanlal, AIR 1982 Supreme Court 1213. That was a case where the title to the property was denied at earliest, point of time. But neither the courts-below or the high court took that fact into consideration while deciding the case. Hence, the Supreme Court had to say that the approach of the courts-bclow is incorrect and thus remitted the matter to the trial court to decide on the issue relating to title to the property in respect of other issues, the Supreme Court did not like to interfere. ( 19 ) HENCE, from the above discussion, it has to be said that there is no merit in any of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 20 ) APART from saying that the principles laid down by this court and the Supreme Court referred to above, on facts are distinguishable and not applicable to the case on hand, one more factor has to be taken into consideration, namely the earlier conduct of the petitioner-tenant. He himself admitted the ownership of Smt. K. g. jayalakshmi and went on paying rents, he did not even choose to raise an objection when notice of eviction petition was served and he filed objections. As such it has to be said that he was not justified now from contending that smt kg. Jayalakshmi not the owner of the property. In fact the trial court took trouble to peruse the entire evidence on this issue and gave a finding that the said contention as untenable. In this regard by the trial court at para 10 has observed thus:"if there is any defect in the title of the petitioner, it is for the person who had got a bettlc title to file a suit for necessary relief. Unless the sale deed in favour of the petitioner is declared as null and void by the competent court, the petitioner continues to be the owner of the property. It is not open to the respondent to take advantage of any defect in the title of the petitioner. Ex. P-3 (a) shows prima facie that the petitioner is the owner of the property having purchased the same from u. s. guptba. It is not open to the respondent to take advantage of any defect in the title of the petitioner. Ex. P-3 (a) shows prima facie that the petitioner is the owner of the property having purchased the same from u. s. guptba. Toe petitioner is me owner or the property and thus, she will be the landlord and respondent is tenant in respect of the premises. Further, the respondent has attorned tenancy in favour of the petitioner on a letter written by O. S. guptha. I have no hesitation to hold that the petitioner is the owner of the property and the respondent is tenant under her in respect of the petition schedule premises. Hence, there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent and this point is answered accordingly. " ( 21 ) FROM the discussion of the trial court, it is clear that the trial court justifiedin holding that Smt. K,g. Jayalakshmi is the owner of the property. ( 22 ) WHET her doctrine of estopple is applicable to the facts of the case, it has to besaid yes, in view of petitioner's conduct. In this connection it is proper to refer to following decision. ( 23 ) UNDER similar circumstances, wherein an eviction proceeding landlord's title to the property was denied, this court in the case of M/s. Popular automobiles v n. Veeraswamy, ILR 1989 KAR. 1555 held thus:"by operation of law, even assuming that the petitioner (tenant) regards the sale as null and void, there is what is known as statutory attornment and until and unless the sale is set aside by a competent court, the petitioner has to be regarded as a tenant of the purchaser of the schedule premises. In other words, the respondent is deemed to be the landlord of the petitioner. In proceedings instituted for eviction of tenant, this court cannot go into the validity of the title to the property in the circumstances in which a registered sale deed has come into existence the validity of which has not been challenged and relief sought before the court of law in a civil suit. In proceedings instituted for eviction of tenant, this court cannot go into the validity of the title to the property in the circumstances in which a registered sale deed has come into existence the validity of which has not been challenged and relief sought before the court of law in a civil suit. " ( 24 ) SUPREME Court in the case of d. Satyanarayana v p. Jagadish, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2192 held as follows :-"section 116 of the Evidence Act provides that no tenant of immovable property shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property. Possession and permission being established, estoppel would bind the tenant during the continuance of the tenancy and until he surrenders his possession. Estoppel under Section 116 of the Evidence Act is restricted to the denial of the title of the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy. From this, the exception follows, that it is open to the tenant even without surrendering possession to show that since the date of the tenancy, the title of the landlord came to an end or that he was evicted by a paramount title holder or that even though their was no actual eviction or dispossession from the property, under a threat of eviction he had attorned to the paramount title holder. Where on a notice of eviction being served by the paramount tide holder of the premises on the sub-tenant. " ( 25 ) SUBSEQUENTLY, Supreme Court took a similar view in the case of pal singh vsunder singh (dead) by l. rs, and others, AIR 1989 Supreme Court 758, it has held thus;"further, there is the estoppel of a tenant under Section 116 of the Evidence Act which was a recognition and statutory assimilation of the equitable principles underlying the estoppel in relation to tenants. Moreover, in the instant case the rent had all along been collected by the landlord who filed the eviction suit. "the Supreme Court has further held as follows:-"11. In tej bhan madan v II addl. Dist. Moreover, in the instant case the rent had all along been collected by the landlord who filed the eviction suit. "the Supreme Court has further held as follows:-"11. In tej bhan madan v II addl. Dist. Judge, (1988)3 SCC 137 : AIR 1988 SC 1413 this court reiterated that there can be a denial of the title by the tenant of his landlord without the tenant renouncing his character as such where, for instance, he sets up a plea of jus tertii. But the implication of the ground on which the denial of the title was made was that if the tenant-appellant could not have denied the vendor's title by virtue of the inhibitions of the attornmenl, he could not question the vendee's title either. The tenant did himself no service by this stand. This court reiterated that the principle that the tenant cannot deny the title of the landlord in its basic foundations, means no more than that under certain circumstances law considers it unjust to allow a person to approbate and reprobate. The law is that the estoppel of a tenant under Section 116 of the Evidence Act was a recognition and statutory assimilation of the equitable principles underlying the estoppel in relation to tenants. In this case the rent had all along been collected by the respondent. "so, from the discussion, it is clear that the first point which was canvassed by Sri H. B. Datar has no merit. ( 26 ) REGARDING the second contention that the trial court should have clubbed all the 3 petitions and a common order should have been passed as otherwise if any finding is now given in this revision petition, the same will definitely prejudice the case of tenants in the other eviction petitions, the answer is that when both the parties participated in the proceedings knowing fully well that petitioner is common in all the eviction petitions and respondents are different and the premises which in their occupation is a portion of the property of a bigger portion which Smt. K. G. Jayalakshmi purchased, in order to avoid any confusion they should have filed an application in the trial court to club all the eviction petitions. Having not done so, that too when other tenants arc not before this court, it is not proper to say that any finding given in this case will prejudice the case of the other tenants. As such it has to be said that the second contention has no merit. ( 27 ) REGARDING the third point, namely the finding of the trial court both on bonafide requirement and comparative hardship quite arbitrary has to be said as devoid of merit. On the other hand, trial court taking into consideration the evidence adduced by both the parties came to a conclusion that the landlord made out a case that she requires the premises for her bona fide use and occupation as pleaded in the petition. In fact, it is clear from some of the portions of the statement of Smt. K. G. Jayalakshmi, as pointed out by Sri H. B. Datar that if the said statements are understood properly, it has to be said that she made out a case for bona fide requirement. ( 28 ) FURTHER, it cannot be said that the order of the trial court either arbitrary orperverse as trial court considered the entire material and gave its findings. Its findings are based on a proper reasoning. The relevant discussion is at paras 13 and 14 of the trial court's order. Hence the finding regarding bonafide requirement has to be said as a correct one. Then coming to the comparative hardship, it has to be said that the landlord has proved her case namely that if eviction is not ordered, greater hardship would be caused to her. This position has been clearly explained by the trial court in para 15 of its judgment :-"15. Point No. 3 : - the respondent has stated that he is carrying on business in the premises. No alternate accommodation is available in that area. But, in the cross-examination, he has stated that many new buildings in avenue road, cubbonpet, nagarathpel and chowdeswari temple are coming up and he has not enquired to get alternate accommodation. When the respondent has not tried to secure alternate accommodation and when there are new buildings are coming up, it cannot be said greater hardship will be caused to the respondent if eviction order is passed. On the other hand, the petitioner has no other premises. She is under threat of eviction. When the respondent has not tried to secure alternate accommodation and when there are new buildings are coming up, it cannot be said greater hardship will be caused to the respondent if eviction order is passed. On the other hand, the petitioner has no other premises. She is under threat of eviction. Greater hardship will be caused to the petitioner if eviction order is refused. " ( 29 ) HENCE, in my view, there is no good ground to interfere with the order passed by the trial court. Accordingly, revision petition dismissed. No costs. ( 30 ) NOW Sri H. B. Datar submits his client has established business by investing huge sums and in view of the difficulty to get an alternative accommodation in Bangalore city if eviction is ordered without giving reasonable time his client would be put to greater hardship, requests for three years time to vacate, whereas Sri Keshavanarayana learned counsel for respondent is agreeing for only 6 months time to vacate. In view of the peculiar circumstances under which both the parties are placed, I am of the opinion that interests of both the parties will be safeguarded if a little more than what Sri Eshavanarayana offered is granted. ( 31 ) HENCE time is granted to the petitioner-tenant till the 'end of may 2993' to vacate and put the landlord in vacant possession of the schedule premises in question without any protest and without seeking for further extension of time. During this period, petitioner shall be regular in payment of rents and he shall not sublease the premises and shall not damage the building. --- *** --- .