Judgment :- This revision petition is directed against the order, condoning the delay of in seeking to set aside the order of dismissal for default made in a suit. 2. The respondent/petitioner filed O.S.No.35 of 1984 for bare injunction. It was posted list for trial on 15.9.1989. As the respondent did not appear, it was dismissed for default. application was filed on 27.1.1990 to set aside the order of dismissal along application to condone the delay of 104 days in filing the same. In the affidavit support of the application, the reason for the delay is given as follows: “I submit that in the month of June, I met an accident and my leg was broken and admitted in the hospital and I was advised to take rest in bed for further six months. was not in a position to meet my advocate to give proper instructions.” The affidavit does not set out the year or the date, but it merely states that in respondent is said to have met with an accident. The only claim in the affidavit is that his was broken. This is denied in the counter statement filed in the trial court by the petitioner herein. In the course of evidence, the respondent produced a medical certificate dated 1.7.1989 and two X-ray films, which are marked as Exs.A-2 and A-3. The medical practitioner who claims to have treated the respondent was examined as P.W.2, who in his evidence states that the respondent met with an accident in August, 1988 and that the X films taken on 29.8 1988 disclose a fracture of the bone in the hip. According to P.W.2, was in the hospital for two months and he was advised to take rest for six months thereafter. 3. Thus, the reasons mentioned, in, the affidavit filed by the respondent that the took place in June 1989 is not correct, If it is assumed to be June, 1988, there explanation as to why he did not take treatment till August, 1988, and the period months was over even in February, 1989. On the other hand, if it is assumed accident took place in June, 1989 that will not fit in with the X-ray films marked as and A-3. That case would be obviously false. Hence, it is clear that the respondent chosen to place the correct facts before the court in the affidavit filed by him. On the other hand, if it is assumed accident took place in June, 1989 that will not fit in with the X-ray films marked as and A-3. That case would be obviously false. Hence, it is clear that the respondent chosen to place the correct facts before the court in the affidavit filed by him. According the affidavit, the respondent’s leg was broken in the accident, but according to the practitioner and the X-ray films, it is a fracture of the bone in the hip and there reference to any fracture in the leg. Assuming that the respondent was in the hospital months, it will take us to October and if he was advised to take rest for six thereafter, it will take us to April, 1989. The suit was posted only on 15.9.1989 There is absolutely no explanation as to why the respondent was absent on 15.9.1989 the suit was posted in the list for trial. The lower court has taken the view respondent has proved that he had suffered fracture in the hip in August 1988 and should be given an opportunity to proceed with the suit on merits and that is required interests of justice. 4. The court below was obviously carried away by sympathy. It had overlooked provisions O.9, Rule 9, C.P.C. Under the rule, the court should be satisfied that there sufficient cause for non appearance of the plaintiff when the suit was called for hearing. this case, the question of satisfaction of the court as to what was sufficient cause arise, as no cause was mentioned by the respondent for his non-appearance in September, 1989. The evidence adduced by him would not take him beyond April, 1989. Even that maximum indulgence could be given to him on the basis of such evidence, there reason as to why the respondent did not attend the court in September, 1989. circumstances, the court below is in error in condoning the delay, without ascertaining whether there was sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the respondent on the trial. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on the decision in Mathi Ammal v.Ajjan another, (1975)2 M.L.J. 384 , wherein, this court held as under: "Sufficient cause" in Sec.5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction advance substantial justice where no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant." 5. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on the decision in Mathi Ammal v.Ajjan another, (1975)2 M.L.J. 384 , wherein, this court held as under: "Sufficient cause" in Sec.5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction advance substantial justice where no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant." 5. In the present case, there is no reason given by the respondent in respect of his that he had sufficient cause for non-appearance on the date 15.9.1989. Hence, the said ruling will have no application to the present case. 6. My attention is drawn to the observation of the Supreme Court in John Singh v. Singh and another, (1990)1 L.W. 534 at 541. The Supreme Court observed that the Court will have jurisdiction to interfere under Sec.115, C.P.C, with the order of the court only (i) if the court had no jurisdiction to make the order it had made: and court below had acted on a wrong approach of any provision of law and had committed error which was material and may affect the decisions. 7. In the present case, the court below completely ignored the provisions of O.9, C.P.C, and proceeded to dispose of the application before it on wrong notions of principles justice. When the court below overlooks the express provision of law by which it is this court is certainly entitled to interfere under under Sec.115, C.P.C. The ruling Supreme Court is really against the respondent and not in his favour. 8. It is clearly pointed out in Amkkaniammal v. Gurusamy, 100 L.W. 707, that the power the court to set aside the order has to be exercised judicially. Unless, sufficient cause shown for non-appearance on the date on which the suit is fixed for hearing, there will be jurisdiction or justification for the trial court to set aside the ex parte decree. This principle will apply to the orders of dismissal for default also. If that principle is applied, the court below has no jurisdiction to condone the delay of 104 days in seeking to set aside the order of dismissal for default. 9. In the result, the order of the court below is wholly unsustainable and it is hereby aside. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed and I.A.No.390 of 1990 is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.