JUDGMENT D.P.S. Chauhan, J. - By means of this petition the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashi ng the order dated 7-12-1990 passed by the Chairman, Nagar Palika, Mirzapur which is Annexure `a' to the writ petition and for issuing a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere with the peaceful working of the petitioner as Clerk Grade II and to pay him month to month salary. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. The impugned order is an order of suspension. 3. The relevant facts for the purposes of the present case are that the petitioner was suspended on 21-7-1990 by the Chairman, which order was challenged in this Court by means of a separate writ petition. In the meantime the petitioner got the suspension order withdrawn through the Vice-Chairman. The charges were serious against the petitioner and no inquiry was conducted. The Chairman on 7-12-1990 passed an order that the petitioner shall continue to remain under suspension and he shall be entitled for the subsistence allowance during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings against him. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted, firstly that a person cannot be punished for the same charges again. This argument has no substance as the petitioner was at no time ever punished and even no disciplinary proceedings have been completed. 5. Next he submitted that the person cannot be suspended with retrospective effect From the order it is apparent that it is not a case of suspension. The petitioner was in fact suspended earlier but subsequently the Vice-Chairman withdrew the order and the Chairman on having come to know again directed that the order of suspension shall continue as the authority of the Vice-Chairman was not competent. The petitioner was in fact suspended earlier but subsequently the Vice-Chairman withdrew the order and the Chairman on having come to know again directed that the order of suspension shall continue as the authority of the Vice-Chairman was not competent. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission has relied upon the provisions of Section 55 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916 which is as under : - "55 Duties of Vice-President - (1) A Vice-President^- (a) shall, in the absence of the President from a meeting of the board and unless prevented by reasonable cause, preside, regulate the conduct of business, and maintain and enforce order, at the meeting and when so presiding may exercise the powers specified in Section 91; (b) shall, during a vacancy in the office of President or the incapacity or temporary absence of the President perform any other duty and, when occasion arises, exercise any other power of the President; (c) shall at any time perform any duty and exercise, when occasion arises, any power delegated to him by the President under Section 53. 6. Under sub-clause (1) the Vice-President during the absence of the President or the incapacity or temporary absence of the President, shall perform any other duty, and when occasion arises, exercise any other power of the President and the submission of the learned counsel is that in exercise of this power the Vice-President passed the order. 7. It is not disputed that there was any vacancy in the office of the President or was any incapacity in the President. There may be an absence of the President but in the temporary absence of the President the Vice-President cannot undo what has been done by the President before. The relevant words used in this provision are "when occasion arises". In the matter of disciplinary proceedings pending against an employee it cannot be said that there has been arisen any occasion for the Vice-Chairman to take action or withdraw the proceedings during the temporary absence of the President. The action of the Vice-President is contrary to the provisions of law. 8. Lastly the petitioner submitted that the order passed by the Chairman is mala fide. There was no question of mala fide before the Chairman when he had earlier passed the suspension order. The action of the Vice-President is contrary to the provisions of law. 8. Lastly the petitioner submitted that the order passed by the Chairman is mala fide. There was no question of mala fide before the Chairman when he had earlier passed the suspension order. The order of the Vice-Chairman was without the authority of law and the same was revoked by the Chairman only. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, submitted that the petitioner is not being paid his subsistence allowance since the date of his suspension. If it is so, it is unfair. The petitioner shall be paid his subsistence allowance according to law regularly and the disciplinary proceedings against him shall be concluded at the earliest. 10. With the above observations the writ petition is dismissed in limine.