Gyan Devi (deceased by L. R. ) v. Collector, Agra — 1991 DIGILAW 615 (ALL)

JUDGMENT P.P. Gupta, J. - This judgment shall dispose of all the three appeals as they arise out of a common award of the Presiding Officer, U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Tribunal, Agra, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') dated June 28, 1985. By the award under challenge, the market value of the acquired land of all the appellants has been fixed at Rs. 16.54 P. per sq. yd., as against their claim at Rs. 25/- per sq. yd. ' 2. The brief facts giving rise to these appeals are that the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (hereinafter referred to as the `Parishad' notified under S. 28 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the'Adhiniyam') a scheme called Trans-Yamuna Griha Asthan and Sarak Yojna, Agra. It was a combination of a housing accommodation scheme and a street scheme. This improvement scheme was framed for acquisition of land for providing land for houses, streets and for general improvement. The finalised scheme was published under S. 32 of the said Adhiniyam. 3. In the scheme, apart from other land, the land in question, belonging to the three appellants, situate in village Naraich Mustaquil, Tahsil Edmadpur, District Agra, was also included. 4. An award under S. 11 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. who adopted belting system for determining the market value and divided the land covered by the award into three belts, fixing different amount for each belt. 5. Being dissatisfied with the award of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, applications for reference under S. 18 of the Act were moved for referring the matter to the Tribunal. The Special Land Acquisition Officer made three references under S. 18 of the Act. The Tribunal consolidated all the references and disposed them of with a common award, which is in dispute in these three appeals. Besides allowing other reliefs to the appellants, regarding solatium, interest, etc., the Tribunal determined the market value of the acquired land in all the three references at Rs. 16.54 P. per sq. yd., as against the claim of each of the appellants at Rs. 25/- per sq. yd. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the said award, the appellants have filed the appeals before this Court under the provisions of S. 54 of the Act. 7. 16.54 P. per sq. yd., as against the claim of each of the appellants at Rs. 25/- per sq. yd. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the said award, the appellants have filed the appeals before this Court under the provisions of S. 54 of the Act. 7. The learned standing counsel for the State and also Sri K. C. Jain, Advocate, assisted by Sri Dilip Gupta, Advocate, appearing for the appellants, were heard at length and the record of the case including the impugned award was perused. 8. The learned standing counsel for the State raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of these appeals. Basing his submission on S. 66 of the Adhiniyam, it was submitted that these appeals are not maintainable. The said S. 66 of the Adhiniyam is reproduced below : "66. Finality of decisions of Tribunal.- relating to the acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No. I of 1894), as modified by the Schedule to this Act, shall be deemed to be an award of the Court under that Act and shall, subject to the provisions of S. 54 of that Act, be final. (2) Any other decision of the Tribunal under this Act shall be final." 9. It may be mentioned here that whereas the word 'Award' has been used under S. 54 of the Act, the word 'decision has been used in S. 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, which, as held by this Court in the case of Aijaz Uddin v. T.O. High Court, AIR 1966 All 227 , will include an 'Award' as given by the Nagar Mahapalika Tribunal. 10. It is significant to note that whereas in sub-sec. (1) of S. 66 the word 'award' has been used, the word decision' has been used under sub-sec. (2). Against the award of the Tribunal, an appeal is provided under S. 4 of the Act. But against any other decision of the Tribunal, no appeal is provided and the decision of the Tribunal has been made final. Since the Legislature has used two different words in two sub-sections of the same Section, it cannot be said that they have been used inadvertently or in ignorance. They must have been used intentionally. But against any other decision of the Tribunal, no appeal is provided and the decision of the Tribunal has been made final. Since the Legislature has used two different words in two sub-sections of the same Section, it cannot be said that they have been used inadvertently or in ignorance. They must have been used intentionally. An analysis of this Section, therefore, leads to the conclusion that whereas an award of the Tribunal is appealable under S. 54 of the Act, no appeal lies against any other decision of the Tribunal. Since, instead of making a separate provision for appeal, sub-sec. (1) of S. 66 provides that an appeal will lie under the provisions of S. 54 of the Act, it has been clarified that such an appeal will lie only against an award of the Tribunal in a case relating to the acquisition of land under the Act, as modified by the schedule to the Adhiniyam. It is, therefore, clear from these provisions that an appeal against an award of the Tribunal will lie only if it relates to a land acquired under the Act, as modified by the schedule of the Adhiniyam. 11. In these appeals there is no dispute that initial notification in respect of the land in question was issued under S. 28 of the Adhiniyam, which corresponds to a notification under S. 4(1) of the Act. It was followed by another notification under S. 32 of the said Adhiniyam, which corresponds to a declaration under S. 6 of the Act. These, inter alia, are some of the modifications in the provisions of the Act made by the schedule of this Adhiniyam. To clarify, notification under S. 28 of the Adhiniyam has been substituted for notification under sub-sec. (1) of S. 4 of the Act and notification under S. 32 is substituted in place of notification under S. 6 of the said Act in the schedule of the Adhiniyam. Hence, the impugned award o the Tribunal in these three appeals relates to the acquisition of land under the Act, a modified by the schedule to the Adhiniyam and so, in view of sub-sec. (1) of S. 66 of the Adhiniyam, an appeal lies against such an award. The provisions of sub-sec. (2) are not attracted. Hence, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents is devoid of any force and is hereby repelled. (1) of S. 66 of the Adhiniyam, an appeal lies against such an award. The provisions of sub-sec. (2) are not attracted. Hence, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents is devoid of any force and is hereby repelled. Accordingly, it is held that the appeals, filed by the appellants, are maintainable under S. 66(1) of the Adhiniyam. 12. It was next urged on behalf of the respondents that the appellants had initially confined their claim to compensation in their reference at Rs. 15/- per sq. yd. only. The Tribunal has enhanced it to Rs. 16.54 P. per sq. yd., which was more than the amount claimed by the appellants themselves. Therefore, the appellants are not entitled to more than what has already been awarded to them mistakenly by the Tribunal. 13. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that by an amendment in their written statement, each of the appellants claimed market value at the rate of Rs. 25/- per sq. yd. This amendment was allowed by the Tribunal and was duly incorporated in the written statements. The objection raised on behalf of the respondents that the appellants had confined their claim to compensation at Rs. 15/- per sq. yd. only has, therefore, no force. 14. Under sub-sec. (1) of S. 23 of the Act, a duty has been cast on the Court to determine the market value of the land acquired as it was at the date of publication of the notification under S. 4, sub-sec. (1). The person, whose land is acquired, is entitled to this market value. Any person interested, who has not accepted the award, as given by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, has been given a right to make request for a reference to Court under S. 18 of the Act. This reference is to be made by a written application which must state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. The application is to be given to the Collector requiring that the matter be referred by him for determination of the Court. S. 18 of the Act specifies four `matters' which can be the subject-matter of a reference to the Court by the Collector. They are : (1) Objection to the measurement of the land. The application is to be given to the Collector requiring that the matter be referred by him for determination of the Court. S. 18 of the Act specifies four `matters' which can be the subject-matter of a reference to the Court by the Collector. They are : (1) Objection to the measurement of the land. (2) Objection to the amount of compensation, (3) objection to the person to whom it is payable, and (4) objection to the apportionment of the compensation amongst the person concerned. This application to the Collector should be moved within six weeks or the limitation as prescribed thereunder from the date of the Collector's award. 15. Since the application is made to the Collector for seeking reference to the Civil Court, no prayer can be made for the grant of a particular amount of compensation to the Collector. Even if such a prayer is made and even if the Collector is agreeable about the grant of request of the person interested, he cannot simply grant that amount of compensation to the claimant. He becomes functus officio after pronouncing the award. Thereafter it is only the Civil Court which can determine the questions contemplated within the meaning and ambit of S. 18 of the Act. In a reference application, the person interested need not, therefore, claim any fixed amount of compensation. It is enough, if he raises objection against the award, saying that the award given by the Collector is not acceptable. The question of determination of appropriate compensation thereafter lies within the domain of the Civil Court, after a reference is made by the Collector. The equitable view, therefore. appears to be that the courts should not bind down the person to the limited relief, which is claimed by him. Whatever relief a land holder is entitled to in law, the same should be allowed to him irrespective of the claim made by him and such compensation is to be determined in accordance with the provision of S. 23 of the Act, taking into consideration the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under sub-sec. (1) of S. 4 of the Act. S. 18 is a clear departure from S. 9 of the Act. (1) of S. 4 of the Act. S. 18 is a clear departure from S. 9 of the Act. By S. 9 the claimant is required to state before the Collector the specific amount which he claims as compensation for his interest in the land acquired. There is a significant omission of such requirement in S. 18. Therefore, all that a person interested has to do is to state in his application for reference that he objects to the amount of compensation awarded and it is not incumbent upon him to state whether he claimed compensation at a particular rate. In view of this, the amendment sought by the appellants and allowed by the Tribunal was clearly unnecessary, as has been held In re : Raja Jagaveera Rama Muthu Kumara Venkateswara Ettappa Naicher Ayyan Avergal, Zamindar of Ettavapuram, AIR 1943 Mad 337 . 16. If, however, an amendment in the application for reference is considered necessary, there is no bar under the Act not to entertain it. The Court hearing a reference made under S. 18 of the Act is a Court of special jurisdiction which acquires jurisdiction only on a reference being made by the Collector. The jurisdiction so acquired by the Court extends over the matters referred to it by the Collector under S. 18 and to no other matters. Within the sphere of its jurisdiction it must follow the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, unless any one of those provisions is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. As there is no provision in the Act inconsistent with the provisions of 0. 6, R. 17, C.P.C. the Court having jurisdiction has the power to allow the reference petition to be amended, subject to the limitation that it cannot allow an amendment which would have the effect of introducing a new matter which has not been referred to it for decision by the Collector under S. 18 of the Act. 17. In the case of Province of Bengal v. P.L. Nun, AIR 1945 Cal 312, the question arose whether an amendment substituting larger sum than the sum claimed in the reference could be allowed. 17. In the case of Province of Bengal v. P.L. Nun, AIR 1945 Cal 312, the question arose whether an amendment substituting larger sum than the sum claimed in the reference could be allowed. An argument against the amendment was raised that the sum claimed was an essential element - an integral part - of the `matter' under reference and so a change in that figure would make the matter of the reference quite different from the matter originally referred to the Court and so the Court below had no jurisdiction to allow the amendment. While upholding that such an amendment can be allowed, the Court observed....... A reference petition would be quite in order, even if no amount is mentioned therein, where the reference raises an objection to the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector." Accordingly it was held" .....that the Court hearing a reference made under S. 18 of the Act has the power to allow an amendment of the nature that has been allowed in this case. A contrary view would lead to irrational results and would work injustice, for, in that case, the Court would be powerless to direct amendment, even when the mistake in the petition of reference was due to an accidental slip." 18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has gone to that extent that even if a citizen has claimed lesser amount that it would be quite just and legitimate to award him any higher amount than that claimed. In the case of Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, AIR 1985 SC 1576 , the Supreme Court has observed that "It must be remembered that this was not a dispute between two private citizens where it would be quite just and legitimate to confine the claimant to the claim made by him and not to award him any higher amount than that claimed through even in such a case there may be situations where an amount higher than that claimed can be awarded to the claimant...." "To deny this benefit to the appellants would tantamount to permitting the State Government to acquire the land of the appellants on payment of less than the due market value..... Where land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it would not be fair and just to deprive the holder of his land without payment of the market value when the law, in so many terms, declares that he shall be paid such market value. The State Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not..... take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the citizen." 19. Hence, an amendment in an application for reference, subject to the above limitations, is permissible under the law. The objection raised on behalf of the respondents is, therefore, devoid of any force. 20. It was next argued on behalf of the respondents that the amendment application was moved beyond six weeks from the date of the Collector's award and so a valuable right vested in the State of U.P. which cannot be divested by allowing an amendment in the rate of compensation, as claimed earlier in the written statement. 20A. So far as the question whether amendment could be allowed after the expiry of the period of six weeks from the application moved before the Collector for making a reference to the Civil Court, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Harcharan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 43 , has held that in a land acquisition case, the application for amendment of memo of appeal seeking higher compensation on the allegation that acquired land had potentiality of building site submitted after a lapse of six years of filing of appeal should have been allowed by the appellate Court. A learned single Judge of this Court has, in the case of Zameer Ahmad v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 All 92 , also allowed an application for amendment, moved after considerable delay, by which enhanced amount of compensation, as against lesser amount claimed, was allowed. 21. As a result of the above discussion, it becomes obvious that a person interested, whose land has been acquired under the Act, need not claim a specific amount as compensation. He has simply to state that the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer is not acceptable to him. This is exactly what the appellants had done in these cases. He has simply to state that the award made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer is not acceptable to him. This is exactly what the appellants had done in these cases. In their applications for references the appellants made the following prayer : "It is, therefore, prayed that the matter may kindly be referred for grant of adequate compensation to the Avas Evam Vikas Tribunal, Agra." 22. This prayer was sufficient compliance of the provisions under the Act. It was not necessary for the appellants to have claimed any specific amount of compensation. It was the duty of the Tribunal to award, in view of S. 23 of the Act, the market value of the land, as it existed on the date of notification under S. 4(1) of the Act. It would, therefore, hardly matter that the appellants restricted their claim for compensation at a lower rate. while the market value was higher. The appellants, however, took precaution in seeking amendment in their prayer by which they claimed the market value. The said amendment was allowed by the Tribunal, though it was not necessary. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that because the appellants had claimed compensation at a lesser rate, they cannot be allowed compensation at a higher rate, which is the market value of the land acquired. The second objection, therefore, has also no merit. 23. Now, coming to the question of compensation payable to the appellants, we find that the Special Land Acquisition Officer had divided the acquired land of the appellants into three belts and different rate for each belt was fixed. The Tribunal, however, awarded compensation at a flat rate of Rs. 16.54 P. per sq. yd. 24. It is an admitted case that under the same scheme land falling both in the North as well as i n the South of the by-pass connecting Mathura Road in the West with old Agra-Firozahad-Kanpur Road in the East was acquired. For the land lying in South of the by-pass, compensation at the rate of Rs. 16.54 per sq. yd. was allowed by the Tribunal. It was argued that the land lying in the South of the by-pass was inferior in quality and was uneven having pits, etc. For the land lying in South of the by-pass, compensation at the rate of Rs. 16.54 per sq. yd. was allowed by the Tribunal. It was argued that the land lying in the South of the by-pass was inferior in quality and was uneven having pits, etc. as compared to the land in question, therefore, the learned Tribunal has erred in awarding the compensation for the impugned land at the same rate allowed for the land lying in the South of the by-pass. 25. In this connection our attention was drawn to the statement of the Lekhpal, Ramesh Chand (D.W. 1), who has specifically admitted that the land involving in all the three cases is even. He has, further, stated that this land, as compared to the land lying in the South of the by-pass, is better and at a higher level. He has further clarified it by saying that the land lying in the South, which was also acquired under the same Yojna, is lower in level and has pits. The Tribunal has also accepted this evidence, which was laid on behalf of the respondents themselves, and has held that the land lying in the South of the by-pass, which was also acquired under the same scheme, is inferior in quality and is also lower in level having pits than the land in question. It is, therefore, abundantly established from the respondents' own evidence that the land in question is of a better quality, higher in level, and is even. Therefore, the market value of the land in question will be more than the market value of the land lying in South of the by-pass. The Tribunal has erred in allowing market value for the land in question at the same rate which the Special Land Acquisition Officer has determined for the land lying in South of the by-pass, vide Ex. 1 and Ex. 2. 26. The Tribunal has erred in allowing market value for the land in question at the same rate which the Special Land Acquisition Officer has determined for the land lying in South of the by-pass, vide Ex. 1 and Ex. 2. 26. At this stage, it is important to note that in the case of Krishna Yachendra Bahadurvaru v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore, AIR 1979 SC 869 , it has been held that for the purpose of deciding what compensation should be awarded to the appellants in respect of the present acquisitions made under the two notifications, the awards which have become final afford the clearest evidence for determining the compensation award able to the appellants in respect of the present two acquisitions. So, where the land under the same Yojna has been acquired and an award in respect of the same land has become final, that award will afford the clearest evidence for determining the compensation award able to the other interested persons, whose land have been acquired under the same Yojna. Therefore, the award of the Tribunal, regarding acquired land falling towards the South of the by-pass. will be the best and safest evidence for determining the compensation award able to the present appellants in respect of their land lying in the North of the by-pass. In the circumstances, when the land in question is of better quality, higher in level, and even as compared to the land lying in South of the by-pass, the Tribunal should have fixed the amount of compensation at a higher rate instead of Rs. 16.54 P., which was the rate fixed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer for the inferior land lying in the South of the by-pass. So on this count some addition in the market value, as determined by the Tribunal, should be made. 27. Now, coming to the plots `inter se' under these three appeals, we find that they are not similarly situate. Some of them are just abutting the by-pass and others are away from it. In between also there are few other plots. Similarly, some plots are in inhabited area and some are away from it. It was for this reason that the Special Land Acquisition Officer adopted belting system in awarding compensation. The belting system of compensation has been followed from a very long time. In between also there are few other plots. Similarly, some plots are in inhabited area and some are away from it. It was for this reason that the Special Land Acquisition Officer adopted belting system in awarding compensation. The belting system of compensation has been followed from a very long time. Far back as in the year 1933 the High Court of Calcutta, in the case of Nityagopal Sen Poddar v. Secretary of State, AIR 1933 Cal 25, adopted belting system in allowing compensation. It was observed that "Now so far as the system of belting is concerned, it is a system which is widely used, but its value as a system depends much upon a variety of facts. If data are available showing the proportion at which the value of land disminished, accordingly as it is situated at a particular distance from a main road or thorough fore, the system would be perfectly scientific. In the absence of any such date also, it may be assumed that in big cities where land sells by cottas or yards or feet there is such a proportion, as common experience shows. In another case of State of West Bengal v. Musst. Nurjahan Sakil, AIR 1985 Cal 39 , the earlier view was reiterated and held considering the above decisions and also the passage referred to hereinbefore of Parks on valuation, I am constrained to hold that the belting method of valuation that has been adopted by the learned Special L.A. Judge in deciding the reference petition and in determining the valuation of the lands acquired is the appropriate method and there is no error or illegality committed and the finding of the learned Special Land Acquisition Judge that the adoption of the belting method and the extent of land in the respective belts as determined by the Collector could not be challenged by the opposite party as Government was bound by the offer is a correct finding and the same is affirmed. "The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Mathura Prosad Raighbaria v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 465 , held that where a large area of land in an urban locality is sought to be acquired in determining the market value, 'the method of belting' is appropriate. "The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Mathura Prosad Raighbaria v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 SC 465 , held that where a large area of land in an urban locality is sought to be acquired in determining the market value, 'the method of belting' is appropriate. It is common knowledge that lands having frontage on the main roads in urban area are always more attractive than the lands which have no such frontage, 'Lastly, a reference may be made to a decision of this Court also, in the case of Baboo Ram v. State of U.P., AIR 1980 All 324 , where the land falling by belts, as adopted by the Additional District Judge, was upheld. 28. It. therefore, follows that in cases where there are large number of plots, which are not exactly similar to each other in their nature, situation and their location, building potentiality, nearness to the road. etc. the method of determining the market value by belting system is most appropriate. 29. In the instant case also, as has been said above, we find that some of the plots are just abutting the by-pass and some are away from it, while the rest are in between. Similarly, some of the plots are nearer to the inhabited area having more building potentiality than others. In these circumstances, looking to the nature and situation of the plots, the Special Land Acquisition Officer was correct in fixing the market value of the acquired land by adopting belting system. 30. We are, therefore, satisfied that it is an appropriate case in which the belting system should be adopted for determining the exact market value of the land in question. 31. Now, the question arises as to at what rate the compensation for the plots in different belts should he fixed. 32. 30. We are, therefore, satisfied that it is an appropriate case in which the belting system should be adopted for determining the exact market value of the land in question. 31. Now, the question arises as to at what rate the compensation for the plots in different belts should he fixed. 32. In determining the market value, guess work and conjectures are permissible, as has been held in the case of Krishna Yachendra Bahadurvaru, AIR 1979 SC 869 (supra), in the following words (at p. 871 of AIR) : The estimation of market value in many cases must depend largely on evaluation of many imponderables and hence it must necessarily be to some extent a matter of conjecture or guess." This Court in the case of Baboo Ram, AIR 1980 All 324 (supra) has also held the same view, which is as follows : ....It is settled that to determine compensation is not an exact science. The question of fair compensation is not algebraic problem which could be solved by abstract formula. There is an element of guess work inherent in most cases involving determination of market value of the acquired land." 33. Therefore, while determining the market rate of the land falling in each of the three belts, some guess work and conjectures will have to be done. Taking into consideration the factors, such as nearness to the by-pass, nearness to the inhabited area and superiority in fact in location and also keeping in view the fact that the Tribunal has awarded Rs. 16.54 P. per sq. yd. for inferior land lying in the South of the by-pass and the rates fixed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer for the land falling in three different belts, we are of the view that the rates for the land for each of the three belts as specified by S.L.O. in his award should reasonably be fixed as below : 1. For the land falling in First Belt ... Rs. 25/- per sq.yd 2. For the land falling in Second .Rs. 23.50 per sq.yd 3. For the land falling in Third .Rs. 20/- per sq.yd It may be clarified here that the rates of the three belts, if fixed in the same proportion as were fixed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the rates of first and second belts would have been much higher than what we have determined and allowed above. For the land falling in Third .Rs. 20/- per sq.yd It may be clarified here that the rates of the three belts, if fixed in the same proportion as were fixed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the rates of first and second belts would have been much higher than what we have determined and allowed above. 34. So far as the question of solatium is concerned, each of the appellants will be entitled to solatium at the rate of 30% on the amount of enhanced compensation to be calculated as above, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, AIR 1990 SC 981 , notwithstanding that the schedule to the Parishad Adhiniyam provides for solatium at 15% only. It may be held on the basis of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the following cases, viz. : 1. Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao, AIR 1973 SC 689 ; (2) Om Prakash v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 1202 ; (3) State of Kerala v. T.M. Peter, AIR 1980 SC 1438 ; that there can be no discrimination in awarding solatium to owners whose land is acquired under the Act as modified by the schedule to the Parish ad Adhiniyam. 35. Besides solatium, the appellants shall also be entitled to interest on the enhanced amount of compensation including solatium which is an essential part of compensation (see the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Periyar and Pareekann Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kerala, AIR 1990 SC 2192 at the rate 9% for the first year from the date of taking possession and at the rate of 15% per annum for the subsequent years, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Hoshiarpur Improvement Trust v. President, Land Acquisition Tribunal, (1990) 2 SCC 625 . 36. The appellants have also claimed an amount under sub-section (1)(a) of Section 23 of the Act for period mentioned therein at the rate of 12% per annum. In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, AIR 1990 SC 981 (supra), the appellants are not entitled to the enhanced amount under Section 28(1)(a) of the Act. 37. In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, AIR 1990 SC 981 (supra), the appellants are not entitled to the enhanced amount under Section 28(1)(a) of the Act. 37. It was argued before us that the view taken by the Supreme Court in the above case is not correct and requires reconsideration. In this connection, it will be sufficient to say that the law declared by the Supreme Court in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, is binding on all Courts within the territory of India. Therefore, in view of the direct decision of the Supreme Court on this point, which has been followed by the Supreme Court in Hoshiarpur Improvement Trust's case, 1990 (2) SCC 625 (supra), this relief is not admissible to the appellants. 38. For the reasons given above, all the three appeals are partly allowed with costs throughout. Each of the appellants will be entitled to market value, solatium and interest to be calculated in the light of our findings in the body of this judgment.