JUDGMENT - DESHPANDE M.S., J.:— By this appeal, the original defendants challenge the decrees passed by the two Courts below against them, directing them to deliver possession of the suit room to the plaintiff. 2. According to the plaintiff, she was the owner of the suit house and the defendants were her licensees who had not vacated the premises, in spite of a notice revoking the licence and she was, therefore, entitled to possession. This claim was resisted by the defendants who denied the plaintiff's title, set up an ownership in themselves and alternatively contended that certain amounts were to be sent to the plaintiff by the defendants for her maintenance, and they were not to be evicted from the house. 3. The trial Court held that the plaintiff was the owner of the house in question, that the defendants were not the owners, that the defendants were allowed to live in the house as licensees and the plaintiff was entitled to possession. In appeal by the defendants against the decree for eviction, the learned District Judge held that the plaintiff allowed the defendants to reside in the suit room as licensees and that there was no agreement that the defendant No. 1 should send money for plaintiff's maintenance till her life-time and the plaintiff was not to evict the defendants from the suit house, in view of that condition. 4. Shri Nand, learned Counsel for the appellants, fairly stated that he would not be in a position to challenge the findings of the two courts below that the plaintiff was the owner and the defendants were the licensees. He, however, urged that in view of the amendments to the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 ('Rent Control Order' for short), brought about on 27th June, 1989 and 26th October, 1989, the plaintiff would not be entitled to claim a decree for eviction. He, however, urged that in view of the amendments to the C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 ('Rent Control Order' for short), brought about on 27th June, 1989 and 26th October, 1989, the plaintiff would not be entitled to claim a decree for eviction. He relied on section 13-A which has been inserted by the Second Amendment Order of 1989, which runs as follows: “No decree for eviction shall be passed in a suit or proceedings filed and pending against the tenant in any court or before any Authority unless the landlord produces a written permission of the Controller as required by sub-clause (1) of Clause 13.” Sub-clause (1) of Clause 13, so far as is relevant, reads as follows :— “No landlord shall, except with the previous permission of the Controller— (a) give notice to a tenant determining the lease or determining the lease if the lease is expressed to be determinable at his option.” The expression “lease” is not defined in the Rent Control Order. The Rent Control Amendment Order dated 25th June, 1989 deleted sub-clause (3) of Clause 2 of the principal Order and inserted sub-clause (4-A), as follows: “(4-A)—“Premises” means, (a) any land not being used for agricultural purposes; (b) any building or part of a building (other than a farm building) let or given on licence and includes,—”. It is not necessary to go into the categories included in sub-clause (b). 5. On behalf of the appellants, emphasis is laid on the insertion of the words “let or given on licence” for urging that a tenant would also include a licensee for the purposes of Clauses 13(1) and 13-A of the Rent Control Order. By the first amending Order, the word “premises” has been substituted for the word “house” wherever it occurs. According to the learned Counsel, the definition so enlarged of the expression “tenant” appearing in sub-clause (5) of Clause 2 of the principal Order, would include even licensees; and the word 'landlord' would have to be accordingly construed. Under Clause 2 of the principal Order, “tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a house and includes a sub-tenant and person continuing in possession after the term of his tenancy has expired. Under Clause 2 of the principal Order, “tenant” means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a house and includes a sub-tenant and person continuing in possession after the term of his tenancy has expired. The provisions as amended by the first amending Order dated 27th June, 1989 would require the word “premises” to be read in place of “house”, but to bring anyone within the definition of “tenant'', and it is not an inclusive definition, the expression necessarily means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for the premises. Therefore, the category of mere licensees by whom the rent is not payable, would not fall within the expression “tenant”, and the expression “landlord” which has to be construed in a similar manner, would include a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a premises, etc. It is, therefore, clear that the present appellants, who have not been paying any rent, would not be in a position to claim the protection either of Clause 13(1) or Clause 13-A of the Rent Control Order, and it was not, therefore, necessary for the plaintiff to obtain the permission of the Controller, as required by sub-clause (1) of clause 13. It is obvious that the two amendments to the Rent Control Order do not lend any assistance to the appellants. 6. In the result, I see no merit in this second appeal. It is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. -----