Judgment :- The above suit was filed by the State of Tamil Nadu, represented by the Collector of Chengalpattu at Kancheepuram, praying for a decree and judgment in the following terms: (a) setting aside the Award No. 12 of 67 dated 12-7-1967 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer and Special Tahisildar for Land Acquisition, Kalpakkam Atomic Energy Project; (b) directing the defendants 1 and 2 to pay the plaintiff the sum of Rs. 6,31,906.33 P. or such other sum as may be found due with interest at 6% from this date till date of payment. Or in the alternative (c) directing the defendants 1 and 2 to pay the plaintiff the sum of Rs. 5,32,174.00 P. with interest from this date at 6% per annum till date of payment; (d) directing the defendants to pay the plaintiff the costs of this suit; and (e) for such further or other reliefs as to this Honble Court may deem fit and proper. The case of the plaintiff as set out in the plaint is as under; 2. The suit was laid by the State of Tamil Nadu for recovery of a sum of Rs. 6,31,906.35 p. and such other sum, as may be found due with interest or in the alternative directing the defendants 1 and 2 to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 5,32,174.00 p. with interest from the date of plaint at the rate of 6 per cent per annum till date of payment and for costs. The basis of the claim is that an extent of 100 acres and more was acquired for the purpose of construction of staff quarters for Madras Atomic Power Project at Kalpakkam and that some of the lands in Pudupattinam village were acquired in pursuance of S. 4(1) Notification under the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter called as the Act) published on 24-8-1966. For the said purpose extensive lands were acquired under the provisions of the Central Act 1 of 1984 for the above project in 15 villages including Pudupattinam in Chengalpattu District and in other Districts. A total extent of 1882.76 acres of land was sought to be acquired. Bulk acquisition of lands was involved in the four villages of Kokkilimedu, Edayur, Kalpakkam and Pudupattinam. The present suit relates to the acquisition of some of the lands in Pudupattinam village belonging to the defendants 1 and 2. A total extent of 1882.76 acres of land was sought to be acquired. Bulk acquisition of lands was involved in the four villages of Kokkilimedu, Edayur, Kalpakkam and Pudupattinam. The present suit relates to the acquisition of some of the lands in Pudupattinam village belonging to the defendants 1 and 2. The Notification under S. 4(1) of the Act was published on 24-8-1966. S. 5(A) enquiry was held on 25-11-1966. The declaration was published on 17-5-1967. The award enquiry was held on 29-6-1967 and Award No. 12 of 1967, the subject matter of the present suit, dated 12-7-1967 was passed by the third defendant Thiru C.J. Vedari, who was the then Special Tahasildar, Land Acquisition, Atomic Power Stations; Kalpakkam. According to the plaintiff, the Award in question was passed only in respect of three survey numbers viz., 210/1, 217 and 221 of the total extent of 100.60 acres of Pudupattinam village, belonging to and owned by the defendants 1 and 2 herein in a great hurry and an unseemly haste not withstanding there were other lands in the same village which were subject matter of acquisition proceedings for the same purpose. According to the plaintiff in Pudupatinam village, a total extent of 243.94 acres of land for the construction of staff quarters of the Atomic Power Project was notified, but the Award in question was passed on 12-7-1967 for an extent of 100.60 acres of dry land, belonging to the defendants 1 and 2. The third defendant as Land Acquisition Officer, by his Award fixed the market value of the lands at Rs. 50/- per cent or Rs. 5000/- per acre and accordingly, a total compensation of Rs. 6,64,529.80 was awarded which included value of trees, casurina, plantations, some structures and the solatium of 15 per cent. The first defendant was paid a sum of Rs. 347548.50 p. and the second defendant was paid a sum of Rs. 284357.85 p. The balance representing the compensation for the casurina trees viz., Rs. 32623.45 p. was deposited into Court as there was a dispute about its apportionment between defendants 1 and 2 and others. It is the case of the plaintiff that the intended acquisition of land for this project was well known to the public in 1963, though the notification under S. 4(1) of the Act was published on 24-8-1966. 32623.45 p. was deposited into Court as there was a dispute about its apportionment between defendants 1 and 2 and others. It is the case of the plaintiff that the intended acquisition of land for this project was well known to the public in 1963, though the notification under S. 4(1) of the Act was published on 24-8-1966. The sort, taram and classification of the acquired lands are 13.3.8 and 14.2.8 and the assessment was at a uniform rate of 0.37 paise per acre. 3. The Land Acquisition Officer, in respect of the market value of the lands in question had for his consideration 17 items of sales of lands of similar nature in the vicinity, the sales relating to the period from September, 1963 to March, 1966. The details of document nos, dates, survey nos, extent, classification, taram , assessment, sale amount and rate per cent have been fully furnished in paragraph 10 of the plaint. According to the plaintiff, the lands bearing a better taram and mucn higher rate of assessment were sold at Rs. 5.83 p. and at Rs. 5.31 p. per cent at the end of the year 1965. The last item being item No. 17 in the above list would show that an extent of 1.40 acres of dry land bearing a better taram of 7-2-5 and higher rate of assessment of Rs. 1.25 p. was sold on 29-3-1966 at the rate of Rs. 14.28 per cent just five months prior to the date of S. 4(1) Notification in this case. This sale was not taken into consideration and was rejected by the land Acquisition officer on the filmsy, inaccurate, untenable and inadequate ground that it was not similar and comparable and far away from the acquired land. The remaining sale deeds taken for consideration indicated the price of lands at less than Rs. 10/- per cent except that of item 15. Despite and notwithstanding this overwhelming and clinching evidence, the Land Acquisition Officer has chosen only item No. 15 in the list, which relates to an item of 4 cents said to have been sold on 19-11-1965 at the rate of Rs. 50/-per cent and the Land Acquisition Officer has stated in his Award that this piece of land is similar in all respects to the acquired lands. 50/-per cent and the Land Acquisition Officer has stated in his Award that this piece of land is similar in all respects to the acquired lands. According to the plaintiff this is a travesty of facts and a dishonest statement made with a corrupt motive. This rate was chosen as the basis for valuation of a bulk acquisition consisting of a very large extent of 100.60 acres of land in barren seashore. It is further stated that the land viz., the subject matter of the sale deed dated 19-11-1965 being item 15 relied on by the Land Acquisition Officer for fixing the market value of the acquired lands, was originally owned by the defendants 1 and 2 and the registry in the village accounts still continues in the name of the defendants 1 and 2 and that the land is said to have been conveyed to the nephew of the vendor under an oral sale and the vendor of item 15 is said to have sold the extent got under the oral sale by his nephew to the vendee on 19-11-1965 for a sum of Rs. 200/-. The vendee is in actual possession of 8.3/4 cents and not 4 cents as referred to in the said sale deed, dated 19-11-1965. It is significant to note that the land Acquisition officer (Defendants) had on 25-2-1967 himself inspected and measured the land said to have been conveyed under the sale deed referred to above and found that the area in occupation of the vendee was 8-3/4 cents as against 4 cents actually conveyed under the document. The Land Acquisition Officer fraudulently suppressed this material fact and did not bring it to the notice of the District Revenue Officer when recommending the value of R.s. 50/- per cent. 4. According to the plaintiff the circumstances surrounding the said sale deed, dated 19-11-1965 were extremely suspicious and lead irresistibly to the conclusion that the document in Question was solely created with a fraudulent and dshonest intention of creating evidence to inflate the price of the lands in the locality with a view to getting exhorbitant compensation. The Land Acquisition Officer was grossly negligent and acted with a corrupt motive in conjunction with or in conspiracy with defendants 1 and 2 in adopting the said sale deed as the soje basis for fixing the market value of the suit lands. The Land Acquisition Officer was grossly negligent and acted with a corrupt motive in conjunction with or in conspiracy with defendants 1 and 2 in adopting the said sale deed as the soje basis for fixing the market value of the suit lands. That apart, the said sale admittedly related to a sale of house site with mango and coconut trees of a very small extent. The Land Acquisition Officer in his preliminary report sent on 15-3-1967 stated that the lands under acquisition were agricultural lands and that they have to be valued as such. Despite these crucial circumstances, he had taken the sale deed pertaining to house site as the basis. The Land Acquisition officer had fraudulently and deliberately omitted to refer to the actual extent in the possession of the vendee under the sale deed, when taking into account the sale deed, dated 19-11-1965. Further, he ought not to have taken a sale of 4 cents of land for fixing the value of a large extent of 100.60 acres of barren land which had no potentiality of being converted into a house site. According to the plaintiff, the true and correct value of the lands can only be Rs. 4/- per cent or Rs. 400/- per acre and not Rs. 50/- per cent or Rs. 5000/- per acre. There has therefore been an an over payment of Rs. 462760/- and Rs. 69,414.00 p. being the 15 per cent solatium thereon thus totaling Rs. 532174/-. The Land Acquisition Officer has not strictly complied with the specific guidelines for fixation of correct market value for ands, buildings etc., to be acquired under the Act. 5. It is further stated that the valuation recommended by the third defendant seems to have been approved on 30-6-1967 by the District Revenue Officer (not a party to the present suits). straightaway without due consideration and his approval was handed over to the third defendant on the same date in person and that the third defendant passed the award in a hurry on 12-7-1967 only for a portion of the lands acquired belonging to the first and second defendants herein, leaving out the lands belonging to t he other persons. All these facts lead to the only conclusion that the third defendant had not exercised the statutory power bonafide. All these facts lead to the only conclusion that the third defendant had not exercised the statutory power bonafide. The fact disclosed above will go to show that the third defendant has not acted in good faith in passing the impugned awards, even assuming that he had the specific authority to pass the award. The hurry with which such an award was passed in favour of the first and second defendants alone, leaving out the lands of other persons would clearly indicate a well planned and pre-meditated design to commit a fraud on the public Exchequer. The plaintiff further submitted that the Land Acquisition Officer, the third defendant received illegal gratification from defendants 1 and 2 and the award in question was passed on consideration of the illegal gratification promised and paid subsequently by the defendants 1 and 2 as a consideration for fraudulently inflating the market value of the lands to an exhorbitant figure and passing an award. The defendants were criminally prosecuted for various offences and inter alia the defendants 1 to 3 were charged with offences under S. 120B of Indian Penal Code, S. 165A and. 5 (2) read with S, 5(1)(c)(d) of the Act II of 1957 in endar case No. 4 of 1969 in the court of the Second Additional Special Judge, Madras. One of the main charges in that case was that the Land Acquisition Officer (defendant-3 herein and accused-3 in the criminal case) received illegal gratification from defendants 1 and 2 (accused-6 7 in the criminal case) for passing the award at a higher rate. The criminal Court has found among other things that the Land Acquisition Officer was actuated by a desire to obtain illegal gratification by inflating the price and received illegal gratification for passing the award at a higher rate. As a result of the trial, the Court found that the defendants 1 and 3 herein were guilty of the offences punishable under the Section mentioned above and convicted them. They were further found guilty of offences punishable under S. 167 India Penal Code read with S. 109 and convicted. However, the second defendant (accused- 7 in the criminal case) was given the benefit of doubt and acquitted. 6. In the appeal therefrom to this court in Criminal Appeal Nos. They were further found guilty of offences punishable under S. 167 India Penal Code read with S. 109 and convicted. However, the second defendant (accused- 7 in the criminal case) was given the benefit of doubt and acquitted. 6. In the appeal therefrom to this court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 755 of 1973 and 448 of 1974, the conviction of the defendants 1 and 3 was upheld by this Court and an appeal against the acquittal of the second defendant was dismissed. According to the plaintiff, the facts narrated above and the circumstances surrounding the facts would indicate that the third defendant was at the very least grossly negligent in the performance of his responsibility, that is even more likely as could be inferred from the facts and circumstances is that the third defendant acted in collusion with the first and second defendant with a fraudulent and dishonest intention. According to the plaintiff, the Award 12 of 1967, dated 12-7-1967 passed by the third defendant is vitiated by fraud, and is not binding on the plaintiff and that the same is liable to be set aside. The defendants 1 and 2 who have received a compensation of Rs. 631906.35 p. were liable to refund and pay the said amount to the plaintiff with interest from the date of plaint. In any event, the plaintiff says that there is an unjust enrichment of the defendants 1 and 2 for having received a compensation at Rs. 50 per cent or Rs. 5000 per acre, whereas the true market value of the land is only Rs. 4 per cent or Rs. 400 per acre, which they are bound to refund to the plaintiff and the plaintiff estimates the said sum at Rs. 532174/-inclusive of solatium. 7. The plaintiff filed Writ Petitions Nos. 1596 and 1597 of 1968 in this Court on 7-3-1968 for the issue of a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ or order or direction to quash and award passed by the third defendant herein in Award No. 12 of 1967 relating to the acquisition of 100-60 acres of land in Pudupattinam village, Chengalpattu District and to further direct the defendants 1 and 2 herein to refund the total compensation of Rs. 631906.35 p. received by them as compensation and for other reliefs. 631906.35 p. received by them as compensation and for other reliefs. The said writ petitions were dismissed by this Court on 25-1-1977 on the ground that the remedy of the plaintiff was to file only a suit. The present suit was therefore instituted by the plaintiff. The suit is not barred by limitation by reason of Act 112 of the Limitation Act. In any event, the plaintiff is entitled to deduct the period from 7-3-1968, when the writ petition was filed to 25-1-1977, when the writ petition was dismissed under S. 14 of the Limitation Act as the plaintiff was diligently and bonafide prosecuting the said writ petition. 8. The suit was resisted by the defendants 1 and 2 by filing separate written statements. Ac cording to the defendants, the suit is not main tainable and that there has been no fraud on their part. The plaintiff is concluded by an award made under the Act by its own officers and it is not open to the plaintiff to plead that the Award was exces sive or was obtained by fraud or deceit. The market value fixed at Rs. 5000/- per acre of dry lands is correct and that the same is not affected by lack of good faith on the part of the defendants 1 and 2. It is a proper market price. They deny that there was any gross or corrupt motive on their part except to get the fair value for their lands. The surrounding circumstances pleaded for indicating the absence of good faith are all incorrect and untrue and they are denied as false, the defendants 1 and 2 state that the plaintiffs are estopped from now claiming that the compensation awarded is excessive. If it was excessive, the plaintiff could have derequisi tioned the property and notified it later. The find ings of the criminal Court in charging the writ petitioner under S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Cor ruption Act was only that the third defendant was given illegal gratification for the purpose of ex pedition. The findings are in any event not binding and are irrelevant and the allegations are therefore untrue and denied. There was no collusion or conspiracy. The plaintiffs as principals are bound by the acts of their own agents. The findings are in any event not binding and are irrelevant and the allegations are therefore untrue and denied. There was no collusion or conspiracy. The plaintiffs as principals are bound by the acts of their own agents. There is no provision under the Act to displace the Award made therein when it becomes final and for filing a suit of this nature. The suit is barred by the provisions of S. 9 of Code of Civil Procedure. This suit is also barred by limitation. The claim for any sum or for setting aside the award of 1967, dated 12-7-1967 is unsustainable. 9. The second defendant has filed his writ ten statement through his counsel Mr. S. Ramalingam (now a Judge of this Court), denying the allegations contained in the plaint. According to the second defendant, his father the first defen dant built a bungalow within a compound at one acre, more or less in the middle of the property and the lands were subsequently brought under cul tivation. The portion was cultivated with casurina trees and some portions were cultivated sub sequently with groundnuts etc., The suit lands have now been arbitrarily and unilaterally valued by the plaintiff at Rs. 400/- notionally as on 24-8-1966 viz., date of the notification under S.(1) of the Act. On the basis that the rate even as early as December, 1942 was Rs. 120/- per acre, the impugned award passed by the third defendant valuing the lands at Rs. 5000/- inclusive of trees, casurina and the superstructure built by the first defendant cannot be said to be either excessive or inflated. The second defendant has not received unduly excessive compensation as alleged. The valuation of Rs. 50/- per cent fixed by the third defendant was to be approved by the District Revenue Officer. The impugned Award was passed only after the valuation was approved by the District Revenue Officer. In any event, the second defendant is not in any way concerned with the official correspondence between the third defendant on the one hand and the District Revenue Officer on the other relating to the Land Acquisition proceedings. There is no mandatory provision in the Act that other things being equal an extent of 4 cents of land ought not to be taken as the data land for fixing the market value of the large extent of land. There is no mandatory provision in the Act that other things being equal an extent of 4 cents of land ought not to be taken as the data land for fixing the market value of the large extent of land. In the absence of any such specific provision in the Land Acquisition Act, the mere fact that the third defendant chose item 15 referred to in paragraph 3 of the plaint as the date land because the taram , classification or grade were the same, would not by itself be proof of any fraud or collusion or vitiate the Award. According to the second defendant, after the retirement of Thiru. K. Periyanayagam, District Revenue Officer of Chengalpattu, steps were taken to unilaterally revise the assessment of the market value of the lands. Thereupon, both the defendants 1 and 2 filed a writ petition in this Court and obtained interim stay restraining the plaintiff from taking possession of the remaining lands mentioned in the Annexure to this written statement, without passing an Award fixing compensation reasonably at the market rate while the petition for vacating stay came up before this court, a representation was made on behalf of the Government that pending disposal of the said writ petition, the stay may be vacated and possession of the balance of 106.56 acres of land could be handed over to the plaintiff in turn to be handed over to the Madras Atomic Power Project. This was in or about October, 1967. Neither the plaintiff nor any official of the Revenue Department to whom the powers of the Collector under the Act has been delegated has passed any Award or paid any compensation to this defendant on a proportionate basis for the remaining 106.59 acres. The plaintiff who took possession of the said lands more fully described in the Annexure to the written statement and the Madras Atomic Power Project which latter took possession of the said lands in October, 1967 from the plaintiff and continued to be in possession till then without the plaintiff or any duly authorised official passing an award or paying compensation for the said lands in the Annexure, are in unlawful possession of the lands comprising 106.59 acres. The compensation payable to the defendants 1 and 2 would thus be substantially more than the suit claim for the recovery of Rs. The compensation payable to the defendants 1 and 2 would thus be substantially more than the suit claim for the recovery of Rs. 6,31,906.30 with interest as prayed in paragraph 31 (b) of the plaint. 10. The second defendant denies the allegations that the data land was sold as a house site. The valuation of the suit lands was fixed by the third defendant, after obtaining the administrative approval of the District Revenue Officer, Thiru. K. Periyanayagam, passed the impugned Award. The District Revenue Officer, Thiru. K. Periyanayagam was therefore a proper and necessary party to the present suit. The suit is therefore bad for non-joinder of parties more particularly when the third defendant alongwith Thiru. K. Periyanayagam were prosecuted by the State represented by the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-corruption and the defendants 1 and 2 and three officials of the Chengalpattu Collectorate were acquited and in the appeals, filed by the State against the acquittal confirmed by this Court. In any event, the third defendant was an agent acting on behalf of the Collector or alternatively of the State Government. The plaintiff having permitted the third defendant to act officially in his capacity as Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition Officer) and pass an award, the validity of the Award passed by the third defendant acting as the agent of the plaintiff and in whom the statutory powers under the Act were vested by delegation, cannot be questioned. The Land Acquisition officer, in law only makes an offer or tender of the compensation on behalf of the plaintiff to the property under acquisition. The second defendant submits that the plaintiff cannot retain the property simultaneously and pray for refund of the amounts paid to the second defendant, when the plaint itself proceeds on the basis that the third defendant acted as an agent of the plaintiff and made an offer for the land-holders, which if accepted by the State culminates in an award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, acting as an agent of the plaintiff. The reliefs prayed for in paragraph 31(a) & (b) of the plaint by which the setting aside the award has been prayed for a consequent recovery of Rs. 6,31,906.35 p. and the reliefs prayed for alternatively for a direction in paragraph 31(c) for refund of Rs. 5,32,174.00 p. are mutually contradictory and destructive and not merely mutually inconsistent. The reliefs prayed for in paragraph 31(a) & (b) of the plaint by which the setting aside the award has been prayed for a consequent recovery of Rs. 6,31,906.35 p. and the reliefs prayed for alternatively for a direction in paragraph 31(c) for refund of Rs. 5,32,174.00 p. are mutually contradictory and destructive and not merely mutually inconsistent. The suit is therefore not maintainable on this ground. 11. On these pleadings the following issues were framed by this Court by Singaravelu, J. on 16-3-1983: (1) Whether the suit claim is barred under S. 9 ot civil Procedure Code as contended by the defendants? (2)Whether the defendants created bogus and Traudulent documents with a view to create evidence for inflating the price of the lands for the purpose of getting exorbitant compensation? (3)whether the land Acquisition Officer was a tool in the hands of defendants 1 and 2 (4)Consequently whether the award in question is ab initio void”) (5)Whether the award is liable to be set aside for the reasons mentioned in the plaint? (6)Whether the defendants are liable to refund any amount to the plaintiff; if so, what amount? (7) To what relief are the parties entitled?” I have also framed an additional issue, which is numbered as 8: (8) Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff for setting aside the award No. 12/67, dated 12-7-1967 passed by the Land Ac quisition Officer and Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition, Kalpakkam Atomic Energy Project (third defendant,), who is the plaintiffs own officer is maintainable? The other issues relate to fraud and other details and they go together. 12. I have heard the arguments of Mr. V.S. Subramaniam and Mr. N.S. Varadachari, for the defendants and the L.Rs of Dl who raised the preliminary point on the question of maintainability of the suit filed by the plaintiff in this Court. Hence, the learned counsel for the defendants were permitted to advance arguments on the question of maintainability. Learned Additional Government pleaders arguments on this point was also heard by me alongwith his arguments on the other issues. Regarding the maintainability of the suit, it is submitted by Mr. V.S. Subramaniam and Mr. Hence, the learned counsel for the defendants were permitted to advance arguments on the question of maintainability. Learned Additional Government pleaders arguments on this point was also heard by me alongwith his arguments on the other issues. Regarding the maintainability of the suit, it is submitted by Mr. V.S. Subramaniam and Mr. N.S. Varadachari, learned counsel appearing for the defendants 1 and 2 and L.Rs of Dl that inasmuch as the entire proceedings were under the provisions of the Act, which is a self contained code, no suit can lie with regard to anything done under the said Act, by any of the parties, as S. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically provides that the Civil Court will have jurisdiction to try all suits excepting suits of which their cogn isance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Inasmuch as the suit is filed for setting ‘ aside the award passed by the plaintiffs own officer, the suit is not maintainable because unless the Award is set aside, the plaintiff cannot seek to recover the amounts paid by way of compensation to defendants 1 and 2 on any ground. In this connection, it will be relevant to note Sections, 11, 12 and 25 of the Act. Under S.ll of the Act, an enquiry by the Collector is stated. In the proviso to S.ll(1), it is specifically stated that no award shall be made by the Collector under this Section without the provision approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf provided further that it shall be competent for the appropriate Government to direct that the Collector may make such Award without such approval in such class or classes as the appropriate Government may specify in this behall. S. 12 of the Act is reproduced hereunder. 12. A ward of Collector when to be final (1) Such award shall be filed in the Collectors office and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not of the true area and value of the land, and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made.* The above Section specifically states that the Award of the Collector shall except as provided under the Act be final and conclusive evidence as between the Collector and the persons interested whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not. Consequently, the Award cannot be assailed in a civil Court. S. 25 of the Act is also extracted hereunder: “25. Amount of compensation by Court not to be lower tlian the amount awarded by the Collector . “The amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the collector under S.ll.” S. 25 of the Act, as it now stands is simple and lays down that the amount of compensation awarded by the court shall in any case be not less than what was awarded by the Collectorunder S. 11. 13. The new S. 25 as stands substituted by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, puts no fetter on Courts awarding any sum to an aggrieved claimant in excess of what was awarded by the Collector, no matter that no claim has been laid by the claimant in answer to a notice under S. 9(2) of the Act. It is useful to refer on this point the famous book, written by Mr. V.G. Ramachandran (7th Edn.) published in 1986 on ‘the law of land acquisition and compensation’. Learned author at page No. 409 observed as follows:. The finality arises as to the area of the land, the value of the land, and the apportionment of compensation among the persons interested”. It is also stated in the said page as follows: “It is noteworthy to mention that a complete machinery has been provided for settlement of the dispute about the quantum of compensation by resorting to the procedure prescribed by the Act as well as the dispute about the rights of the owners to compensation”. It is also stated in the said page as follows: “It is noteworthy to mention that a complete machinery has been provided for settlement of the dispute about the quantum of compensation by resorting to the procedure prescribed by the Act as well as the dispute about the rights of the owners to compensation”. the test from which the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Court is to be inferred are as follows: “Where a statute gives a finality to the orders of Special Tribunal, the Civil Courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to it what the civil Court would normally do in a suit.” Thus, it is seen where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the Special Tribunal, the civil Courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. 14. In this connection the following Judgments are to be noticed in regard to the ouster of jurisdiction of Civil Court: 1. State of W.B. v. The Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd AIR 1970 SC 1298 = 1970 (2) SCC 39 2. Bata Shoe Co. v. Jabalpur Municipality AIR 1977 SC 955 “State of West Bengal was a case filed by the State of West Bengal against the Indian Iron and Steel Company Limited, which was the owner of Ramnagar Colliery. For the years 1946-47, 1947-48, 1948-49, they filed returns before the assessing authority under S. 72 of the Bengal Cess Act, 1880. The assessing authority rejected the returns and levied road cess and public works cess, valuing the coal supplied by it to the factories at the control rate at the relevant time. The respondent company paid the amount under protest and filed a suit for refund of excess amount collected by it. It also challenged the said levies on the ground that it made no profit and hence in computing the profits of colliery the value of the coal supplied to the factories and workshops should not have been taken into consideration. The trial Court decreed the suit and the High Court confirmed it. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. It also challenged the said levies on the ground that it made no profit and hence in computing the profits of colliery the value of the coal supplied to the factories and workshops should not have been taken into consideration. The trial Court decreed the suit and the High Court confirmed it. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. While accepting the contention of the State, the Supreme Court held that it was open to the assessing authorities to take into consideration the value of the coal supplied to the factories and workshops referred to earlier in computing the profits of the colliery. The Supreme Court further held that the mode of computation is a matter for the assessing authorities except where the computation is done in violation of any provision of law. If there was any mistake in the computation, that mistake should have been got rectified by following the procedure prescribed in the Act. If the respondent was aggrieved by the mode of computation adopted by the assessing authority, it should have agitated that question firstly before that authority and thereafter before the appellate authority. Having not done so, the company cannot be permitted to raise that question in the presence suit; otherwise the finality contemplated by S. 102 of the Act would become illusory. 15. In the said case, what was contended was not that any provision in the Act had been ignored by the assessing authority but that S. 72 thereof has not been properly interpreted by that authority. The Supreme Court held as under: If the provisions of the Act form a precise, self contained code, as we hold them to be, the assessee cannot be permitted to challenge the levy on the ground that the levy imposed on him is excessive. It must be remembered that the levy under the Act is imposed by a special law which law also provides its own remedies for correcting the errors that may be committed by the assessing authority. Where a liability not existing previously is created by a statute, at the same time provides a special or partic ular remedy for correcting any mistake that may occur in its enforcement the aggrieved party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute and no other. Where a liability not existing previously is created by a statute, at the same time provides a special or partic ular remedy for correcting any mistake that may occur in its enforcement the aggrieved party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute and no other. The Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to examine he correctness of the computation of the net profits made by the authorities under the Act.” Bata Shoe Companys case was a case filed by Bata Shoe Company against Jabalpur Municipality in respect of the articles which were imported by the retail shops at Jabalpur within the limits of the then Jabalpur Municipal Committee. The plaintiffs paid to the Municipal Committee a sum of Rs. 16,528/- and odd as octroi duty. The said duty was assessed by the Municipal Committee on an amount which was 40 per cent less than the retail price of the goods which were brought within the municipal limits. The Municipal Committee in the year 1946-47 decided to reopen and revise the assessment by charging the octroi duty on an amount which was only 61/4% less than the retail price of the goods. The Municipal Committe further decided to levy double the duty by way of penalty for the aforesaid period on the ground that the plaintiffs had intentionally evaded the payments of the duty payable on the goods. The plaintiffs in that case preferred an appeal against the decision of the Municipal Committee to the Sub Divisional Officer, Jabalpur who by an order dated 14th July, 1948 modified the decision of the Municipal Committee by permitting them to charge the octroi duty on an amount which was less by 12 1/2 % than the retail price of the goods. The sub Divisional Officer however upheld the Assessment of double duty. The revision application preferred by the plaintiffs (Bata Shoe Company) to the Board of Revenue was rejected on October 4, 1948 on the ground that it was not maintainable. In conformity with the appellate order, but under protest, the plaintiffs in that case paid to the Municipal Committee a sum of Rs. 21071-1-3 on August 6, 1948. The defendant Municipality demanded a further sum of Rs. 10604-3-6 alleging that they had overlooked asking for it through mistake. The plaintiff company paid that amount too on September 22, 1948 under protest. 21071-1-3 on August 6, 1948. The defendant Municipality demanded a further sum of Rs. 10604-3-6 alleging that they had overlooked asking for it through mistake. The plaintiff company paid that amount too on September 22, 1948 under protest. They filed a suit against the defendant Municipality for recovery of the total amount of Rs. 31677-3-9 with interest at 6 per cent per annum on the ground that the defendants were not entitled to recover the amount by way of octroi duty and penalty. The trial court decreed the suit to the extent of Rs. 32629-7-0. The defendants had raised contentions both as regards the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit and as regards limitation, but the trial Court rejected those contentions and held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and that it was not Barred by limitation. In appeal the High Court held that the defendant were entitled to revise and reopen the assessment and that the re-assessment of octroi duty which was ultimately fixed in appeal by the Sub-Divisional Officer could not be questioned by the plaintiffs in the civil Court. The High Court granted to both the parties a certificate to file an appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India and both parties being partly aggrieved by the decree of the High Court filed cross appeals. The first question that arose for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit brought by the plaintiffs. In support of the contention that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit, plaintiffs cited some decisions. The plaintiffs’ contention that the suit was not barred from, the cognizance of the civil Court was effectively answered by the Municipal Committee. The defendant Municipal Committee strongly relied on the Judgment reported in Kamala Mills Ltd v. State of Bombay AIR 1965 SC 1942 The Supreme Court held as follows: “These provisions show in the first place that the defendants indubitably possess the right and the power to assess and recover octroi duty and double duty on goods which are brought within the municipal limits for sale, consumption or use therein. The circumstances that the defendants might have acted in excess of or irregularly in the exercise of that power cannot support the conclusion that the assessment or recovery of the tax is without jurisdiction. The circumstances that the defendants might have acted in excess of or irregularly in the exercise of that power cannot support the conclusion that the assessment or recovery of the tax is without jurisdiction. Applying the test in Kamala Mills , if the appropriate authority while exercising its jurisdiction and powers under the relevant provisions of the Act, holds erroneously that an assessment already made can be corrected or that an assessee is liable to pay double duty when Rule 14(b), in fact does not justify such an imposition, it cannot be said that the decision of the authority is without jurisdiction. Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are, as held in Dhulabhai AIR 1969 SC 78 . for the decision of the authorities set up by the Act and a civil suit cannot lie if the orders of those authorities are given finality.” “That is in regard to the power of the authority concerned to reassess and to levy double duty. Secondly both the Act and the Rules contain provisions which we have noticed above, enabling the aggrieved party effectively to challenge an illegal assessment or levy of double duty. By reason of the existence and availability of those special remedies, the ordinary remedy by way of a suit would be excluded on a true interpretation of S. 24(3)of the Act.” The Supreme Court thus dismissed the Civil Appeal filed by Bata Shoe Company and allowed the suit filed by the defendant, with the result, dismissing the plaintiffs suit. State v. P. Kanagamani AIR 1975 Mad. 303 = 87 L.W. 841 is another decision cited by Mr. N.S.Varadachari, learned counsel for the defendant to say that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In that case, writ petitions were filed on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu against P. Kanagamani and others in W.P. Nos. 489 and 490 of 1971. The short facts in that case are as follows: Manali village in Chengalpattu Taluk, Chengalpattu District was an inam village which became an estate under the Tamil Nadu Estates Land Act, 1908 by virtue of the Tamil Nadu Estates Land (III Amendment) Act, 1936. 489 and 490 of 1971. The short facts in that case are as follows: Manali village in Chengalpattu Taluk, Chengalpattu District was an inam village which became an estate under the Tamil Nadu Estates Land Act, 1908 by virtue of the Tamil Nadu Estates Land (III Amendment) Act, 1936. For the purpose of the Madras Refinaries Limited, a major portion of the lands in the said village was notified to be acquired under the provisions of the land Acquisition Act, 1894 The notification under S. 4(1) of the Act was published in all those cases in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazettee and the declaration under S. 6 of the Act was also published in the Gazettee. Under the Provisions of S. 17(1) of the Act, possession was taken on different dates, even before the passing of the award. Pursuant to G.O.Ms. No. 11, Revenue, dated 3- 6-1969 referred to above, the Land Acquisition officer passed awards in respect of the lands covered by these writ petitions on different dates. These writ petitions have been filed by the State of Tamil Nadu for quashing these awards made by the first respondent under the provisions of the Act. It was contended by the State that the first respondent acted mala fide in passing these awards, that he had colluded with the inamdars of the village in assessmentquestion and that consequently this act was fraudulent. However, the only point that was urged before the learned Judge in the course of the hearing of the writ petitions by the learned Advocate General, who appeared for the petitioner in those writ petitions was that the first respondent, Land Acquisition officer, had not taken into account the tenure of the land in determining the market value of the land as provided for in S. 23 of the Act. As against this contention of the learned Advocate General, learned counsel for the Inamdars and persons interested in lands advanced two arguments. One is that having issued G.O.Ms. No. 1111, Revenue, dated 3-6-1969, the Government is estopped from contending that the Land Acquisition Officer had erred in ascertaining the market value of the lands without reference to the tenure of the lands. One is that having issued G.O.Ms. No. 1111, Revenue, dated 3-6-1969, the Government is estopped from contending that the Land Acquisition Officer had erred in ascertaining the market value of the lands without reference to the tenure of the lands. The second is that in any event, the State is not entitled to apply for any writ of certiorari to quash the award made by the first respondent, having regard to the nature of the award under the law as well as under the decisions of courts. 16. In regard to the second contention that the State is not entitled to apply for any writ of certiorari to quash the award made by the first respondent, the learned counsel for the Inamdars contended that the making of an award by the Land Acquisition Officer amounts only to an office made bv that officer on behalf of the Government to the persons interested in the lands by way of compensation for the lands compulsorily acquired by the Government, that when the offer is made, the Land Acquisition Officer is acting as the agent of the Government, that the offer so made by the land Acquisition officer as the agent of the Government is binding on the Government and that the Government cannot challenge the same by means of a petition for the issue of writ of certiorari. 17. While considering the above submission of the learned counsel for the Inamdars, Mr. Justice Ismail (as he then was) referred to the following decisions: 1. Ezra v. The Secretary of State 1903 ILR 30 Cal. 36 In the said decision, the Calcutta High Court after making an elaborate reference to the provisions of the Act held as follows: “The considerations to which we have referred satisfy us that the Collector acts in the matter of the enquiry and the valuation of the land only as an agent of the Government and not as a judicial officer; and that consequently, although the Government or the company at whose instance the Government is acquiring the land is bound by his proceedings, the persons interested are not concluded by his finding regarding the value of the land or the compensation to be awarded. His enquiry and his valuation are departmental in their character for the purpose of enabling the Government to make a tender through him to the persons interested. His enquiry and his valuation are departmental in their character for the purpose of enabling the Government to make a tender through him to the persons interested. Such tender once made is binding on the Government, and the Government cannot require that the value fixed by its own officer acting on its behalf should be open to question at its own instance before the civil court.” Thus it was made clear in the above judgment that any order passed by any officer of the Government is binding on the Government and that the Government cannot require that the value fixed by its own officer acting on its behalf should be open to question at its own instance before the civil court.. 2. This view of the Calcutta High Court was affirmed by the Privy Council an appeal in Ezra v. Secretary of State for India 1905 ILR 32 Cal. 605 PC. It is useful to extract the observations made by the judicial Committee which runs thus: “The sections directly relevant (besides the 9th already set out) are the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 18th. These Sections and the question as a whole are very satisfactorily discussed in the judgment under appeal, and their Lordships do not think it necessary to repeat the reasoning. It is to say the least, perfectly intelligible that the expert official charged with the duty of fixing a value should be possessed of all the information in the hands of the department, and should at the same time avail himself of all that is offered at the enquiry his ultimate duty being not to conclude the owner by his so called award, but to fix the sum, which in his best judgment is the value and should be offered.” 3. The Chief Court of Punjab in Macdonald v. The Secretary of State for India in Council 1909 4 Ind cas. 914 have also expressed the view that an award under the Act is in the nature or a tender made by the Government to the owner of the land. The Supreme Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officers AIR 1961 SC 1500 referred to with approval principles laid down by the Calcutta High Court in Ezras case 1905 ILR 32 Cal. The Supreme Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officers AIR 1961 SC 1500 referred to with approval principles laid down by the Calcutta High Court in Ezras case 1905 ILR 32 Cal. 605 PC and the decision of the Punjab Chief Court in Macdonalda case 1909 4 Ind Cas 914 referred to above. The Supreme Court in Harish Chandra Raj Singhs AIR 1981 SC 1500 case held as under: In dealing with this question it is relevant to bear in mind the legal character of the award made by the Collector under S. 12. In a sense it is a decision of the Collector reached by him after holding an enquiry as prescribed by the act. It is a decision, inter alia in respect of the amount of compensation which should be paid to the person interested in the property acquired; but legally the award cannot be treated as a decision; it is in law an offer or tender of the compensation determined by the Collector to the owner of the property under acquisition. If the owner accepts the offer no further proceeding is required to be taken; the amount is paid and compensation proceedings are concluded. If however, the owner does not accept the offer, S. 18 gives him the statutory right of having the question determined by Court and it is the amount of compensation which the Court may determine that would bind both the owner and the Collector. In that case it is on the amount thus determined judicially that the acquisition proceedings would be concluded. It is because of this nature of the award that the award can be appropriately described as a tender or offer made by the Collector on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property for his acceptance”. 18. Ss. 18 and 25 of the Act give a right to a person interested in the land to apply to the Collector for referring the matter to the Court. The Government is not considered to be a person interested and therefore the Government does not have a right under S. 18 to call for a reference to a Civil Court against the award made by a Collector under Ss. 11 and 12. The Government is not considered to be a person interested and therefore the Government does not have a right under S. 18 to call for a reference to a Civil Court against the award made by a Collector under Ss. 11 and 12. Under S. 26(1) of the Act, when the applicant has made a claim to compensation pursuant to any notice given under S. 9, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under S.ll. These provisions also therefore make it clear that the amount awarded by the Collector is the irreducible minimum which the Government offers to the owner of the land by way of compensation and even when the owner of the land or the person interested takes up the matter to the Court, the court shall not give him anything less than the amount awarded by the Collector under S.ll. These provisions themselves indicate that the amount awarded by the Collector is the final amount as far as the Government is concerned and it is binding on the Government. As a matter of fact, S. 12(1) of the Act itself states that the award shall be filed in the Collectors office and shall, except as provided in the Act thereafter be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land, and the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. The only provision destroying this finality is that contained in S. 18 which gives a right to a person interested to ask for a reference and not to the Government to ask for a reference. Therefore, Ss. 12,18, 25 themselves will show that the amount awarded by the Collector under S. 11 is final as far as the Government is concerned and is binding on the Government and the Government cannot call that in question in any court. 19. Thus, it is seen that an award made by the Collector is only an offer made by him on behalf of the Government to the owner of the land and that the Collector acts only administratively in ascertaining the compensation. 19. Thus, it is seen that an award made by the Collector is only an offer made by him on behalf of the Government to the owner of the land and that the Collector acts only administratively in ascertaining the compensation. The award does not constitute a decision or a determination by a judicial or a quasi-judicial offer so as to bring it within the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the constitution of India. 20. In Khorshed Shapoor v. Asstt. Controller , Estate Duty, A.P. AIR 1980 SC 775 , the Supreme Court held as follows: Upon acquisition of his lands under the Land Acquisition Act the claimant has only one right, which is to receive compensation for the lands at their market value on the date of the relevant notification and it is this right which is quantified by the collector under S. 11 and by the Civil Court under S. 26 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Collectors award under S.ll is nothing more than an offer of compensation made by the Government to the claimants whose property is acquired.” Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corpn. AIR 1986 SC 1164 is a case arising under the provisions of the Act. For the purpose of constructing godowns for the Central Warehousing Corporation and at the instance of the Corporation, the Collector published a notification under S. 4 of the Act proposing to acquire certain lands belonging to the appellants. Santosh Kumar and others. The declaration under S. 6 of the Act was duly made and possession of the land was also taken from the appellant owners. The Collector made awards under S.ll of the Act in January and February, 1980, determining the compensation proposed to be paid to the owners. The owners sought references under S. 18 of the Act for enhancement of compensation. The Central Warehousing Corporation was also aggrieved by the amount of compensation determined by the Collector and sought a reference to the Civil court under S. 18 of the Act for reducing the amount. The Collector rejected the request for making a reference on the ground that such a reference as was sought by the Central Warehousing Corporation was barred by the proviso to S. 50(2) of the Act. The Collector rejected the request for making a reference on the ground that such a reference as was sought by the Central Warehousing Corporation was barred by the proviso to S. 50(2) of the Act. Thereupon the Corporation filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh challenging the awards. The High Court set aside the awards and itself determined the compensation at a reduced rate. The erstwhile owners of the land filed appeals after obtaining Special Leave from the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The principal submissions of the learned counsel for the owners of the land was that the High Court was wholly in error in entertaining writ petitions to challenge awards made by the collector under the Act on the ground that the amount awarded was excessive and that too not at the instance of the Government, but at the instance of the Corporation at whose request the acquisition was made. What the Government and the Collector were not entitled to do, obviously the person at whose instance the acquisition was made would also not be entitled to do. The Supreme Court in paragraph 4 of the said Judgment held as under: “In our view there cannot be any possible doubt that the scheme of the Act is that apart from fraud, corruption or collusion, the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector under S.ll of the Act may not be questioned in any proceeding either by the Government or by the Company or Local authority at whose instance the acquisition is made. S. 50(2) and S. 25 lead to that inevitable conclusion. Surely what may not be done under the provisions of the act may not be permitted to be done by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. Article 226 is not meant to avoid or circumvent the process of the law and the provisions of the statute. S. 50(2) and S. 25 lead to that inevitable conclusion. Surely what may not be done under the provisions of the act may not be permitted to be done by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. Article 226 is not meant to avoid or circumvent the process of the law and the provisions of the statute. When S. 50(2) expressly bars the company or local authority at whose instance the acquisitions are made from demanding a reference under S. 18 of the Act, notwithstanding that such company or local authority may be allowed to adduce evidence before the Collector, and when S. 25 expressly prohibits the court from reducing the amount of compensation wh ile dealing with the reference under S. 18, it is clearly not permissible for the company or local authority to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector and to have it reduced.” Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Standing orders of the Board of Revenue may also be usefully referred to: “Safeguards to be adopted against excessive awards:All awards are to be reported to the District Collector with particulars as to the area, soil rate per acre and total amount in each case with adequate explanation whenever the awards exceed the preliminary valuation. All cases, in which the Collector proposes to award more than 10 per cent in excess of the original estimate, or more than Rs. 10000 or in which he considers that the evidence is conflicting, or of such a nature that the civil Court may possibly award a sum exceeding the estimate by 10 per cent on appeal, should also be reported to the District Collector. In cases of acquisition for a large project, if the collector finds that the awards are likely to exceed the aggregate estimate for the district by 20 per cent or more, the announcement of further awards should be suspended and a special report should be submitted to the Board through the District Collector. On receipt of these reports, the District Collector may furnish to the Collector (Land Acquisition Officer) any information which may be helpful to the Land Acquisition Officer to determine the correct value of the land. On receipt of these reports, the District Collector may furnish to the Collector (Land Acquisition Officer) any information which may be helpful to the Land Acquisition Officer to determine the correct value of the land. It is not, however, competent for the District Collector to direct the Collector to award any particular amount as compensation. When the Collector after considering all the information placed at his disposal has finally decided the award to be made, the only alternatives open to the Government are, either to withdraw from acquisition proceedings, or allow them to proceed on the basis of the Collectors award. The Di strict Collector should call for the explanations from the officers responsible for the original valuation whenever their estimate is found to be materially lower than the value finally awarded. If the land is to be paid for by another department of Government, the District Collector should enquire of that department whether the acquisition should, in the circumstances, be completed.” 17. Revision of award duly announced not permitted: (i) “An award made by a Collector under S. 11 and duly announced under S. 12 of the Act should not be revised or amended either by himself or by the District Collector even though the persons interested may consent to the revision or amendment.” From the above two paragraphs, it will be apparent that ample safeguards have been provided for any excessive awards and that there is no question of filing any suit with reference to the acts done. In fact, it will be clear from the Boards Standing order that the only Option for he Government is either acquire or drop the lands from acquisition. 21. Mr. In fact, it will be clear from the Boards Standing order that the only Option for he Government is either acquire or drop the lands from acquisition. 21. Mr. V.S. Subramaniam, learned counsel appearing for the defendants cited the decision reported in Sathyanarayanan v. Kamashah Narayan Singh AIR 1956 Patna 360 the said decision, it has been held: “ Even if the award is erroneous, so long as it is enforced, it cannot be ignored and a party cannot be asked to refund any money already paid under the award and that it is conclusive evidence as to the true value of the land as between the Collector and the person interested!) At page 236 of the same Book, the matter relating to bar to civil suit has been discussed and the observations of Maxwell has been extracted: “There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be estimated founded upon a statute. One is where there was liability existing at common lawand that liability is affirmed by the statute which gives a special and particular form of remedy different from the remedy which existed at common law; there, unless the statute contains words which expressly or by necessary impliation exclude the common law remedy, the party suing has his election to pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class of cases is where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides noparticular form of remedy, then the party can only proceed by an action at common. But there is a third class, viz., where liability not existing at a common law is created by the statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it the remedy provided by the statute must be followed and it is not competent for the party to pursue the course applicable to the second class”. This has been extracted in AIR 1975 SC 2238 dealing with a case of Industrial Disputes Act. This has been extracted in AIR 1975 SC 2238 dealing with a case of Industrial Disputes Act. As far as the present case is concerned, the Land Acquisition Act is a special Act where the liability not existing in common law is created by the statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy provided by the statute must be followed and it is not competent for the party to pursue any other remedy, The other cases cited by the learned counsel may also be usefully and conveniently referred to for the purpose of exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. State of J.&K. v. Sauna Ullah AIR 1966 J&K 45 The learned Judge of the Jammu and Kashmir High court held as follows: “There is a world of difference between ‘taking of Possession’ and ‘acquisition’ of land. In the former the possession remains with the possessor, but the ownership continues to vest in the original owner, whereas in the case of acquisition the title of the owner is completely extinguished and possessor steps into the shoes of the original owner who is compensated for the lands taken possession of. The idea of compensation is inherent in acquisition of a land. A contract can certainly be avoided on the ground of mistake of fact but the same principle does not apply to a decree. A decree cannot be set aside on the ground of a mistake of fact or negligence of a party or perjured evidence. No suit therefore, is maintainable to set aside a decree on the ground of mistake of fact. Under S. 12 of the Act, where the Collector had made an award and a reference was made by him at the instance of the defendant to the District Judge any decision given by the District Judge as modified in appeal by the High Court would be final and conclusive and cannot be re-opened in a separate suit. Under S. 12 of the Act, where the Collector had made an award and a reference was made by him at the instance of the defendant to the District Judge any decision given by the District Judge as modified in appeal by the High Court would be final and conclusive and cannot be re-opened in a separate suit. The very object of the Land Acquisition Act is to extinguish the title of the original owner and when this is done, the Collector will not be heard to say that he proceeded under the provisions of the Act due to the negligence or mistake on his part.” In Babubhai v. Special Land Acquisition Officer AIR 1967 Gujarat 264, A Division Bench of Gujarath High Court held as follows: “In a reference made under S. 18 and 19 of the land Acquisition Act, the Court, at the instance of the Collector, cannot go into the question of true area of the land acquired since the Collector not being a person interested within the meaning of the Act (Ss. 8, 9, 11, 12 and 8(b) cannot make a reference under Ss. 18 and 19 and since in view of S. 12 the award is final, as between the Collector and the person interested, Inter alia, so far as the true area of the land acquired.” Ss. 18 to 21 of the Act indicate that the scope of enquiry before the Court in a reference made under Ss. 18 and 19 is to consider the objections made by the persons interested under S. 18 and no more. The scope of the enquiry cannot be enlarged by others putting forward contentions, not relevant to the objections. Those who do not ask for a reference under S. 18 on any of the points covered by it or those who cannot file a reference under S. 18 cannot in view of S. 20 and 21 call for an enquiry upon a matter outside the objections raised in the reference. Even the person who had applied for a reference cannot go beyond the objections raised by him in his applications for reference,” The decision reported in State of Bihar v. Dr. G.H. Grant AIR 1959 Patna 343 may also be referred to in this connection. Even the person who had applied for a reference cannot go beyond the objections raised by him in his applications for reference,” The decision reported in State of Bihar v. Dr. G.H. Grant AIR 1959 Patna 343 may also be referred to in this connection. A Division Bench of the Patna High Court held: “The finality of the award under S. 12 of the Act is subject to the decision by the court under S. 18 of the Act. Further, that finality is also be subject to the decision made by the court on a reference under S. 30. Where the Collector has made an award under S. 11 of the act and before payment has been made, if a new person, not previously appearing before him, appears he can make a reference to the court for the determination of that claim and the court, to which this reference is made, will be competent to decide the question between them. There is nothing in S. 30 to limit it to the disputes between the persons inter se to whom the compensation is payable and who are mentioned in the award of the collector. The clear object of this S. appears to be to make some provision for decision of complicated matters, where the collector experiences difficulty in apportioning the compensation. Having regard to the whole scheme of the Act and especially to the definition of the person interested in the land as given in this Act, there does not seem to be any justification for the argument that no reference under S. 30 can be made by the Collector if a dispute is raised by any person other than those who have been mention ed as persons interested in the award of the Collector” It will also be pertinent to note that S. 25 of the Act specifically provides that the court cannot fix any compensation lower than that awarded by the Collector. Though the Section is introduced by amending Act 68 of 1984, the Section anterior to amendment is also to the same effect thought it has been classified under the head ‘Rules as to amount of compensation’ as Ss. 25(1), 25(2) and 25 (3). The overall effect of the old Section also is to tne same effect as that now provided under the amended Act. 25(1), 25(2) and 25 (3). The overall effect of the old Section also is to tne same effect as that now provided under the amended Act. This is only to show that when the court itself has no power to reduce the compensation awarded by the Collector, the plaintiff cannot seek relief before this Court to set aside the same or reduce the amount already fixed under the Award. The plaintiff cannot indirectly ask the Court to do what the court itself cannot do under the provisions of the Act. 22. Thus, I hold on issue No. 8 that the suit filed by the State for setting aside the award passed by their own officer is not maintainable in law I may at this stage also point out that the learned Additional Government pleader appearing for the plaint was not in a position to place before me any decided authority on this issue as to whether the suit filed by the plaintiff in this court is maintainable in law. The issue is answered in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff. The issue Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 can be conveniently clubbed together and considered. 23. With regard to the claim made on the basis that an award was passed by the third defen dant fraudulently and dishonestly and in collusion and conspiracy with defendants 1 and 2, the fol lowing are the submission made by learned coun sel appearing for the defendants 1 and 2. Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure was referred to Order 6, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure is reproduced hereunder: “Particulars to be given where necessary.- “In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in the pleading”. Order 6, Rule 2 requires that a pleading should contain material facts on which the party relies for his claim of defence. The rule requires that, wherever necessary particulars of such material facts shall also be given. The rule is mandatory. Order 6, Rule 2 requires that a pleading should contain material facts on which the party relies for his claim of defence. The rule requires that, wherever necessary particulars of such material facts shall also be given. The rule is mandatory. The object of the said Rule is two fold: 1) to enable the opposite party to know what case he has to meet and thus to prevent a surprise at the trial, and 2) to limit the generality of the pleadings and so to define and limit the issues to be tried and thus save the unnecessary expense. Order 6, Rule 4 provides that in all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust etc., and in all other cases in which particulars may be necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid, particulars shall bestated in the pleading. The entire plaint is stated to be based on the alleged fraud or misrepresentation or collusion as between defendants 1, 2 and 3. I have also searched in vain to find out any particulars with regard to any misrepresentation, fraud or breach of trust. The plaint does not contain particulars of fraud. The plaint proceeds on the basis that because defendants 1 and 2 the officers of the plaintiffs were convicted in the criminal proceedings the fraud and collusion can be taken as having been proved in the present case also. 24. Learned Additional Government Pleader submits that since the defendants were criminally prosecuted for various offences and inter alia , the defendants 1 to 3 were charged with offences under S. 120 B Indian Penal Code, S. 165-A, S. 5(2) read with S. 5(1)(c)(d) of Act II of 1947 in Calender Case No. 4 of 1969 in the Court of the Second Additional Special Judge, Madras, the findings among other things that the third defendant was actuated by a desire to obtain illegal gratification by inflating the price and received illegal gratification for passing the award at a higher rate, the defendants 1 and 3 herein who were found guilty of the offences punishable under S. 120 B of India Penal Code read with Ss. 167 and 409 of Indian Penal Code and S. 5(2) read with S. 5(1) (c) & (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Central Act II of 1947) were convicted by the criminal Court. 167 and 409 of Indian Penal Code and S. 5(2) read with S. 5(1) (c) & (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Central Act II of 1947) were convicted by the criminal Court. They were found guilty of offences punishable under S. 167 of Indian Penal Code read with S. 109 and convicted. In Criminal Appeal No. 755 of 1973, the conviction of the defendants 1 and 3 was upheld by this court. However, the appeal against the acquittal of the second defendant was dismissed. Hence, learned Additional Government Pleader submitted that since they were convicted In the said criminal proceedings, fraud and collusion can be taken as having been proved in the civil forum also. I am unable to affix my seal of approval to the said contention of learned Additional Government Pleader 25. It is well settled that proceedings or Judgment before the Criminal Court cannot be relied upon as evidence in a civil proceedings. The plaintiff who has come forward with a case of fraud and collusion has to independently allege, give particulars in the plaint and also prove by evidence both oral and documentary about the same. In the instant case, in my opinion, the plaintiff has miserably failed to do so. Without independent proof of these, the plaintiff cannot seek the relief prayed for in the plaint. 26. In support of the contention that the proceedings or the judgment before the criminal court cannot be relied upon as evidence in a civil court, Mr. V.S. Subramaniam and Mr. N.S. Varadachari have placed strong reliance on the following pronouncement: 1. Anil Behari v. Latika Bala Dassi , AIR 1955 SC 366 wherein it was held as under: “Where in a proceedings for revocation of the grant of probate under S. 263, Succession Act, the question is whether the son of the testator murdered him it cannot be assumed on the basis of a previous judgment of a criminal court convicting the son of the murder of his father and sentencing him to transportation for life, that the son was the murderer of the testator. The judgment of the criminal Court is relevant only to show that there was such a trial resulting in the conviction and sentence of the son to transportation for life. It is not evidence of the fact that the son was the murderer of the testator. The judgment of the criminal Court is relevant only to show that there was such a trial resulting in the conviction and sentence of the son to transportation for life. It is not evidence of the fact that the son was the murderer of the testator. That question has to be decided on evidence.” It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that no question of the Genuineness of the will arises for consideration till the Court has decided that the probate must be revoked on one or more of the grounds specified in S. 263. S. 263 also contemplates a case for revocation based on the single ground that the will in respect of which the grant in question was obtained was a forged one. In such a case, whether or not the will was a forged one would be the only question to be canvassed before the cour t before the order of revocation could be made out”. The law has vested a judicial discretion in the court to revoke a grant where the court may have prima facie reasons to believe that it was necessary to have the will proved afresh in the presence of interested parties.” 2. Pedda Venktapathi v. Gangagunda Balappa 1933 Madras 429:37 L.W. 623 In the said decision, ft was held as unaer: “In a suit for damages for malicious prosecution the civil court should undertake an independent enquiry before satisfying itself of the absence of reasonable and probable cause and the Judgment of the Criminal Court acquitting the plaintiff can be used only to establish the fact that an acquittal has taken place as a fact in issue in the civil suit as a fact in issue in the civil suit and not to ascertain the grounds upon which the acquittal proceeded or the views of the trying Magistrate upon the evidence” and 3. Krishna Asari v. Adaikalam AIR 1966 Madras 425 = 79 L.W. 107 In the said case, Venkatadri, J. held that any decision of a criminal case cannot be relied on as one binding in a civil action. Equally the findings in a civil proceeding are not binding on a subsequent prosecution founded upon the same or similar allegations. While holding so, the learned Judge has also referred the following decisions: 1. Anil Behari v. Latika Bala Dassi AIR 1955 SC 366; 2. Equally the findings in a civil proceeding are not binding on a subsequent prosecution founded upon the same or similar allegations. While holding so, the learned Judge has also referred the following decisions: 1. Anil Behari v. Latika Bala Dassi AIR 1955 SC 366; 2. Kutumbarao v. Venka Taramayya AIR 1951 Mad. 344 =63 L.W. 820; In re. Chakka Jaggarao AIR 1335 Mad. 563 = 41 L.W. 786= 68 M.L.J 660. Thus, the plaintiff, in my opinion cannot seek to rely upon fraud or collusion purely on the basis of a Judgment of the criminal Court. Hence, I reject the contention of the Learned Additional Government Pleader on the issue also. 27. As far as the present suit is concerned, the plaintiff state has examined as many as seven witnesses and marked documents, Exs. P1 to P25. 28. Let me now analyse the evidence tendered by the plaintiff to see whether the allegations of misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust etc., have been proved by their witnesses or by any documentary evidence. I can straightway say that the plaintiffs have not substantiated their case for the reasons stated infra; [The discussion of evidence is omitted Ed] XXXXXXXXXX 29. Thus, looked at from any point of view, the plaintiff has not substantiated their case of fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust etc., There are no sufficient pleadings. The evidence tendered by the plaintiff both oral and documen tary are not sufficient to hold and prove any mis representation, fraud, breach of trust etc. The alleged fraud and collusion between the defen dants 1, 2 and 3 have not been either pleaded with particulars or established. Thus, in my opinion, the plaintiff has miserably failed to plead and prove the case of fraud, collusion and breach of trust. 30. It is seen from paragraph 23 of the written statement filed by the second defendant that after 22-2-1983 (on vertification of the relevant records) the second defendant was informed that the suit has been dismissed against the third defendant. It was further contended that apparently, the plaintiff was no longer interested in prosecuting the suit further against the third defendant and therefore had not taken effective steps to serve him. It was further contended that apparently, the plaintiff was no longer interested in prosecuting the suit further against the third defendant and therefore had not taken effective steps to serve him. It is seen from the main allegations in the plaint including the cause of action referred to in paragraph 29 are all based on the alleged fraud, collusion between the land owners, defendants 1 and 2 on the one hand and the third defendant on the other and also because the main prayer is for setting aside the impugned award, dated 12-7-1967 passed by the third defendant for the suit lands and fr consequential recovery of the compensation paid by the third defendant to the second defendant and the first defendant under the award, the suit having been dismissed against the third defendant for non-prosecution. The plaintiff must be deemed to have waived its remedies and given up the suit against the third defendant/Thus, it was contended on behalf of the defendants 1 and 2 that the cause of action for the suit therefore no longer subsists and that the suit is no longer maintainable against the defendants 1 and 2. 31. No reply statement was filed by the plaintiff-State disputing the said statement made in paragraph 23 of the written statement filed by the second defendant. Learned Additional Government pleader also was not in a position to inform this Court whether the suit which has been dismissed against the third defendant has been restored to file. Nobody has also appeared on behalf of the third defendant in this Court. 32. Thus, it has to be held that the suit as against the third defendant having been dismissed already, there cannot be any survival of the cause of action against defendants 1 and 2 alone, so as to make them liable. Hence, the suit of the plaintiff has to fail on this ground also. Thus, I answer Issue No. 2 against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants and hold that on the evidence available on record, it cannot be held that the defendants created bogus and fraudulent documents with a view to create evidence for inflating the price of the lands. Thus, I answer Issue No. 2 against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants and hold that on the evidence available on record, it cannot be held that the defendants created bogus and fraudulent documents with a view to create evidence for inflating the price of the lands. On issue No. 3, it has to be held that the land Acquisition Officer has not been proved to have been a tool in the hands of the defendants 1 and 2 and consequently, I hold that the award in question is not ab initio void , as contended by the plaintiff. On issue No. 5, I hold that the award is not liable to be set aside for the reasons mentioned in this Judgment. Thus, on issue No. 6, 1 hold that the defendants are not liable to refund any amount to the plaintiff. On issue No. 1 on the question whether the suit claim is barred under S. 9 of Civil Procedure Code, as contended by the defendants, I hold that the suit claim is barred for the elaborate reasons given supra; Issue No. 7:In the plaint, the plaintiff seeks to claim the sum of Rs. 6,31,90633 without handing over possession of the lands acquired and utilised. Now, I have already held that the Award No. 12/67, dated 12-7-1967 is not liable to be set aside, the plaintiff cannot seek to claim the amount, without handing over possession of the lands acquired and utilised Thus, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief as prayed for in the plaint. It is unfortunate to note that the Collector of Chenglepattu at Kancheepuram instead of acting as a responsible body has fought the litigation and necessarily. 33. In the result, the civil suit is dismissed with costs of defendants 1 and 2.