Judgment :- The only question is whether Ex. B3 is a settlement deed or a Will, Learned counsel for the appellants contends that it is only a Will and not a settlement deed as it does not convey any interest in the property in praesenti . Learned counsel places reliance on judgments in Commissioner of Gift Tax, Madras II Madras v. G. Thiruvenkata Mudaliar Madras 1976 T.L.N.J. 325 and in Sadasivam v. Subramania Pillai 1986 T.L.N.J. 270. In the former case, a Division Bench of this Court had to consider a document, the provisions of which were as follows: “(1) The settlors are to continue to enjoy both the items of properties during their life time. (2) The settlors will have no power to alienate or otherwise dispose of the property in any manner such as by way of gift, exchange, mortgage, etc. (3) After the death of both the settlors, one of the sons should enjoy the property during his lifetime without any power of alienation by way of gift, etc., and after his life time, his heirs should take and enjoy the said properties as full owners absolutely. (4 ) Similarly, another son is to take and enjoy another property during his lifetime without power of alienation and after his death, his heirs would take and enjoy the same as full owners. (5) The settlors have no right to revoke the document.” 2. Thus, it is seen that in the document, there was no conveyance of any interest in the property. But there was a restriction of the estate owned by the settlors themselves whereby they declared that they had no power to alienate or otherwise dispose of the property in any manner during their life time. The Division Bench had no difficulty in holding that the document did not constitute a settlement or gift as there was no provision at all in the document transferring any interest in the immovable property in praesenti in favour of the settlee. 3. In the second case, another Division Bench held that the document in question was a Will and not a settlement deed as it did not create an interest in praesenti . The relevant terms on which considerable reliance were placed were The Division Bench, on a reading of the entire document negatived the contention that the said expression meant that the settlor gave an interest in praesenti 4. The relevant terms on which considerable reliance were placed were The Division Bench, on a reading of the entire document negatived the contention that the said expression meant that the settlor gave an interest in praesenti 4. In Rajammal v. Authiammal alias Authi Lakshmiammal 33 Madras 304 a Division Bench of this Court held that one of the invariable tests in coming to a conclusion as to the testamentary character of a document is whether the document is revocable, and if it is not revocable, the document is not a will. Their Lordships have also held that the intention of the party will be given effect to, though it is expressed in inappropriate language and that the reservation of a life interest does not of itself suffice to make a document testamentary. It was pointed out that where the document contains provisions which are not of an ambulatory character, the presumption will be against the testamentary nature of the document and the fact that such provisions are expressed to operate in the future will not affect the nature of the document. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on judgments in P. Somasundaram v. K. Rajammal 89 L.W. 151 and in Ram Mohan v. Lalitha Raghuraman 89 L.W. 175. The judgment in the earlier cases is followed by the same Division Bench in the latter case. Learned counsel for the respondents relies on the following observations found in the judgment in the earlier case. “An interest is said to be vested when it is not subject to any condition precedent, when it is to take effect on the happening of an event which is certain, whereas an estate is contingent when the right to enjoyment depends upon the happening of an uncertain event which may or may not happen. A person takes a vested interest in property at the testators death when he acquires proprietary right in it at that time; but the right of enjoyment is only deferred till a future event happens which is certain to happen. A person takes a vested interest in property at the testators death when he acquires proprietary right in it at that time; but the right of enjoyment is only deferred till a future event happens which is certain to happen. But, a contingent interest is one in which neither any proprietary interest nor a right of enjoyment is given at the testators death but both depend upon future uncertain events in this case, since the deaths of Piramu Ammal and Chellammal are certain, Vellammal had acquired a vested interest in the properties on the death of the testator Seeni Chettiar, S. 119 of the Indian Succession Act clearly applies. In the absence of any contrary, intention, by no strength of imagination can it be sa id that Ex. A1 created only a contingent interest, and the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is understandable.” 6. Reiterating the principles of construction of documents, the Division Bench observed in the latter case that there cannot be a vacuum or interrugnum where there is a life estate followed by an absolute estate, because the residue must vest somewhere and what is deferred is only the possession of the properties in favour of the settlees and not the vesting of interest. According to learned counsel for the respondents, in the present case also, the interest is vested immediately and possession has also been given. Learned counsel submits that the recitals in the document which restrict the power of alienation of the settlees is repugnant to the grant of interest in the property and invalid as per the provisions of S. 10 of Transfer of property Act. 7. The relevant terms of the document in question are as follows: Tamil 8. The crucial circumstances referred to in the above recitals are that there is no other nearer heir than the settlees, and that, the settlees have been attending to the needs of the settlor and the settlor believed that they would continue to do so. Consequently, the settlor expected the settlees to maintain and protect the settlor without any difficulty. Thirdly, the property was handed over on the date of the document to the settlees. Fourthly, one of the settlees being a minor, the guardian of the minor shall take possession of the property and hand over the same on the minor attaining majority. Consequently, the settlor expected the settlees to maintain and protect the settlor without any difficulty. Thirdly, the property was handed over on the date of the document to the settlees. Fourthly, one of the settlees being a minor, the guardian of the minor shall take possession of the property and hand over the same on the minor attaining majority. Fifthly, there is an embargo an alienation by the settlees. Sixthly, the settlees are directed to discharge the debt due under Promissory note to Sri V.K. Ramakrishna Pillai. Seventhly, the settlees shall perform the obsequis of the settlor after his life time and enjoy the properties with absolute rights., just as the settlor was enjoying the same. 9. If the settlor did not intend to convey any interest in the property in praesenti to the settlees there was no necessity for the settlor to place an embargo on alienation. In fact there was no necessity to execute the settlement deed at all; the settlor could well have executed a power of attorney in order that the properties could be managed and they could be taken care of Reading all the recitals in the documents ‘there is no doubt that the settlor intended to confer an interest in the property on the settlees. If the contention of learned counsel for the appellant is accepted’ th ere is no recital at all conferring any interest in the properties on the settlees, even after the life time of the settlor. In other words, the recital, according to which the settlees are entitled to enjoy the properties absolutely after the life time of the settlor, does not state that the interest will pass on to the settlees on the death of the settlor. Hence, it cannot be said that it is a will under which the right in the property is bequeathed to the settlees. On the other hand, the nomenclature of the document and the recitals therein would show that the settlor parted with his interest once and for all in the property. It is not necessary for me to decide whether the prohibition of alienation by the settlees is valid or not. Suffice it to hold that the document is only a settlement deed and not a will and the interest in the property passed on to the settlees immediately on the execution of the document. It is not necessary for me to decide whether the prohibition of alienation by the settlees is valid or not. Suffice it to hold that the document is only a settlement deed and not a will and the interest in the property passed on to the settlees immediately on the execution of the document. There is no reservation of power to revoke the document if the settlor intended to execute a Will. He would have certainly included the recital expressly reserving the power of revocation. The tests laid down by the Division Bench in Rajammal v. Authiammal alias Authi Lakshmiammal and Ors I.L.R. 33 Mad 304are clearly satisfied in this case and applying those tests I have no doubt in holding that Ex. B3 is a settlement deed and not a will. 9. No other question has been argued before me and as I have held against the appellant, on the only question whether Ex. B3 is a settlement deed or a will, the second appeals have to fail and are hereby dismissed. But, there will be no order as to costs.