BHARUCHA, CJ. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal by the employer, the Karnalaka Electricity Board, against the order of the learned Single Judge quashing disciplinary proceedings against an employee. ( 2 ) THE employee joined the Karnataka Electricity Board (for short "the Board")in 1950 as a Store-Keeper. Consequent upon a preliminary enquiry, the Chief engineer, Electrical (General), who was the Disciplinary Authority in so far as the employee was concerned, initialed disciplinary proceedings against the employee in exercise of powers conferred by Rule 11 (2) of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, as adopted by the Board. By the same order, he conferred upon the Executive Engineer, Electrical, Master Plan division, Bangalore, of the Board, the authority to be the specially empowered authority to frame charges against the employee and to conduct the disciplinary enquiry. On 6th June, 1980 the specially empowered authority issued a charge-sheet to the employee. Briefly stated, the charge was that the employee had misused stores material, which amounted to its theft; he had unaulhoriscdly loaded a few coils of wires measuring about 400 metres and had misappropriated the same. A list of witnesses and documents was annexed to the charge-sheet. On 6th June, 1980 the employee submit ted his answer to the Enquiry Officer. The disciplinary enquiry was held. The Enquiry Officer made a report thereon which found the employee guilty of the charge levelled against him. On the basis of the report the Disciplinary authority passed an order reducing the respondent in rank and directing that his promotion should be withheld fora period of three years. An appeal was preferred, which was disposed of during the pendency of the writ petition. The appeal was dismissed. The writ petition was, thereupon, amended so that it challenged not only the disciplinary proceedings but also the order in appeal. ( 3 ) HAVING regard to the broad sweep of the order under appeal, it is necessary to refer to it at some length. The learned Single Judge noted that it was not disputed that there had been no preliminary notice anterior lo the appointment of the Enquiry officer. ( 3 ) HAVING regard to the broad sweep of the order under appeal, it is necessary to refer to it at some length. The learned Single Judge noted that it was not disputed that there had been no preliminary notice anterior lo the appointment of the Enquiry officer. As he put it, "the'recognised and accepted practice" before appointing an enquiry authority ''is to serve on the delinquent a notice containing allegations and, after receipt of reply, on application of mind, to come to a conclusion as to whether or not aprinia facie ease is made out against the delinquent and thereafter, if a ease was made out, lo proceed to serve a charge-sheet. . . . . "the appointment ol an enquiry officer followed thereafter. In the instant case, the Enquiry officer was appointed first. Later on a charge-sheet had been served. The disciplinary proceedings has been conducted on receipt of a reply thereto from the employee. Such a procedure was not known to law. Only after the disciplinary authority was convinced that there was a case for being enquired into that an enquiry officer should have been appointed, If this procedure was not followed, the presumption would be that the disciplinary authority took it for granted lhat there was a case made out against the employee and this would be attributable to a preconceived notion on the part of the disciplinary authority which would vitiate a fair trial. There was justification and scope for the employee to impute either bias or preconceived notion against the disciplinary authority because the disciplinary authority had straightaway proceeded to appoint an enquiry officer and subsequently issued the articles of charge. Though there was only a procedural violation, it was of such material consequence that the substantive right of the employee to a fair trial was affected. The learned Judge, was, therefore convinced that the entire proceedings were vitiated and the punishment inflicted did not stand legal scrutiny. ( 4 ) WE think it necessary, first, to deal with tlie general position in law, and that is set out in the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Employers of Firestone Tyre and rubber Co. (Private) Ltd. v The Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 236 . ( 4 ) WE think it necessary, first, to deal with tlie general position in law, and that is set out in the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Employers of Firestone Tyre and rubber Co. (Private) Ltd. v The Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 236 . It was contended by the appellant before the Supreme Court that the Tribunal had been wrong in holding that the domestic enquiry was not properly conducted because it was held immediately after a notice and without taking into account the explanation of the workman. The Supreme Court said that it was clear that, although it might be desirable to call for such an explanation before serving a charge-sheet, there was no principle which compelled such a course. The calling for an explanation could only be with a view to making an enquiry unnecessary where the explanation was good, but in many cases it would be open to the criticism Lhat the defence of the workman was being fished oul. If after a preliminary enquiry there was prima facie reason to think that the workman was at fault, a charge-sheet setting out the details of the allegations and the likely evidence could be issued without offending against the principle of justice and fair-play. ( 5 ) THIS Judgment, therefore, shows that what was done by the Board in the present case was not contrary to any principle of natural justice. ( 6 ) WE may at this stage also deal with the argument on behalf of the employee that it was not open to the Board to contend before us that no prejudice was caused to the employee by reason of the procedure it adopted. Reliance was placed in that behalf upon the Judgment reported in S. L. Kapoor v Jagmohan and Others, AIR 1981 SC 136 . The Supreme Court said in a memorable passage that the non-observance of natural justice was itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice was unnecessary. It will came from a person who had denied justice that the person who had been denied justice was not prejudiced. The Supreme Court said in a memorable passage that the non-observance of natural justice was itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice was unnecessary. It will came from a person who had denied justice that the person who had been denied justice was not prejudiced. Since we hold, on a consideration of the settled law, that the Board did not act in contravention of the principles of natural justice, we cannot preclude the board from contending before us that no prejudice was caused to the employee by reason of the procedure it adopted. ( 7 ) THE real argument on behalf of the employee is based upon Rule 11 of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, as adopted by the Board (now called "the Rules" ). Sub-rules 1 to 4 of Rule 11 may be reproduced:"11. Procedure for imposing major penalties. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of any law applicable to the Government servant, no order imposing on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (viii) of Rule 8 shall be passed except after an inquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner hereinafter provided. (2) The disciplinary authority or any authority specially empowered by it in this behalf (hereinafter in this Rule referred to as 'specially empowered authority') shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is proposed to be held. Such charges, together with a statement of the allegations on which they are based, shall be communicated in writing to the Government servant, and he shall be required to submit, within such time as may be specified by the disciplinary authority or any authority specially empowered by it in this behalf, a written statement of his defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person. (3) The Government servant shall, for the purpose of preparing his defence, be permitted to inspect and take extracts from such official records as he may specify, provided that such permission may be refused if, for reasons to be recorded in writing, in the opinion of the disciplinary authority or specially empowered authority such records are not relevant for the purpose or it is against the public interest to allow him access thereto. (4) On receipt of the written statement of defence or if no such statement is received within the time specified, the disciplinary authority or Specially empowered authority may inquire into such of the charges as are not admitted or, if the disciplinary authority considers it necessary so to do, it may appoint a Board of Inquiry or an Inquiring Officer for the purpose. " ( 8 ) THE argument is that sub-rule (4) requires the disciplinary authority or the authority specially empowered under sub-rule (2) to frame charges to enquire into such of the charges as are not admitted in the written statement of defence of the delinquent. The disciplinary authority is also empowered by sub-rule (4), if it thinks necessary so to do, to appoint a Board of Inquiry or an Inquiry Officer for the purpose of such enquiry. It is, therefore, submitted that the required procedure is that a charge-sheet should be issued to the delinquent; the delinquent's reply thereto within the time specified should be awaited; if such reply is received, it must be looked into; it must thereafter be decided by the disciplinary authority whether or not an enquiry is necessary; and, finally, the disciplinary authority must decide whether it will conduct the enquiry itself or appoint a Board of Inquiry or an Inquiring officer for the purpose. In the present case, inasmuch as the Inquiry Officer was appointed by the disciplinary authority even prior to the drawing up of the charge-sheet against the employee, the appointment of the Inquiry Officer was bad in law and, consequently, the inquiry conducted by him, the report submitted by him thereon and the disciplinary authority's conclusion of imposing the penalty upon the employee based on the report was vitiated. ( 9 ) HAVING regard to the clear terms of sub-rules 1 to 4 of Rule 11, we are unable to accept the argument on behalf of the Board that there was no deviation therefrom. There can be no doubt that sub-rule (4) requires the disciplinary authority to await, for the period specified therein, the written statement of defence of the delinquent to the charge-sheet already served upon him. If a written statement is received within that period, the disciplinary authority may enquire into such of the charges as are not admitted therein. There can be no doubt that sub-rule (4) requires the disciplinary authority to await, for the period specified therein, the written statement of defence of the delinquent to the charge-sheet already served upon him. If a written statement is received within that period, the disciplinary authority may enquire into such of the charges as are not admitted therein. This does imply that the disciplinary authority must look into the reply to the charge-sheet, if received in time. Thereafter the disciplinary authority may decide to hold the enquiry itself or through another agency such as a Board of Inquiry or an Inquiry Officer. In that the disciplinary authority proceeded to nominate an Inquiry Officer even prior to the framing of charges against the delinquent, the procedure set out in Rule 11 was infringed. ( 10 ) IT was submitted on behalf of the Board that, in any everii, no prejudice had been caused to the employee because he had denied the charge in his written statement of defence. Thereafter the Inquiry Officer had given him a full opportunity to substantiate his case in the inquiry proceedings. The employee had participated in the inquiry to the full extent. There was no allegation cither before Inquiry Officer or the appellate authority or this Court that there had been any infringement of the principles of natural justice in so far as inquiry was concerned. The fact that the charges had been framed subsequent to the appointment of Inquiry Officer did not, of itself, lead to the conclusion that the disciplinary authority had already made up its mind about the guilt of the employee. ( 11 ) ON behalf of the employee it was submitted that the appointment of the Inquiry Officer before the charge was framed and the written statement was received and considered rendered the inquiry proceedings infirm in law. ( 12 ) RELIANCE was placed upon the Judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in M. K. Nagaraja v State of Karntaka, ILR 1979 (1) Karnataka page 564. The learned Judge was dealing with the identical Rule 11 and he held that the appointment of an Inquiry Officer before the framing of the charges was in contravention of sub-rule (5) of Rule 11. This is indisputable. The learned Judge was dealing with the identical Rule 11 and he held that the appointment of an Inquiry Officer before the framing of the charges was in contravention of sub-rule (5) of Rule 11. This is indisputable. It was not, however, contended before the learned Judge that no prejudice had been caused to the delinquent in that case, as, indeed, it could not have been, because there were also other complaints. ( 13 ) WE have no doubt that had the breach of the provisions of Rule 11 led to any prejudice to the employee, the disciplinary inquiry and all proceedings consequent thereon would have had to be quashed. But. in the circumstances of this case, we feel that no prejudice whatsoever has been caused by reason of the breach. In his written statement the employee denied the charge that was levelled against him. Even if the Inquiry Officer had not been appointed at that point of time, an inquiry would, therefore, have been called for and it was open to the disciplinary authority to delegate to an Inquiry Officer the power of holding such inquiry. The inquiry was held. The employee participated therein. He raised no objection thereto. There is no averment before us that there was any breach of the principles of natural justice during the course of the inquiry or that the employee was not afforded the fullest opportunity to defend himself. Having regard to the specific facts of this case, we are of the view that the breach of the rule was np more than a technicality, that caused no prejudice to the employee. ( 14 ) IT was submitted that the employee had pleaded in the writ petition that the Inquiry Officer was biased and that the learned Single Judge had not considered this plea, having regard to his conclusions in regard to the breach of Rule 11. ( 15 ) WE have carefully examined the writ petition and we find no averment inregard to bias. That was not even the case before the Inquiry Officer or in appeal. ( 16 ) THE last argument that was advanced on behalf of the employee was that the punishment that was imposed upon him was harsh and disproportionate to the offence. We have referred to the charge, the findings and the punishment. That was not even the case before the Inquiry Officer or in appeal. ( 16 ) THE last argument that was advanced on behalf of the employee was that the punishment that was imposed upon him was harsh and disproportionate to the offence. We have referred to the charge, the findings and the punishment. We do not think that it can be held that the punishment is harsh or disproportionate to the offence. ( 17 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed. The Judgment and order under appealare set aside. The writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs throughout. --- *** --- .