Judgment :- Mishra, J.: A question as to whether Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property unconstitutional has been brought before this Court under Sec.113 of the C.P.G since perceived as a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. 2. The Tamil Nadu Handloom, Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd., represented by Marketing Officer, has instituted the suit for the reliefs inter alia to direct the defendant deliver vacant possession of the suit property to it and to pay a sum of Rs.9,000 damages for use and occupation of the suit property from the date of plaint till delivery possession. In the suit, Messrs. Glamour Saree Museum, the defendant is described partnership firm carrying on business at 843, Mount Road, Madras-2. The plaintiff claimed that it is the owner of the suit property and the defendant was a tenant of the plaintiff in respect of the northern portion of the ground floor of the said premises on a monthly rent of Rs.200, the tenancy being calculated according to English calendar. The plaintiff terminated the tenancy of the defendant lawyer’s notice dated 13.11.1977 sent by registered post with acknowledgment due as by certificate of posting and called upon the defendant to quit and deliver vacant possession of the demised premises on 1.12.1977. The defendant received the notice 14.11.1977 and by reply dated 22.11.1977 refused to comply with the notice to quit. Hence the suit. It is also alleged in the plaint that the suit property is exempt from the provisions the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (Act 18 of 1960 as amended by 23 of 1973) by notification No.II(2) H.O.No.6060 of 1976 published in Part II, Sec.2 of Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 21.11.1976. 3. Hence the suit. It is also alleged in the plaint that the suit property is exempt from the provisions the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (Act 18 of 1960 as amended by 23 of 1973) by notification No.II(2) H.O.No.6060 of 1976 published in Part II, Sec.2 of Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 21.11.1976. 3. The defendant in its first written statement has pleaded only that there has not been valid termination of tenancy and that the plaintiff did not come within the exemption notification issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu exemption buildings owned by operative Societies from the operation of the Act, and that the exemption notification illegal, ultra vires of the powers of the Government and, therefore, no right could be derived under the said notification by the plaintiff besides saying that damages claimed excessive and exorbitant, but in the additional written statement raised some more disputes including, "The defendants further respectfully submit that provisions of Sec.106 of the Transfer Property Act offend the equal protection guaranteed under Art.14 of the Constitution of and therefore the notice given to the defendants the suit filed on the basis of such given under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act is unsustainable." 4. Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act, which falls in Chapter V thereof, which contains provisions with respect to leases of immovable properties, says, "In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, shall be deemed to be a lease from to year, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months ’ notice expiring the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either or lessee, by fifteen days ’ notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. notice under this section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered delivered personally to such party, or to one of his family or servants at his residence, such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicious part of the property." 5. This provision thus has recognized that the lease would be from year to year or month according to the nature of the property and would be terminable by six months fifteen days’ notice as the case may be subject to a contract or local law or usage contrary. The two types of properties recognised to be a lease from year to year terminable on the part of the lessor or lessee by six months’ notice are properties leased for agricultural or manufacturing purposes. The rest are recognised by it as a month to month terminable on the part of the lessor or lessee by fifteen days notice expiring with the a month of the tenancy. After so recognising the leased property with reference purposes, it provides that in every case wherein a tenancy is from year to year or from month to month, the tenant or the lessee would continue to enjoy his rights notice to quit is given to him by the lessor and the tenancy is terminated on expiration notice with the end of a month of the tenancy. This pre-constitutional law, which has the field uninterrupted and without suffering the eclipse on account of the constitutional provisions, however, has been challenged solely on the ground that by recognising the of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purpose, it has made unreasonable classification and thus caused hostile discrimination. 6. Before, however we go further into the question, a glance of some other provisions Chapter V of the Act, we think, will be beneficial. Sec.107 says, "A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument oral agreement’ accompanied by delivery of possession. Sec.107 says, "A lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument oral agreement’ accompanied by delivery of possession. Where a lease of immovable property is made by a registered instrument such instruments or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed both the lessor and the lessee: Provided that the State Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Gazette, direct that leases of immovable property, other than leases from year to year, for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession." Sec.108 describes in some details the right and liabilities of the lessor as well as the and liabilities of the lessee, which accrue in the absence of a contract or local law or usage the contrary. Sec. 109 preserves the right of the lessor to transfer the property leased part there of or any part of his interest therein but subject to the conditions as to the of the lessee. Sec.110 provides for computation of the period of lease in the absence of express agreement to the contrary and the option to determine lease only to the where the time so limited is expressed to be terminable before expiration and the omitted to mention at whose option it was so terminable. Sec.111 provides how a lease determined. It states, "A lease of immovable property determines (a) by efflux of the time limited thereby. (b) where such time is limited conditionally on the happening of some event happening of such event. (c) where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on, or his power to dispose the same extends only to, the happening of any event-by the happening of such event. (d) in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right (e) by express surrender, that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his interest under lease, to the lessor by mutual agreement between them. (f) by implied surrender. (d) in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right (e) by express surrender, that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his interest under lease, to the lessor by mutual agreement between them. (f) by implied surrender. (g) by forfeiture: that is to say, - (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition provides that, on breach thereof, the lessor may re-enter, or (2) in case the renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title himself; or (3) lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor re-enter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease. (h) on the expiration of a notice to determine the lease, or to quit, or of intention to quit, property leased, duly given by only party to the other." 7. The other provisions deal with the exceptions carved out of the determination of a under Sec.111 above and other allied matters. One noticeable provision, however, Sec.117 of the Act which says, "None of the provisions of this Chapter apply to leases for agricultural purposes, except far as the State Government may, by notification, published in the official Gazette, declare all or any of such provisions to be so applicable in the case of all or any of such together with, or subject to, those of the local law, if any, for the time being in force. notification shall not take effect until the expiry of six months from the date publication." 8. notification shall not take effect until the expiry of six months from the date publication." 8. It can thus be seen that Sec. 106 for the purposes of notice and the duration of the absence of written contract or local law or usage has recognised a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes falling in one class or category and of immovable property for any other purpose in another class or category, but Sec.117 made a further classification and left enforcement of the provisions of Chapter V of the the lease for agricultural purpose at the discretion of the State Government and subject such notification published in the official gazette containing the declaration of the Government about the application of all or any of the provisions in that chapter in the all or any of such leases, together with, or subject to, those of the local law, if any, time being in force. These provisions of the Act have often times fallen under judicial and courts including the Supreme Court have not noticed anything discriminatory or unreasonable so as Art.14 of the Constitution. Although there has, it appears, been no direct examination issue in any such case, one of the earliest judgments of the Supreme Court in the Ram Kumar v. Jagdish Chandra, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 23:1952 S.C.J. 813:1952 S. examined the question as to the nature of tenancy created by acceptance of rent, was a tenancy from month to month or from year to year. After quoting Sec.106 of the Supreme Court said, “The section lays down a rule of construction which is to be applied when there is agreed upon between the parties. In such cases the duration has to be determined reference to the object or purpose for which the tenancy is created. The rule of construction embodied in this section applies not only to express leases of uncertain duration but leases implied by law which may be inferred from possession and acceptance of other circumstances. It is conceded that in the case before us the tenancy was manufacturing or agricultural purposes. The object was to enable the lessee structures upon the land. In these circumstances, it could be regarded as a tenancy month to month, unless there was a contract to the contrary. It is conceded that in the case before us the tenancy was manufacturing or agricultural purposes. The object was to enable the lessee structures upon the land. In these circumstances, it could be regarded as a tenancy month to month, unless there was a contract to the contrary. The question now is, there was a contract to the contrary in the present case?......It is not disputed contract to the contrary, as contemplated by Sec.106,T.P.Act, need not be an contract; it may be implied, but it certainly should be a valid contract. If it is no law, the section will be operative and regulate the duration of the lease. It has no doubt recognised in several cases that the mode in which a rent is expressed to be payable a presumption that the tenancy is of a character corresponding thereto. Consequently, the rent reserved is an annual rent, the presumption would arise that the tenancy annual tenancy unless there is something to Tebut the presumption. But the difficulty applying this rule to the present cases arises from the fact that a tenancy from year or reserving a yearly rent can be made only be registered instrument, as laid Sec.107, T.P.Act. The Kabuliyat in the case before us is undoubtedly a registered but exconcesis it is not an operative document at all and cannot consequently requirements of Sec.107, T.P.Act.” 9. From this it can be seen that Sec.106 of the Act has taken the object or purpose for the tenancy is created as the basis of the classification for the differential treatment manufacturing and agricultural leases from the leases for other purposes. In fact, Chapter contains provisions treating the object or purpose for which the tenancy is created basis for laying down conditions and procedures to be followed in the case of a immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing or other purposes. 10. The statement of law in Keshava Madhava Menon’s case, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 128, “all laws, existing or future which are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III Constitution are, by the express provision of Art.13, rendered void to the extent consistency. ” has without any reservation been recognised and reiterated by the Supreme Court time whenever occasion has arisen to consider this aspect. ” has without any reservation been recognised and reiterated by the Supreme Court time whenever occasion has arisen to consider this aspect. A Constitution Bench Supreme Court in the Case of State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974)2 S.C.J. (1974)4 S.C.C. 656 , has said, “It is a wise tradition with Courts that they will not adjudge on the constitutionality statute except when they are called upon to do so when legal rights of the litigants actual controversy and as part of this rule is the prinr ciple that one to whom the application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application be unconstitutional. ” The Supreme Court has approved an observation in the case of United States v. (1960)362 U.S. 17, “A person ordinarily is precluded from challenging the constitutionality of governmental action by invoking the rights of others and it is not sufficient that the statute administrative regulation is unconstitutional as to other persons or classes of persons; must affirmatively appear that the person attacking the statute comes within the persons affected by it.” 11. What has the defendant asked? It says that Sec.106 of the Act is unconstitutional. If it is so declared, the very requirement of notice terminate the tenancy will cease to exist in the statute. It cannot argue that if its lease not for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, in its case also six months notice should the law. For that, a legislation will be needed. The court cannot usurp the functions of Legislature except in cases where for making a provision workable, legislative words require a different meaning. The Court cannot hold as indicated in the case of State of Gujarat Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974)2 S.C.J. 211: (1974)4 S.C.C. 656 , that since the rule of month notice is applied to agricultural and manufacturing leases, the same should be applied to all other kinds of leases. 12. The Court cannot hold as indicated in the case of State of Gujarat Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974)2 S.C.J. 211: (1974)4 S.C.C. 656 , that since the rule of month notice is applied to agricultural and manufacturing leases, the same should be applied to all other kinds of leases. 12. Since the topic of Transfer of Property Act other than agricultural land is covered Entry 6 of List HI in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution that is to say the Concurrent List, many State Rent Control Acts by necessary implication and many of them by a specific provision done away with one or the other provisions in Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act. A learned single Judge of this Court in the case of K.Sukumaran Nair etc., S.Neelakantan Nair by Constituted Attorney P.Raman Nair etc etc., A.I.R. 1976 Mad. (1976)2 M.L.J. 84 , has taken the view that no -notice to quit was necessary under Sec.106 the Act in order to enable the landlord to get an order of eviction against the tenant the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control), Act, 1960. 13. In V.Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yasodai Ammal, (1979)2 All India Rent Control Journal Seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court while affirming the said judgment of this took notice of the difference of opinion on account of the difference in the phraseology different State Acts and some difference of opinion expressed in the judgments of Supreme Court accordingly. The Court quoted clause (h) of Sec.111 of the Act stating "It is this clause which brings into operation the requirement of Sec.106 of the Transfer Property Act" and observed-"Without adverting to the effect and the details of waiver forfeiture, waiver of notice to quit, relief against forfeiture for non-pay- ment of rent, etc., provided for in Secs.112 to 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, suffice it to say that the said Act no ground of eviction of a tenant has to be made out once a contractual tenancy is put to an end by service of a valid notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Until and unless the lease is determined, the lessee is entitled to continue in possession. Once it is determined it becomes open to the lessor to enforce his right of recovery possession of the property against him. Once it is determined it becomes open to the lessor to enforce his right of recovery possession of the property against him. In such a situation it was plain and clear that lease of the immovable property did not stand determined under any of the clauses (a) of Sec.111, a notice to determine it under Sec.106 was necessary. But when under various State Rent Acts, either in one language or the other, it has been provided tenant can be evicted on the grounds mentioned in certain section of the said Acts, then does the questions of determination of a tenancy by notice arise? If the State Rent requires the giving of a particular type of notice in order to get a particular kind of such a notice will have to be given. Or, it may be, that a landlord will be well advised by of abundant precaution and in order to land additional support to his case, to give a notice his tenant intimating that he intended to file a suit against him for his eviction on the ground mentioned in the notice. But that is not to say that such a notice is compulsory or obligatory or that it must fulfil all the technical requirements of Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Once the liability to be evicted is incurred by the tenant, he cannot turn round and say the contractual lease has not been determined. The action of the landlord in instituting for eviction on the ground mentioned in any State Rent Act will be tantamount expression of his intention that he does not want the tenant to continue as his lessee and jural relationship of lessor and lessee will come to an end on the passing of an order decree for eviction. Until then, under the extended definition of word ‘tenant’ various State Rent Act, the tenant continues to be a tenant even though the contractual tenancy has been determined by giving of a valid notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer Property Act. In many cases the distinction between a contractual tenant and a statutory tenant was alluded to for the purpose of elucidating some particular aspects which cropped up in a particular case. That led criticism of that expression in some of the decisions. In many cases the distinction between a contractual tenant and a statutory tenant was alluded to for the purpose of elucidating some particular aspects which cropped up in a particular case. That led criticism of that expression in some of the decisions. Without detaining ourselves on aspects of the matter by any elaborate discussion, in our opinion, it will suffice to say the various State Rent Control Acts made a serious encroachment in the field of freedom contract. It does not permit the landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely his act of serving a notice to quit on him. Inspite of the notice, the law says that he continues to be a tenant and he does so enjoying all the rights of a lessee and is at the same denied to be under all the liabilities such as payment of rent etc in accordance with the After a detailed discussion in the judgment of the provisions of the various State laws, Court’s final observation is in these words. "If we were to agree with the view that determination of lease in accordance with Transfer of Property Act is a condition precedent to the starting of a proceeding under State Rent Act for eviction of the tenant, we could have said so with respect that the expressed in the above passage is quite correct because there was no question determination of the lease again once it was determined by efflux of time. But on the assumption we have taken a different view of the matter and have come to the conclusion that determination of a lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and a more surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even such determination. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. That being so, out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue notice in accordance with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act." 14. The tenant continues to be so even thereafter. That being so, out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue notice in accordance with section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act." 14. We may state that the law in Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act particularly Sec.106 thereof, which creates an obligation of a notice to quit is a piece of legislation entering into a contract between the lessor and the lessee and under Clause (h) of Sec.111 of the Act, the lessor cannot institute a suit for eviction without terminating the tenancy without following the technicalities in and for the notice. 15. Courts ordinarily do not go into the motive behind the legislation. It is a exclusively for the Legislatures to decide whether for the reasons they have in their particular class of people should be subjected to a particular law or not. Such classification may be based on the difference in the nature of the persons, trade, calling or occupation. There may be some degree of hostility on account of the peculiar nature of the trade calling or the transactions that are subjected to a classification. Indeed, every classification shall have some degree of hostility or bias for or against a certain section of the society the overall effect of the law that will determine whether certain classification is unreasonable and hit by Art.14 of the Constitution. In order to find out whether there has been inequality so as to strike off a certain piece of legislation, the test to be applied is not degree of inequality but the reality of it. Thus the presumption is always in favour constitutionality of an enactment since it must be assumed that the Legislatures understand and correctly appreciate the needs of its own people. It will be for those who challenge rebut the presumption. They can do so undoubtedly by reference to the contents of the itself and also by intrinsic evidence. 16. Thus the presumption is always in favour constitutionality of an enactment since it must be assumed that the Legislatures understand and correctly appreciate the needs of its own people. It will be for those who challenge rebut the presumption. They can do so undoubtedly by reference to the contents of the itself and also by intrinsic evidence. 16. In order to support the contention that there is sufficient intrinsic evidence that classification giving to the agricultural and manufacturing leases a longer period of notice unreasonable learned counsel for the defendant, has taken us through some of judgments of the Supreme Court including one in Motor General Traders v. State of A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 121: (1984)1 S.C.C. 222 . Before however we refer to this judgment, may refer to the principles governing a valid classification which are available in an judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Krishna-dalmia v. Justice S.R.Tendolkar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538. Before however we refer to this judgment, may refer to the principles governing a valid classification which are available in an judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Krishna-dalmia v. Justice S.R.Tendolkar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538. The Supreme Court has said, (a) that a law may be constitutional even though it related to a single individual account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable other, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; (d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its to those case where the need is deemed to be the clearest; (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the legislation; and (f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. 17. We may profitably refer to the case of Bhaiyalal Shukla v. State of M.P. A.I.R. 981. 17. We may profitably refer to the case of Bhaiyalal Shukla v. State of M.P. A.I.R. 981. That was a case in which one of the contentions of sales tax in the area formerly known as Vindhya Pradesh (a Part "C" State) on building materials used in contract was discriminatory after the merger of that area in the new State of Pradesh which was formed on November 1, 1956 under the States Reorganisation as the sale of building materials in a works contract was not subjects to any levy of in another part of the same new State namely the area which was formerly part of known as State of Madhya Pradesh (The Central Provinces and Berar area). The Court rejected the said contention stating, "The laws in different portions of the State of Madhya Pradesh were enacted by Legislatures, and under Sec.119 of the States Reorganisation Act, all laws in force continue until repealed or altered by the appropriate Legislature. We have already the sales tax law in Vindhya Pradesh was validly enacted, and it brought its validity under Sec.119 of the State Reorganisation Act, when it became a part of the State of Pradesh. Thereafter, the different laws in different parts of Madhya Pradesh can be sustained on the ground that the differentiation arises from historical reasons, and a geographical classification based on historical reasons has been upheld by this Court in M.K.Prithi v.State of Rajasthan, C.A.No.327 of 1956, dated on November 2, 1960, and again in State of M.P. v. Gwalior Sugar Co., Ltd., C.A.Nos.98 and 99 of 1957, decided on November 30. 1960 S.C. The latter case is important, because the sugarcanecess levied in the former Gwalior State but not in the rest of Madhya Bharat of which it formed a part, was challenged on the same ground as here, but was upheld as not affected by Art.14. 1960 S.C. The latter case is important, because the sugarcanecess levied in the former Gwalior State but not in the rest of Madhya Bharat of which it formed a part, was challenged on the same ground as here, but was upheld as not affected by Art.14. We, therefore, reject this argument." 18.The Supreme Court expressed a similar view in the case of The State of M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., A.I.R 1964 S.C. 1179, in these words: "Continuance of the laws of the old region after the reorganisation by Sec.119 of the States Reorganisation Act, was by itself not discriminatory even though it resulted in differential treatment of persons, objects and transactions in the new State, because it-was intended serve a dual purpose facilitating the early formation of homogeneous units in the larger interest of the Union, and maintaining even while merging its political identity in the unit, the distinctive chapter of each region, till uniformity of laws was secured in those branches in which it was expedient after full enquiry to do so.......It would be impossible lay down any definite time-limit within which the State had to make necessary adjustments so as to effectuate the equality clause of the Constitution. That initially there was a geographical classification of regions in the same State justifying unequal laws when State was formed must be accepted. But whether the continuance of unequal laws by sustained the plea of unlawful discrimination in view of changed circumstances could only be ascertained after a full and thorough enquiry into continuance of the grounds on which the inequality could rationally be founded, and change of circumstances, if any, which obliterated the compulsion of expediency necessity existing at the time when the Reorganisation Act was enacted." 19. We have seen already that the notice rule engrafted in Sec. 116 of the Act has serving the tenants by providing to them a shield against arbitrary eviction and providing them an opportunity to adjust themselves to the ultimate eviction, Nothing has been to our notice to think that continuance of this rule after the Constitution or in view changed circumstances, is not based on any rationale. 20. We have already indicated that if Sec.106 of the Act is declared void, it shall against the interest of the tenants. 20. We have already indicated that if Sec.106 of the Act is declared void, it shall against the interest of the tenants. It is not a type of legislation which can be divided two parts so that one part which protects the tenants with a rule of fifteen days notice sustained and the other part in which agricultural and manufacturing leaseholders are a longer period of notice is quashed or declared void: 21. In R.D.M.Chamarbuagwalla v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 628, it has been out that, (1) In determining whether the valid parts of a statute are separable from the invalid thereof, it is the intention of the Legislature that is the determining factor. The test applied is whether the Legislature would have enacted the valid part if it had known rest of the statute was invalid. (2) If the valid and invalid provisions are so inextricably mixed up that they cannot separated from one another, then the invalidity of a portion must result in the invalidity the Act in its entirety. On the other hand, if they are so distinct and separate striking out what is invalid, what remains is in itself a complete code independent of then it will be upheld notwithstanding that the rest had become unenforceable. (3) Even when the provisions which are valid are distinct and separate from those invalid, if they all form part of a single scheme which is intended to be operative as then also the invalidity of a part will result in the failure of the whole. (4) Likewise, when the valid and invalid parts of a statute are independent and do part of a scheme but what is left after omitting the invalid portion is so thin and truncated to be in substance different from what it was when it emerged out of the legislature, also - it will be rejected in its entirety. (5) The separability of the valid and invalid provisions of a statute does not depend whether the law is enacted in the same section or different section; it is not the form, substance of the matter that is material, and that has to be ascertained on an examination the Act as a whole and of the setting of the relevant provisions therein. (6) If after the invalid portion is expunged from the statute what remains cannot be without making alterations and modifications therein, then the whole of it must be down as void as otherwise it will amount to judicial legislation. (7) In determining the legislative intent on the question of separability, it will be legitimate take into account the history of the legislation, its object, the title and the preamble. 22. The legislative intent in providing for longer period of notice in the case of agricultural lease as well as manufacturing lease is not beyond comprehension. Manufacturing, essentially is trading, is a kind of operation which cannot be easily shifted from one another and evidently a longer duration will be necessary for the manufacturer to another suitable accommodation. Agricultural operations are generally seasonal; durations which vary depending upon the type of crop grown in the land. For the obvious geographical and historical reasons, agricultural tenancies are protected by different tenancy regulations of the States. The two purposes specially chosen for a longer period thus constitute a reasonable basis of classification and a special legislation for such only leaving other purposes as a separate class. The case of Motor General Traders of A.P. A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 121: (1984)1 S.C.C. 222 , cited at the Bar relating to a classification as a temporary measure was found based on an intelligible differentia, to be unreasonable for long continuance thereof. The Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, and Eviction) Control Act, covered all types of leases and prescribed how tenants could be evicted, but in Sec.32, it said, “Act not to apply to certain buildings: The provisions of this Act shall not apply: (a) to any building owned by the Government; (b) to any building constructed on and after August 26, 1957. ” When the constitutional validity of Sec.32(b) was raised before the Andhra Pradesh Court in the case of Chintapalli Achaiah v. P.Gopalakrishna Reddy, A.I.R. 1966 A.P. 51, court observed, “ The policy of the Act can be found out, as discussed above, from all permissible intrinsic extrinsic sources. Thus examined, the policy underlying Sec.32 is to provide an incentive private efforts to construct new buildings. The Act read as a whole therefore balances policy underlying the main Act and the policy underlying Sec.32. Thus examined, the policy underlying Sec.32 is to provide an incentive private efforts to construct new buildings. The Act read as a whole therefore balances policy underlying the main Act and the policy underlying Sec.32. This purpose cannot be to be in any manner derogatory to the main purpose of the Act; in fact it supplements true that the tenants of the new buildings would suffer, from the same hardship in order redress which the measure was enacted. The Legislature in it wisdom and perhaps justification thought that this hardship to the tenant will be shortlived and compared necessity of bringing into existence more and more new houses, for which purpose concession is shown has necessarily to be tolerated for a short while in the interests entire body of tenants as the new buildings are bound to bring down not only the hardships from which the new tenants would thus suffer but solve the larger problem of residential accommodation thus giving relief in all respects to the entire body of the tenants. It this purpose that it is now-well-settled that the Legislature can recognise degrees without being arbitrary, unreasonable or in conflict with Art.14 of the Constitution. ” When the exemption had continued to remain in force i.e., for more than a quarter century, once again this provision was challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court said, “This is a case where the Legislature while passing the law had given the exemption apparently as an incentive to encourage building activity. The long period that has elapsed after the passing of the Act itself serves as a crucial factor in deciding the question whether the impugned law has become discriminatory or not because the ground on which classification of buildings into two categories is made is not a historical or geographical but is an economic one. Exemption was granted by way of an incentive to encourage building activity and in the circumstances such exemption cannot be allowed to last for ever. The case of Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 121: (1984)1 222, it is obvious from the facts, is distinguishable from the case on hand. 23. Exemption was granted by way of an incentive to encourage building activity and in the circumstances such exemption cannot be allowed to last for ever. The case of Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 121: (1984)1 222, it is obvious from the facts, is distinguishable from the case on hand. 23. The purposes for which manufacturing lease and agricultural lease have been treated a separate clause are based on a firm foundation of the nature of the activities historically recognised as activities of distinct significance for people involved in them as well as for people at large. There can be no equation available in the duration or the time as such any aggravation or enhancement of the degree of hostility, if at all any such hostility in the classification of the two types of leases, namely, agricultural and manufacturing longer period of notice. 24. The Supreme Court In the case of Rattan Arya v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1986 395, held that Sec.30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 violative of Art.14 of the Constitution for, that intended to make a distinction between tenant of a residential building and a tenant of a non-residential building on the basis of rent paid by the respective tenants. The Supreme Court after examining the law on subject said that there was no justification at all for picking, out the class of tenants residential building paying a rent of more than Rs.400 per mensem to deny them the rights conferred generally on all tenants of buildings, residential or non-residential by the Act. 25. We thus find that it is not possible to say that Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act ultra vires Art.14 of the Constitution read with Art.13 thereof. It has always been a valid piece of legislation and shall so continue until amended, repealed or otherwise obliterated an act of competent Legislature. The reference is answered accordingly. Reference answered.