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1991 DIGILAW 62 (ALL)

Ram Piyari v. Board Of Revenue, U. P. At Allahabad

1991-01-10

B.L.YADAV

body1991
JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav 1. By the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the prayer is that the impugned order dated 17-10-90 passed by the Board of Revenue Summarily dismissing the second appeal, and the judgment dated 31-8-90 passed by the Additionul Commissioner (Judicial) Jhansi Division, Jhansi, in appeal in a suit filed by respondent no. 3 Visheshwar under section 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1950 (for short the Act) are sought to be quashed. 2. The facts are that respondent no. 3 was a member of Scheduled Caste and he filed a suit for declaration of bhumidhari rights under section 229-B of the Act against the petitioners, the Gaon Sabha and the State of U. P. with the allegations that over plot no. 303 he was in possession for the last five years prior to 30-6-75 (Before June 30, 1975) as provided under section 122-B (4-F) of the Act, and also he has obtained a lease from the Gaon Sabha, but he was sought to be ejected by the Gaon Sabha and also by the Petitioners on the basis that the petitioners have obtained some lease deed which was unauthorised. Consequently a declaration may be made in his favour in respect of bhumidhari rights, and that he was just having 1.33 acres of Land in all including the land in dispute. Consequently he was entitled to the benefit of sub-section (4-F) of section 122-B of the Act. The suit was contested by the petitioners alleging that they have obtained lease deed and that the suit was liable to be dismissed as the plaintiffs have no right or title. The trial court by its judgment dated 11-8-89 dismissed the suit (Annexure 1), where as appeal of respondent no. 2 was allowed by the judgment dated 31-8-90 and the second appeal of petitioners was dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 17-8-90. Against these judgments the present petition has been filed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that in a suit under section 229-B of the Act no declaration can be granted nor the lease deed in favour of petitioners could be cancelled. For that purpose the appropriate forum was under section 198 (4) of the Act. 4. Against these judgments the present petition has been filed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that in a suit under section 229-B of the Act no declaration can be granted nor the lease deed in favour of petitioners could be cancelled. For that purpose the appropriate forum was under section 198 (4) of the Act. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner I am of the view that there was no question of cancellation of the lease deed in favour of petitioner involved in the present case, rather respondent no. 3 was seeking benefit of statutory rights created by sub-section (4-F) of section 122-B of the Act. In case these conditions are fulfilled as laid down under sub- section (4-F) of section 122-B that the tenure holder happens to be an agricultural landless labourer belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes and was in possession over the land prior to 30-6-1975 (June 30, 1975) and in case the land in occupation together with his earlier land, if any, must not exceed an area of 3.125 acres, then the suit has to be decreed and the person in possession since prior to 30-6-85 would acquire bhumidhari rights and he can not be ejected. Sub-section (4-F) of section 122-B has been added by the legislature by U. P. Act no. 35 of 1976, in its wisdom to materialize the goal of social justice as contemplated by the framer of our sacred Constitution as contained in its preamble on these words : "We the people of India having solemnly resolved to Constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic and to secure to all its citizens Justice, social, economic and political". 5. In this way it is evident that social justice is the cherished goal of our Constitution. In Keshevanand v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 , the majority of the Full Bench held that the objectives (including social justice) as specified in the preamble contain the basic structure of our Constitution which cannot be amended in the exercise of the power under Article 398 of the Constitution. 6. In Keshevanand v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 , the majority of the Full Bench held that the objectives (including social justice) as specified in the preamble contain the basic structure of our Constitution which cannot be amended in the exercise of the power under Article 398 of the Constitution. 6. Ex abundanti cautela the statutory provisions of sub-section (4-F) of section 122-B, so far as it is relevant, is set out below : "(4-F) Not with standing anything in the fore going sub-sections, where any agricultural labourer belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is in occupation of any land vested in a Gaon Sabha under section 117 (not being land mentioned in section 132) having occupied it from before June 30, 1975 and the land so occupied together with land, if any, held by him from before the said date as bhumidhar sirdar, asami does not exceed 1.26 hectare (3.125 acres) then no action under this section shall be taken by the Land Management Commiteee or the Collector against such labourer, and shall be deemed that he has been admitted as sirdar of that land under section 195." This sub-section (4-F) in my opinion, reflects the policy of the legislature to achieve social justice, hence it must receive its full force and effect. This is a piece of beneficient legislation. In other words, it is a remedial section intended specially to benefit a class of persons of this country entitled in view of the legislature, to exceptional consideration: To be more precise the duty of a judge is to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the object and add force and life to the remedy according to the true intention of the makers of the Act 'pro bono publico.' (See Heydon's case, (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 75). This sub-section (4-F) is a beneficial legislation, hence it has not to be interpreted in a restricted sense, rather perspective of approach must be generous. In such matters approach should be in favour of a coustruction which can further the object of the legislature. Rep. 75). This sub-section (4-F) is a beneficial legislation, hence it has not to be interpreted in a restricted sense, rather perspective of approach must be generous. In such matters approach should be in favour of a coustruction which can further the object of the legislature. In case the object of a legislation is to benefit a particular class of persons (i.e. agricultural labourers belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes) even if the provision is ambiguous so as to be capable of two meanings, one which would preserve the benefit and the other which takes it away, the meaning which preserves it has to be adopted. See Mahadev Lal Kanodia v. Administrator General, AIR 1960 SC 936 . 7. In Brown v. Brash and Ambross, (1967) 1 QB 42, it was held held that the approach to a statute of predomenant social nature has to be made in that light. The judges must take a broad view of the background and policy of the Statute in question. 8. In Dyson Holdings Case, (1975) 3 All ER 1030 page 1036, it was held as follows : "If the language can change its meaning to accord with changing soction attitudes, then a decision on the meaning of a word in a statute before such a change should not continue to bind there after. In Otheyeth Lakshine Amma v. Nellachinkuni Yil Govindan Naiyer JT (1990) 3, 230, it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as follows :" While interpreting a Benevolent provision, the dominant purpose of the statute, the intention or the legislature and the policy underlying has to be considered. The Court has to take special precaution while interpreting the social defence legislation with a view so that it suppresses the mischief aimed at by the legislation and advance the remedy. See Dinesh Chandra Jamna Das Gandhi v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1989 SC 1011 . 9. Sub-section (4-F) opens with non- obstante- clause and this indicates that it has overriding effect inspite of anything standing in the way. This means the effect has to be given inspite of any other provision to the contrary. This non- obstanted- clause if normally used in a provision is to indicate that the provision should prevail even though there might be anything to contrary in the provision mentioned. This means the effect has to be given inspite of any other provision to the contrary. This non- obstanted- clause if normally used in a provision is to indicate that the provision should prevail even though there might be anything to contrary in the provision mentioned. In case of any inconsistency, it is the non obstante clause which must prevail. (See South India Corporation v. Secretary Board of Revenue, AIR 1964 SC 207 ). 10. Taking all these precautions the legislature in its collective wisdom enacted sub-section (4-F) of section 122-B of the Act which is beneficient piece of legislation opening with non-obstante clause, hence it has to be liberally interpreted so that the benevolent and social purpose behind this enactment may be achieved. Applying this elementary rule of interpretation of the statutes, I am of the opinion that Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue have committed no error. In the present case it -has been held by the Addl. Commissioner that respondent no. 3 has acquired rights under sub-section (4-F) of section 122-B as he has fulfilled the conditions indicated there in. Consequently it cannot be assumed that the plaintiff respondent must bring a suit for cancellation of the lease deed infavour of petitioners. If, however, the lease was obtained by the petitioners in respect of the land so occupied by the plaintiffs respondent no. 3, Visheshwar, who was a landless agricultural labourer and who was a member of the Scheduled Caste, he (respondent no. 3) was entitled to the benefit envisaged by the legislature, that alleged lease deed becomes a non-est- factum and there was no necessity to file a suit for cancellation of that lease deed. 11. In view of the premises aforesaid, the present petition lacks merit and the same is dismissed summarily. Petition dismissed.