G. D. DUBE, J. This revision has been preferred against the judgment and order of Sessions Judge, Bijnor, who has allowed the revision filed by opposite-party No. 2 against the judgment and order of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Chandpur district Bijnor. The Sessions Judge has set aside the order of Sub-Divisional Magistrate and quashed the proceedings initiated by the learned Magistrate under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code ). The Sessions Judge has also directed that if the crop standing in the property in dispute had been sold in pursuance of the order of the learned Magistrate, then the sale proceeds be paid to the opposite party No. 2. 2. The applicant had moved an application on 28-3-1989 before the Magistrate for initiating proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. He had alleged in the petition that one Smt. Shakooran widow of Chhiddu was the owner of the property in dispute. She was real aunt of the applicant. She had executed a Will in favour of the applicant. The applicant had cultivated the land and a crop of wheat was standing. Since the opposite-parties had threatened on 27-3-1989 that they will cut the crop, the applicant had appre hension that there will be a breach of peace. It transpires that opposite-party Kaneeza filed an objection against the application. It was stated that in 1973 a litigation had taken place between the parties in revenue court in mutation proceedings in which the applicant had admitted the possession of opposite-party No. 2 It was also alleged that the applicant, taking the benefit of poor pecuniary condition of opposite-party No. 2, iiad initiated the proceedings. It was alleged that she -vas in possession and the applicant had no concern with the property. On these facts she had prayed for withdrawing the order dated 28-3-1989. 3. At this place, it would be worth mentioning that, after receipt of the application of the revisionist applicant, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had called for a report from the Station Officer concerned by 28-4-1989 and had also directed the police to maintain status quo in respect of the standing crop in the property in dispute. The Station Officer was also asked to inform the parties to appear on 18-4-1989. It transpires that on 12-4-1989 the parties were present. The Station Officer was also asked to inform the parties to appear on 18-4-1989. It transpires that on 12-4-1989 the parties were present. The learned Magistrate, after hearing the parties, came to the con clusion that there was an apprehension of breash of peace. Hence he directed that notice under Section 145 (1) of the Code ba issued and the crop standing on the land in dispute be attached under Section 145 (8) of the Code. As against this order, the aforesaid revision had been filed before the Sessions Judge. 4. It has been argued that the alleged mutation had taken place in 1973. The compromise was a forged document and the revisionist had not entered into any compromise. The revisional court had erred in entering into appreciation of evidence. The learned Magistrate had rightly come to the conclusion that there was an apprehension of breach of peace. It was the satisfaction of the Magistrate which was material. He could come to this conclusion even if the police had not sent its report in pursuance of the order of the learned Magistrate dated 28-3-1989. Learned counsel for the opposite-parties has urged that since mutation had taken place, then it amounted to a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 146 of the Code. The learned Magistrate should have droppsd the proceedings under Section 146 of the Code. The Sessions Judge had only corrected me mistakes committed by the Magistrate by its impugned order. In support of his contention, learned counsel for ths opposite-parties has relied upon Vinay Kumar v. Om Prakash, 1980 All Cri Reports 4 aad Ram Sumer Purl Mahant v. State of U. P. , 1983 All Crl Reports 108. 5. In the case of Vinay Kumar (supra), it was held that mutatioa court is a court oi competent jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 16 of the Code. It was held that a mutatioa court is fully competent to decide as to who is entitled to the possession of the property. Once this order has been passed, proceedings under Section 145 of the Cade should be set aside. The facts of this case are quite different. In this case, the recorded tenure-holder had sold the land in favour of the applicant by means of a sale- deed dated 27-6-1975. Ora Prakash the opposite-party had filed an application under Section 145, Cr. Once this order has been passed, proceedings under Section 145 of the Cade should be set aside. The facts of this case are quite different. In this case, the recorded tenure-holder had sold the land in favour of the applicant by means of a sale- deed dated 27-6-1975. Ora Prakash the opposite-party had filed an application under Section 145, Cr. P. C. alleging that there was reasonable apprehension of breach of peace regarding possession. A preliminary order was thereafter passed on 16-2-1976 attaching the land. After the execution of the sale-deed mentioned-above, mutation proceedings had started. On 3-2-1978 the Board of Revenue decided the matter in favour of applicant Vinay Kumar. Accordingly the names of the applicants were recorded over the plots in dispute in village records. On these facts, the observations were made. In this case, mutation is said to have taken place in 1973 whereas proceedings under Section 145 oi the Code were started in April, 1989. Hence any decision of mutation court about sixteen years before the start of the proceedings cannot amount to a decision of a competent court in 1989. The proceedings of mutation are summary in nature. They cannot amount to a decision by a court having competence to decide the right and title of the parties. The facts in the case of Vinay Kumar (supra) were entirely different. During the pendency of proceedings under Section 145 of the Code, the mutation court had decided the question of possession. Therefore, on this basis, the Magistrate could proceed under Section 146 oi the Code. The facts of the present case are quite different from the case of Vinay Kumar. The ratio of Vinay Kumars case cannot be applied to the present matter. 6. The case in Ram Sumer Puri Mahant (supra) is based on its own facts. There a civil litigation was pending for the property wherein the ques tion of possession was involved. It had been adjudicated and decided by the trial court. An appeal was preferred against the decree of the trial court. On these facts, the Supreme Court had observed that proceedings undei Section 145 of the Code could not be continued. 7. The above case laws do not support the contention of the opposite-parties that proceedings under Section 145 of the Code could not be initiated. An appeal was preferred against the decree of the trial court. On these facts, the Supreme Court had observed that proceedings undei Section 145 of the Code could not be continued. 7. The above case laws do not support the contention of the opposite-parties that proceedings under Section 145 of the Code could not be initiated. However, the question remains whether the learned Sessions Judge was justified in quashing the order of the learued Magistrate, drawing a preliminary order under Section 145 (i) of the Code and attaching the crop under Section 145 (8) of the Code. The learned Sessions Judge has given adequate reasons for his conclusion. The facts narrated above go to show that when the application had been moved on 28-3-1989, the learned Magistrate was not at all satisfied that there was any breach of ppace. He had called for a report from the police. Before the date fixed for submission of the report the learned Magis trate had passed the impugned order asking the parties to show cause under Section 145 (1) of the Code and attachment of the crop. The learned Sessions Judge could certainly not adjudicate about the satisftction of the learned Magistrate but there ought to have been some material before the learned Magistrate on the basis of which he could have come to the conclusion that there was an apprehension of breach of peace. The order dated 12-4-1989 of the learned Magistrate does not indicate that he had any material before him except the affidavit of the applicant for his satisfaction that there was appre hension of breach of peace. He had himself admitted that on similar application he called for report and the report of the police had not been received by the time of passing of the order dated 12-4-1989. Earlier he had not deemed the application and affidavit sufficient. The opposite-parties had clearly stated that in 1973 a litigation had taken place in which they were successful. The opposite-party alleged that since before 1973 she was in possession. In view of these facts and particularly that earlier the learned Magistrate had asked the police to submit his report the order of 12-4-1989 appears to have been passed in a hot haste. The learned Sessions Judge was fully justified in interfering with this order and quashing the proceedings. 8. In view of these facts and particularly that earlier the learned Magistrate had asked the police to submit his report the order of 12-4-1989 appears to have been passed in a hot haste. The learned Sessions Judge was fully justified in interfering with this order and quashing the proceedings. 8. The case of J. C. Chauhan and others v. Smt. Shakuntala Singh, 1990 U. P. CR. R. 62 is of no help to the revisionist. In this case it was observed that mutation proceeding will not preclude the Sub-Divisional Magistrate from taking proceeding in the case. It has been noticed above that there was no substantial material before the learned Magistrate to proceed under Section 145. The case law mentioned above is not applicable to the facts of this case. 9. No other point has been pressed. 10. The revision has no force. It is rejected. Revisipn dismissed. .