M. RAMAKRISHNA RAO, J. ( 1 ) THESE writ petitions are by the purchasers of certa in bits of lands in sy. Nos. 160 of menasikyathanahalli village and 96 of heggur village, T. Narasipur Taluk, Mysore district. They have challenged in these petitions the legality and correctness of the orders made under the Karnataka scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (prohibition of transfer of certain lands) Act, 1978 ('the act' for short) by the assistant commissioner and the deputy commissioner, respondents, respondents 2 and 3 in all the petitions respectively. ( 2 ) BRIEF facts of the case for the disposal of these petitions are as follows: 38 guntas of land in sy. No. 160/16 was granted in favour of basava @ papa, father of respondent-4 on 25-6-1968. It was sold to chikka kullegowda, petitioner in W. P. No. 15823 of 1990 by the grantee's son lingaiah, respondent-4, and his mother siddamma by a registered sale deed dated 23-9-1968. Out of 2 acres 25 guntas of land in sy. No. 160/4 granted on 25-6-1968 to respondent-9-siddaiah, 1 acre 4 guntas was sold to lingegowda, petitioner in W. P. No. 15824 of 1990 on 23-10-1968. Out of 1 acre 13 guntas of granted land in sy. No. 16/24,1 acre 7 gunlas was sold by nanjundaiah, whose father vaikunta was the grantee, to kempegowda, petitioner in W. P. No. 15825 of 1990 on 23-9-1968. The grant was on 25-6-1968. Chikkaputtegowda, petitioner in W. P. No. 15826 of 1990, purchased 15 guntas, out 6. 37 guntas of land granted on 1-5-1968 from the grantee mudukaiah, respondent-7, under a registered sale deed dated 19-6-1969. The land was comprised in sy. No. 160/19. Likewise 34 guntas of land in sy. No. 160/35b granted on 2-5-1968 in favour c the father of ramakrishna, respondent-8, was purchased by petitioners in W. P. nc 15827 of 1990 on 19-8-1968. Out of the land in sy. No. 160/17 granted in favour of basavaiah @ kundaiah respondcnt-5, on 12-3-1968,38 guntas was sold in favour of lingegowda, petitione in W. P. No. 15828 of 1990, on 29-5-1974. On the applications made by the respective grantees or their lega representatives under the act for granting benefit thereunder, the assistan commissioner, competent authority under the Act, allowed their applications am granted reliefs as prayed for by his orders impugned herein at annexures-c, d, e f, g and h respectively. On the applications made by the respective grantees or their lega representatives under the act for granting benefit thereunder, the assistan commissioner, competent authority under the Act, allowed their applications am granted reliefs as prayed for by his orders impugned herein at annexures-c, d, e f, g and h respectively. When appeals were filed as against the said orders, the deputy commissioner, appellate authority, confirmed the said orders by his common order, Annexure-J. ( 3 ) NOW I deal with the facts of the other two writ petitions. In W. P. No. 1449 of 1991, petitioner kullaiah's mother purchased 20 guntas of land in sy. No. 96/block-iii granted to one vankataiah, uncle of respondents 4 to 7 on 30-11-1960 from one channegowda under a registered sale deed dated 30-8-1969. The said channegowda purchased it from one somashekharaiah who purchased it from the original grantee on 24-4-1965. Similarly, in W. P. No. 1452 of 1991 the petitioner's mother purchased 20 guntas of land in the said survey number on 30-8-1969 from one channegowda who, in turn, purchased it from the original grantee (r-4) who was granted the land on 10-10-1961. In these cases also, the original grantees having approached the assistant commissioner for granting them reliefs under the Act, the assistant commissioner granted them the reliefs by declaring the alienations as null and void. On appeal, the deputy commissioner upheld the orders of the assistant commissioner. The orders of the assistant commissioner and the deputy commissioner are impugned in these petitions at annexures-a and b respectively. Hence these petitions. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, earlier the lands were leased temporarily in favour of the grantees on certain conditions and the said conditions having been complied with, the competent authority confirmed the leases by way of grant in favour of the grantees. Therefore, Rule 43-j of the Karnataka land grant (Amendment) rules, 1960 ('the rules' for short) is attracted, in which event no condition could be imposed in the saguvali chit, and not Rule 43-g. Inspite of this position of law, the granting authority imposed the non-alienation condition in the saguvali chit and following the same the competent authority under the act declared the alienations as null and void under the impugned orders. Hence these petitions. Hence these petitions. ( 5 ) NOW the important questions that arise for consideration in these petitions are whether, the government land having been leased temporarily for cultivation to persons belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes on certain conditions and such conditions having been complied with, the granting authority was justified in imposing a condition of non-alienation at the time of grant in the saguvali chit as required by Rule 43-g of the rules and whether the competent authority under the act was justified in declaring the alienations of the lands so granted as null and void, following the condition imposed in the saguvali chit. ( 6 ) SRI T. S. Ramachandra, learned counsel for the petitioners, vehemently argued that in a case like this, no condition could be imposed as the grant attracted Rule 43-j and not Rule 43-g because the grant was made on the fulfilment of the conditions imposed in the lease temporarily made for a specified period. In support of his arguments, the learned counsel relied upon the ruling of this court in Shivanna v State of Karnataka, 1989 (1) Kar. L. J. 294 followed by the division bench of this court in Smt. Siddamma v Chikkegowda and others, 1991 (1) Kar. L. J. 210. Elaborating his Arguments, Sri T. S. Ramachandra submitted that undisputedly, the grantees, vendors of the petitioners in these petitions, had been enjoying the lease hold rights temporarily conferred on them subject to certain conditions; that they having fulfilled the conditions became eligible for being considered for confirmation of lease in their favour; but while doing so, the granting authority committed a mistake in imposing a condition that the granted land shall not be alienated for a period of 15 years and that following the said condition, the authorities under the act also committed a mistake in declaring the alienations as null and void, because question of applying sections 4 and 5 of the act would not arise in those cases. ( 7 ) SHRI v. s. gunjal, learned counsel appearing for some of the contesting respondents, argued that Rule 43-j being a general provision, it had to yield to the Provisions of the act having regard to the scope of Section 11 of it. I will deal with the Provisions of Section 11 presently. ( 7 ) SHRI v. s. gunjal, learned counsel appearing for some of the contesting respondents, argued that Rule 43-j being a general provision, it had to yield to the Provisions of the act having regard to the scope of Section 11 of it. I will deal with the Provisions of Section 11 presently. His next contention is that under Article 310 of the constitution, the state of Karnataka has made a declaration that the Provisions of the act are for giving effect to the policy of the state towards securing the principles laid down in Article 46 of the Constitution and hence the object sought to be achieved under the act should always prevail over any general Provisions of the act. In that view, both Article 31c and Article 46 would come to the rescue of the persons representing scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and in order to discharge the constitutional obligations, this social piece of legislation was enacted. He further submitted that Article 46 of the Constitution provided for a special feature for the purpose of achieving the promotion of educational and economic interests of the weaker sections particularly scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and that therefore to achieve the object enshrined in the preamble of the constitution, the act was passed. According to him, the act is a special act and the Provisions thereof should prevail over any other Provisions of the general acts or rules. Indeed, he pointed out that Section 11 of the act did make it abundantly clear that the Provisions of the act should prevail over any other law for the time being in force notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained. To say so, Sri Gunjal Placed reliance upon the ruling of the Supreme Court in J. K, Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. V State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1961 SC 1170 . Lastly he submitted that having regard to the law declared by the division bench of this court in Bhagi Hengsu v Rocky Lasrado, 1990 (3) Kar. LJ. 575: ILR 1991 Kar. 2375, Rule 43-j should yield to the Provisions of the special act viz. , The Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain lands) Act, 1978. Lastly he submitted that having regard to the law declared by the division bench of this court in Bhagi Hengsu v Rocky Lasrado, 1990 (3) Kar. LJ. 575: ILR 1991 Kar. 2375, Rule 43-j should yield to the Provisions of the special act viz. , The Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain lands) Act, 1978. He contended that Rule 43-g of the rules was meant to give protection to the members belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes from exploitation and that, that being so, the protection provided under Rule 43-g could not be taken away merely because Rule 43-j intended to provide no conditions in the grant as held by this court in siddamma's case. He submitted that the language employed in Rule 43-j was directory in nature and not mandatory and that therefore that Provisions should yield to the Act, regard being had to Section 11 of the act. To say so, he also placed reliance upon the ruling of the Supreme Court in Harishankar Bagla and another v The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 465 . ( 8 ) THE last contention of Sri Gunjal is based upon the ruling of the Supreme Court in Lingappa pochanna appealwar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1985 SC 389 . He submitted that having regard to the Provisions of Section 4 read with Section 11 of the Act, the interpretation should be with a view to aid the members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes who had been granted lands to eke out their living due regard being had to their economic conditions. Thus he supported the impugned orders and prayed to dismiss the writ petitions. ( 9 ) SRI P. L. Kumaraswamy, learned counsel appearing for some other contesting respondents/grantees submitted that certain lands in favour of certain respondents in these petitions were granted not only under the erstwhile Mysore land grant rules but also under the Mysore cultivation of fallow lands Act, 1951 ('the act of 1951' for short) (act No. Xvii of 1951 ). Section 12 thereof confers powers upon the state government to frame rules. The scope of the rules under the act of 1951 would be entirely different from the scope of the general provisions of the Mysore land grant rules. Rule 43-j came into force only in the year 1960. Section 12 thereof confers powers upon the state government to frame rules. The scope of the rules under the act of 1951 would be entirely different from the scope of the general provisions of the Mysore land grant rules. Rule 43-j came into force only in the year 1960. Therefore, according to him, the Provisions governing the grant under the act of 1951 were entirely different from the Provisions of the rules framed in the year 1960 by the state of Karnataka. Therefore, Rule 43-j introduced for the first time in 1960 could not take away the benefits accrued to the grantees under the act of 1951. In that way, he submitted that Rule 43-j could not be applied with a view to take away the conditions imposed under Rule 43-g when several lands were granted in favour of the persons belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes to confer rights upon them. The object of imposing such conditions was to see that they had not alienated the granted lands lost their living conditions should further deteriorate. ( 10 ) THE second submission of Sri Kumaraswamy was that the division bench in Siddamma's case did not consider the scope of Section 11 which provided overriding effect over other laws which might conflict with the act. Therefore, he submitted that in view of the ruling in bhagi hengsu 's case wherein Section 11 was interpreted and held that Rule 29-a brought into the Karnataka land grant rules should yield to Section 11, it was abundantly made clear that the act being a special Act, the Provisions of the said act must prevail over any other law for the time being in force. ( 11 ) THE learned counsel further submitted that in these cases though upset priceof Rs. 500/- per acre was imposed, the competent authority waived Rs. 200/- in each case and the amount thereafter collected was only a nominal sum and that therefore the granting authority rightly imposed a condition not to alienate the granted lands for a period of fifteen years. ( 12 ) ONE more submission made by Sri Kumaraswamy was that, when the lands were granted subject to certain condition, in some of them there was also a direction to execute mutchalikas to abide by the conditions imposed and that therefore invocation of Rule 43-j would not arise. I will deal with these contentions later. ( 12 ) ONE more submission made by Sri Kumaraswamy was that, when the lands were granted subject to certain condition, in some of them there was also a direction to execute mutchalikas to abide by the conditions imposed and that therefore invocation of Rule 43-j would not arise. I will deal with these contentions later. ( 13 ) AS to the scope of Section 11 of the Act, that it provides a special remedy by treating the act as a special act and with having overriding effect over any other law for the time being in force, is reiterated by Sri Kumaraswamy as contended Sri Gunjal- ( 14 ) SRI Nagaraj, learned counsel appearing for some of the contesting respondents-grantees adopted the argument of Sri Kumaraswamy. ( 15 ) IN order to appreciate the legal contentions urged, it is better to refer to the salient rules under the Karnataka land grant rules. Rule 43 (8) as it stood prior to the amendment reads:"43 (8 ). Lands granted free or at reduced upset price shall not be alienated but may be accepted as security for loans. Occupancies granted to applicants belonging to depressed classes under Rule 43 (5) above and those granted by government free of upset price or reduced upset price to poor and landless people of other communities or to religious or charitable institutions, shall not be alienated and the grantees shall execute mutchalikas in the form prescribed by government. This shall not, however, prevent land granted to depressed classes under Rule 43 (5) being accepted as security for any loan which they may wish to obtain from government or from a co-operative society for the bona fide purposes of improving thed land. " ( 16 ) THE above Rule came to be amended by the notification dated 4-8-1953 in No. B 7594-604-l. r. 266-53-2 relaxing the condition of non-alienation to twenty years. It reads:"the grant of lands under sub-rules (1) and (2) to persons belonging to depressed classes for an upset price or reduced upset price and to poor persons not owning any land shall be subject to the condition that the land granted shall not be alienated for a period of twenty years from the date of the grant and the grantees shall also execute mutchalikas in the form prescribed by government. " ( 17 ) THIS Rule has undergone dynamic changes from time to time. " ( 17 ) THIS Rule has undergone dynamic changes from time to time. Rule 43 of the Karnataka land grant rules, 1958 which came to be substituted by notification No. Rd 262 lgb 57, dated 20-1-1958 deals with grant of lands belonging to the government to various persons. Rule 43-a relating to grant of lands to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes provides:"43-A. Grant of lands to scheduled castes in certain cases: (1) where any land has been leased under the "grow more food" scheme to persons belonging to the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes, who are poor and the lessee is under the scheme entitled to confirmation of the land on payment of the upset price, the said land may, if an application is made by the lessee in accordance with sub-rule (2), be granted to him by the deputy commissioner subject to the Provisions of sub-rule (6) of Rule 43 waiving two hundred rupees out of the upset price, the balance being payable in annual instalments not exceeding three. (2) a lessee referred to in sub-rule (1) may apply to the deputy commissioner requesting that the land leased to him may be granted to him and agreeing to surrender the lease and to pay the amount payable under sub-rule (1) in the manner indicated therein and to hold the land subject to the conditions specified in sub-rule (6) of Rule 43. "18. "18. Sub-rule (6) of Rule 43 subject to which a land is granted under Rule 43-areads: (6) (a) every grant of land under Rule 43-a and every grant of registered occupancy of land under clause (a) of Rule 43-h shall be subject to the condition, (i) where the grant is made free of cost, that the land granted shall not be alienated for a period of fifteen years from the date of the grant; or (ii) where the grant is made for an upset price or for a reduced upset price, that the land granted shall not be alienated for a period of ten years from the date of the grant:provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall apply to (i) the alienation of any land in favour of the state government or a co-operative society as security for loans obtained for improvement of the land or for buying cattle or agricultural impliments for the cultivation of the land; or (ii) the leasing of any land by a person who is a widow, a minor or who is subject to physical or mental disability. (b) if the Provisions of clause (a) are contravened, the land granted may be summarily resumed by the government and such land shall vest in the government free from all encumbrances and neither the grantee nor the alienee, if any, shall be entitled to any compensdation. " ( 18 ) (A) it does not admit of any dispute in these writ petitions that earlier to the grants in question, the lands were leased to grantees temporarily for a period of five years subject to confirmation on the fulfilment of the conditions imposed therein. If the leases in these cases were confirmed during the subsistence of the rules under which the leases were created, then there would have been no grievance at all from any angle because the Rule which provided for lease also provided for grant subject to certain conditions and also for consequence in case of breach of the said conditions. Unfortunately, that is not so in these cases because, though the leases were admittedly created in the year 1959 under Rule 43-a of 1958 rules, confirma tion of leases by way of grant came to be made subsequently i. e. , in the years 1960 and 1961 in respect of the lands, subject matter of W. P. Nos. Unfortunately, that is not so in these cases because, though the leases were admittedly created in the year 1959 under Rule 43-a of 1958 rules, confirma tion of leases by way of grant came to be made subsequently i. e. , in the years 1960 and 1961 in respect of the lands, subject matter of W. P. Nos. 1449 of 1991 and 1452 of 1991 respectively and 1968 in respect of the lands involved in other set of writ petitions viz. , W. p. Nos. 15823 to 15828 of 1990, when altogether a different provision was made for regulating the confirmation of leases created earlier. It is Rule 43-j under the Karnataka land revenue (Amendment) rules, 1960 and Rule 25 under the Mysore land grant rules, 1968. I will hereunder extract one by one. Rule 43-j under 1960 rules reads:"43-J. Grant of land to persons to whom lands have been leased temporarily. notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding rules of this chapter, in the case of agricultural land leased by competent authority to any person for purposes of cultivation at any time before the commencement of the Mysore land revenue (Amendment) rules, 1960, if such land is available for disposal and if the conditions of the lease have been complied with, the land may be granted to the lessee. "rule 25 of the Mysore land grant rules, 1968 reads:"grant of land to persons to whom lands have been leased temporarily. Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding rules, in the case of agricultural land leased by competent authority to any person for purposes of cultivation at any time before the commencement of these rules, if such land is available for disposal and if the conditions of the lease have been complied with such land may be granted to the lessee subject to the payment of upset price to be fixed by the deputy commissioner subject to the limit prescribed in these rules. " ( 19 ) THE rules referred to above are analogous and both of them clearly spell out any agricultural land leased by competent authority to any person for purposes of cultivation at any time before the commencement of these rules, if such land is available for disposal and if the conditions of the lease have been complied with, may be granted to the lessee. Though the second part of Rule 25 contains a further clause "subject to the payment of upset price to be fixed by the deputy commissioner subject to the limit prescribed in these rules" which does not find a place in Rule 43-j, we are not concerned with that clause in these petitions where it is not in issue. The real issue involved in these petitions, as already stated, is whether the competent authority was justified in imposing a condition of non-alienation while granting the lands. ( 20 ) BEFORE I proceed to consider the various contentions urged, I feel it also necessary to extract Rule 43-g of the Mysore land revenue (Amendment) rules, 1960 dealing with imposition of conditions for grant of lands under Rule 43-e thereof. Rule 43-g reads: "43-g. Grant of lands under the preceding rules shall be subject to the following conditions. (1) in the case of grant of lands to applicants belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and to other applicants, who are unable to pay the occupancy price on account of poverty, the occupancy price may be waived upto rupees two hundred and the balance recovered in three annual instalments. (1) in the case of grant of lands to applicants belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and to other applicants, who are unable to pay the occupancy price on account of poverty, the occupancy price may be waived upto rupees two hundred and the balance recovered in three annual instalments. (2) xx xx (3) xx xx (4) where the grant is made free of cost, or is made at a price which is less than the full market value, the grant shall be subject to the condition that the land shall not be alienated for a period of fifteen years from the date of the grantee taking possession of the land, after the grant: provided that such land may be alienated with the previous sanction of the government and subject to such conditions as the government may specify, if the government is of the opinion that in the circumstances of any case, it is just and reasonable to permit such alienation either for purposes of acquiring some other land or for any other purpose: xx xx xx (5) xx xx (6) xx xx (7) the grant is liable to be terminated (by the divisional commissioner or the state government) and the land resumed if any of the aforesaid conditions is not fulfilled and on such resumption the land shall vest in government free from all encumbrances: provided that no land shall be resumed under this clause except after giving an opportunity to the grantee or his successor in interest to show cause why the grant should not be terminated and the land resumed. " ( 21 ) WHILE granting lands in these cases, the granting authority following sub-rule (4) of Rule 43-g, referred to above, imposed a condition not to alienate the lands for a period of 15 years from the date of grant. It is this imposition of condition by the granting authority that has been mainly challenged in these petitions by the petitioners. 21 (a ). Having regard to the general Provisions as provided under Rule 43 of 1960 rules, it is seen that the lands belonging to the government may be granted to persons belonging not only to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes but also to other communities. Therefore, the grants are not confined only to the persons of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Having regard to the general Provisions as provided under Rule 43 of 1960 rules, it is seen that the lands belonging to the government may be granted to persons belonging not only to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes but also to other communities. Therefore, the grants are not confined only to the persons of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. ( 22 ) NOW we will see the scope of Rule 43-j which came to be incorporated for the first time in 1960 rules and which has been extracted above. When the question of interpretation of Rule 43-j arose in shivanna's case 1989 (1) KAR. L. J. 294, I had taken the view that when the grantee was found to have enjoyed the leasehold rights of the land leased to him subject to certain conditions and, on compliance with the said conditions, when he applied for grant of the very land to him, the granting authorily must grant him the land under Rule 43-j and not under Rule 43-g in which event no condition, not to alienate the land could be imposed, as the said land would not be available for being disposed of in favour of others by applying the general Provisions found in Rule 43-g. Therefore, I had taken the view that in such cases Rule 43-j should be invoked. Unfortunately, at that time, I did not notice the scope of Section 4 (3) read with Section 11 of the act. In siddamma's case 1991 (1) KAR. L. J. 210, the division bench approving my view in shivanna's case held while referring to Rule 43-j as follows:"in the case of grant of land under Rule 43 (j) there is no question of considering the application of other persons. The competent authority concerned is required to find out as to whether the land had been granted for temporary cultivation to the person concerned and secondly as to whether he had fulfilled eligibility for grant of land and once those conditions are found to have been fulfilled, the authority is competent to grant the land. The competent authority concerned is required to find out as to whether the land had been granted for temporary cultivation to the person concerned and secondly as to whether he had fulfilled eligibility for grant of land and once those conditions are found to have been fulfilled, the authority is competent to grant the land. One special feature about the grant is the person concerned would have already been in possession and enjoyment of the land for several years even before the grant of land and he would have invested money and time and engaged in cultivating the land even prior to the grant of land under Rule 43 (j ). Therefore, for such a grant falling under Rule 43 (j) no other condition is imposed as is evident from 'the non-obstante clause with which it begins. As pointed out by the learned judge, with which we respectfully agree, Rule 43 (g) cannot be invoked to the grant made under Rule 43 (j) also for the reason Rule 43 (g) expressly makes it clear that the conditions prescribed in the said Rule is applicable for the grant of lands made under the Rule preceding it. " ( 23 ) WHILE ruling so, the division bench also did not notice the scope of sections 4 (3) and 11 of the act. But, the earlier division bench of this court in Lakshmamma v State of Karnataka, 1983 (1) KAR. L. J. 417 considering the effect of Section 11 of the act held in paragraphs-46 and 47 as follows:"46. Section 11 of the act removes all doubts and gives overriding effect to the Provisions made in the act. Section 11 provides that the Provisions of the act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law or decree or order of a court, tribunal or other authority. 47. In dealing with cases arising under the Act, if an assistant commissioner finds that an alienation is in contravention of the terms of the grant made or law providing for such grant made to a member of a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, he is bound to give effect to the same by ignoring any decree or order made by a civil court, tribunal or any other authority. " ( 24 ) SAME was the view taken by putlaswamy, j. , As he then was in Siddoji Rao M. V. State of Karnataka, 1983 (1) KAR. L. J. 478 wherein he has held as follows:"rcspondent-3 was a member of the scheduled caste, and land had been granted to him with the stipulation that he should not alienate for 15 years, but in violation of the same he sold the land to d, who leased the land to the petitioner. Petitioner obtained occupancy rights under the Land Reforms Act. Rcspondcnt-3 moved the assistant commissioner for declaring the alienation made by him to d as void and for restoration of possession of the land to him and the assistant commissioner allowed the application. Held, sections 4 and 11 give overriding effect to the prohibition transfer of certain lands Act, 1978 and the order of the land tribunal notwithstanding, the assistant commissioner was right in declaring the sale void and restoring possession to rcspondent-3. " ( 25 ) VERY recently, another division bench of this court to which I am a party, interpreting Section 11 of the act with reference to Rule 29-a of the Karnataka land grant rules, 1969, in bhagi hengsu's case ILR 1991 KAR. 2375 has held as follows:"by a perusal of Section 11 of the Act, it is undoubtedly clear that the Provisions of that Section will have overriding effect over all other enactments. Therefore, the view that Rule 29-a validates the alienations made to persons other than sc/st also, is incorrect and improper. On the other hand, in view of Section 11 of the Act, which will have overriding effect over all other enactments, Rule 29-a must yield to it. " ( 26 ) INDEED, the decision rendered in bhagi hengsu's case is earlier than the decision in siddamma's case former being dated 10-10-1990 and the latter being dated 8-11-1990. Yet the division bench in siddamma's case did not notice the ruling in bhagi ffengsu's case probably because the publication of the decision in bhagi hengsu's case is subsequent to that in siddamma's case. Further, no contention with regard to the scope of Section 11 of the act was urged in siddamma's case, muchless the decision in bhagi hengsu's case was brought before it. Further, no contention with regard to the scope of Section 11 of the act was urged in siddamma's case, muchless the decision in bhagi hengsu's case was brought before it. Therefore, the division bench in siddamma's case had no occasion to consider the scope of Section 11 of the act muchless the decision rendered in bhagi hengsu's case. However, on the facts of the case, while interpreting Rule 43-j with reference to Rule 43-g, the division bench in siddamma's case held as above in para-22. According to the said ruling, the granting authority in such cases should grant the lands under Rule 43-j, in which case no condition could be imposed as against alienation, and not under Rule 43-g. The said interpretation is perfectly justified in so far as the grantees other than the grantees belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. But we should not lose sight of the object sought to be achieved under the act. The preamble of the act provides for that. It says: "an act to provide for the prohibition of transfer of certain lands granted by government to persons belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the state; whereas it is expedient to provide for the prohibition of transfer and for restoration of lands granted by the government to persons belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the state;" to find out the intention behind the enactment of the Act, we have to refer to Articles 31-c and 46 of the constitution. Article 31-c provides:"31c. Saving of laws giving effect to certain directive principles. Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the state towards securing all or any of the principles laid down in part iv shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19 and no law containing a declaration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall be called in question in any court on the ground that it docs not give effect to such policy: provided that where such law is made by the legislature of a state, the Provisions of this Article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the president, has received his assent. "article 46 of the Constitution provides:"promotion of educational and economic interests of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and other weaker sections. The state shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. " ( 27 ) FROM the foregoing, itjs made clear that the object of the act is to provide for the prohibition of transfer of certain lands granted by the government to persons belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the state and for restoration of such lands to such persons. If the interpretation of Rule 43-j made by the division bench in siddamma's case is applied to the grantees other than those belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, they become beneficiaries. But, when it is applied to the grantees belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, the very object of the act would be defeated because such interpretation would work hard against the grantees seeking relief under the act. In other words, if the interpretation of Rule 43-j made in siddamma's case is applied, then there scannot be any prohibition at all to be imposed at the time of confirmation of lease by way of grant. Consequently, transfers of any land so granted cannot be brought within the purview of sections 4 and 5 of the act. That being so, question of granting relief under the act to persons belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes does not at all arise. Thus, the object of the act would be defeated. Therefore, it is contended before me that the interpretation made in siddamma's case is not a conceivable interpretation because sections 4 (3) and 11 were left unnoticed while laying down the ruling interpreting Rule 43-j. ( 28 ) WHEN the constitutional validity of the act was challenged, this court in S. V. krishnappa v State of Karnataka, ILR 1982 (2) KAR. 1310 has held with regard to classification of grantees as follows; "the question is whether the classification of grantees of lands by the government into those belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and those not belonging to those categories, is a valid classification for the purpose of Article 14 of the constitution. 1310 has held with regard to classification of grantees as follows; "the question is whether the classification of grantees of lands by the government into those belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and those not belonging to those categories, is a valid classification for the purpose of Article 14 of the constitution. The Constitution itself has treated persons belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes as forming a separate class for giving them certain protection and special treatment in certain matters. Clause (4) of Article 15 and clause (4) of Article 16 are such instances of special treatment. This is in recognition of the fact of utmost backwardness of persons belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and the handicap from which they have suffered for centuries. Hence the similar classification made by the act cannot be said to be offensive of Article 14 of the constitution. " The division bench also noticed in paragraph-15 the overriding effect of Section 11 over other laws, customs and usages, contracts, decree and orders of courts, tribunals and other authorities. In paragraph-12 it has noticed the effect of sub-section (3) of Section 4 stating that sub-section (3) of Section 4 makes the Provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of that Section applicable also to sales of granted land in execution of a decree or order of a civil court or any award or order of any other authority. ( 29 ) IN Manchegowda v State of Kamataka, ILR 1984 KAR. 1, the Supreme Courtalso while upholding the view taken by this court in s. v. krishnappa's case has held in paragraph 22 as follows:". . . . . . THAT persons belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes can be considered to be separate and distinct classes particularly in the matter of preservation and protection of their economic and educational interests. . . . . . The object of this act is to protect and preserve the economic interests of persons belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and to prevent their exploitation. For the purpose of the Present Act, the classification has a clear nexus to the object sought to be achieved. . . . . . "thus the Supreme Court also has noticed having regard to the preamble of the act that a special benefit is sought to be conferred upon these sections of the people to prevent their exploitation. For the purpose of the Present Act, the classification has a clear nexus to the object sought to be achieved. . . . . . "thus the Supreme Court also has noticed having regard to the preamble of the act that a special benefit is sought to be conferred upon these sections of the people to prevent their exploitation. Therefore, the interpretation of Rule 43-j should be to give effect to the Provisions of the act and not to defeat the same. ( 30 ) KEEPING this object in view, the division bench in bhagi hengsu 's case takingin to consideration the scope of Section 11 of the act has ruled that Rule 29-a of the Karnataka land grant rules should yield to the Provisions of Section 11 due regard being had to the overriding effect it has over any other law. This was not brought to the notice of the division bench in siddamma's case nor did it notice these views. Therefore, I am of the view that for the reasons stated above, the interpretation of Rule 43-j in siddamma's case would cause hardship to persons belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes by preventing them from seeking relief under the act. Not only that, it takes away the benefit accrued to them under the Act, inasmuch as in view of the interpretation of Rule 43-j in siddamma's case as not to impose any condition while confirming the lease by way of grant, sections 4 and 5 cannot be invoked for the purpose of giving relief in favour of persons belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Therefore, that would defeat the very object of the act. ( 31 ) BY a perusal of Rule relating to imposition of condition of grant comingunder Rule 43, it is clear that certain protection was sought to be given to the grantees belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes when the lands were granted by the government. The object as can be seen from the language employed therein was to see that the granted lands arc retained with them without alienation. It is for that reason, the legislature imposed conditions preventing the grantees from alienating the granted lands for a certain period, though that period came to be relaxed and varied from time to time. The object as can be seen from the language employed therein was to see that the granted lands arc retained with them without alienation. It is for that reason, the legislature imposed conditions preventing the grantees from alienating the granted lands for a certain period, though that period came to be relaxed and varied from time to time. Secondly, the language employed in Rule 43-j is only directory and not mandatory inasmuch as the discretion is still vested in the authority to impose condition or not when the lease hold rights are confirmed on the fulfilment of the conditions imposed under the lease. Therefore, if Rule 43-j is to be interpreted as has been done in siddamma's case, it works hard against the persons belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. That is not the intention of the legislature. ( 32 ) ONE glaring example that can be given to say so is this. As contended by srikumaraswamy, some of these cases also, lands came to be granted by the competent authority under the Mysore cultivation of fallow lands Act, 1951 (Mysore act No. XVII of 1951 ). By a perusal of the preamble of the Act, it is seen that it is with a view to bring fallow lands under cultivation in the state of Mysore except bellary district. The Provisions are made so as to enable landless to cultivate the lands subject to certain conditions. Sub-section (4) of Section 1 there of makes it clear that the act shall remain in force for a period of five years and upon its expiry, the Provisions of Section 6 of the Mysore General Clauses Act, 1899, shall be applicable as if it had been repealed by a Mysore act. In other words, those persons who continued to cultivate the lands belonging to the government under the said Act, even after the expiry of five years, shall continue to be lessees under the state of Karnataka. Therefore, even after the expiry of the period of five years, the right or interest accrued in such persons by virtue of the said act cannot be taken away without due process of law. Therefore, even after the expiry of the period of five years, the right or interest accrued in such persons by virtue of the said act cannot be taken away without due process of law. ( 33 ) SECTION 12 of the said act conferred upon the state government power tomake rules for carrying out the purposes of that act and in the absence of any rules made there under, if such a lessee or grantee sold the land, such sale is also brought within the purview of the act of 1978. The submission is that since no rules were made under the said act regulating the rights and liabilities of the persons to whom lands were granted under the said Act, they are entitled to seek relief under the act of 1978 and that, as long as their rights and interests are not taken away in accordance with law, they cannot be said to be persons who have lost their rights merely because of the interpretation of Rule 43-j in the manner in which it has been done in siddamma's case. It is also submitted that since the land granted under the said act would come within the definition of "granted land" occurring in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the act of 1978, the grantees are entitled to seek relief thereunder. ( 34 ) ANOTHER aspect which we will have to notice is that, in order to increase the food production, the government of karnalaka some where in 1958 launched a scheme known as "grow more food" scheme under which government lands were leased to landless persons temporarily for a specified period subject to certain conditions and in case of transfers of such lands by the lessees cither before or after the period of lease, this court took the view in many number of cases that the lessees are entitled to seek relief under the act of 1978. If the decision rendered in Siddamma's case is to be made applicable to such a large number of cases, then such persons will not be entitled to seek relief under the act of 1978. Therefore, 1 am of the opinion that there is enough force in the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents/grantees. If the decision rendered in Siddamma's case is to be made applicable to such a large number of cases, then such persons will not be entitled to seek relief under the act of 1978. Therefore, 1 am of the opinion that there is enough force in the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents/grantees. ( 35 ) AT this stage Sri T. S. Ramachandra, learned counsel appearing for thepetitioners/purchasers, argued that the decision of the division bench was binding upon the single judge and that therefore I could not distinguish the view taken by the division bench in siddamma's case. The learned counsel for the respondents brought to my notice the view taken by the Supreme Court in A. R. Antulay v R. S. Nayak, AIR 1988 SC 1531 and contended that this court can distinguish the view taken by the division bench of this court in siddamma's case and lay the correct law in conformity with the doctrine of 'actus curiae neminem gravabit'. It is a case where the Supreme Court transferred a case triable by the special judge under Section 6 (1) of the criminal law Amendment Act, 1952 to the high court which had no jurisdiction to try the offences alleged for a speedier trial by an order which was clearly per incuriam. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court recalled the directions contained in the order in question. ( 36 ) THE learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal and others v Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy, AIR 1971 SC 2355 , wherein it has been held as follows: "a question relating to jurisdiction of a court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of that court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not operate as res judicata. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not operate as res judicata. Similarly by an erroneous decision if the court assumes jurisdiction which it docs not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise, because, if those decisions are considered as conclusive, it will assume the status of a special Rule of law applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of the court in derogation of the Rule declared by the legislature. " Further, in paragraph 10 of the judgment, it has been held as follows: ". . . . . but, where the decision is on a question of law, i. e. , the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is thw same, for the expression "the matter in issue" in Section 11, code of civil procwdure, means thw right litigated between the parties, i. e. , the facts on which thw right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the court or a decision of the court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the Rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of the order under the Rule of res judicata, for a Rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land. " ( 37 ) THE Supreme Court in one of its latest decisions in sushil kumar mehta vgobind ram bohra (dead) through his l. rs. , 1990 (1) SCC 193 has held in paragraph 26 as follows: ". . . . . an issue of fact or law or mixed question of fact and law, which are in issue in an earlier suit or might and ought to be raised between the same parties or persons claiming under them and was adjudicated or allowed uncontested becomes final and binds the parties or persons claiming under them. . . . . an issue of fact or law or mixed question of fact and law, which are in issue in an earlier suit or might and ought to be raised between the same parties or persons claiming under them and was adjudicated or allowed uncontested becomes final and binds the parties or persons claiming under them. Thus the decision of a competent court over the matter in issue may operate as res judicata in subsequent suit or proceedings or in other proceedings between the same parties and those claiming under them. But the question relating to the interpretation of a statute touching the jurisdiction of a court unrelated to question of fact or law or mixed questions does not operate as res judicata even between the parties or persons claiming under them. The reason is obvious; a pure question of law unrelated to facts which are the basis or foundation of a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. The principle of res judicata is a fact of procedure but not of substantive law. The decision on an issue of law founded on fact in issue would operate as res judicata. But when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority or when the earlier decision declared a transaction to be valid despite prohibition by law, it does not operate as res judicata. Thus a question of jurisdiction of a court or of a procedure or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties founded purely on question of fact in the previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. A question relating to jurisdiction of a court or interpretation of Provisions of a statute cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of a court. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to a case of decree of nullity. If the court inherently lacks jurisdiction, consent cannot confer jurisdiction. Where certain statutory rights in a welfare legislation are created, the doctrine of waiver also does not apply to a case of decree where the court inherently lacks jurisdiction. " ( 38 ) SIMILAR is the view taken in a. r. antulay's case. If the court inherently lacks jurisdiction, consent cannot confer jurisdiction. Where certain statutory rights in a welfare legislation are created, the doctrine of waiver also does not apply to a case of decree where the court inherently lacks jurisdiction. " ( 38 ) SIMILAR is the view taken in a. r. antulay's case. ( 39 ) FOLLOWING the decision of the Supreme Court in Sarwan Singh v Kasturilal, Air 1977 SC 265 , this court in Jivaji @ Balasaheb Venkateshanikhindi v Sadashiva Rao Ramachandra Rao pole, ILR 1991 KAR. 4307, while considering the question whether the Provisions of the Limitation Act could be applied to eviction proceedings arising under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, in view of non-obstante clause in Section 21 (1) thereof, has held as follows: "section 21 (1) of the act opens with the non-obstantc clause "notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract". Thus, the non-obstante clause contained in Section 21 of the act gives overriding effect to the Provisions contained in Section 21 of the act over any other law ,. . The words "any other law" contained in the non-obstante clause take into their fold not only the Provisions contained in the Limitation Act, but also any other Provisions contained in any other law which are inconsistent with or have the effect of defeating the object and intendment of Section 21 of the act. . . The Provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceedings under Section 21 (1) of the act. " The above ruling is in agreement with the view taken in bhagi hengsu's case. ( 40 ) IN the light of what is stated above, I am clearly of the opinion that theinterpretation made by the division bench in siddamma's case without notice to the rulings in bhagi hengsu and siddoji rao's case, cannot be extended to the persons belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes seeking relief under the act. Therefore, I hold that in all these cases the authorities below were justified in imposing a condition while confirming the leases that the granted lands shall not be alienated for a period of 15 years. ( 41 ) IN writ petitions 1449 and 1452 of 1991, one more contention has been urgedfor the petitioners. Therefore, I hold that in all these cases the authorities below were justified in imposing a condition while confirming the leases that the granted lands shall not be alienated for a period of 15 years. ( 41 ) IN writ petitions 1449 and 1452 of 1991, one more contention has been urgedfor the petitioners. The contention is that earlier to the application under the act by the grantees for restoration of the lands, the petitioners approached the concerned land tribunals on the ground that they were cultivating the lands as tenants and obtained orders in their favour and that they have been enjoying the lands even now on the strength of those orders. Therefore, question of attracting the Act, for the purpose of restoration of the lands to the grantees, does not at all arise. This contention has to be noticed only for being rejected. This point has been settled as far back as in 1983 by this court in siddoji rao's case 1983 (1) KAR. L. J. 478, ruling of which has been extracted in paragraph 24 of this order. Puttaswamy, J. , As he then was, while considering the similar question held that notwithstanding the order of the land tribunal in favour of the tenants, in view of the overriding effect of the Provisions of sections 4 and 11 of the act of 1978, the assistant commissioner was right in declaring the sale void and restoring possession to the grantees. The division bench of this court also subsequently held in bhagi hengsu's case, relevant paragraph of which is extracted here in paragraph-25, that in view of the overriding effect of the Provisions of Section 11 of the act over any other law, any other law for the time being in force which runs counter to the object of the act must yield to it. Therefore, the contention urged in this behalf does not hold good. Hence it is rejected. ( 42 ) NEXT I come to the contention of Sri Kumaraswamy regarding imposition ofupset price and execution of mutchalikas. These contentions are urged to strengthen his argument that the competent authority was right in imposing the condition that the granted lands shall not be alienated for a period of 15 years. Hence it is rejected. ( 42 ) NEXT I come to the contention of Sri Kumaraswamy regarding imposition ofupset price and execution of mutchalikas. These contentions are urged to strengthen his argument that the competent authority was right in imposing the condition that the granted lands shall not be alienated for a period of 15 years. Since I have held that the competent authority was justified in imposing the condition at the time of grant, I need not go into these contentions in detail. However, I consider them in brief. Dealing with a similar question in Basappa v Special Deputy commissioner, 1991 (2) KAR. Lj. 480 : ILR 1991 KAR. 1321, I have clearly held that the upset price must be equivalent to the actual market value on the date of grant. In the instant cases, though Rs. 500/- per acre was imposed, Rs. 200/- of it was waived and the remaining Rs. 300/- having been collected, cannot be said to be the upset price. Presuming for the purpose of argument that it was upset price imposed and collected, even then the non-alienation was for a period of 10 years. In the cases on hand, all the granted lands were sold within a period of 10 years. It is an admitted fact. Thus, even on payment of the said sum of money, contravention is proved. ( 43 ) WHEN the lands were granted in these cases during 1960, 1961 and 1968, therewas no provision providing for execution of mutchalikas. That provision was provided only under Rule 43 (8) which was in force before 6-7-1955. However, we could not find fault with the authorities concerned for having obtained mutchalikas executed by the grantees and those mutchalikas were only to abide by the grantees by the conditions imposed under the grant. Yet the grantees ignoring the execution of mutchalikas by them, sold the lands granted to them. Therefore, the authority under the act was perfectly right in annulling such alienations made in contravention of the condition of the grant. Yet the grantees ignoring the execution of mutchalikas by them, sold the lands granted to them. Therefore, the authority under the act was perfectly right in annulling such alienations made in contravention of the condition of the grant. ( 44 ) NOW considering the question whether the authorities below were justified indeclaring the alienations as void on the ground of contravention of the condition of the grant, as already stated, the alienations in the present cases having taken place within a period of 10 years contrary to the condition of the grant, I must hold that they are justified in doing so, in view of my conclusion that they have power to impose condition as provided under Rule 43-g. ( 45 ) IN view of what is discussed above, I do not see any good ground to interferewith the impugned orders. These writ petitions fail and are accordingly rejected. No costs. Mrkj. 10-12-1991 after the pronouncement of the Order, Sri T. S. Ramachandra, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that, in most of these cases, the petitioners having continued to be in possession and cultivation of the lands, subject matter of these petitions, current year had raised crops, that the crops would be ready for harvest shortly and that therefore they might be permitted to harvest them by the end of january, 1991. This submission being fair, I direct the assistant commissioner to permit the petitioners to harvest the crops on the land, if raised by them, not later than 31-1-1992. --- *** --- .