JUDGMENT D. P. Sood, J — A lable or the substance ? Which one of them determines the real nature of relationship between the parties to the instant lis, is the important question which requires determination by this Court. The aforesaid question has arisen in the backdrop of the following facts and circumstances of this Regular Second Appeal filed under para 32 of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order, 1948. 2. Late Dr. Dharam Singh, the father of the respondent was the original plaintiff. He died during the pendency of the suit and the respondent was substituted m his place as his legal heir. The original plaintiff had filed a suit for recovery of vacant possession of the residential premises occupied by the appellant-original defendant and for recovery of Rs. 650 as arrears on account of use and occupation of the said premises. The aforesaid residential premises are situated in Bazar Paonta Sahib, Teh. Paonta Sahib District Sirmour (hereinafter referred to as the disputed premises). 3. The disputed premises constituting of four rooms in the upper storeyed formed part of the building belonging to late Dr. Dharam Singh. The entire building had been leased out to the State Bank of India, Paonta Sahib as tenant by the original owner and at that time the appellant was in occupation of the disputed premises as an employee, Manager of the said Bank, The State Bank of India then vacated the building on 4-11-1974 but when the original plaintiff wanted to take the possession of the entire building, the appellant requested him that since no accommodation for his residence was available in Paonta Bazar, he should be allowed to remain in the occupation of the disputed premises for some time as he is expecting a transfer from that place The appellant had cordial relations with Doctor Dharam .Singh, the original-plaintiff at the material time. Thus on the request so made to him (Late Dr. Dharam Singh) after seeking legal advice allowed the appellant to remain in occupation of the disputed premises for a period of one year purely as a licensee on a monthly license-fee of Rs. 150 pursuant to the terms and conditions of document unilaterally executed by the appellant on 6-11-1974 (Ex. Thus on the request so made to him (Late Dr. Dharam Singh) after seeking legal advice allowed the appellant to remain in occupation of the disputed premises for a period of one year purely as a licensee on a monthly license-fee of Rs. 150 pursuant to the terms and conditions of document unilaterally executed by the appellant on 6-11-1974 (Ex. PA), The appellant, however, failed to vacate the disputed premises on expiry of one year and also fell into arrears of licence-fee which resulted into the filing of the civil suit in the Court of the Senior sub Judge, Sirmour, Nahan, Himachai Pradesh on the ground that the appellant was in occupation of the disputed premises as a trespasser. 4. the appellant admitted the original plaintiff to be the owner of the disputed premises which was formerly in the occupation of the State Bank of India, Paonta Branch as tenant upto 4-11-1974 when the bank vacated the same while he continued to be in occupation thereof However, he denied that he was allowed to remain in the disputed premises for a period of one year as licensee and as a matter of fact he was inducted by the original plaintiff as a tenant in the aforesaid premises on payment of Rs. 100 as monthly rent and he had been regularly paying the rent to the plaintiff ever since. As regards Ex. PA, dated 6-11-1974 he denied its execution by contending that the original plaintiff got signed a stamp-paper by him on the plea that this document would help him at the time of his filling Income Tax Return and he signed the same as he had blind faith in the original plaintiff and had cordial relations with him Alternatively, he contended that said document amounted to a lease-deed and not a license and, therefore, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try this suit and that he could be legally evicted only under the provisions of the Himachal Pradesh Rent Control Act. He also denied that he was in arrears of rent 5. Both the Courts below have concurred to construe Ex. PA dated 6-11-1974 as a license. The trial Court dis-allowed the mesna-profit but the first appellate Court, that is, the learned District Judge allowed the mesne profit in the cross-appeal of the respondent with costs throughout. 6. He also denied that he was in arrears of rent 5. Both the Courts below have concurred to construe Ex. PA dated 6-11-1974 as a license. The trial Court dis-allowed the mesna-profit but the first appellate Court, that is, the learned District Judge allowed the mesne profit in the cross-appeal of the respondent with costs throughout. 6. Feeling aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 10-3-1982 of the learned District Judge, the appellant has come up in this Regular Second Appeal. 7. Shri Bhupender Gupta, learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that on the basis of the so-called leave and licence agreement Ex PA and in the facts and circumstances of the case, both the lower Court have erred in coming to the conclusion that the appellant was a licensee. 8. On the other hand, Shri K D. Sood has vehemently urged that the finding arrived at by the Courts below is correct keeping in view the real intention of the parties in executing the document in the prevailing circumstances referred to hereinabove. 9. Both the parties have concentrated my attention to the above aspect of the case and they have also taken me through the entire record. 10. There is no dispute that originally the building of which the disputed premises formed a part, was under the tenancy of the State Bank of India Parties are also not at controversy that the aforesaid tenant handed over the possession of the tenanted premises on 4- 11-1974. Further the fact that appellant being an employee Manager of the State Bank, was in occupation of the disputed premises and he was liable to vacate the disputed premises when his employer vacated the building. There is also no dispute that agreement Ex PA bore the signature or the appellant alone. Thus whether the document Ex PA is a lease or a licence has to be interpreted in view of the settled principles formulated by the Supreme Court. If the document evidences a lease, the appellant will be entitled to the protection of the Himachal Pradesh Rent Control Act and in case it is held to be a lease and licence agreement, the appellant is liable to be evicted from the disputed premises. 11. Definition between a lease and a license is rather thin and some time quite obscure. 11. Definition between a lease and a license is rather thin and some time quite obscure. Payment of an amount, periodically, either monthly or yearly is by itself not sufficient to determine the nature of the relationship between the owner of the land and its occupant. However, there is a broad distinction between a license and a lease. The lease necessarily creates an interest in the land in favour of the lessee, but in the case of a license, no interest is created in the land. It is an entirely different matter that the grantor may not be able to revoke the license for the conditions laid down in section 60 of the Indian Easement Act. The following propositions can be taken as well established for the purpose of determination as to whether a document is that of a lease or a license. (See s Qudrat Ullah v. Bareilly Municipality, AIR 1974 SC 396 and Board of Revenue v. A. M. Ansari, AIR 1976 SC 1813. "1. Principles for determining whether agreement creates lease or licence.—In determining whether an agreement creates between the parties the relationship of landlord and tenant or merely that of licenser and licensee the decisive consideration is the intention of the parties The parties to an agreement cannot, however, turn a lease into a licence merely by stating that the document is to be deemed a licence or describing it as such, the relationship of the parties is determined by Jaw on a consideration of all relevant provisions of the agreement, nor will the employment of words appropriate to a lease prevent the agreement from conferring a licence only If from the whole document it appears that it was intended merely to confer a licence. In the absence of any formal document the intention of the parties must be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the parties. 2. Nature of grant of exclusive possession.—The fact that the agreement grants a right of exclusive possession is not in itself conclusive evidence of the existence of a tenancy, but it is a consideration of the first importance. In deciding whether a grantee is entitled to exclusive possession regard must be had to the substance of the agreement. 2. Nature of grant of exclusive possession.—The fact that the agreement grants a right of exclusive possession is not in itself conclusive evidence of the existence of a tenancy, but it is a consideration of the first importance. In deciding whether a grantee is entitled to exclusive possession regard must be had to the substance of the agreement. To give exclusive possession there need not be express words to that effect; it is sufficient if the nature of the acts to be done by the grantee requires that he should have exclusive possession. The grant of an exclusive right to a benefit can, however, be inferred only from language which is clear and explicit. If an exclusive right of possession is subject to certain reservations or to a restriction of the purposes for which the premises may be used, the reservations or restriction will not necessarily prevent the grant operating as a lease. 3. When grant conferring exclusive possession operates merely as licence.—A grant which confers the right to exclusive possession may operate as a licence in the following circumstances which negative the intention to create a lease. 4. Instances of agreements creating licences.—A licence is normally created where a person is granted the right to use premises without becoming entitled to exclusive possession thereof, or the circumstances and conduct of the parties show that all that was intended was that the grantee should be granted a personal privilege with no interest in the land. If the agreement is merely for the use of the property in a certain way and on certain terms while the property remains in the possession and control of the owner, the agreement will operate as a licence, even though the agreement may employ words appropriate to a lease." 12. On the scrutiny of the document coupled with the prevailing circumstances in which it was executed by the appellant and then applying the test referred to hereinabove, it is not possible to infer that the document is that of a lease. At this juncture it would be proper to reproduce the contents of Ex. PA :— "Agreement subject to temporary occupation licence of Dr. Dharam Singh, resident of Nahan (HP) house situated at Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour (HP). I, Ramesh Kumar Sharma son of Sh. At this juncture it would be proper to reproduce the contents of Ex. PA :— "Agreement subject to temporary occupation licence of Dr. Dharam Singh, resident of Nahan (HP) house situated at Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour (HP). I, Ramesh Kumar Sharma son of Sh. Murari Lai Sharma, resident of Paonta Sahib, working as Officer in the Paonta Branch of State Bank of India, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour (HP), have taken four rooms one bath room and one kitchen etc. from the owner Dr. Dharam Singh, resident of Nahan who is the sole owner of the said building situate at Paonta Sahib for one year only from this day the 6th November, 1974 the commence of this agreement ; that the aforesaid premises were previously under the tenancy of the State Bank of India branch Paonta Sahib and the said Bank had handed over the said premises to the owner Dr. Dharam Singh with possession on 4th November, 1974. That I was occupying these very premises as an Employee of the said Bank and had to vacate the said premises at once then and when the said Bank handed over the possession of the said building on 4th November, 1974, but I was not in a position to manage for another accommodation at the moment due to shortage and non-availability of accommodation at Paonta Sahib and requested the said landlord to permit me to use the said premises temporarily for one year from 6th November, 1974 the day of commencement of this agreement who has agreed to give me Temporary Licence to use and occupy the above said premises for a period of one year only on the terms and conditions mentioned below — 1. That I will be paying to the said landlord a monthly consideration of Rs. 150 (Rupees one hundred and fifty) for making use of the said premises and will make the regular payment thereof. 2. That I shall pay all costs of electricity water, conservancy or maintenance expenses of the said premises and will keep the said premises well intact. 3. That on the termination of licence I shall hand over the possession of the said premises to the said owner without any delay, and will abide by all the terms and conditions of my above agreement. 3. That on the termination of licence I shall hand over the possession of the said premises to the said owner without any delay, and will abide by all the terms and conditions of my above agreement. In witness, whereof, I Ramesh Kumar Sharma, the above licencee have hereunto signed at Nahan this day 6th November, 1974." Witness Sd/- Mani Ram Sharma Signed by licencee Sd/- Ramesh Kumar Sharma Witness Sd/-." 13. The careful scrutiny of the document above indicate firstly, the appellant earlier having occupied the disputed premises under the State Bank of India as its employee and later having surrendered the tenancy rights of the entire building including the premises in dispute in favour of the original owner, the appellant was also under legal obligation to have vacated the premises on 4-11-1976 ; secondly, the very heading of this agreement show that it was executed by the appellant in favour of the plaintiff for temporary occupation of the disputed premises as a licensee ; thirdly, para 2 of the said document Ex. PA by itself narrates the circumstances under which this document came into being It clarifies that with the surrender of the tenancy by the State Bank of India in favour of the original owner, the appellant was liable to be bundled out but since it was not possible for him to get residential accommodation for himself anywhere else, he requested the original owner late Dr Dharam Singh to allow him to stay in the disputed premises as licensee for a period of one year on payment of Rs 150 as license-fee and also with a categorical undertaking that he shall be liable to vacate these premises without any delay on the expiry of the period of license of one year which shall be deemed to have been commenced from 6-11-1974. 14. 14. The record shows that late Dr, Dharam Singh, the original owner wanted to take possession of the entire house vacated by the State Bank of India on 4-1 l-l976 but since it was not possible for the defendant to shift at any other place at that time and as no other accommodation was available in Paonta Sahib town and further he had cordial relations with the appellant, he on humanitarian grounds, after seeking legal advice from his Counsel, allowed the appellant to remain in occupation of the aforesaid premises purely as a license pursuant to his execution of the leave and license agreement Ex PA on the terms and conditions contained therein without any other reservations. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that Rent Laws were already in vague and ordinarily the owner would not have allowed any person to continue to be in occupation of the premises as a tenant of which he was getting vacant possession. Even the appellant in his statement admitted the existence of cordial relations in between him and late Dr Dharam Singh, the original owner inter-se. Thus the conduct of the appellant in making a request to the owner particularly apprising the latter that he was liable to be transferred from that place within a very short period, appears to have impelled the owner on humanitarian grounds allowing the appellant to remain in the occupation of the disputed premises. Thus attenuating circumstances coupled with the conduct of the parties leading to the execution of document Ex. PA on 6-11-1974 immediately after the vacation of the building by the State Bank of India, the earlier tenant of which the appellant was an employee, read with the terms thereof, merely spell out that the real intention of the parties at the time of the execution of the document was that the appellant would occupy the disputed premises purely as a licensee. It is to be taken note of that appellant is a well educated man holding the post of the Manager, State Back of India and he even tried to riggle out of document Ex, PA by first denying its execution and merely admitting his signature thereon, on the ground that he had in a good faith signed the stamp-paper on the asking of late Dr. Dharam Singh that it would help him at the time of filing the Income Tax return, that is to say, that the document was result of the manipulation at the behest of the original owner. This plea has not been raised by the appellant in his reply to the notice Ex PC It is further to be noted that earlier the original owner had sent a notice to the defendant on 10-11-1975 but since it had come back undelivered, it was sent again and was received by the defendant on 9-11-1975 The appellant did not care to reply to this notice Ex, PD. In both these notices the original plaintiff had clearly stated that the appellant was a licensee. Also the appellant had raised no such plea that he was not a licensee of these premises but a tenant at the monthly rent of Rs. 100. To my mind the learned Courts below had correctly appraised the evidence and held the appellant to be a licensee. There is thus no force in the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellant and as such it is rejected. 15. No other point has been urged. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed with costs throughout. The impugned judgment and decree are up-held. The appeal stands disposed of in terms of the above. Appeal dismissed