D. M. PATNAIK, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is by the members of the second party in a proceeding under Section 107, Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) against the order dated 15-9-1987 of the Executive Magistrate, Nayagarh. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order called upon the second party members to execute interim bonds for an amount of Rs. 1000/each. ( 2 ) THE prosecution report brought out a case of imminent breach of peace on account of factional rivalry between the two groups in village Kendudbipi under the Sarankual Police Station in the District of Pun. The report revealed that both parties were bent upon to out-weigh each other by force and assault and counter assault. It was alleged that the members of the second party on various occasions prior to the passing of the preliminary order, created disturbance and resorted to serious rioting in village when the first party members were observing Danda. On 23-5-1987 they pelted stones to the houses of the members of the first party. Consequently, a report was lodged with the police and a case registered. ( 3 ) THE learned Sub-divisional Magistrate drew up the preliminary order on 28-5-1987 which reads as follows:perused the non-F. I. R. No. 9/87 of Sarankul P. S. I am satisfied that there is apprehension of breach of peace within local limits of my jurisdiction. Start a case under section 107 of the Cr. P. C. The case is transferred to the Court of Sri L. N. Misra. Executive Magistrate, Nayagarh, for disposal according to law. The learned Executive Magistrate issued notice calling upon them to show cause as to why they should not execute bonds for Rs. 1000/- each to maintain peace for a period of one year. Pursuant to such notice, the second party members numbering about 90 appeared before the learned Magistrate and filed show cause, wherein they denied all accusations made against them as stated above. ( 4 ) THEIR case was that there was rivalry between the two groups as one Sri Udayanath Naik, a member of the first party contested for the post of Sarpanch against one Harihar Guru, the latter being supported by the members of the second party. ( 4 ) THEIR case was that there was rivalry between the two groups as one Sri Udayanath Naik, a member of the first party contested for the post of Sarpanch against one Harihar Guru, the latter being supported by the members of the second party. The second party members claimed that since they supported the cause of Harihar Guru who ultimately lost the election, the first party members bore grudge against them and falsely implicated them in the case. The learned Magistrate fixed the case to 15-9-1987 for orders with a direction to the parties to produce their witnesses for evidence. ( 5 ) ON 15-9-1987 a memo of appearance of two witnesses was filed but when the learned Magistrate found the witnesses absent on call, he observed that the parties had no intention to adduce evidence. The learned Magistrate found for himself that there was apprehension of imminent breach of peace and he recalled the order which he had passed on that day allowing representation of most of the second party members and directed them to appear in person on 24- 91987 with a further direction to execute interim bonds for Rs. 1000/- each until final disposal of the case. ( 6 ) MR. A. S. Naidu, learned counsel for the petitioners, urged for setting aside the impugned order of the learned Magistrate on the ground that the passing of the impugned order dated 15-9-1987 by the learned Executive Magistrate is the result of total non-application of judicial mind and arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction vested in him. Mr. Naidu further urged that on the face of the settled proposition of law, the learned Magistrate's direction to execute interim bond is wholly illegal. He referred to the provisions contained in Section 116 (3) of the Code as well as various decisions on the point. Mr. J. M. Das, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties, submitted his arguments in support of the orders passed by the learned Magistrates. ( 7 ) THE proposition of law laid down in the off-quoted decision reported in Madhu Limaye and another v. Ved Murti and others,, renders the order of the Magistrate directing execution of interim bond illegal. In the said case, their Lordships held that the Magistrate was not competent to call upon the delinquents to execute interim bonds without commencing the inquiry. In the said case, their Lordships held that the Magistrate was not competent to call upon the delinquents to execute interim bonds without commencing the inquiry. Their Lordships observed that the Magistrate should have made atleast some effort to examine some witnesses instead of directing the delinquents to execute interim bonds and this was, in their Lordships opinion, in total violation of the provisions contained in section 117 (3) of the Code of 1898 (presently section 116 (3) of the Code of 1973 ). In other words, their Lordships held that such a direction cannot be given without commencing the inquiry with a view to ascertain the prima facie truth of the allegations. In a Full Bench decision of our own High Court reported in Sona Khan and others v. State, following the above decision of the Supreme Court, it has been held that an order under Section 116 (3) of the Code directing to furnish interim bond can be made only after commencement of the inquiry but before its completion, provided the allegations forming the basis of the parent proceeding or the allegations leading to the necessity for furnishing of interim bonds, are tested by inquiry and application of judicial mind for ascertaining the prima facie nature of the case so as to justify the action taken by the Magistrate under the sub-section. It has been further made clear that inquiry does not commence merely on the appearance of the delinquent or on the reading of the notice under Section 112 of the Code to him. The allegations have got to be tested. It may be that in a particular case, oral evidence may not be necessary to test the truth or otherwise of the allegations and in some cases, affidavits may be enough for the satisfaction of the Magistrate. So much so, the Magistrate may be also satisfied by perusing the documentary evidence which, in some cases, might substitute oral evidence. In a peculiar situation, the parties may also agree that the allegations are true and that there may not be any necessity to look for any evidence. So much so, the Magistrate may be also satisfied by perusing the documentary evidence which, in some cases, might substitute oral evidence. In a peculiar situation, the parties may also agree that the allegations are true and that there may not be any necessity to look for any evidence. Intheir Lordships opinion, situations arising in daily life cannot be catelogued and discretion must be left to the Magistrate to deal with particular situations as may arise before him from time to time, but the mandate of the law is that the inquiry must commence and the Magistrate must proceed to as certain the truth of the allegations by application of his judicial mind and look for materials which would substitute the allegations into facts. The inquiry contemplated is an acceptable legal process by which, the allegations can be converted into facts. As to the nature of the process, their Lordships in the decision referred to above, observed that the same should be left to the discretion of the Magistrate, with reference to the facts of each case. Yet in another decision of our own High Court reported in Ratnakar Sahu and others v. The Stale of Orissa it has been held that an order under sub-section (3) of section 116 of the Code directing for an interim bond can be made only after commencement of the inquiry but before its completion. The direction of the Magistrate to execute interim bonds without commencing the inquiry is illegal since in such a case, he exceeds in exercising the jurisdiction vested in him. ( 8 ) SECTION 116 (3) of the Code which permits direction to execute interim bond specifically states that the power can be invoked after commencement of the inquiry. The underlying idea is to have some materials on record to satisfy the mind of the Magistrate that the allegation made against (he opposite party is at least prima facie true. This was thought necessary as execution of even interim bond affects the reputation of the concerned person adversely. So, commencement of the inquiry was regarded as a precondition to ask execution of interim bonds. It is only after commencement of the inquiry that materials necessary for recording a prima facie satisfaction about correctness of the allegation would come on record. This was thought necessary as execution of even interim bond affects the reputation of the concerned person adversely. So, commencement of the inquiry was regarded as a precondition to ask execution of interim bonds. It is only after commencement of the inquiry that materials necessary for recording a prima facie satisfaction about correctness of the allegation would come on record. ( 9 ) IN the case at hand, the impugned order dated 15-9-1987 calling upon the present petitioners to execute interim bonds suffers from the infirmities mentioned above and discussed in the decisions referred to in Para 7. No doubt, the records show the presence of two witnesses in the Court but they were not examined and the reason given by the learned Magistrate for their nonexamination was that they were found absent on call. I may observe here that the duty of the Magistrate did not end there. It was obligatory on the part of the learned Magistrate to inquire into the allegations in the preliminary report and satisfy himself about the truth or otherwise of the allegations and only if the learned Magistrate found prima facie truth in the allegations, he would have been justified in directing the petitioners to execute interim bonds. This mandate, as per law, having not been followed, the order is liable to be quashed. ( 10 ) THE next point for consideration is whether the proceeding in question in the lower Court should continue. In a decision of our own High Court reported in 53 (1982) C. L. T. 38 Purnananda Behera and another v. Sunakar Singh and another; the proceeding was quashed in the interest of justice since by the time of the order a considerable time had elapsed, but the Court held that the Magistrate was free to initiate a fresh proceeding in case there existed apprehension of breach of peace. ( 11 ) IN the present case at hand, more than three years have elapsed in the meantime since the preliminary order was passed directing initiation of the proceeding. A retrospect of the peculiar circumstances in which the proceeding was initiated will show that, no doubt, at one stage the flood-gates of bad-blood, mistrust and ill-will were wide open on account of factional rivalry between the two groups. It is not known whether the same situation still continues in the village. A retrospect of the peculiar circumstances in which the proceeding was initiated will show that, no doubt, at one stage the flood-gates of bad-blood, mistrust and ill-will were wide open on account of factional rivalry between the two groups. It is not known whether the same situation still continues in the village. The hearing hands of time might have been able to bring amity in the meantime between the two groups and a cordial and inviting atmosphere of good will and friendship might have prevailed in the village. To allow the proceeding to continue after lapse of three years and more may again regenerate a bad feeling and retrograde the situation and might give scope to the parties to be taken themselves to further violence with renewed vigour for a fresh clash. ( 12 ) IN the result, the revision is allowed and the proceeding is quashed. It is, however, left open for the Magistrate to start a fresh proceeding if there still exists apprehension of breach of peace. Revision allowed.