Judgment :- The appellant is a dealer in hides and skins. According to the statutory authorities, the dealer used to buy hides and skins, tan them and sell the dressed hides and skins mostly to exporters. Against the determination of turnover by the assessing authority for the assessment year 1978-79, the appellant filed an appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner where the principal objection raised related to the purchase turnover of raw hides and skins which purchases had been made by the assessee for the purpose of complying with the agreement or order for or in relation to such export. In short, the assessee had claimed exemption by virtue of section5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, hereinafter referred to as "the Central Act" read with the proviso to section9 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, hereinafter called "the State Act". The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, after hearing the parties, remitted the matter to the assessing authority to re-examine the appellant's claim in the light of the judgment of this Court in Mahi Traders v. State of Tamil Nadu 1980 (45) STC 327 . While the matter was pending finalisation before the assessing authority, the Joint Commissioner, in exercise of the suo motu powers of revision, proposed to revise the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and after issuing notice to the assessee and inviting objections as well as hearing the assessee, the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was set aside and that of the assessing authority was restored. The question in short, therefore, in this appeal is whether the benefit of section 5(3) exemption under the Central Act can be granted to the appellant. 2. The precise issue came up for consideration by a Bench of this Court in Azeezur Rahman & Co. The question in short, therefore, in this appeal is whether the benefit of section 5(3) exemption under the Central Act can be granted to the appellant. 2. The precise issue came up for consideration by a Bench of this Court in Azeezur Rahman & Co. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1991 (82) STC 355 and after a detailed discussion and noticing that the judgment of this Court rendered in Mahi Traders v. State of Tamil Nadu 1980 (45) STC 327 had been affirmed by the Apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Mahi Traders 1989 AIR(SC) 1167, 1989 (23) ECR 193, 1989 (40) ELT 266 , 1989 (1) JT 196 , 1989 (73) STC 228, 1989 (1) Scale 267 , 1989 (1) SCC 724 , 1989 (1) SCR 445 , 1989 (1) UJ 593 , 1989 (8) STJ 139, 1989 (22) ECC 1, 1989 UPTC 737, 1989 SCC(Tax) 190this Court opined thus : "For the purpose of determining the entitlement of an assessee to the benefit of section5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act as far as the declared goods are concerned, the context and setting as well as the description of the commodity also becomes vitally relevant. Having regard to the wording of section14(iii) of the Central Act, raw hides and skins and dressed hides and skins are to be treated as one and the same. The fact that raw hides and skins are subjected to certain process of preservation does not render them any the less hides and skins. In our view, the description of the entry as contained in section14(iii) of the Central Act has reference and relates to 'hides and skins' and the specification of the goods as 'hides and skins' constitutes the genus and the further description following the same, i.e., 'whether in a raw or dressed state' not only is inclusive in nature but is meant to be comprehensive enough to include all its species or products emerging from hides and skins until the process of dressing or finishing is done. The entry as it is found in section 14(iii), in a sense, indicates the legislative intent and in our view constitutes legislative recognition of the fact of the position that simply because manufacturing process of preservative nature is undergone by raw hides different goods do not necessarily emerge. The entry as it is found in section 14(iii), in a sense, indicates the legislative intent and in our view constitutes legislative recognition of the fact of the position that simply because manufacturing process of preservative nature is undergone by raw hides different goods do not necessarily emerge. Such a construction will also be an inevitable consequence of the purpose and object of section14(iii) and section15 of the Central Act and consequently for purposes of determining a claim vis-a-vis section5(3) of the Central Act, the fact that they are commercially treated as distinct commodities or that entry 7 of the Second Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, deals with them as two different and distinct commodities becomes wholly irrelevant. Thus, raw hides and skins and dressed hides and skins are merely the nomenclature used to identify and indicate the different condition or stages of processing of the one and the same commodity, namely, 'hides and skins'. If even during or at either of these stages also the commodity continues to be 'hides and skins' only, the criteria of 'those goods' as found in section5(3) of the Central Act must be held to have been satisfied. We are, therefore, of the view that the order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained and consequently the same is set aside in so far as the claim pertaining to exemption claimed under section5(3) of the Central Act is concerned." * The learned counsel for the parties are greed that the judgment applies to this case fully. 3. From a perusal of the orders of the Joint Commissioner we find that the benefit of the exemption under section5(3) of the Central Act was denied to the appellant without going into the question as to whether and to what extent the essential prerequisites stipulated in section5(3) of the Central Act had been fulfilled by the turnover and the transactions in question. These are matters which require proper verification with reference to the relevant record. These are matters which require proper verification with reference to the relevant record. While, therefore, setting aside the order of the Joint Commissioner and resorting that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, we clarify that the assessing authority, to whom the matter stood remanded by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall consider the case of the appellant in the light of the declaration of law made by this Court in Azeezur Rahman and Company v. State of Tamil Nadu 1991 (82) STC 355 . The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. 1992-(087)-STC -0401 -KAR STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER v. PRABHA SOAPS AND SYNTHETICS. (W.A. NO. 722 OF 1991). COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER, V CIRCLE, HUBLI v. GOPAL INDUSTRIES. (W.A. NO. 2340 OF 1991). W.A. Nos. 722 and 2340 of 1991, decided on December 5, 1991. H. L. Dattu, Government Advocate, for the appellants in both appeals. S. S. Angadi and B. V. Katageri, for the respondents in W.A. No. 722 of 1991. E. R. Indrakumar, for the respondents in W.A. No. 2340 of 1991. JUDGMENT The Judgment was delivered by S. P. BHARUCHA, C.J. - We are concerned in these appeals with three exemption notifications issued under the provisions of section8-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (for short "the Act"). The three notifications are in substantially identical terms. The last of them, dated 31st March, 1984, may be reproduced. JUDGMENT The Judgment was delivered by S. P. BHARUCHA, C.J. - We are concerned in these appeals with three exemption notifications issued under the provisions of section8-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (for short "the Act"). The three notifications are in substantially identical terms. The last of them, dated 31st March, 1984, may be reproduced. It reads thus : "In exercise of the powers conferred by section8-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (Karnataka Act 25 of 1957) and in supersession of Notification No. FD 51 CSL 83, dated 31st March, 1983, the Government of Karnataka hereby reduces with effect from the 1st day of April, 1984, the rate of tax payable by a dealer under section5 of the said Act on the sale of handmade washing soaps manufactured by him to four per cent provided that the total turnover of any such dealer in a year does not exceed rupees ten lakhs." * The question that we have to answer in these appeals may be put thus : Whether the "total turnover" of a dealer referred to in the notifications means, as the assessees contend, only the turnover in handmade washing soaps or, as the Revenue contends, the total turnover of the dealer in all goods in which he deals including handmade washing soaps ? The authorities below having come to a conclusion in favour of the Revenue, the assessees filed the writ petitions. The learned single Judge held that the contention of the assessees was correct and, accordingly, set aside the notices issued to the assessees by the Revenue. Hence, these appeals. Our attention was drawn by Mr. H. L. Dattu, learned High Court Government Advocate, appearing for the Revenue, to the provisions of section 2(1)(u-2) of the Act which defines "total turnover". Thereunder "total turnover" means "the aggregate turnover in all goods of a dealer at all places of business in the State, whether or not the whole or any portion of such turnover is liable to tax, including the turnover of purchase or sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of export of the goods out of the territory of India or in the course of import of the goods into the territory of India". We may also note the definition of" turnover"in section 2(1)(v) of the Act. We may also note the definition of" turnover"in section 2(1)(v) of the Act. It means" the aggregate amount for which goods are bought or sold or supplied or distributed ....... by a dealer, either directly or through another, on his own account or an account of others, whether for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration" * .Mr. H. L. Dattu submitted that, having regard to the definition of "total turnover" in the Act the expression in the notifications issued under the Act should bear the same meaning. In this behalf he relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of B.P. Automobiles v. State of Karnataka 1984 (55) STC 93 , 1983 (2) LJ 105, 1983 (2) Kar(LJ) 105. The provisions of section6B(1) of the Act used the expression "total turnover". It was argued that the expression in section 6B(1) ought not to be read in accord with the definition under section 2(1)(u-2). The Division Bench, upon consideration of the arguments, came to the conclusion that the contention of the Revenue, namely, that the expression total turnover in section 6B(1) was required to be read in terms of section 2(1)(u-2), had to be upheld. Mr. Dattu also drew our attention to the decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Radha Dyeing and Printing Mills 1981 (48) STC 61, wherein it was held that, in view of the provisions of the General Clauses Act, where any Act conferred a power to issue a notification, order, rule or bye-law, an expression used in such notification, order, rule or bye-law ought, unless there was anything repugnant in the subject or context, to bear the same meaning as it bore in the Act conferring the power. On behalf of the assessees it was submitted thus : "The expression 'total turnover' as it occurs in the notifications should be confined to the total turnover of only handmade washing soaps. Any other construction would result in an anomalous situation in that although a dealer dealt in handmade washing soaps and his total turnover therein was less than Rs. On behalf of the assessees it was submitted thus : "The expression 'total turnover' as it occurs in the notifications should be confined to the total turnover of only handmade washing soaps. Any other construction would result in an anomalous situation in that although a dealer dealt in handmade washing soaps and his total turnover therein was less than Rs. 10, 00, 000 but the sales of other goods were included, he would lose the benefit of the notifications, but a dealer who had a turnover of handmade washing soaps and various other goods and his total turnover in all the goods was less than Rs. 10, 00, 000, he derived the benefit of the notifications." * Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Kaushalya Naryanan v. Dadajee Dhackjee & Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. 1980 ELT 102, where the principle set out in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 12th edition, page 228, was approved. Put briefly, Maxwell said that where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, led to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment or to some inconvenience or absurdity which could hardly have been intended, a construction could be put upon it which modified the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. Counsel for the assessees also relied upon the judgment in Nyadar Singh v. Union of India . The Supreme Court observed that the meaning to be given to statutory language depended on the evaluation of a number of interpretative criteria. Shorn of the context, words by themselves were "slippery customers". The Supreme Court also said that it was true that statutory language should be given its most obvious meaning, "to accord with how a man in the street might answer the problems posed by the words" * , the statute had to be taken as one found it. Considerations relevant to interpretation were not whether a differently conceived or worded statute would have yielded results more consonant with fairness and reasonableness. Consequences did not alter the statutory language, but could only help to fix its meaning. We have no doubt that the language of the notifications is clear. Considerations relevant to interpretation were not whether a differently conceived or worded statute would have yielded results more consonant with fairness and reasonableness. Consequences did not alter the statutory language, but could only help to fix its meaning. We have no doubt that the language of the notifications is clear. It states that the rate of tax payable by a dealer under the Act on the sale of handmade washing soaps manufactured by him is reduced to 4 per cent provided that his total turnover in a year does not exceed Rs. 10, 00, 000. As the notifications read it is clear that the expression "total turnover" is meant to include the turnover in respect of handmade washing soaps and of goods other than handmade washing soaps, if the dealer deals in such. To construe the notification in any other manner would be to render the word "total" in the expression "total turnover" otiose, and that is impermissible.We turn now to the source of the power to exempt. It is contained in section8-A of the Act. Under sub-section (1) thereof the State Government is empowered to make an exemption or reduction in rate in respect of any tax which is payable under the Act and, under sub-section (2) thereof, the exemption or reduction can be made subject to such restrictions and conditions as are specified in the exemption notification. The reduction of the rate of tax payable by a dealer on the sale of handmade washing soap manufactured by him is empowered by sub-section (1) of section 8-A. The condition upon which a dealer can avail of the reduction is that his total turnover in a year does not exceed Rs. 10, 00, 000 and the imposition of such condition is empowered by sub-section (2) of section 8-A. There is, therefore, every reason to interpret the expression "total turnover" in the notification in conformity with the definition thereof in section 2(1)(u-2) of the Act and no justification for interpreting it differently. We see no anomaly in the notifications, either as contended or otherwise. The obvious purpose is to assist and encourage the comparatively smaller dealer in handmade washing soaps. It gets the advantage of the notifications if, overall, his turnover is less than Rs. 10, 00, 000. We see no anomaly in the notifications, either as contended or otherwise. The obvious purpose is to assist and encourage the comparatively smaller dealer in handmade washing soaps. It gets the advantage of the notifications if, overall, his turnover is less than Rs. 10, 00, 000. Counsel for the assessees placed great emphasis upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Punjab National Hotel 1985 (58) STC 68. The Division Bench was concerned with the interpretation of an exemption notification issued under the Bombay Sales Tax Act. The notification prescribed conditions for the availability of the exemption. The second condition used the expression "turnover of sales". The Division Bench observed that the expression "turnover of sales" would normally be interpreted as "total turnover of sales" or the "turnover of all sales" in view of the definition given to that expression in the Bombay Act. The question, however was whether the context in which the expression was used required that a more limited meaning should be given to it. The Division Bench examined the notification in detail. It quoted the opening part thereof and found that the classes of sales or purchases referred to therein had to be sales or purchases which would have been liable to tax under the Bombay Act but for the exemption granted to them. The sales referred to, therefore, were only such sales which would not have been exempted from the payment of tax under the Bombay Act but for the exemption granted by the notification. The condition referred to such classes of sales, so that it referred only to the turnover of taxable sales. The Division Bench also drew support from the fact that the notification, as it had originally been issued, had spoken of "turnover of the registered dealer of all sales" and that the word "all" had subsequently been deleted. The condition referred to such classes of sales, so that it referred only to the turnover of taxable sales. The Division Bench also drew support from the fact that the notification, as it had originally been issued, had spoken of "turnover of the registered dealer of all sales" and that the word "all" had subsequently been deleted. The Division Bench held that, looking to the language used in the opening part of the notification it appeared that the word "all" had been deleted with a view to make it clear that the turnover of sales referred to was only the turnover of taxable sales.There is nothing in the notification before us which can, upon analysis, lead us to the conclusion that the expression "total turnover" therein must in any manner be restricted and should not mean what it plainly does and what is is defined to mean under section 2(1)(u-2). In a sense this Bombay authority is actually against the assessees. It is clear that the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was impressed by the fact that the notification before it had originally used the words "all sales" and that the word "all" had been deleted. This suggested that the word "all" had been deleted to make it possible to give a limited construction to the words "turnover ..... of sales". To put it differently, the Bombay authority suggests that "total turnover" must be interpreted to mean what it plainly says, namely, the aggregate of the turnover in all goods. Attention was also invited to the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Hiranand Tejumal v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1962 (13) STC 74 . The word "turnover" was used in section13(1) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, and the expression was defined in section 2(t) thereof. The court held that it was true that the word "turnover" as defined in section 2(t) meant the aggregate of the amount of sale price in respect of all goods, whether or not any portion of such turnover was liable to tax, but this was prefixed and conditioned by the expression "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context". Having regard to the anomalous consequences that the court set out, there was a doubt as to the true meaning of the word as used in section 13(1). Having regard to the anomalous consequences that the court set out, there was a doubt as to the true meaning of the word as used in section 13(1). In that situation the court had to come to a decision as to the true meaning having regard to the subject-matter of the enactment and the object which the Legislature had in view. The anomaly the court found read thus : "So construed, the cases arising with reference to section 13 may be classified as under : (i) If a dealer carries on business only in the goods specified in Schedule III and his turnover exceeds Rs. 50, 000, the concession is not available. (ii) if, in the case mentioned above, the turnover does not exceed Rs. 50, 000, the concession is available in respect of the entire turnover. (iii) If the dealer carries on business in the goods specified in Schedule III and also in other goods and his total turnover exceeds Rs. 50, 000, the concession is not available even though the turnover in respect of the specified goods may be below Rs. 50, 000. (iv) If, in the above case, the total turnover does not exceed Rs. 50, 000, the concession is available but it is limited to the turnover in respect of the specified goods. Since the concession is not available except as regards the turnover in respect of the specified goods, the consequences are clearly anomalous. In certain cases, it may be claimed up to the limit of Rs. 50, 000. In other cases, it cannot be had even if the turnover in respect of the specified goods does not exceed a much smaller amount ......" * In the instant case we find the notification to be clear and to lead to no anomaly. The notification must, therefore, be read in as it stands. Attention was, lastly, drawn by counsel for the assessees to the judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in M.P. Shoe House v. State of M.P. 1987 (67) STC 427 . This was a case in which the notification giving the exemption restricted it to a dealer "who deals exclusively in footwear made of rubber and/or plastic and the sale price of such footwear does not exceed rupees ten per pair". The case of the petitioner was that the word" exclusively" * ought to be quashes because it rendered the notification arbitrary. The case of the petitioner was that the word" exclusively" * ought to be quashes because it rendered the notification arbitrary. The court found, allowing the petitions, that even in big cities dealers exclusively dealing in rubber or plastic footwear were few in number and, in villages, the position would be worse since there were usually small shops selling all necessary items. The poor labourer, for whose benefit the exemption was found to be granted, would either have to pay sales tax if he bought footwear at one of these shops or travel miles to find a dealer dealing exclusively in rubber or plastic footwear. The presence of the word "exclusively" defeated the purpose of the notification and seemed to have no nexus with it, especially since a similar notification issued subsequently under the same Act contained no such restriction.We are not dealing with writ petitions in which the assessees seek to have the word "total" in the notifications quashed, nor have we before us a similar notification issued under the same Act which does not contain the word " total. It is difficult to see what bearing this judgment can have upon the case before us. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the orders under appeal, are set aside. The writ petitions of the assessees are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Writ appeals allowed.