ARJEES WOOL AND FUR INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD v. ALLAHABAD BANK
1991-04-23
H.C.MITTAL
body1991
DigiLaw.ai
H. C. MITTAL, J. ( 1 ) THE revisionists are defendants in suit No. 328 of 1989, filed by Allahabad Bank, Branch Mussorie, district Dehradun, the respondent. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case, in brief, are that in respect of Agricultural Loan, National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (Nabard) had recommended to the Bank to advance a sum of Rs. 41. 26 lacs to the Revisionist but instead of providing loan in terms of Nabard scheme a total sum of Rs. 24. 08 lacs only had been advanced. That as the plaintiff failed to advance the balance of Rs. 19. 17 lacs, the defendants concerned suffered a serious loss and damage and for that the defendants filed a suit for damages before the Calcutta High Court praying for a decree of Rs. 2,36,11000. 00 and that suit No. 455 of 1989 is pending before the Honble High Court at Calcutta. As a counter blast the plaintiff filed a suit before the Civil Judge, Mussoorie, at Dehradun and prayed for the recovery of Rs, 39,98,744. 65. In that suit the plaintiff-respondent specified that defendant No. 1 hypothecated in favour of the plaintiff all the future product goods and movable property including all plants, Engines, Machineries etc. , through a letter of hypothecation dtd. 15-11-84. That defendant Nos. 2 to 4 also stood as guarantors of defendant No. 1 with a liability, being joint and several, and created an equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds in respect of the property through the mortgage agreement dated 15-11-84, hence the suit was filed as a suit on the basis of mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Though the suit was on the basis of mortgage but still in the relief claimed there was no prayer for preliminary and final decree, hence the plaintiff moved an application for amendment of the plaint alleging that due to over-sight the word "preliminary" had been omitted from the relief clause and as a consequence thereof some other amendments were also to be done and it was prayed that the word "preliminary" be added before the word "decree" and subsequently on the defendants failure "a final decree may kindly be passed debarring defendants 1 and 2 from all rights to redeem mortgaged property". The learned court below allowed the application in spite of objection. On being aggrieved, this revision has been preferred.
The learned court below allowed the application in spite of objection. On being aggrieved, this revision has been preferred. ( 3 ) THE only point pressed in this revision is that so far the amendment of addition of words "preliminary" and "final decree" was concerned, the revisionist had no objection but the plaintiff could not also claim the relief regarding debarring the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from all rights to redeem the mortgaged property which clearly amounts to a relief of foreclosure which could not legally be granted on the allegations made in the plaint and the nature of the suit on the basis of amortgage by deposit of title deeds and, therefore, the order of the learned court below was clearly against the provisions of law and the Civil Judge has acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction while allowing that part of the amendment application. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel for the parties agreed that this revision be finally disposed of, hence the arguments were heard on merits. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the respondents it was urged that the plaintiff has only claimed amendment in the relief which he was entitled to claim at any stage of the suit and even if the relief claimed was not legal or which may not be granted to him, still the amendment has rightly been allowed and this Court in revision would not recall that order and if initially relief of foreclosure had been there in the plaint then the Court would not have ordered its deletion on the application of the defendants. ( 6 ) THE contention that if initially the relief of foreclosure had already been in the plaint the same could not have been deleted on the application of the defendant revisionist on the facts of the present case is not sound. Order VI rule 16 of the Civil Procedure Code reads as under :-"striking out pleadings - The Court may at any stage of the pleadings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading - (a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or (b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.
" ( 7 ) IN view of the above provision if any matter in the pleadings is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, is liable to be struck off. Thus the power is there with the Court to strike out any portion of the pleadings under the circumstances stated above. Hence an embarrassing plea is liable to be struck off. The question whether a plea is embarrassing, is a question of fact in view of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. A claim or defence which a party is not entitled to make use of, or a pleading which contains irrelevant allegation is embarrassing. In the case of Dal Chand v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1983 Rajasthan 23 it has been held that the defence of benami transaction was inconsistent and based on contradictory facts and could not be taken by the defendants in respect of the pronote and that was liable to be struck out under Order VI rule 16 on the ground that the same will embarrass and delay the trial of the suit. The suit was based on a negotiable instrument and it is not open to either side to show that they acted Benami through others. Benami transactions are not recognized in connection with negotiable instruments. Hence the claim which would affront any statutory provision was liable to be struck off. ( 8 ) AS regards the contention that the amendment sought did not change the nature of the suit and it amounted only to a relief in the alternative and could not be rejected, for that reliance has been placed on the following decisions by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents. ( 9 ) FIRM Srinivas Ram v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 177 wherein it has been held that a plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative.
( 9 ) FIRM Srinivas Ram v. Mahabir Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 177 wherein it has been held that a plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. ( 10 ) NAND Lal Mehton v. Naubat Mehton, AIR 1965 Patna 345 wherein it was held that where any variation is made either in the cause of action or the subject matter of the suit as a result of the amendment of the plaint, there is nothing illegal on the part of the Court to allow the amendment relating to the alternative relief. ( 11 ) JAI Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. N. B. Material Supply Gurgaon, AIR 1969 SC 1267 wherein it has been held that rules of procedure are intended to be a hand-maid to the administration of Justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or infraction of the rules of procedure (Underlined mine ). ( 12 ) THERE can be no two opinions against above referred to decisions but the same are not applicable to the facts of the present revision. ( 13 ) PATEL Construction and Co. v. S. R. Amulakh, AIR 1973 Gujarat 283. In that case it was held that where the effect of amendment would be to oust the jurisdiction of the Court which it originally had, the proper course would be to allow the amendment and then to return the amended plaint for presentation to proper court. Prima facie this decision is of no relevance. ( 14 ) JAMMA v. Raghu, AIR 1977 Orissa 12. It was also held that amendment of pleadings can be granted at any stage of the litigation. It is also of no relevance. ( 15 ) LASTLY, in the case of Siya Ram Das v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 Patna 98, it was held that if the new relief on same set of facts and cause of action does not effect any change in the nature of the suit then the same should be allowed.
It is also of no relevance. ( 15 ) LASTLY, in the case of Siya Ram Das v. State of Bihar, AIR 1979 Patna 98, it was held that if the new relief on same set of facts and cause of action does not effect any change in the nature of the suit then the same should be allowed. ( 16 ) RELIANCE was also placed on Mangal Dass v. Union of India, AIR 1973 Delhi 96, wherein it was held that the Court in deciding the propriety of amendment cannot probe into the merits of the proposed amendment. It is also true that where an amendment of plaint is sought in order to take up a new ground the Court at that stage cannot consider whether the ground is available to the plaintiff or not and the amendment on that score cannot be disallowed. ( 17 ) HOWEVER, when the proposed amendment affronts a legal provision, it is to be rejected as already held above that if the plea affronts a legal provision it is liable to be struck off as well. ( 18 ) IN the case of Ram Singh v. Smt. Sona Devi, AIR 1988 Him Pra 27 the defendant had previously taken the plea that he was either owner of the house in dispute or had become owner thereof by having been in adverse possession for over 12 years but subsequently he filed an application for amendment seeking to assert that he was the real owner of the house and that the plaintiff was a mere Benami and sale was effected in favour of the plaintiff with a view to avoid attachment and sale thereof at the instance of his creditors. It was held that the defendant did not inhere any rights in himself to challenge the validity of sale transaction against the plaintiff even if it was a fraudulent one within the meaning of S. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, being made with an intent to defeat or delay the interest of the creditors of the defendant. It was held that the proposed amendment, if allowed, would amount to affront the provisions of S. 53 of the T. P. Act and the amendment was rejected. ( 19 ) IN the present case admittedly the suit is on the basis of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds.
It was held that the proposed amendment, if allowed, would amount to affront the provisions of S. 53 of the T. P. Act and the amendment was rejected. ( 19 ) IN the present case admittedly the suit is on the basis of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Under S. 76, T. P. Act the right of foreclosure is only to a mortgagee who is mortgagee by conditional sale or a mortgagee under an anomalous mortgage by the terms of which he is entitled to foreclose, to institute a suit for foreclosure, or a usufructuary mortgagee as such. ( 20 ) SECTION 96 of the Transfer of Property Act further specifically provides that the provisions hereinbefore contained which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Hence in a mortgage by deposit of title deeds a decree as may be passed in a suit of a simple mortgage can only be passed. A decree for foreclosure cannot be passed in a suit of mortgage by deposit of title deeds and, therefore, the relief sought to be added by the words "debarring defendants 1 and 2 from all rights to redeem the mortgaged property" clearly amounts to a relief of foreclosure which it clearly an affront to Sections 76 and 96 of the T. P. Act and, therefore, the learned court below has exceeded in its jurisdiction while allowing the amendment of such a relief which legally the plaintiff cannot be entitled on the allegations made in the plaint of a suit for mortgage by deposit of title deeds. ( 21 ) THE revision is, therefore, allowed in part and the amendment relating to the addition of the words "debarring defendants 1 and 2 from all rights to redeem the mortgaged property", which has already been incorporated in the relief claimed, is directed to be struck off and the amendment application to that extent stands dismissed. ( 22 ) THE revision is decided accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this revision. Revision allowed. .