P. N. Nag, J. ( 1 ) THESE writ petitions raise important and interestingquestions of law, which can be formulated as follows ; (1) Whether the deposit of tax amount under Section 170 (b) of thedelhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1937 (herdnafier referred to as the Act ) is a condition precedent for hearing or determination ofthe appeal but also for filing of memorandum of appeal ? (2) Whether the District Judge baa a discretion to grant stay of thedisputed amount or dispense with the condition of predeposit ofthe amount in appeal, with or without condi iion, in the office ofcorporation ? Further what is the amount in deposit in appeal ? (3) Incuse it is held that the deposit tax amount under Section,170 (b) of the Act is a condition precedent for hearing or determination of the appeal and the District Judge has no discretion. to grant stay of the deposit of tax amonot and dispense with thecondition of pro-deposit of amount with or without conditions,whether such provision is ultra vires ? ( 2 ) IN Civil Writ Petition No. 148/89 the matter was referred by thedivision Bench of this Court on 17/01/1989 to the Full Bench forthe reason that certain other writ petitions on such questions have beenadmitted, although the judgment of the Division Bench comprising of V. S. Deshpande and Yogeshwar Dayal, JJ. in Civil Writ Petition No. 963/75panchsheela House Building Cooperative v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the Panchsheela case ) already covers some issuesinvolved. Therefore, Panchsheela case requires reconsideration. ( 3 ) IN Panchsheela case the Division Bench of this Court has taken aview that an appeal is filed to be heard. On constructions of Sections 169to 171 of the Act, the deposit of the amount is a condition precedent to thehearing of the appeal and an appeal cannot be entertained or filed unlessthe condition is complied with. The appellant cannot insist on the appellatecourt receiving the memo of appeal but disabling itself from bearing theappeal by the mere refusal of the appellant to deposit the amount. ( 4 ) SIMILAR questions arose in Civil Writ Petition No. 2799/87 L. K. Goyal v. M. CD. which was dismissed by a Division Bench of tbi Court comprisingof N. N. Goswamy and Arun B. Saharya. ( 4 ) SIMILAR questions arose in Civil Writ Petition No. 2799/87 L. K. Goyal v. M. CD. which was dismissed by a Division Bench of tbi Court comprisingof N. N. Goswamy and Arun B. Saharya. JJ on 25-9-1987 by relyingupon Panchsheela case In S. K. Verma v. Municipal Corporation, Delhireported in 1988 RLR 487 D. P. Wadhwa, J. also expressed the same view byfollowing Panchsheela case and dismissed the matter. However. Wad, J. inpunj Sons (P) Ltd v. Municipal Corporation reported in 1982 RLR 247 hastaken. a conflicting view. He has held that an appeal under Section 169could not be heard or determined unless the amount, as directed by thedistrict judge, was deposited by the appellant However, the district judgehad a discretion to direct deposit of an admitted amount or disputed amountor a part of the total tax amount, as directed by the district judge, wasdeposited by the appellant. However, the district judge bad a discretion todirect deposit of an admilled amount or disputed amount or a part of thetotal tax amount, with or without conditions. According to him the literalinterpretation of Section 170 (b) of the Act could perhaps lead to the resultnot intended by the scheme of taxation under the Act. In such a situationsection 457 read with Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure can beipressed in service to resolve the conflicting interest of the assessees and thecorporation. The District Court can in exercise of the discretion of Appellate Authority direct the appropriate sum to be deposited by assessee beforethe appeal is heard. In a given case it may be proper to direct the depositof an admitted amount In another case, the interest of justice would beserved by directing deposit of the disputed amount. The exercise of thediscretion is necessary both in the interest of the assessee and the Corporation and to make Section 170 workable. ( 5 ) IT appears the Panchsheela case was not brought to the notice oflearned single Judge. Although the questions formulated are involved inboth the writ petitions. CWs. 148/89 and 179/89, however, for the purposeof this Judgment, I am referring to the facts of CW 179/89 in brief that thepetitioner is the owner of the property in dispute, viz, B-13, Lawrence Roadindustrial Area. Delhi. This plot was allotted to him under a policy ofshifting of industries from conjusted business area in Old Delhi. CWs. 148/89 and 179/89, however, for the purposeof this Judgment, I am referring to the facts of CW 179/89 in brief that thepetitioner is the owner of the property in dispute, viz, B-13, Lawrence Roadindustrial Area. Delhi. This plot was allotted to him under a policy ofshifting of industries from conjusted business area in Old Delhi. Thoughthe costruction was started by him in 1971, it had to be given up in 1972or so on account of paucity of funds and material After re-validation ofplans in 1979 by the D. D. A. the construction was re-commenced add completedsome time in 1983 The Deputy Assessor A Collector vide his orderdated 23/12/1986 assessed the rateable value of the property as Rs. 2,28,650. 00 with affect from 27- 6-1983. the date when the party applied forcompletion certificate. According to the petitioner, the rateable value witheffect from 1/03/1984 should be only Rs. 94,920. 00 as opposed to Rs. 2,28,650. 00 with effect from 27-6-1983. The petitioner being aggrieved againtthis order of assessment of reteable value of the Deputy Assessor and Collectorfiled an appeal before the District Judge under Section 169 of the Act whichwas dismissed by him vide order dated 13-10-1988 on the preliminary pointthat the petitioner has not deposited the amount as required under Section170 (b) of the Act which is a condition precedent for the purpose of maintainability of the appeal. The judgment of Panchsheela case was also reliedupon. Being aggrieved against this order of the District Judge dated13-10-1988, the petitioner has tiled the present writ petition on variousgrounds inter alia, that the rateable value has not been fixed by the Deputyassessor and collector in accordance with law. Apart from that the impugnedjudgment is illegal as the District Judge should not have thrown out thecase merely because of non-deposit of the amount under Section 170 (b) of theact as under Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which has beenmade applicable under Section 457 of the Act, the District Judge has discretion to grant stay of the deposit of the disputed amount or dispense withthe requirement of pre-deposit with or without conditions in appeal. Furthermore it is held that pre-deposit of the amount under Section 170 (b) ismandatory for the maintainability of the appeal, in such a situation Section170 (b) is unconstitutional, ultra vires, illegal and deserves to be struck down. Furthermore it is held that pre-deposit of the amount under Section 170 (b) ismandatory for the maintainability of the appeal, in such a situation Section170 (b) is unconstitutional, ultra vires, illegal and deserves to be struck down. Even otherwise the appeal before the District Judge should have been considered against the rateable value assessed by the Deputy Assessor and Collectorfor one year only, i. e. ,1983 and for subsequent years the decision of thedistrict Judge would have been automatically applicable as the rateablevalue as fixed in 1983 would govern the field for the subsequent years aswell The petitioner had already deposited Rs. 1 lac in two instalments ofrs. 50,000. 00 each, almost double the amount what is required to be depositedfor one year as according to the petitioner, the amount of tax would bers. 54,877. 00 per year only and. therefore, even the requirarment of pre-depositunder Section 170 (b) also stands complied with Consequently the petitionerhas prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the judgment dated 13/10/1988 of the District Jadge and to issue a writ of mandamus declaringsection 170 (b) of the Act as unconstitutional and for hearing the appealunder Section 169 of the Act on merits. ( 6 ) MR Rohatgi, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted thatfor the purpose of filing an appeat under Section 169 of the Act against thelevy or assessment of any tax betore the court of the district judge of Delhi. it is not necessary that the amount in dispute in the appeal should be deposited by the appellant in the office of the Corporation under Section 170 (b)of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act as the condition of pre-deposit of theamount is only for the purpose of hearing or determination of the appealand not for the purpose of filing such an appeal. The judgment in Panchsheela case does not lay down the correct law wherein this court has heldthat the deposit of amount is condition precedent to the hearwing of the appealand an appeal cannot be entertained or filed unless the condition is compliedwith. On the other hand, the judgment in Punj Sons case (supra) correctlydecides the issue where it has been held that unless the amount is deposited,no appeal shall be heard or determined. Normally, no appeal shall bedetermined unless it is beard. Tbi would suggest that the appeal can befiled by the assessee without deposit of any amount. On the other hand, the judgment in Punj Sons case (supra) correctlydecides the issue where it has been held that unless the amount is deposited,no appeal shall be heard or determined. Normally, no appeal shall bedetermined unless it is beard. Tbi would suggest that the appeal can befiled by the assessee without deposit of any amount. The District Judge atthe time of hearing shall have the discretion to direct the deposit of anadmitted amount or disputed amount or a part of the total tax amount, withor without conditions In view of Section 457 of the Act, Order 41 Rule 5of the Code of Civil Procedure can be pressed in service to resolve the conflicting interest of the assesses and the Corporation. In order to appreciatethis contention the relevant portion of Section 170 (b) is reproduced below. : "170. Conditions of right to appealno appeal shall be heard or determined under Section 169 unless- (a ). . . . . . . . . (b) the amount, if any, in dispute in the appeal has been deposited by the appellant in the office of the Corporation". ( 7 ) A bare perusal of Section 170 of the Act reveals that there is nobar for filing a memorandum of appeal. The only restriction imposed undersection 170 (b) of the Act is that the pre-deposit of the amount is necessaryonly for hearing or detcrmination of the appeal. I do not find anythingcontrary to such an interpretation in Section 169 and 171 of the Act, whichalto deal with or relate to the different mages of the appeal, in this connection, refence may be made to M/s Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Asstt Commissioner (Judicial) 1, Sales Tax, Kaupur Range, Kanpur andanother AIR 1968 SC 488 ). In that case one of the questions that arosefor consideration was whether an appeal under Section of the U. P. Salestax Act. 15 of 1948 before the prescribed authority could be entertainedunless it is accompanied by a satisfactory proof of the payment of tax andin the absence of which the appeal itself would become incompetent. Theproviso to Section 9 of the Act provided that no appeal against an assessmentshall been entertained unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of thepayment of the amount of tax admitted by the appellant to be due. Theproviso to Section 9 of the Act provided that no appeal against an assessmentshall been entertained unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of thepayment of the amount of tax admitted by the appellant to be due. In thiscontext the Supreme Court also examined certain decisions of Allahabadhigh Court wherein that court bag interpreted Order 21 Rule 90 of the Codeof Civil Procedure which had been amended by that court. The relevantproviso to changed rule is to the following effect : "provided that no application to set aside the sale aball be entertained : (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . (b) unless the applicant deposits such amount not exceeding12 1/2% of the sum realised by the sale or furnishes suchsecurity as the court may in its discretion fix except whenfor reasons to be recorded it dispenses with the requirementsof this clause. . . "this decision of Allahabad High Court in Kundan Lal v. Jagan Nath Sharma ( AIR 1962 All. 547 ) and other decisions referred to hereinafter on the interpretation of the afore-mentioned Order 21 Rule 90 of the Code of Civilprocedure have been approved by the Supreme Court. In this connectionrelevant extract in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment may be reproducedbelow:the word entertain is explained by a Divisional Bench of theallahabad High Court as denoting the point of time at which anapplication to set aside tb sale is heard by the court. Theexpression entertain , it is stated, docs not mean the same thingas the filing of the application or admission of the application bythe court. A similar view was again taken in Dhoom Chand Joinv. Chamanlal Gupta, AIR 1962 All 543 in which the learned Chiefjustice Desai and Mr. Justice Dwivedi gave the same meaning tothe expression entertain . It is observed by Dwivedi, J. thatthe word entertain in its application bears the meaning admitting to consideration , and therefore when the court cannot refuseto take an application which is backed by deposit or security, itcannot refuse judicially to consider it. In a single bench divisionof the same court reported in Bawan Singh v Kunj Beharilal AIR1962 All 42 one of us (Bhargava J.) had to consider the samerule. There the deposit had not been made within the period oflimitation and the question had arisen whether the court couldentertain the application or not. In a single bench divisionof the same court reported in Bawan Singh v Kunj Beharilal AIR1962 All 42 one of us (Bhargava J.) had to consider the samerule. There the deposit had not been made within the period oflimitation and the question had arisen whether the court couldentertain the application or not. It was decided that the application could not be entertained because proviso (b) debarred thecourt from entertaining an objection unless the requirement ofdepositing the amount or furnishing security was complied withwithin the time prescribed. In that case the word entertain isnot interpreted but it is held that the court cannot proceed toconsider the application in the absence of deposit made withinthe time allowed by law. This case turned on the fact that thedeposit was made out of time. In ye t another case of theallahabad High Court reported in Haji Rahim Bux and Sens v. Firm Samiullah and Sons, AIR 1963 All 320 a Division Benchconsisting of Chief Justice Desai and Mr. Justice S. D. Singhinterpreted the words of Order 21 Rule 90 by saying that the word entertain meant not receive or accept bill proceed to consideron merits or adjudicate upon . In our opinion these cases have taken a correct view of the word entertain which according to dictionary also means admit toconsideration . It would therefore appear that the direction toe court in the proviso to Section 9 is that the court shall notproceed to admit to consideration an appeal which is not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the admitted taxthis will be when the case is taken up by the court for the firsttime In the decision on which the Assistant Commissionerrelied ; the learned Chief Justice (Desai C. J.) holds that the words"accompanied by" showed that something tangible had to accompany the memorandum of appeal. If the memorandum of appealif the memorandum of appeal had to b; accompanied by satisfactory proof, it bad to be in the shape of something tangible,because no intangible thing can accompany a document like thememorandum,of appeal ln our opinion making an appeal theequivaient of the memorandum of appeal is not sound Evenunder 041 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the expressions"appeal" and "memorandum of appeal" are used to denote twodistinct things. In Wharton s Law 1 exicon, the word "appeal" is defined as the judicial exmination of the decision by a higher Court of the decision of an inferior court. The appeal is the judicial examination; the memorandun or appeal contains thegrounds on which the judicial examiation is invited. For thepurpose of limitation and for purposes of the rules of the Courtit is required that written memorandum of appeal shall be filed. When the proviso speaks of the entertainment of the appeal, itmeans, that the appeal such as was filed will not be admitted toconsideration unless there Irrsatisfactory proof available of themaking of the deposit of admitted tax". This decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Lakshmiratan Engineering Worksltd. case (supra) was followed in Hindustan Commercial Bank Lid. v. Punnusahu (dead) through legal representatives (AIR. 1970 SC 1384 ). In that casethe amended clause (b) to provisoof Order 21 Rule 90, by Allahabad Highcourt with effect from 1-6-1957, was again considered and the contentionthat this proviso would not apply to the proceedings to set aside the saleinitiated earlier under the amended proviso was rejected and the interpretationof word "entertain" was followed as given in M/s Lakshmiratan Engineeringworks Ltd. case (supra) which would mean adjudicate upon or proceed onmerits and does not refer to initiation of proceedings. M/s Lakshmiratanengineering Works Ltd. case (supra) which Would mean adjudicate upon orproceed on merits and does not refer to initiation of proceedings. M/s. Lakshmiratan Engindering Works Ltd. case (supra) was again followed inm/s Lalta Prasad Khinni Lal v. Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) Sales Tax. Kanpur Range I, Kanpur and another ( AIR 1972 SC 401 ). The question thatarose in that case was that the memorandum of appeal was filed under Section9 (6) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act (15 of 1948) within time but the amount oftax admitted to be due was not deposited within time although it was deposited later. It was held that it is true that an appeal filed under Section 9of the Act cannot be entertained by the appellate authority unless satisfactoryproof is adduced of the payment of tax admitted by the appellant to be duebut in a case where the amount of admitted tax is deposited after the periodof limitation has expired all that will happan is that the appeal will becomeentertainable only on the day on which satilfactory proof of payment of that amount is produced. ( 8 ) IN the light of the decilions of the Supreme Court discussed above,the consequences that follow which we accordingly hold are that : (1) There is no restriction for filing of an appeal without deposit ofthe amount of dispute in appeal under Section 170 (b) of the Act. The law makes a distinction between receiving or filing of the fteappeal and hearing or adjudication of such an appeat. Themaking of in appeal, the equivalent of memorandum of appeal isnot sound as both the expressions, appeal and memorandum ofappeal denote two distinct things. The appeal is a judicial examination, the memorandum of appeal contains the grounds inwhich the judicial examination is invited. For purpose of limitation,it is required that memorandnm of appeal is filed However,the requirement under Section 170 (b) of the Act for deposit ofthe amount in dispule in the appeal is only for hearing or adjudication of the appeal which was filed. (2) The hearing or adjndication of appeal does not indicate the samething as filing of the appeal which equivarent to memorandumof appeal. The words bearing or adjudication denote thepoint of time at which the appeal is heard or disposed of onmerits by the Court. The Supreme Court hasbag interpreted the word entertain as to mean, not to receive or accept but proceed toconsider on merit, or adjudicate upon . It goes without sayingthat the case cannot be adjudicated, considered on merits andentertained unless it is beard. The word hear is meant the firstoccasion on which the court takes up the matter for consideration. It may be at the admission stage, or if the appeal is admittedautomatically it with be the time of the hearing of the appeal. Incase of failure of deposit Of the amount as required under Section 170 (b) of the Act, the court can dismiss the appeal as not maintainable but this would not amount to hearing or consideration on merits. ( 9 ) AS such the reasoning and view taken by this Court in Panchsheelacase that the memorandum of appeal cannot be filed under Section 169 ofthe Act and entertained unless the condition precedent of deposit of theamount is complied with is not quite correct. ( 10 ) MR. ( 9 ) AS such the reasoning and view taken by this Court in Panchsheelacase that the memorandum of appeal cannot be filed under Section 169 ofthe Act and entertained unless the condition precedent of deposit of theamount is complied with is not quite correct. ( 10 ) MR. Rohatgi, relying upon the judgment of Wad, J. in Punj Sonscase (supra) next submitted that after the appeal is filed by the assessee undersection 169 of the Act, the application under Order XL Rule 5 of the Codeof Civil Procedure can be filed by him with the prayer for grant of stay ofthe disputed amount of the property tax with or without conditions and thecourt has discretion to grant stay having regard to facts and circumstances ofeach case in the interest of justice. It is possible that the appellant maynot have money to deposit the amount along with the memorandum ofappeal and may arrange and deposit afterwards. The arguments proceed onthe basis that under Section 457 of the Act the procedure provided in thecode of Civil Procedure with regard to suits should be followed as far as itcan be made applicable, in the disposal of applications, appeals or referencesthat may be made to the court of District Judge of Delhi under this Act orany bye-law made thereunder. I am afraid this contention of the learnedcounsel cannot prevail. Firstly it is doubtful whether the procedure as provided for suits can be applied in a case of an appeal before the Districtjudge. But assuming such procedure is made applicable, I am of opinionorder 41 Rule 5 cannot be pressed in service as (be provisions in the Code,of Civil Procedure would be in direct conflict with Section l70 (b) of theact which provides that no appeal shall be hard or determined unless theamount, if any, in dispute in the appeal has been deposited by the appellantin the office of the Corporation. There would be apparent conflict betweengeneral and specific provisions in the statute, ft is settled principle of lawthat where there are two provisions in an Act, one of which is specific or ofa special character and the other of a general character, the specific orspecial provision qualifies the general one and ought to be applied in preference to and unaffected by the general one. Thus, when there is a specificprovision in an Act Which covers a particular case, it is not proper to applyanother general provision, the application of which is not free from doubt. Therefore, invoking of the provision of Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code ofcivil Procedure cannot arise. Viewed from another angle if Order 41 Rule5 is made applicable under Section 457 of the Act, Section l70 (b) can onlycarve out an exception and in case of appeal filed under Section 169 of theact, therefore, the District Judge has no power and jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the appeal unless the condition of pre-deposit under Section 170 (6)is complied with. Even otherwise, when the appeal cannot be beard oradjudicated upon unless the amount if deposited, the application of stayobviously cannot be beard. Therefore, with respect I am unable to cind myselfin agreement with the views expressed in Punj Sons case. ( 11 ) IT was next submitted that the appellate court/tribunal hasinherent powers to grant stay as incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction although specific power in the statute for the grant of stay might nothave been conferred. In this connection the case of Income Tax Officer,cannanore v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi (Alr 1969 SC 430) was referred to. 1have given careful consideration to the submission of the learned counsel andam of opinion that such a contention cannot be accepted. The case cited isdittinguishable. In this case there was no provision under the Act forgranting stay for the recovery of penalty or tax etc. although the provision ofappeal was provided for in the statute. Therefore, in such circumstances itwas held that the court has inherent powers to grant stay as incidental andancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. In the present case, however, there is aspecific provision to the contrary under Section 170 (b) of the Act that unlessthe amount in dispute in the appeal is deposited by the appellant in the officeof the Corporation, no appeal shall be heard or determined. This contentionis, therefore, also rejected. ( 12 ) IT was next contended that even if Order 41 Rule 5 of the Codeof Civil Procedure is not to be made applicable then the petitioner should beallowed to deposit the disputed amount in appeal filed before the Districtjudge under Section 169 of the Act and not the whole amount of the tax. This contentionis, therefore, also rejected. ( 12 ) IT was next contended that even if Order 41 Rule 5 of the Codeof Civil Procedure is not to be made applicable then the petitioner should beallowed to deposit the disputed amount in appeal filed before the Districtjudge under Section 169 of the Act and not the whole amount of the tax. The interpretation being given by the District Judge under Section 169 of theact and not the whole amount of the tax The interpretation being given bythe District Judge is wholly erroneous and it cannot be sustained in the eyesof law. ( 13 ) IN this context let me examine the relevant provisions of themunicipal Corporation Act. The method of determining the rateable valueof the lands and buildings assessable to the property tax is provided insection 116 of the Act.-Section 124 deals with the preparation of the assessment list. It provides that the Corporation shall cause an assessment list ofall lands and buildiogs in Delhi to be prepared in such form and manner andcontaining such particulars with respect to each land and building as may beprescribed by bye-laws and invite objections and finally such a list will beprepared subject to alterations under Section 126 and subject to appeal andsuch assessment shall be conclusive evidence Under Section 126 theCommissioner has, however, been given a power to amend the assessment list afterproviding an opportunity to the person affected by such amendment. How- ever, there is a stipulation in the section that no person shall by reason ofany such amendment become liable to pay any tax or increase of tax in respect of any period prior to the commencement of the year in which thenotice under Sub section (2) is given It is possible and in fact has beenbrought to our notice that in many cases assessment is concluded after severalyears the notice of amendment was given, In-such a situation the assesseemight have to pay the properly tax for several years with the result that ascertain times with best of intentions he may not be able to pay such tax andthat his property might be sold in this process Under Section 123 of theact, the property tax is the first charge on the premises which is subject toassessment. There is a prescribed procedure for recovery of tax under265section 152 onwards, particularly under Sections 155 and 156 of the Act. There is a prescribed procedure for recovery of tax under265section 152 onwards, particularly under Sections 155 and 156 of the Act. Even warrant of distress can be issued for the recovery of tax. Under. Section 155 if the person liable for payment of any tax does not, within 30days from the service of demand under Section 154, pay the sum due and ifno appeal is preferred against such tax, he shall be deemed to be in default. Section 156 provides that the Commissioner shall not recover any sum theliability for which has been remitted on appeal under the provisions of thisact. However, the Commissioner has been given a power under Section 156to recover the arrears of tax by warrant of distress and sals of immoveableproperly or the attachment of sale of the property of the defaulter. If boththese Sections (155 and 156) are read harmoniously it would only mean thatin case an appeal is preferred against the demand of tax, it has necessarily tobe for the purpose of final determination/adjudication as otherwise no remission of appeal is possible under the provisions of the Act. The Districtjudge before whom the appeal has to be preferred under Section 169 can remitthe amount in appeal only in case the appeal is beard and adjudicated upon,for which the amount in dispute in the appeal has to be deposited undersection 170 (b) of the Act. Merely filing of a memorandum of appealwithout deposit of amount in dispute in the appeal shall not amount to preferring of an appeal, as discussed earlier. Therefore, unless the amount isdeposited under Section 170 (b) of the Act, there is no preferring of an appealin the eyes of law and, therefore, the assessee shall be deemed to be in defaultand consequently there will be no legal impediment for the recovery of taxunder warrant of distress or otherwise as provided under the law. ( 14 ) IN this background the question that arises for consideration is asto what is the amount in dispute in the appeal in the present writ petition andhow it should be interpreted, If the literal interpretation to the words amount in dispute in the appeal is given, it would mean the difference ofthe admilted rateable value, i e. , Rs. 94,920. 00 and the rateable value fixed bythe Deputy Assessor and Collector, ie. Rs. 2,28,650. 00, i e , Rs. 1,23,730. 94,920. 00 and the rateable value fixed bythe Deputy Assessor and Collector, ie. Rs. 2,28,650. 00, i e , Rs. 1,23,730. 00 andconsequential increase of the tax amount thereon. What would be theamount in dispute in the appeal on the rateable value assessed undersection 126 of the Act in which the amendment of the list is sought lor bythe prescribed authorities ? In this connection reference may be made to Punjsons case (supra) where after the payment of tax on the rateable value ofrs. 88,500. 00 the notice was issued to landlord for increase of rateable value tors. 1. 29. 250. 00 under Section 126 o! the Act with effect from 1. 4. 1959. However, after hearing objections of the landlord the rateable value was finallyfixed at Rs. 1,16,520. 00on 10. 8. 1970 against which the landlord preferred anappeal. Therefore, in that case it meant that if the assessee deposited the laxamount on the basis of the difference or the disputed amount of the rateablevalue, i e , Rs. 28,500. 00 then the court would hear and determine the appeal. In addition to this it may be pointed out that there may be many cases oforiginal assessment of the rateable value or of amended assessment in whichthe increase in the amount of rateable value and consequently the increase inthe tax amount-the amount in dispute in the appeal which has to bi deposited under Section 170 (b) of the Act may be a small amount in comparison tothe original assessment of the rateable value under Section 124 or the amended assessment under Section! 26 of the Act. The assessee by depositing thedisputed amount, which sometimes can involve a very small amount can defeatthe very object of Section 170 (b) of the Act of adequately securing therecovery of taxes and preventing the assesses from filing frivolous appeals. As already discussed, under Sections 155 and 156 of the Act if an appeal ispreferred against such tax the assessee shall not be deemed to be in defaultand the Commissioner shall not recover the sum the liability of which has266 been remitted in appeal under the provisions of the Act and no warrant ofdistress or sale of immoveable property or attachment of the sale of immoveable properly can be effected. In other words the decision of appeal willhave to be awaited. In other words the decision of appeal willhave to be awaited. This literal interpretation will obviously lead to manifestabsurdity and also to the result not intended by the scheme of taxation. Theobject of enacting provision of Section 170 (b) appears to us is that theassessee should be prevented from filing frivolous appeal against the rateablevalue and levy of the properly taxes against the corporation and that the taxdue to the Corporation is more than adequately secured betore the appeal isheatd and determined. In case if the disputed amount is literally interpretedto mean the disputed amount in the appeal as discussed above, this will defeatthe very purpose and object of the provisions of Section 170 (b) of the Actwhich the Legislature never intended Therefore, the amount in dispute inthe appeal would have to be interpreted as the tax amount based on wholeamount of the rateable value-which tax has to be paid by the assessee. Suchan interpretation shall be in conformity with the well settled principle ofinterpretation of statutes. In this connection reference may be made tomaxwell on interpretation of Statutes :"the so-called "golden rule" is really a modification of the literalrule It was stated in this way by Parke B. : "it in a very usefulrule, in the construction of a statute, to adhere to the ordinarymeaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction,unless that is at variance with the intemion of the legislature, tobe collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifestabsurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be variedor modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further. " ( 15 ) MR. Jain, petitioner in CW 148/89. submitted that Section 170 (b)of the Act is not applicable to the appeals against the rateable value in respectof property taxes inasmuch as the legislature has secured the properly taxesby making it as a first charge on the properly under Section 123 and has laiddown in Section 155 (1) that if an assessee has preferred any appeal then heshall not be visited the penally under Section 155 (2 ). This contention is inherently erroneous and has been advanced merely to be rejected. By virtueof Section 156 (l), the Commissioner has been authorised to recover the taxesby distress but will not recover the sum which has been remitted in appeal. This contention is inherently erroneous and has been advanced merely to be rejected. By virtueof Section 156 (l), the Commissioner has been authorised to recover the taxesby distress but will not recover the sum which has been remitted in appeal. In case Sections 155 and 15s of the Act are interpreted harmoniously, this willlead to one interpretation only that the reference to preferring of an appealunder Section 155 of the Act is to ths competent appeal when the amount indispute in the appeal under Section 170 (b) of the Act has been deposited, asotherwise, such an appeal cannot be heard or determined, as already discussed earlier and the stage of not recovering of the sum, which has been remitted in ths appeal would not arise. Preferment of appeal denotes not merelythe memorandum of appeals but otherwise a competent appeals but otherwisea competent appeat in which the amount under Section 170 (b) of the Act alsohas been deposited In such a situation, when no competent appeal has beenpreferred before the District Judge, the provision of Section 155 (1) that theassessee shall not be deemed in default will not apply. In order to avoidthe recovery of property tax by warrant of distress, or other coercive methodsavailable to Commissioner or other authorities, the assessee will have toprefer a competent appeal in case he is aggrieved against the assessmentbelore the District Judge and the amount in dispute in the appeal will haveto be deposited under Section 170 (b)of the Act. Therefore, to say thatsection 170 (b) is not applicable to properly tax is not correct. ( 16 ) LASTLY it was contended that the provision of Section 170 (b) ofthe Act requiriog the assessee to deposit the amount in dispute in the appealin the office of the Corporation before the appeal is heard anddetermined is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The argument proceeds on the bails that the condition imposedunder Section 170 (b)is so onerous that it would amount to unreasonablerestrictions rendering the right almost illusory as no discretion is left with theappellate authority to grant stay or dispense with the requirement of ore-deposit of the amount in dispute in the appeal. On the other hand, Mr. The argument proceeds on the bails that the condition imposedunder Section 170 (b)is so onerous that it would amount to unreasonablerestrictions rendering the right almost illusory as no discretion is left with theappellate authority to grant stay or dispense with the requirement of ore-deposit of the amount in dispute in the appeal. On the other hand, Mr. Datar, learned counsel for the respondents, vehemently Submitted that theright to appeal if creature of statute and there is no reason why the legislaturewhile granting the right cannot impose the conditions for the exercise of suchrights. Therefore, before the appeal is heard or determined Section 170 (b) ofthe Act must necessarily be complied with. ( 17 ) IN support of his submissions Mr. Datar. learned counsel appearing for the respondents, referred to various cases At the very outset the caseof Shri Vijay Prakash D Mehta lsh. Jawahar D. Mehta v. Collector of Customs (Preventive) Bombay (1988-3 Judgements Today-SC-435) may benoticed. In that case the appellant s appeal under Section 129 A of thecustoms Act, 1962 was dismissed by the Tribunal for non-deposit of thepenalty of Rs, 1 lac ordered to bereduced under Section i29e of the Customs Act pending hearing the appeal, which resulted into non-compliance ofthe provisions of Section 129e of the Customs Act. In this context thesupreme Court observed that right to appeal is neither an absolute right noran ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be followed inall judicial and quasi judicial adjudications The right to appeal is a statutoryright and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant If the statutegives a right to appeal upon certain conditions, it is upon fulfilment of thoseconditions that the right becomes vested and exerciseable to the appellant. Further, it was observed that the right given under Section 129 A is controlled by Section I29e of the Act, and that right is with a condition and thus aconditional right. The petitioner in this case has no absolute right of stay. He could obtain stay of realisation of tax levied or penalty imposed in anappeal subject to the limitations of Section I29e. The proviso gives a discretion to the authority to dispense with a obligation to deposit in case of"undue hardships". The petitioner in this case has no absolute right of stay. He could obtain stay of realisation of tax levied or penalty imposed in anappeal subject to the limitations of Section I29e. The proviso gives a discretion to the authority to dispense with a obligation to deposit in case of"undue hardships". No doubt, the Supreme Court has laid down the afore mentioned principle but, it must be home in mind that constirutional validityof the provision of pre-deposit of amount under Section 129e was notchallenged in the case and that case, as such, cannot be of much assistance tous in deciding the constitutional validity of Section 170 (b) of the Act ( 18 ) IN Soorajmull Nugarmull v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1963 SC393) the same principle has been laid down that the appeal is the creation ofstatute. However, there was no provision under examination under that Actwhich is para materia to the provision under the present Act. Therefore thisauthority is not of much relevant to the present Act. ( 19 ) IN The Anant Mills Co. Ltd. etc. v. The Municipal Corporation ofthe City of Ahmedabad and others ( AIR 1975 SC 1234 ) the Supreme Courtwas concerned with the constitutional validity of various provisions of thebombay Municipal Corporation Act. 1949. One of the provisions challengedwas the amended Section 406 of that Act where-under it was provided that noappeal against rateable value should be "entertained" unless the amountclaimed from the appellant by a bill for property taxes was deposited incourt. The amended section gave to the Judge a discretion to dispense with268 the deposit or a part thereof it he was of opinion that the deposit would causeundue hardship io the appellant. It appears the unamended provision didnot give io a Judge the discretion to dispense with the deposit or a part thereof in case of undue hardship. This unamended provision was struck down bythe Gujarat High Court on the basis that the unamended Section 406 (2) (e)classified the appellants fling appeals against tax and rateable value into twoclauses : (a) those who deposited the amount of tax assessed by the Commissioner; and (2) those who did not. It was held that the above classificationhad no rational nexus with the object of the provision for appeal and thatthere was no reasonable justification for giving a right of appeal to one classand denying it to the other. It was held that the above classificationhad no rational nexus with the object of the provision for appeal and thatthere was no reasonable justification for giving a right of appeal to one classand denying it to the other. Section 406 (2) (e) was further amended by Act5 of 1970 wherein the Judge was given a discretion to dispense with thedeposit or a part thereof if he was of opinion that the deposit would causeundue hardship to the appellant. This clause was also struck down by thegujarat High Court on the ground that it did not make any material difference so far as the constitutional validity of the above provision was concerned, he proviso merely carves out an exception from the main provision insection 406 (2) (e) and limits the applicability of the main provision to appellants who can deposit the amount of tax without undue hardship. Theresult, in the opinion of that High Court, was that the discrimination betweenthe appellants who deposited the amount of lax and the appellants who didnot which is the necessary cansequence of the condition requiring deposit ofthe amount of tax, still persisted, though it was now limited to the class ofappellants who could deposit the amount of tax without undue hardship. The Supreme Court considered the question whether or not the amended provisionin Section 406 (2) (e) which provides far a discretion to a Judge to dispensewith the requirement of deposit with or without conditions is constitutionallyvalid. in that context the Supreme Court observed :"the requirement about the deposit of the amount claimed as a condition precedent to the entertainment of an appeal which seeks tochallenge the imposition or the quantum of that tax, in ouropinion, has not the effect of nullifying the right of appeal,especially when we keep in view the fact that discretion is vestedin the appellate Judge to dispense with the compliance of theabove requirement All that the statutory provision seeks to do isto regulate the exercise of the right of appeal. The object of theabove provision is to keep in balance the right of appeal, which isconferred upon a person who is aggrieved with the demand of taxmade from him, and the right of the Corporation to speedyrecovery of the tax. The impugned provision accordingly confersa right of appeal and at the same time prevents the delay in thepayment of the tax. The impugned provision accordingly confersa right of appeal and at the same time prevents the delay in thepayment of the tax. We find ourselves unable to accede to theargument that the impugned provision has the effect of creating adiscrimination as is offensive to the principle of equality enshrinedin Article 14 of the Constitution. It is significant that the right of appeal is conferred upon all persons who are aggrieved againstthe determination of (ax or rateable value. The bar created bysection 406 (2) (e) to the entertainment of the appeal by a personwho has not deposited the amount of tax due from him and who is not able ro show to the appellate Judge that the deposit of theamount would cause him undue hardship arises out of his ownomission and default. The above provision, in our opinion, hasnot the effect of making invidious distinction or creating twoclasses with the object of meeting out differential treatment tothem; it only spells out the consequences flowing from the269omission and default of a person who despite the fact that thedeposit of the amount found due from him would cause him nohardship, declines of his own volition to deposit that amount. Theright of appeal is the creature of a statute. Without a statutoryprovision creating such a right the person aggrieved is not entitledto file an appeal. We fail to understand as to why the legislaturewhile granting the right of appeal cannot impose conditions forthe exercise of such right. In the absence of any special reasonsthere appears to be no legal or constitutional impediment to theimposition of such conditions. " ( 20 ) IT necessarily follows from that decision of the Supreme-Courtthat in case the condition of requirement of the appeal has the effect of nullifying the right of appeal constitutional validity of such a provision can bechallenged. Further, it has been held that the right of appeal is the creationof statute and the conditions can be imposed for hearing and determining ofsuch an appeal in the absence of any special reasons to the contrary. In thatcase, however, the constitutional. validity of the amended provision wasupheld because there was a discretion vested in the appellate Judge todispense with the compliance of the above requirement of pre-deposit in thecase of undue hardship. In thatcase, however, the constitutional. validity of the amended provision wasupheld because there was a discretion vested in the appellate Judge todispense with the compliance of the above requirement of pre-deposit in thecase of undue hardship. It may be pointed out that the condition imposedof pre-deposit in the unamended provision of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, which was struck down by Gujarat High Court, was almost paramateria to the present provision in Section 170 (b) of the Act. The case ofm/s Elora Construction Company v. The Municipal Corporation of Gr Bombayand others (AIR 1980 Born. 162) was very heavily relied upon by Mr Datari am afraid that this decision cannot be of much help to the respondents asthe principle laid down in Anant Mills case (supra) for judging the constitutional validity of provision has not been taken not by the single Judge ofbombay High Court although the above case of Supreme Court, has beenrelied upon by him. ( 21 ) ANOTHER decision in Chatter Singh Baid and others v. Coporationof Calcutta and others (AIR. 1984 Calcutta 283) decided by a learned singlejudge, no doubt has taken into account the decisions of the Supreme Courtin Anant Mills case (supra) and Nand Lal and another v. State of Haryana andanother ( AIR 1980 SC 2097 ). ( 21 ) ANOTHER decision in Chatter Singh Baid and others v. Coporationof Calcutta and others (AIR. 1984 Calcutta 283) decided by a learned singlejudge, no doubt has taken into account the decisions of the Supreme Courtin Anant Mills case (supra) and Nand Lal and another v. State of Haryana andanother ( AIR 1980 SC 2097 ). However, the learned single judge in so manywords has not gone into the question whether the condition of payment ofconsolidated rate to be determined according to new valuation is onerous asto render the right of appeal nugatory or illusory He has upheld the constitional validity of the provision on the basic of the ratio laid down in theaforementioned eases that the right of appeal is a creature of statute andwhile granting the right of appaal the legislature can impose conditions forexercise of such right and there is no constitutional or legal impediment toimposition of such a condition for deposit of tax and that further the powerto determine consolidated rate on the valuation of the property would bereasonably exercised and in case such power is arbitrary exercised theaggrieved person can seek redress in another appropriate forum ( 22 ) IN the light of what has already been discussed io Anant Mill scase (supra) and in the case Nand Lal to be discussed hereinafter, itis apparent that though no doubt right of appeal is the creation ofstatute but in case the conditions imposed on the right of appeal are so onerous as to amount unreasonable restrictions rendering the rightalmost illusory and nugatory, such conditions can always be struck down by270 the court being ultra vires. In fact, in thbe aforementioned caicsi, the Supremecourt did go into the question whether the conditions imposed on the rightof appeal are onerous as to render the right of appeal illusory and negatory. Furthermore, for the correction in the assessment of the rateable value, theappropriate forum is neither the writ jurisdiction nor a civil suit as has alsobeen explained hereinafter. Therefore, the decision of Chattar Singh s casecannot also advance the case of the respondent any further. ( 23 ) IN Nandlal and another v. State of Haryana and another (AIR. 1980 SC 2097) the case of Anant Mills (supra) was followed. Therefore, the decision of Chattar Singh s casecannot also advance the case of the respondent any further. ( 23 ) IN Nandlal and another v. State of Haryana and another (AIR. 1980 SC 2097) the case of Anant Mills (supra) was followed. In that casechallenge was made to the provision contained in Section 18 (7) of Haryanaceiling and Land Holdings Act imposing a condition of making a deposit ofa sum equal to 30 times the land holdings tax payable in respect othe disputed area before any appeal or revision is entertained by the appellate orrevisional authority-a provision inserted in the Act of Amending Act 40of 1976. Section 18 (1) and (2) provide for an appeal, review any revision oftbe orders of the prescribed authority and the position was that proir to 1976there was no fetter placed on the appellate/revisional remedy by the State. However, by the amendments made by Haryana Act No. 40 of 1976, subsections (7) and (8) were added and the newly inserted sub-section (7) for thefirst time imposed a condition that all appeals under subsection (1) or sub-seclion (2) and revision under Sub-section (4) would be entertained only on theappellant or the petitioner depositing with the appellate or revisional authoritya sum equal to 30 times the land holdings tax payable in respect of the disputedsurplus area. Under sub-seclion (8) it was provided that it the appellant ortbe petitioner coming against the order declaring the land surplus failed in bisappeal or revision, be shall be liable to pay for the period be has at any timebeen in possession of the land declared surplus to which he was not entitledunder the law, a licence lee equal to 30 times the land holdings tax recoverablein respect of this area. On 6/06/1978, the Act was further amended byamending Act 18 of 1978 when by the rigour of the condition imposed undersub-section (7) was reduced by permitting the appellant or the petitioner tofurnish a bank guarantee for the requisite amount as an alternative to makingcash deposit and while reading sub-section (8) in its original form. On 6/06/1978, the Act was further amended byamending Act 18 of 1978 when by the rigour of the condition imposed undersub-section (7) was reduced by permitting the appellant or the petitioner tofurnish a bank guarantee for the requisite amount as an alternative to makingcash deposit and while reading sub-section (8) in its original form. a new subsection (9) we inserted under which it has been provided that if the appeal orrevision succeeds, the amount deposited or the bank guarantee furnished shallbe refunded or released, as the case may be, but if the appeal or revision tailsthe deposit or the guarantee shall be adjusted against the licence lee recoverable under sub-section (8), In this context the Supreme Court followed andfurther elaborated the principle laid down in Anant Mills case and observedin para 19 as : "it is well settled by several decisions of this Court that the right ofappeal is a creature of a statute and there is no reason why thelegislature while granting the right cannot impose conditions forthe exercise of such right so long as the conditions are not soonerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering theright almost illusory. . . In the first place, the object of imposingthe condition is obviously to prevent frivolous appeals and revisionthat impede the implementation of the ceiling policy secondly. having regard to sub-sections (8) and (9) it is clear that the cashdeposit or bank guarantee is not by way of any exaction but in thenature of securing mesne profits from the person who is ultimatelyfound to be in unlawful possession of the land; thirdly, the depositor the guarantee incorrelated to the land holdings tax (30 timesthe tax which, we are informed, varies in the State of Haryana. . 271around a paltry amount of Rsand. 8 per acre annually; fourthly, thedeposit to bs made or bank guarantee to be furnished is confinedto the land holdings tax payable in respect of the disputed area i. e. the area or part thereof which is declared surplus after leaving thepirmmissble area to the appellant or petitioner Having regard tothose aspects, particularly the meagre rate of the annual land taxpayable, the fetter imposed on the right of appeal/revision, evenin the absence of a provision conferring discretion on the appellate/revisional authority to relax or waive the condition, cannot beregarded as onerous or uareasonable. The challenge to Section18 (7) must, therefore, fail. The challenge to Section18 (7) must, therefore, fail. "no doubt the validity of Section 18 (7) of the Haryana Ceiling Act was upheldbut that the conditions imposed are not onerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering the right almost illusory as the appellant wasrequired to deposit only a paltry amount of Rs. 8 per acre annually. ( 24 ) AT this stage, it would be very much relevant to point out that inthis case. the rateable value of the property has been assessed for number ofyears, which is not a small amount There may be cases, where the amendment of assessment under Section 126 of the Act is made also for number ofyears, after the service of notice contemplated thereunder and may againinvolve huge amount. The assessment may sometimes suffer from arithmeticalmistake and result in exorbitant amount. The assessment can be perverse aswell and not in accordance with law. There can be so many other similarcontingencies and situations. In many cases although the assessee may not beable to deposit the amount in dispute in the appeal under Section 170 (b) ofthe Act because of financial hardship and the huge amount involved and inthis process at certain limes his property may bs sold, yet the District Judgeshave no discretion to grant stay of deposit of or dispense with the requirement of the disputed amount in appeal and consequently, the appeal will haveto be dismissed. It goes without saying that for the purpose of determinationof rateable value of the property in accordance with the method laid down indr. Balbir Singh and others v. M/s M. CD. and others ( AIR 1985 SC 339 ),certain complicated questions of facts will have to be determined for whichthe appropriate remedy is the only appeal provided for, and writ jurisdictionordinarily cannot be resorted to or entertained for correction of error inarsessment Further, as would be discussed hereafter, the jurisdiction of thecivil court would be barred in the matter This provi. sion of Section 170 (b)of the Act, therefore, arbitrarily compels the citizen to deposit the amountunder Section 170 (b) of the Act without any exception or guideline. Suchprovision, therefore, in my opinion, imposes conditions which are on the faceof it so onerous as to amount unreasonable restriction rendering the right ofappeal almost illusory and nugatory and, therefore, suffers from vice ofunconstitutionality and of being ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution. Suchprovision, therefore, in my opinion, imposes conditions which are on the faceof it so onerous as to amount unreasonable restriction rendering the right ofappeal almost illusory and nugatory and, therefore, suffers from vice ofunconstitutionality and of being ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 25 ) NO doubt provisions of Haryana Ceiling Act in Nand Lal's caseand Bombay Municipal Corporation Act in Anant Milis' case have been upheld but that is on the basis of a finding that the conditions are not onerousor unreasonable whereas in the present case the condition is onerous andunreasonable which makes the right to appeal illusory. As we have seenvarious other Acts, e. g. . Customs Act, 1962, Haryana Ceiling Act, Bombaymunicipal Corporation Act, 1949 wherein in order to relieve the person fromthe rigour of the provision of pre-deposit of the amount in dispute in appealfor hearing and determination, the provision has been made for granting the272 Tribunal/judge a discretion to stay the deposit of the amount or dispense withor waive the requirement of pre-deposit of the amount in case of hardship. As already discussed, Section 406 (2) (e) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 which imposed a condition for deposit of the amount of taxbefore the appeal is heard or determined was struck down by the Gujarathigh Court and the Act was suitably amended to provide for grant of discretionary relief in case of undue hardship. ( 26 ) SECTION l70 (b) of the Act. viewed from different angle as well,cannot stand the test of constitutional validity. Sections 123-126 of the Actprovide for assessment and amended assessment of the rateable value of theproperty. This assessment is subject to appeal before the District Judge andprovisions governing such appeal are in Sections 169 to 171 of the Act. Undersection 171 the order of the District Judge has been made final. Undersection 457 of the Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure inregard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in thedisposal of applications, appeals or references that may be made to the courtof the District Judge of Delhi under this Act or any bye-law made thereunder. I do not find anything which the District Judge while bearing the appeal cannot decide, what civil court would normally do in a civil suit. I do not find anything which the District Judge while bearing the appeal cannot decide, what civil court would normally do in a civil suit. In this background, it can easily be assumed that jurisdiction of civil court in regard to assessment of rateable value of property and levy of tax is excluded and barred. In this connection, reference may be made to Dhulabhai etc. v. State ofmadhya Pradesh and another ( AIR 1969 SC 78 ) wherein it has been clearlyheld that where the statute gives a finality to the order of the special Tribunal,the jurisdiction of civil court must be held to be excluded, if there is adequateremedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a civil suit. ( 27 ) AS already discusssed earlier, in certain situations and circumstances it is neither practicable nor possible to deposit the amount in disputein the appeal with the result, the assessee is lefl with no remedy of appealconsequently the assessment made under Sections 123-126 becomes conclusive and final. Jurisdiction of civil court is also barred. It goes withoutsaying that assessment of rateable value of property and property tax affectsthe rights in property of the citizens and they cannot be left without a judicialremedy. No doubt under Section 169 (1) reference can be sought to thesuperior court or High Court on the question of law or on construction ofdocument but such a remedy cannot be considered to be as sufficient saleguard for a judicial review of all questions including question of facts. Inaddition, the availability of right to invoke Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution is also not a sufficient saleguard as all questions relating to appeal including highly disputed and complicated questions of acts cannot be gone intoin the writ and supervisoiy jurisdiction. In M/s Wtre Netting Stores, Delhiand another v. The Regional Provident Fund Cummisrioner, New Delhi and others (1981 Lab I. C. 1015) this Court struck down Section 7a of the Employees'provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act being violative of Article14 of the Constitution since no appeal was provided for against the orderunder Section 7a of the Act and jurisdiction of civil court was also barred. In that case (be question that arose for consideration was whether Section 7aof the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act whichgives adjudicative power to the Commissioner to determine the amount duefrom the employer is ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution as such thisprovision gave a finality to such an order and was not to be questioned inany court of law, and no remedy of appeal etc. was provided for against suchadjudication. It was held that admittedly there is no appeal provided foragainst the order under Section 7a. The order passed by the Commissioner273is made final and non-justiciable in civil court. Thbe constitutional remedyunder Aiticle 226 of the Constitution cannot supply the lacuna. Therefore,sub-section (4) of Section 7a must be held to be violative of Article 14 of theconstitution Following that judgement in the absence of alternative remedyof appeal being rendered illusory and ineffective and the jurisdiction of civilcourt being barred in the matter. Section (l70 (b) of the Act in the present casemust be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ( 28 ) IN the light of the above discusion, I am left with no optionexcept to hold that Sub-section (b) of Section 170 of the Act which imposes acondition that no appeal shall be heard or determined unless the amount indispute in the appeal is deposited is arbitrary and renders the right to appealunder Section 169 almost illusory and nugatory. It is without any judicialreview. However, I am of opinion that in case this provision is suitablyamended by the legislature by permitting the District Judge to exercise thejurisdiction to grant stay or waive or dispense with the condition of predeposit of the amount in disyute in the appeal before the appeal is heard ordetermined in cases of financial hardship on the lines of amended Section406 (2) (c) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, the provision canbe saved from the vice and attack of constitutional validity and can alsoprovide a relief against the rigour of the provision by granting discretion tothe Judge/tribunal to grant slay or waive or dispense with the condition ofdeposit of amount in case of undue hardship. At any rate this is the exclusive function of the legislature which they themselves will have to decide. At any rate this is the exclusive function of the legislature which they themselves will have to decide. ( 29 ) IN the result, I allow the writ petitions and strike down subsection (b) of Section 170 of the Act being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The District Judge consequently is directed to entertainthe appeal of the appellant without deposit of the amount and decide on. merits. ( 30 ) NO costs. V B. Bansal, [j. for himself and Leila Seth, J. ] ( 31 ) WE have persued the judgement of our learned brother Nag J. inwhich he has indicated three questions as arising from the writ petition requiring decision. They are as follows :- 1. Whether the deposit of tax amount under Sec. l70 (b) of the Delhimunicipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as theact) is a condition precedent tor bearing or determination of theappeal but also for filing of memorandum of appeal?2. Whether the District Judge has a discretion to grant stay of thedisputed amount or dispense with the condition or pre-deposit ofthe amount in appeal, with or without conditions, in the office ofcorporation? Further what is the amount in deposit in appeal?3. In case it is held that the deposit of tax amount under See. 170 (b)of the Act is a condition precedent for hearing or determinationof the appeal and the District Judge has no discretion to grantstay of the deposit of tax amount and dispense with the conditionof pre-deposit of amount with or without conditions, whether suchrovision is ultra vires? ( 32 ) WE agree with the conclusion arrived at by oar learned brothernag. J. as regards the firsit two questions, but are unable to do so with rewardto the third question. ( 33 ) SUB-SEC (L)OF Sec l69 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act,1957 provides that an appeal against the levy of assessment of any tax underthis Act shall lie to the court of District Judge of Delhi. Sec. 170 of the Actprovides for conditions of right of appeal. ( 33 ) SUB-SEC (L)OF Sec l69 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act,1957 provides that an appeal against the levy of assessment of any tax underthis Act shall lie to the court of District Judge of Delhi. Sec. 170 of the Actprovides for conditions of right of appeal. It would be appropriate to quotethe section which runs as under:-Section 170"no appeal shall be heard or determined under section 169 unless- (a) the appeal is, in the case of a property tax, brought within thirtydays next after the date of authentication of the assessment listunder section 124 (exclusive of the time required for obtaining acopy of the relevant entries theirin) or, as the case may be, withinthirty days of the date on which an amendment is finally madeunder section 126 and. in the case of any other tax, within thirtydays next after the date of the receipt of the notice of assessmentor of alteration of assessment or, if no notice has been given,within thirty days after the date of presentation of the first bill or,as the case may be, the first notice of demand in respect thereof;provided that an aeal may be admitted after the expiration ofthe period prescribed thereof by this section if the appellantsatisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferringthe appeal within that period; (b) the amount, if any, in dispute in the appeal has been deposited byby the appellant in the office of the Corporation. " ( 34 ) THE first question for consideration is, whether there is an inherent right in every person to file anpeal from a decision of any court or tribunal which is not to this linking In fact, there is an inherent right availableto an individual to a file a suit. A suit for its maintainability requires noauthority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit. However,the position with regard to appeal is entirely different. The right of appealinheres in no one, and, therefore, an appeal for its maintainability must havethe clear authority of law. It is on this account that the right of appeal isdescribed as a creature of statute. Reference in this regard can be made tothe Smt Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and others, AIR 1974 Supreme Court1126. In the matter of an arbitration between Sandback Chirity Trusteesand the North Staffordshire Railway Company. 1877 (3) Queen's Bench Division1 ,bramwell, LJ. It is on this account that the right of appeal isdescribed as a creature of statute. Reference in this regard can be made tothe Smt Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and others, AIR 1974 Supreme Court1126. In the matter of an arbitration between Sandback Chirity Trusteesand the North Staffordshire Railway Company. 1877 (3) Queen's Bench Division1 ,bramwell, LJ. held that "an appeal does not exist in the nature ofthings; a right to appeal from any decision of any tribunal must be given byexpress enactment". In case M/s Elora Construction v. The Municipalcorporation of Gr. Bombay and others, AIR 1980 Bombay 162, it was observedthat the right of appeal is the creation of statute and it can be taken awayonly by a statute; and by express words or necessary intendment. It wasfurther observed that the right of appeal is not inherent or fundamental butcreated by law Courts which are subordinate to the High Court are notconstituted under the Constitution and, therefore, access to such subordinatecourts may be lawfully abridged or made subject to the fulfilment of condilions imposed by law. 275 ( 35 ) IT if, thus, clear that the right of appeal is neither absolute, inherent or unfettered and limitations can be prescribed to the right of appeal bythe statute itself. ( 36 ) SUBMISSION of learned counsel for the petitioner has been thatthere is a total bar in the bearing of an appeal of a person who is unable todeposit the amount of tax which as such is violative of the provision ofarticle 14 of the Constitution of India. He has, thus, submitted that unlessand until the amount in dispute in the appeal is deposited by a person bisshall not be heard by the District Judge on account of which the said individual would be deprived of his right of adjudication by the appellate court. Hehas also submitted that there may be instances where two different individualshave appeals on identical facts but a person who is unable to deposit theamount would face the consequence of his appeal being dismissed whereas theother appeal entertained and dilposed of on merits after the deposit of theamount in dispute gives relief to the individual. He has. thus, submittedthat in the instant case there being no discretion left with the District Judgethe provisions contained in Sec. 170 (b) is ultra-vires and prayed that the samemay be declared as void. He has. thus, submittedthat in the instant case there being no discretion left with the District Judgethe provisions contained in Sec. 170 (b) is ultra-vires and prayed that the samemay be declared as void. Reliance in support of this submission has beenplaced on the case The Anant Mills Co. Ltd. Etc. etc. v. State of Gujarat,1975 Supreme Court 1234 and Nand Lal and another v. Stale of Haryanaand others AIR 1980 Supreme Court 2097. ( 37 ) WE have given our thoughtful consideration to these submissionsbut have not been able to persuade ourselves to agree with the same. Inanant Mill's case (supra) Supreme Court was required to examine a numberof provisions and one of them being Section 406 of the Bombay Provincialmunicipal Corporation Act which is similar to Section 170 of Municipalcorporation Act. While interpreting this provision High Court of Bombayheld that Sec. 406 classified the appeals against tax and rateable value intoclasses, (1) those who deposit the amount of tax assessed by the Commissionerand (2) those who do not whatever be the reason for non-deposit. ( 38 ) THERE being no discretion left with the court the provision wasstuck down by the Gujarat High Court Subsequently, a proviso was addedto this provision to the effect that where in any particular case the judge isof the opinion that the deposit of the amount by the appellant will cause undue hardship to him. the judge may, in his discretion, dispense with suchdeposit or part thereof either unconditionally or subject to such conditions ashe may deem fit Eveeven after the addition of this proviso the section wasstruck down by the Gujarat High Court. While disposing of the appeal thefollowing observation was made in para 40 by the Supreme Court :-''the right of appeal is the creature of a statute. Without a siatutoryprovision creating such a right the person aggrieved not entitled tofile an appeal. We fail to understand as to why the legislaturewhile granting the right of appeal cannot impose conditions forthe exercise of such right. In the absence of any special reasonsthere appears to be no legal or constitutional impediment to theimposition of such conditions. It is impossible, for example, toprescribe a condition in criminal cases that unless a convictedperson is released on bail he must surrender to custody before hisappeal against the sentences of imprisonment would be entertained. In the absence of any special reasonsthere appears to be no legal or constitutional impediment to theimposition of such conditions. It is impossible, for example, toprescribe a condition in criminal cases that unless a convictedperson is released on bail he must surrender to custody before hisappeal against the sentences of imprisonment would be entertained. Likewise, it is permissible to enact a law that no appeal shall lieagainst an order relating to an assessment of tax unless the tax276 bad been paid. Such a provision was on the statute book in Section 30 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922. The proviso to thatsection provideo that. . . . . . no appeal shall lie against an orderunder Sub section (1) of Section 46 unless the tax had been paid". Such conditions merely regulate the exercise of the right of appealso that the same is not abused by a recalcitrant party and this is nodifficulty in the enforcement of the order appealed against in casethe appeal is ultimately dismissed It is open to the legislatureto impose an accompanying liability upon a party upon whom alegal right is conferred or to prescribe conditions for the exerciseof the right. Any repuirement for the discharge of that liabilityor the fulfilment of that condition in case the party concernedseeks to avail of the said right to a valid piece of legislation, andwe can discern to contravention of Article 14 in it. " ( 39 ) IT has further been observed that "a disability or disadvantagearising out of a party's own default or omission cannot be taken to be tant a amount to the creation of two classes offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution, especially when that disability or disadvantage operates upon all personswho make the default or omission. " ( 40 ) A persual of the aforesaid observations made by the Supreme Court makes it amply clear that the legislature is competent to make a lawthat no appeal shall lie against any order relating to an assessment of taxunless the tax has been paid and that such a provision was on a statute bookin Section 30 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. ( 41 ) MUCH reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the case Nand Lal and Another (Supra) which has referred withapproval to the case of Anant Mills' Co. Ltd. (Supra ). ( 41 ) MUCH reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on the case Nand Lal and Another (Supra) which has referred withapproval to the case of Anant Mills' Co. Ltd. (Supra ). The following observations have been made in paragraph 19 of the said judgement :-"it is well settled by several decisions of this Court that the right ofappeal is a creature of a statute and there is no reason why thelegislature while granting the right cannot impose conditions forthe exercise of such right so long as the conditions are no soonerous as to amount to unreasonable restrictions rendering theright almost illusory (vide the latest decision in Anant Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat AIR 1975 SC 1234 )". ( 42 ) IN the said case different provisions of the Haryana Ceiling onland Holdings Act were under consideration. Section 18 (7) imposed a condition of making a deposit of a sum equal 30 times the land holding tax payable inrespect of the disputed area before any appeal or revision is entertained by the appellate or revisional authority. This provision was introduced in the year1976 and earlier there was no such restriction on filling of an appeal or revision Under Sub-section (8) of Sec. 18 it was provided that if the appellantor the petitioner coming against the order declaring the land surplus fails inhis appeal or revision he shall be liable to pay for the period he has at anytime been in possession of the land declared surplus to which he was notentitled under the law. A licence fee equal to thirty times the land holdingtax was recovered in respect of land I here was afurther amendment in thissection in June 1978 thereby permitting the appellant or the petitioner tofurnish a bank guarantee for the requisite amount as an alternative to makingcash deposit. This provision was upheld by the Supreme Court for more than277one reasons which have been enumerated. One of the grounds mentionedtherein was that the amount required to be deposited was not a heavy amount. This provision was upheld by the Supreme Court for more than277one reasons which have been enumerated. One of the grounds mentionedtherein was that the amount required to be deposited was not a heavy amount. The fact, however, remains that in the said provision also there was no discretion with the appellate or the revisional authority to grant exemption fromthe payment of the amount and the provision was still held to be valid It is,thus, clear that the consistent view has been that the appeal is a statutoryright and it is open to the legislature to provide for conditions under whichthe right of appeal can be exercised. ( 43 ) WE may also refer to the case Chatter Singh Baid and others v. Corporation of Calcutta and Others, AIR 1984 Calcutta 283. It was a caserelating to the payment of house-tax and the right of the aggrieved party whofiled an appeal. Petitioners in the said case were the owners of Premises No. II, Indra Kumar Karnani Street and wilh effect from 4th quarter, 1978-79 thecorporatian of Calcutta had determined the annual value of the said premisesat Rs. 4,30,606. 00. Objections filed by the owners were disposed of by Specialofficer of the Corporation and the value was fixed at Rs. 3,61,135. 00. ( 44 ) OWNERS were not satisfied by the assessment and so an appeal wasfiled in the court of Small Causes, Calcutta. ( 45 ) SEB-SEC. (3-A) added to Section 180 reads as under :-"no appeal under this section shall be entertained unless the consolidated rate payable upto the date of presentation of the appeal onvaluation determined- (a) by an order under Section 182, in the case of an appeal to thecourt of Small Causes, (b) by the decision of the Court of Small Causes, in the case ofan appeal to the High Court,has been deposited in the municipal office and such consolidatedrate is continued to be deposited until the appeal is finallydecided. " ( 46 ) THIS provision is similar to the provision contained in Sec 170 ofdelhi Municipal Corporation Act. ( 47 ) AN argument was advanced by learned counsel for the petitionersthat unless the. appellate authority is given discretionary powers to relax ormodify such condition for deposit of the dispuled amount, the conditionprecedent ought to be pronounced as unreasonable. " ( 46 ) THIS provision is similar to the provision contained in Sec 170 ofdelhi Municipal Corporation Act. ( 47 ) AN argument was advanced by learned counsel for the petitionersthat unless the. appellate authority is given discretionary powers to relax ormodify such condition for deposit of the dispuled amount, the conditionprecedent ought to be pronounced as unreasonable. This argument was notaccepted by observing that the observations made in para 40 of the Sup remecourt decision in Anant Mill's case (Supra) are directly against the abovesubmission of the petitioner. Reliance was also placed on the cage ofnandlal v. State of Haryana (Supra) holding that condition of prepaymentbefore appeal could be heard is not onerous on account of there being nodiscretion lefto the appellate and revisional authority so relax or waive thegaid conditions. This case fully supports the view we are talking. ( 48 ) THE proviso to Section 170 of the Delhi Municipal Corporationact docs not make the right of appeal nugatory or illusory because it is onlyon account of his own default to comply with the condition for deposit the278 appellant himself may fail to avail of the remedy by way of appeal. We areclearly of the view that the ratio of the decision in Anant Mills case (Supra)and Nand Lal's case (Supra) is that the right of appeal la creature of statuteand while granting the right of appeal the legislature can impose conditionsfar exercise of such right and there is no constitutional or legal impedimentto imposition of such a condition for deposition of tax. ( 49 ) ABSENCE of discretion in the appellate court to exempt the depositof the amount of tax may cause hardship in some cases but the court cannottest the validity of the statutory provision on the touch-stone of hardship orstringency. If a provision made in astatute is not invalid, any person desirousof availing the right of appeal has no option but to comply with the conditionunder which this right of appeal can be exercised. Arestriction is, undoubtedly, bound to be irksome and painful to the citizens even though it may befor public good. However, important the right of a citizen or an individualmay be. it has to yield to the larger interest of the country or the community. Arestriction is, undoubtedly, bound to be irksome and painful to the citizens even though it may befor public good. However, important the right of a citizen or an individualmay be. it has to yield to the larger interest of the country or the community. ( 50 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner submits that there may be caseswhere the assessing authority goes palpably wrong in the determination of therateable value of the property and may even assess a person not even being. the owner of the premises. He has also suggested that may be that onaccount of clerical mistake the assessment is made ten times or hundred timesmore and in such like cases the aggrieved person may not be in a position todeposit the amount of tax and, thus, would be deprived of his property evenwhen no such tax was due from him. We do not agree with this submission. The law presumes that all authorities function properly and bona ficte withdue regard to the public interest, however, in case there is any such contingency a party can resort to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court underarticle 226 of the Constitution of India. The mere fact that an assessee mighthave to deposit the amount of the tax when filing an appeal could not in everycase justify his by-passing the remedics provided by the Act. There must begome thing more in a case to warrant the entertainment of the petition underart. 226, something going to the root of the jurisdiction of the officer orsomething to show that it would be a case of palpable injustice to the assesseeto force him to take the remedy provided under the Act. Reference in thisregard can be made to the case Sales Tax Officer. Jodhpur and another v. M/s. Shiv Ratan G. Mohatta 1965 (3) SCR 71 . In case I. TC. Limited andanother v. Union of India and others 1983 E. L. T. I. (Delhi) it has been held thatas a matter of practice and procedure the courts do not normally permit theaggrieved party to abandon the normal remedies of appeal etc. Jodhpur and another v. M/s. Shiv Ratan G. Mohatta 1965 (3) SCR 71 . In case I. TC. Limited andanother v. Union of India and others 1983 E. L. T. I. (Delhi) it has been held thatas a matter of practice and procedure the courts do not normally permit theaggrieved party to abandon the normal remedies of appeal etc. under the Actin favour of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but ifany action is taken without jurisdiction or if the court comes to the conclusionthat the alternative remedy provided under the Act is not adequate or cannotinspire confidence inasmuch as it would amount an appeal from 'ceaser ofceaseri then the existence of an alternative remedy is no bar to the exercise ofwrong jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. These two judgments provide a complete answer to the argument of the Assessing Authoritycommitting an illegality apparent on the face of the record or going beyondthe jurisdiction. Except such like cases an individual has to comply with theprovisions of deposit of the amount before he can be permitted to avail theright of appeal. . ( 51 ) WE may also note that the Municipal Corporation of Delhi hasto maintain essential civil services, like water supply, street lighting etc. apartfrom running public institutions. It has also to pay the salaries of the staff. Liquid cash is, thus, required for the, running of its administration by the279municipal Corporation. We are of the opinion that this may be one of thereasons for the legislature to make a provision for the deposit of the disputedamount before an appeal is entertained by the District Judge. An assesseegetting relief in appeal would have a right of adjustment of the excess amountpaid as tax and, thus, he is not deprived of any excess amount. ( 52 ) AT this stage it would be useful to refer to a recent judgment ofthe Supreme Court in case Shri Vijay Prakash D. Mehta/sh Savahar D. Mehtav. Collector of Customs Prewniive) Bombay, Judgment Today 1988 (3) S. C. 435. In the said case at the material time in 1983 Vijay Prakash D. Mehta andshri Jawahar D. Mehta were based in Hong Kong and Singapore respectively. They came to India in February 198? Collector of Customs Prewniive) Bombay, Judgment Today 1988 (3) S. C. 435. In the said case at the material time in 1983 Vijay Prakash D. Mehta andshri Jawahar D. Mehta were based in Hong Kong and Singapore respectively. They came to India in February 198? and were charged of alleged offencesunder Sections 112 and 1 14 of the Customs Act and simultaneously they werealleged to have committed offences under the Foreign Exchange Regulationact (FERA) Petitioners' statements were recorded by the Enforcementauthorities under Section 40 of FERA which according to them were obtainedby using third degree methods. Their statements, however, were not recordedunder Section 108 of the Customs Act. In the FERA proceedings they were,however, discharged on a request by the FERA authorities. The Enforcement Directorate, however, instituted adjudication proceedings and vide orderdated 19/01/1984the Additional Collector of Customs (Preventive)Bombay imposed a penalty of Rs. 3 lacs on each of the appellants, againstwhich they preferred an appeal to the appellate tribunal. The order of theadditional Collector of Customs (Preventive) was modified and both theappellants were asked to deposit a sum of Rs. 1 lac each pending hearing oftheir appeals. They failed to deposit this amount on account of which theirappeals were dismissed. The plea taken up by them in the Supreme Courtwas that they had no money, hence the right of appeal would be illusoryunless they were permitted to deposit only Rs. 60,000. 00 each which they hadprocured with the assistance of their father. Under Section 129-E of the Actthere was a proviso authorising the appellate tribunal to dispense with suchdeposits subject to such conditions as it may deem fit to impose so as to safeguard the interest of revenue. Not accepting the plea of the petitioner it washeld that the right of appeal is neither absolute right nor an ingredient ofnatural justice and the principles of which must be followed in all judicialand quasi-judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is a statutory right andit can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant. This judgement, thus,a mply supports our conclusion that there is no absolute right of appeal andit being not a right under the Constitution there is nothing wrong in thestatute making provision of conditional appeal and a person desirous ofavailing the provision of appeal has to comply with the conditions. This judgement, thus,a mply supports our conclusion that there is no absolute right of appeal andit being not a right under the Constitution there is nothing wrong in thestatute making provision of conditional appeal and a person desirous ofavailing the provision of appeal has to comply with the conditions. ( 53 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon thecase M/s. Wire Netting Stores, Delhi and another v. The Regional Providentfunds Commissioner, New Delhi and others, 1981 Lab I. C 1015. In this caseno right of appeal was availabe to an employer and the provisions of Section7a of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act weretield to be unreasonable, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution Submissionof learned counsel for the petitioner has been that even in the instant casethere is practically no right of appeal on account of an onerous condition ofpredeposit and so proviso to Section 170 of Delhi Municipal Corporation Actis violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India We have carefully gonethrough the aforesaid judgment and have, no doubt, in our mind that thisjudgment cannot be of any help to the petitioners The admitted facts in thesaidcase were that no appeal was provided from the decision of the Commissioner of Provident Funds nor could it be justified in a civil court. It was280held that a provision should have been made for an appeal to tribunal, judicial or quasi-judicial. It is also pertinent to note that in the laid case powerswere conferred on the Commissioner to enforce attendance of persons toexamine them on oath and require discovery and production of documents. However, no such right was made available to the employer. In this way, theprocedure provided was not just as it did not provide similar opportunitiesto the employer as were made available to the Commissioner. There was acomplete absence of the right to challenge the order of the Commissionerwhich was made final as there was no provision for appeal nor could the samebe challenged in a civil court. The facts of the present case arc, however,entirely different and a right of appeal has certainly been provided though aproviso to the effect that the amount of tax has to be deposited before theappeal ii beard or determined. The judgment, thus. is distinguishable andcannot be of any help to the petitioners. ( 54 ) AS a result, the writ petitioners are dismissed. The judgment, thus. is distinguishable andcannot be of any help to the petitioners. ( 54 ) AS a result, the writ petitioners are dismissed. In the circumstanecs, the partics are left to bear their own costs. By The Court ( 55 ) LA view of the majority decision our findings on the questionsformulated are as follows : (1) The deposit of the tax amount under Section 170 (b) of the Delhimunicipal Corporation Act, 1957 is a condition precedent forhearing or determination of the appeal but there is no restrictionon filing the memorandum of appeal. However, mere filing of amemorandum of appeal shall not be construed as a valid and competent appeal for the purpose of Section 155 (1) of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. (2) The District Judge has no discretion to grant stay of the disputedamount or dispense with the condition of pre-deposit of theamount in appeal, with or without conditions. Further theamount in dispute in appeal referred to in Section 170 (b) of thedelhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 would mean the taxamount based on the whole amount of the rateable value. (3) The provisions of Section 170 (b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 are intravires the Constitution of India. ( 56 ) IN the light of the above findings, the writ petitions are dismissed,however, in the circumstances of this case we make no order as to costs.