ORDER S. R. Singh, J. - 'Mahavir Prasad Balika Vidyaley' Junior High School Khuldabad, District Allahabad, is a recognised school within the meaning of the term as defined in Rule 2(g) of the Uttar Pradesh Recognised Basic Schools (Junior High Schools) (Recruitment and conditions of Services of Teachers) Rules. 1978 (herein after referred to as the rules). 2. The factual matrix of the case is delineated in a short compass. The petitioner was appointed as Teacher in the 'Mahavir Prasad Balika Vidyaley, Junior High School, Khuldabad, Allahabad (briefly referred to as the School) with effect from 11-9-80 and her appointment was preceded by an interview held on 13-7-90 for the purpose of selecting a suitable candidate in accordance with the provisions of the rules by the Selection Committee, which recommended the name of the petitioner to the Committee of Management of the school for appointment. The Committee of Management concurred with the recommendations of the selection committee and sent the papers pertaining to the selection. to the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Mahila) Allahabad for approval. The papers were received in the office of the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Mahila) Allahabad on 28-7-80. The appointment of the petitioner was approved on one year's probation effective from the date of her appointment vide communication issued by Additional Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Women) Allahabad, a copy of which has been annexed to the writ petition as Annexure 1. 3. The services of the petitioner were sought to be terminated with effect from 30-6-81 by means of a notice dated 7-9-1981, which purports to have been issued in pursuance of a resolution dated 16-8-81 of the Committee of Management. Relevant portion of the said notice is reproduced below. "Prabandh samiti ke Dinank 16-8-81 ke prastav Sankhiya (3) ke Anusar Vidyaley me Apki Sewa Dinank 30-6-81 se Sampat Kar Di Ja Rahi He. Kripiya Tadarth Notice Kijati Hai." 4. A copy of this notice was endorsed to the Additional Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Mahila) Allahabad. The Additional Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Women) Allahabad held vide order contained in the letter dated 5-12-1981 that the aforesaid notice dated 7-9-1981 was 'irregular (Aniamit), but at the same time the Addl. Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari. Kripiya Tadarth Notice Kijati Hai." 4. A copy of this notice was endorsed to the Additional Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Mahila) Allahabad. The Additional Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Women) Allahabad held vide order contained in the letter dated 5-12-1981 that the aforesaid notice dated 7-9-1981 was 'irregular (Aniamit), but at the same time the Addl. Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari. (Mahila) Allahabad approved the resolution of the committee of Management for the termination of the petitioner's services with the observation that the petitioner was entitled to a month's prior notice or salary in lieu thereof. Pursuant to the order dated 5-12-81 a notice dated 16-1-82 was issued stating therein that the notice of termination was already given on 7-9-81 and that in view of the order dated 5-12-81 a bank draft No. DD,180/397638 Bank of Baroda, Khuldabad, Allahabad dated 16-1-82 was being sent towards payment of a month's salary to the petitioner in lieu of notice. The date with effect from which the services were sought to be terminated is conspicuously missing from the notice. 5. On 27-1-82 the validity of the order dated 5-12-81 was challenged by the petitioner by means of an appeal filed before the Secretary, U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad, Allahabad. The appeal failed and was dismissed vide order dated 13-12-84, a copy of which is annexed as Annexure 8 to the writ petition. In the instant petition, the petitioner has challenged the validity of the termination of her services and sought for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the notice dated 7-9-81 and the appeallate order dated 13-12-84. 6. The principal contention advanced by Sri U. N. Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that having already completed the probationary period prior to 7-9-81 and 5-12-81 the petitioner was not liable to be discharged/ terminated from service treating her as on probation. 6. The principal contention advanced by Sri U. N. Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that having already completed the probationary period prior to 7-9-81 and 5-12-81 the petitioner was not liable to be discharged/ terminated from service treating her as on probation. Relying upon Rule 12(2) of the Rules, Sri Sharma contends that the papers received by the Committee of Management under Rule 10(3) were sent to the appropriate authority for approval and it had received the same on 27-7-80, but as the Management received no communication from the Additional Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Women) within a month from the date of the receipt of the papers, it shall be deemed to have approved the recommendation of the selection committee for the appointment of the petitioner under Rule 10(5)(iii) of the rules on 28-8-80 and therefore the appointment became effective from 11-9-80 and one year period of probation expired on 11-9-81 on which date the petitioner stood automatically confirmed in view of Rule 12(2) of the Rules. 7. Sri R. S. Misra, learned counsel for the respondent, Committee of Management. has contended that clause ( iii) of sub-rule (5) of Rule 10 of the Rules providing for deemed approval to the recommendation of the selection committee was not attracted as the complete papers regarding the selection of the petitioner were not received in the office of the Additional Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Woman) Allahabad and the Manager was orally asked by the Addl. Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Women) Allahabad on 25-8-80 to supply the wanting papers. In support of his contention, Sri Misra relies on the letters dated 27-8-80 and 7-12-80 which purport to have been written by the Manager to the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari, Allahabad in connection with the approval of appointments made in 1980-81. Some of these two letters, however, finds mention in the order contained in the letter dated 3-1-81 hereby the selection made by the selection committee on 13-7-80 was approved. 8. Having bestowed my anxious consideration to the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, I fell persuaded to accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The provisions contained in Rule 10(5)1 iii) of the rules were attracted on the facts of the present case. 8. Having bestowed my anxious consideration to the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, I fell persuaded to accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The provisions contained in Rule 10(5)1 iii) of the rules were attracted on the facts of the present case. The Additional Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Women) Allahabad, shall be deemed to have accorded approval to the recommendations made by the selection committee immediately on expiry of one month from the date of the receipt of papers. It is admitted that the papers were received in the office of Zila Basic Shiksha (Mahila) Allahabad on 28-7-80, though according to Sri R. S. Misra. the papers submitted to Zilla Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Mahila) Allahabad for according approval to the selection were not complete in all respects. The learned counsel has relied upon letter dated 27/28-8-80 written by the Manager to the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Mahila) Allahabad, with reference to what transpired between him and the respondent No. 2 in respect of the approval to the selections made in 1980-81. In this letter, it is alleged that the Manager had met the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari on 25-8-80 and there he was told by the latter that the papers received in regard to the selection in question, were incomplete. By means of this letter, the Manager seems to have informed the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Mahila) Allahabad that the requisite papers would be sent as early as possible. The learned counsel has further placed reliance upon another letter dated 7-12-80, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-4 to the Supplementary counter affidavit. This letter purports to have been written with reference to selection of teachers made on 13-7-80. Certain papers, not mentioned in the covering letter, are supposed to have been sent along with this letter. The letter further recites that certain other papers (particulars not disclosed) would be sent as and when they would be available. 9. The learned counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this court in Ram Chandra Sharma v. State of U.P., 1980 UPLBEC 245. In this case, Section 16F(2) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 was up for consideration. 9. The learned counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this court in Ram Chandra Sharma v. State of U.P., 1980 UPLBEC 245. In this case, Section 16F(2) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 was up for consideration. It was found that the complete papers were not submitted and the District Inspector of Schools had asked for additional papers and so in view of the enquiry being made by the District Inspector of Schools, the approval was delayed. Under the circumstances the court held that the provision regarding deemed approval was not attracted. 10. In the case in hand, no counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Women). In the counter affidavit filed by the Manager, reliance has been placed upon an oral enquiry allegedly made by the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Women), Allahabad from the Manager on 25-8-80 about some irregularity regarding the selected candidates being not related to any member of the committee of Management and want of some certificates of the selected candidates. 11. The oral enquiry, to my mind, does not savour of a tuye of enquiry which may be regarded as communication of decision within the meaning of clause (iii) of Rule 5 of the rules. The aforesaid rule requires communication of decision within a specified time, failing which the consequence of deemed approval is to follow. The rule under references, has been enacted to the advantage of the teachers and therefore, the communication of decision, if any, must be a written one, for oral communication, if held to be sufficient, for the purpose of arresting ,the consequence of non-communication to follow, may have the tendency to defeat the valuable rights accrued in favour of the selected candidates through manipulation. Under the circumstances, the communication of decision within the meaning of rule aforesaid, must be a written communication and consequently, the enquiry, if any, must also embrace in its fold the written enquiry relating to any deficiency or want of relevant papers. Admittedly, no written communication was sent by Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Women) Allahabad regarding approval of the selection sought for by the Management by a letter accompanied with the minutes of the proceedings etc. which reached the office of Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (women) Allahabad on 28-7-80 within the stipulated time. Admittedly, no written communication was sent by Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Women) Allahabad regarding approval of the selection sought for by the Management by a letter accompanied with the minutes of the proceedings etc. which reached the office of Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (women) Allahabad on 28-7-80 within the stipulated time. The consequences of non-communication of any decision be it a decision to make an enquiry before according or refusing approval shall automatically ensure on expiry of the stipulated period of time and the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari would be deemed to have accorded approval to the selection immediately on expiry of the stipulated period of time. Even otherwise, the two letters allegedly written by the Manager on 27-8-80 and 7-12-80, do not inspire confidence on the ground of their being vague and also on the ground that these letters do not find any reference in the letter dated 3-1-81 written by Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Women) Allahabad, belatedly according approval. The decision cited by Sri Misra, Learned Counsel, is therefore of no avail in so far as the present case is concerned. 12. As such on expiry of the period i.e. on 28-8-80, the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (Mahila) Allahabad, shall be deemed to have accorded approval to the recommendation made by the selection committee and in this, view of the matter, the appointment of the petitioner with effect from 11-9-80 was well in accordance with the provisions of Rule 1 l of the Rules, which provides that on receipt of communication of approval or as the case may be, on the expiry of the period one month under clause (iii) of sub-rule (5) of Rule 10, the Management shall first offer appointment to the candidate. given first preference by the Selection Committee and on his failure to join the post, to the candidate next to him in the list prepared by the selection committee. The appointment of the petitioner with effect from 11-9-80 was perfectly valid. One year's probation within the meaning of Rule 12 of the Rules, accorditly commenced with effect from 11-9-80 i.e. the date of appointment and not with effect from 3-1-81, the date on which a specific order of approval purports to have been issued. The appointment of the petitioner with effect from 11-9-80 was perfectly valid. One year's probation within the meaning of Rule 12 of the Rules, accorditly commenced with effect from 11-9-80 i.e. the date of appointment and not with effect from 3-1-81, the date on which a specific order of approval purports to have been issued. As noticed above, the provisions of Rule 10(5)(iii) of the rules were attracted and the concerned Authority shall be deemed to have accorded the requisite approval on 28-8-80 and the mere fact that an express approval order was issued on 3-1-81. would not make any difference and the petitioner's services were not liable to be terminated on the basis of assumption that he was still on probation. The respondents have erred in law in treating the petitioner as if she was still on probation and terminating her services on the ground of her alleged unsuitability and unsatisfactory work. The order dated 5-12-81 as also the, appellate order dated 13-12-84 proceeds on erroneous presumption that the petitioner had not completed the probationary period and was liable to be terminated from service on the basis of unsuitablity and unsatisfactory work. Both these orders as also the notice) dated 16-12-82 given by the Management on the basis of the order dated 5-12-81 are liable' to be quashed. 13. The notice dated 16-1-82 is vitiated also on the ground that it does not specify the date with effect from which the services of the petitioner were sought to be terminated. Instead. it appears to have been issued in continuation of the earlier notice dated 7-9-81 which was void for want of prior approval of the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari (women) Allahabad as contemplated by Rule 15 of the Rules which provides that no Head Master or Asstt. Teacher of a recognised School may be discharged or removed or dispensed from the service or reduced in rank or subjected to any dimunition in the emoluments or served with the notice of termination of the services, except with the prior approval in writting of the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari. 14. Teacher of a recognised School may be discharged or removed or dispensed from the service or reduced in rank or subjected to any dimunition in the emoluments or served with the notice of termination of the services, except with the prior approval in writting of the Zila Basic Shiksha Adhikari. 14. Even if it be assumed for a moment that the petitioner had not acquired the status of a permanent and confirmed teacher and she continued to be on probation on 5-12-81, an informal, if not formal, enquiry ought to have been made in order to assess the suitability of the petitioner vis-a-vis her, conduct, work and performance as a teacher and she should have been apprised of her short comings and the deficiencies in her conduct and performance as a teacher. But irrationally, she was not afforded any opportunity to mend herself in her work and performance during the period of probation. The impugned orders are vitiated for this reasons as well. I am fortified in my view by a decision rendered by Hon. Supreme Court in Sumati P. Shere v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 1431 : (1989 Lab IC 1372) which runs to the following effect : "The defects or deficiencies; indifference or indiscretion may be with the employee by inadvertence and not by incapacity to work. Timely communication of the assessment of work in such cases may put the employee on the right track. Without any such communication, in our opinion, it would be arbitrary to give movement order to the employee on the ground of unsuitabiity." It is worthy of notice in the above noted case that Sumati P. Shere was an ad hoc appointee, even then the Supreme Court has emphasised the need of formal assessment of work in tune with the requirements of the principles of natural justice before the services are terminated, as such a course of action is in consonance with the requirments of fair-play and absence of the elements of arbitrariness in action. The Supreme Court in the above noted case, has observed that "in the relationship of Master and Servant there is a normal obligation to act fairly." In the instant case, no such formal enquiry congruous to the principles of natural justice was embarked upon and furthermore, the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to improve upon her work and performance before her service were sought to be terminated treating her as on probation. Sri Mishra, learned counsel also placed reliance upon another Division Bench case of this Court reported in Janta Vidayaley Society Deoria v. Deputy Director of Education, 7th Region Gorakhpur, reported in 1983 UPLBEC 622 : (1984 Lab IC (NOC) 52). In this case, it was held that the termination of services of probationer during period of probation, does not cast any stigma on the probationer and that the probationer is not entitled to any opportunity of hearing. Similar is the view expressed by another Division Bench case in Brigadier B. B. Chaddha v. M/s. Balber Lawrie and Company Limited reported, in 1989 (1) UPLBEC 95 : (1989 Lab IC (NOC) 50). None of these ceases is of any avail to Sri Mishra, for I have taken the view that the petitioner had acquired the character of a permanent teacher and was not a probationer. 15. Another case which I advert to for resolving the controversy in the instant case, is 'Indra Pal v. Managing Committee, M.I. College, Thora, AIR 1984 SC 1110 : (1984 Lab IC 900). In this case, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the matter arising out of termination of services of the probationer principal of an Intermediate College, has held as under at Pages (904 & 905) of Lab IC): "The above report was the real foundation on which the decision of the Managing Committee was based. This is a case where the order of termination issued is merely a camouflage for an order imposing the penalty of termination of service on the ground of misconduct. This is a case where the order of termination issued is merely a camouflage for an order imposing the penalty of termination of service on the ground of misconduct. Secondly, the Division Bench has tried to justify the action of the Management, by observing that since the Management had to secure the approval of the District Inspector to its action, it was necessary for it to give its assessment of the work of the appellant as principal and, therefore, in the context of the statutory requirement, it cannot be said that merely because the Manager's report or the resolution of the Managing Committee refers to the various aspects of the assessment of the performance of the Principal of terms unfavourable to him, it would in law, amount to casting a stigma upon the Principal'. It is difficult to engraft an exception of the above tuye to the well settled rule that if the order of termination carries a stigma it has to fall to the ground unless it is preceded by an enquiry as contemplated by law. A reading of the letter of termination of the service and the resolution which forms part of that letter clearly shows that they bear a mark of disgrace or infamy and that the appellant is visited with evil consequences as explained in Parshottam Lal Dhingra's case AIR 1958 SC 36 : (1958 All LJ 372) (supra) The Division Bench, therefore, erred in holding that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order of termination was an innocuous one and did not carry any stigma. The order of the Division Bench is, in our opinion, an unsustainable one and is liable to be set aside." 16. In the instant case, the Committee of Management had passed the resolution for the termination of the petitioner's service on the basis of a report submitted by the Head Mistress of the institution making a bald assertion therein that the work and conduct of the petitioner was not good during the probationary period. In the instant case, the Committee of Management had passed the resolution for the termination of the petitioner's service on the basis of a report submitted by the Head Mistress of the institution making a bald assertion therein that the work and conduct of the petitioner was not good during the probationary period. The appellate authority (respondent No. 1) in justification of the termination order has relied upon the said report and observed as under : "Shrimati Rashmi Chauhan Ke Sambandh Me Sunwai Ke Samaya Prabandhak Dwara Jo Sakchhya Prastut Kiye Gaye Uske Anusar Yeh Sapsta Hai Ki Shrimati Chauhan Ne Aniyemitta Ki Hai Aur Unhone Adeshen Ka Ulanghan Kiya Hai Aur Kartabyo Ke Prati Udesinta Dikhayee Hai." . Yet another case which I advert to is Smt. Prem Lata Yadav v. Basic Shiksha Adhikari. In this case a Division Bench of this court while dealing with the case of termination of services of a teacher of a Junior High School during probationary period has observed as under: "The provisions of the Rules as discussed earlier provide that appointment of a teacher shall be made on probation of one year, which may be extended for a further period of one year. The management has no power to extend the probationary period beyond the extended period of one year and if the services of a teacher is not dispensed with within the probationary period, in would be deemed to have been confirmed on the expiry of the probationary period. The management has right to discharge the services of a teacher who may be on probation before or at the expiry of the period of probation; but the order of discharge cannot be issued except with the prior approval of the District Basic Education Officer as contemplated by Rule 15. Any order of discharge passed by the Management dispensing with the services of a teacher who may be on probation without obtaining the prior approval of the District Basic Education Officer would be illegal as it would be in contravention of the statutory provisions contained in Rule 15. The policy underlying the Act and Rules is to regulate the exercise of powers by the Managing Committee in discharging or dismissing teachers employed in the recognised institutions. The policy underlying the Act and Rules is to regulate the exercise of powers by the Managing Committee in discharging or dismissing teachers employed in the recognised institutions. The restriction on their power has been with a view to curb the tendency of unscrupulous management to dispense with the services of teachers who may be inconvenient to the management for any reasons. The Act and the Rules provide safeguard to the teachers and employees." Sri R. S. Misra, learned counsel has also drawn my attention to a case reported in 1991 UPLBEC P 152, State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla. This was a case of temporary Government servant appointed for a fixed term on ad hoc basis. There were adverse reports regarding the work and conduct of the employee and it was reflected in the adverse remarks made for the relevant year. The competent authority held preliminary enquiry into the allegations of improper conduct of the concerned Government Servant in carrying out audit of boys fund unauthorisedly of an Educational Institution. On result of the preliminary enquiry, no charges were framed and the services of the delinquent were terminated under the terms of contract as well as in the relevant rules applicable to the temporary Government Servant. The Supreme Court in the facts and circumstances of the said case held that it was never intended to dismiss the concerned Government Servant from services and that the holding of preliminary enquiry did not affect the nature of termination order. The facts of the said case are distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand. Hence the said decision of the Supreme Court is of no avail to the facts of the present case. 17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is obvious that the impugned orders cannot be sustained inasmuch as the services of the petitioner were not terminated during the probationary period and alternatively the assessment of her work during the probationary period was not made in tune with the requirements of the principles of natural justice. The one year's probationary period had expired on 11-9-81 moreso when there is no material on record to establish that it was ever extended, thereafter. The one year's probationary period had expired on 11-9-81 moreso when there is no material on record to establish that it was ever extended, thereafter. It is also borne out from the facts of the case as discussed above that approval of District Basic Shiksha Adhikari for termination of the petitioner's services was accorded on 5-12-81 and consegeunt notice of termination dated 16-1-82 was issued only after the expiry of the probationary period. It thus can be construed that the petitioner had acquired the status of a permanent teacher and her services were not liable to be terminated on grounds of her work and conduct being unsatisfactory while on probation. It is not thus difficult to construe that the order of termination was merely a camouflage of an order imposing penalty of termination of services on the ground of misconduct as reported by the Manager. It must be borne in mind that since such an action in terminating the services of the petitioner affects her livelihood or attaches stigma, the punitive action could have been taken only after holding enquiry according to the minimum principles of natural justice which are an unbiased Judge and an opportunity to controvert the allegations as to clear herself of the charges. 18. In the perspective of what has been expatiated above, the petitioner indubitably is entitled to be reinstated but the question remains whether it would be justifiable to saddle the respondents with the liability to pay full back salary and allowances to the petitioner. I would like to appreciate this controversy in the light of the fact that before the termination of her services, the petitioner took long medical leave and was not attending to her duties. In the case of the project and the Equipment Corporation of India Limited, AIR 1984 SC 1361 , the Supreme Court having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, held that "the appellant should be paid 50% of the back wages for the period since his removal from service up to his reinstatement excluding the period for which he had procured an alternative employment. 19. 19. From the facts found by the respondent No. 1 in its order dated 13-12-84 as to the dereliction of duties, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the petitioner is in no case entitled to be reinstated with full salary and allowances with retrospective effect but what I feel in the circumstances of the case, traversed upon supra, is that the reinstatement of the petitioner followed by payment of a lump sum amount of Rs. 50,000/- towards full satisfaction of back wages anterior to 1-4-90 in my opinion, would not prejudice the interest of justice. 20. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned notices dated 7-9-81 and 16-2-82 and the orders dated 5-11-81 and 13-12-84 are hereby quashed. The petitioner is declared to be in uninterrupted service entitled to all the benefits flowing from this declaration except the benefit of past salary anterior to 1-4-91, in lieu of which I direct the respondents to pay a lump sum amount of Rs. 50,000/-. There shall be no orders as to the costs.