JUDGMENT M. B. SHARMA, J. - In the above numbered writ petitions an identical question is involved and therefore, all the above writ petitions are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioner in each of the above writ petitions purchases wheat from outside State as well as from within the State of Rajasthan for crushing it into flour and fine-flour, i.e., maida and suji and sells it to the traders within and without the State. 3. Clause 3 of article 286 of the Constitution lays down that any law of a State shall in so far as it imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of goods declared by Parliament by law to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce, or a tax on the sale or purchase of goods being a tax of the nature referred to in sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) or sub-clause (d) of clause (29A) of article 366, be subject to such restrictions and conditions in regard to the system of levy, rates and other incidents of the tax as Parliament may by law specify. In view of the aforesaid constitutional mandate provisions were made in the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (for short, "the CST Act"). Section 2(c) of the CST Act defines "declared goods" and the said term means goods declared under section 14 to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. Section 14 of the CST Act declares certain goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce, and for the convenience these goods have come to be known as "declared goods". A conjoint reading of sections 14 and 15 of the CST Act will show that so far as declaration of goods under section 14 is concerned, the sales tax law of the State shall impose or authorise imposition of tax not exceeding 4 per cent of the sale or purchase price thereof and such tax shall not be levied at more than one stage. So far as clause (i) of section 14 of the CST Act is concerned, it reads as under : "Section 14 : Certain goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. So far as clause (i) of section 14 of the CST Act is concerned, it reads as under : "Section 14 : Certain goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. - It is hereby declared that the following goods are of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce - (i) cereals, that is to say - (i) paddy (Oryza sativa L.); (ii) rice (Oryza sativa L.); (iii) wheat (Triticum vulgare, T. compactum, T. sphaerococcum, T. durum, T. aestivum L., T. dicoccum); (iv) jowar or milo (Sorghum vulgare Pers); (v) bajra (Pennisetum typhoideum L.); (vi) maize (Zea mays D.); (vii) ragi (Eleusine coracana Gaertn.); (viii) kodon (paspalum scrobiculatum L.); (ix) kutki (panicum miliare L.); (x) barley (Hordeum vulgare L.);" It will therefore appear from the aforesaid extracted clause (i) that "wheat" is declared goods. 4. In the seventies wheat was exempted from payment of sales tax by various notifications issued under section 4(2) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 (for short, "the RST Act"). Under the various notifications the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by proviso ii to section 5 of the RST Act prescribed the rates of sales tax payable by a dealer in respect of goods including flour, fine-flour, i.e., maida, and suji and a reference may be made to the following notifications in this respect - Notification number and date Rate of tax 1. F.5.(23)E&T/61-I dated March 9, 1961 1% 2. 5(A) : F.5(40)FD(R&T)/63 XIII dated March 2, 1963 2% 3. S. No. 94 : F.5(125)FD(CT)/65-IV dated November 2, 1965 1% 4. S. No. 248 : F.5(24)FD/CT/72-8 dated April 26, 1972 1% 5. F.4(67)FD/Gr.IV/76-23 dated September 8, 1976 3% 6. F.4(5)FD/Gr.IV/88-13 dated March 8, 1988 : for paddy, rice and wheat 4% for maida, suji and sewaiyan 5% 7. F.4(4)FD/Gr.IV/89-12 dated March 23, 1989 4% 5. The case of the petitioners is that in the past the contention of the respondents that "flour" and "fine-flour" (maida) are different cereal commodities and therefore, tax would be leviable in addition to tax on wheat, but the same was overruled by the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal on considering the various notifications namely notification dated April 26, 1972 and other notifications, wherein a view was taken that flour and fine-flour are forms of wheat and no tax on the same is payable. Therefore, till October 7, 1976, when the notification dated April 26, 1972, was in force the flour mills were not required to pay any sales tax on flour or fine-flour but the notification dated April 26, 1972, was superseded by notification dated September 8, 1976 and the petitioner as well as members of the Rajasthan Flour Mills Association (one of the petitioners) were taxed under the aforesaid notifications dated September 8, 1976, March 26, 1988 and March 23, 1989 on the plea that with effect from September 8, 1976, wheat as such is a declared commodity under section 14 of the CST Act and therefore, the restrictions prescribed under section 15 of the said Act do not apply to the other forms of wheat, i.e., flour and fine-flour (maida and suji) and the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal confirmed the levy under the notification dated September 8, 1976. The litigation is going on and the matter is said to be pending in this Court in various revision petitions under the RST Act. 6. The petitioners' case further is that in the year 1989 the case of Dhanbad Flour Mills v. State of Bihar [1989] 75 STC 47 (Pat) came to the notice of the petitioner wherein a view had been taken that atta, maida and suji, which are obtained by merely reducing the size of wheat grains into smaller particles or powder, are included in the item "wheat" in section 14(i)(iii) of the CST Act and are to be treated as declared goods. Additional tax under section 6 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, is not exigible thereon. It is the case of the petitioners that they are not liable to pay any sales tax on the flour or fine-flour (maida and suji), as it is unconstitutional being in violation of sections 14 and 15 of the CST Act and amounts to double taxation on the declared goods on more than one point. 7. The notification which has now been challenged in these petitions is of June 27, 1990, is reproduced here and reads as follows : "FINANCE (GR. IV) DEPARTMENT NOTIFICATION Jaipur, June 27, 1990 SO. 94. 7. The notification which has now been challenged in these petitions is of June 27, 1990, is reproduced here and reads as follows : "FINANCE (GR. IV) DEPARTMENT NOTIFICATION Jaipur, June 27, 1990 SO. 94. - In exercise of the powers conferred by section 5 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 (Rajasthan Act No. XXIX of 1954) and in supersession of this Department Notification No. F.4(4)FD/Gr.IV/89-12 dated March 23, 1989, as amended from time to time, the State Government being of the opinion that it is expedient in the public interest so to do, hereby provides that with immediate effect the rate of tax payable by a dealer in respect of the goods specified in column 2 of the list annexed hereto shall be as shown against them in column 3 of the said List : LIST ------------------------------------------------------------------------ S. No. Description of goods Rate of tax ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1 to 31 ......................... 32. Paddy, rice, wheat, atta (flour) of rice and wheat, maida and suji. 4% 33 to 102 ......................... 103. General rate, i.e., all goods that are not covered by Sl. Nos. 1 to 102 10% [No. F.4(37)FD/Gr.IV/90-15] By Order of the Governor Sd/- Rakesh Verma, Deputy Secretary." 8. The petitions are contested on behalf of the respondents and preliminary objections have also been raised including the preliminary objection that it is a question of fact as to whether the flour or fine-flour (maida and suji) are declared goods or not and against the order, if any, appeal lies to the appellate authority and then to the Tribunal and then revision lies to this Court. Thus, there is alternative remedy in such a case where best judgment assessment under section 7-B of the RST Act has been framed and appeals have been preferred. We are of the opinion that the existence of alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the invoking of extraordinary jurisdiction under articie 226 of this Court and more so in a case where the jurisdiction to impose and levy tax has been challenged on the ground that flour and fine-flour are forms of wheat and therefore they are declared goods which have already suffered tax at the rate of 4 per cent as provided under section 15. We will therefore proceed to examine the issue and we will see as to whether in the term "wheat" in clause (i)(iii) of section 14 of the CST Act, flour or fine-flour are also included or "wheat" has been used therein in the restricted sense ? 9. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that flour and fine-flour, i.e., maida and suji are merely forms of wheat and therefore are declared goods under the above referred clause (i)(iii) of section 14 of the CST Act. Learned counsel has built his case on the case of Dhanbad Flour Mills' case [1989] 75 STC 47 wherein the Patna High Court has taken a view that atta, maida and suji are included in the item "wheat" in section 14(i)(iii) of the CST Act. In the aforesaid case reliance was also placed upon the case of Alladi Venkateswarlu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh [1978] 41 STC 394 (SC). In the aforesaid case of Alladi Venkateswarlu [1978] 41 STC 394 the apex Court was dealing with word and phrase "rice" which too are declared goods, under clause (i)(ii) of section 14 of the CST Act. The apex Court was dealing with a case where the First Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (No. 6 of 1957), dealing with matters provided by section 5(2)(a) contained entry 66, which runs as follows : ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "Description of goods Point of levy Rate of tax ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 66. Rice - At the point of sale by 6 paise in (a) Rice not covered the first wholesale dealer the rupee by sub-item (b) in the State effecting below. the sale. Provided that a rebate of two paise in the rupee shall be allowed on the rice sold and consumed in the State in accordance with such rules as may be prescribed. (b) Rice obtained from At the point of sale by 1 paisa in paddy that has met the first wholesale dealer the rupee." tax under this Act in the State effecting the sale. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ There was no dispute that paddy out of which the commodity in question, i.e., "atukulu" (parched rice) and "muramaralu" (puffed rice) (had been made), had been subjected to tax. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ There was no dispute that paddy out of which the commodity in question, i.e., "atukulu" (parched rice) and "muramaralu" (puffed rice) (had been made), had been subjected to tax. The Supreme Court said that the question before it was that whether "atukulu" (parched rice) and "muramaralu" (puffed rice) are "rice" within the meaning of entry 66(b) of Schedule I to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. The court posed a question, "whether paddy ceased to be "rice" when it is converted into "parched rice" and "puffed rice" ? The court said that : "It is true that it is no longer rice grain as it emerges from the husk. Parched rice and puffed rice have to go through further processes. These are only processes of converting rice grain into a different form of it by heating or parching. If such rice is still rice, even if we confine the term 'rice' to grain, is it by going through these processes of heating or parching converted into separate items for the purposes of entry 66 in the First Schedule of the Act ?" It does not appear from the aforesaid case that the question in issue was as to whether the goods in question was declared goods or not and the only limited question was whether the goods can be termed both in sub-section (1) of section 5 as well as sub-section (2) of section 5 simultaneously. The court said : "We do not think that it is fair to so interpret a taxing statute as to impute an intention to the Legislature to go on taxing what is virtually the same product in different forms over and over again. Such a result would be contrary to basic axioms of taxation. Unless the language of the taxing statute was absolutely clear, it should not be given an obviously unfair interpretation against the assessee." The court quoted Kayani and Co. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1953] 4 STC 387 (Hyd.) and said that : "The only principle deducible from it is that the commonly accepted sense of a term should prevail in construing the description of an article of food. While dealing with an item meant for rice as a cereal, the court had accepted a more limited meaning of the term 'rice' so as to exclude cooked rice in all its forms. While dealing with an item meant for rice as a cereal, the court had accepted a more limited meaning of the term 'rice' so as to exclude cooked rice in all its forms. Of course, the case before us is not a case of rice cooked and prepared in the form of 'pulao' or 'biriyani' or any other type of cooked rice which may have undergone changes of character by additions or chemical transformation which may convert it into a food product with a substantially different identity. It was only converted from unedible grain into an edible form by parching or puffing through a heating process." The court again said that : "Even if parched rice and puffed rice could be looked upon as separate in commercial character from rice as grain offered for sale in a market, yet, keeping in view the other matters mentioned above, it could not be presumed that it was intended to exclude from entry 66 rice', which, at any rate, had not so changed its identity as not to be describable as 'rice' at all. 'Muramaralu' was after all rice even though it was puffed. 'Atukulu' even though parched was still called rice. We must also remember that the Schedule which we have to interpret is in the English language where the term 'rice' is still found in the rendering or description of 'pelalu' as well as that of 'muramaralu' in the English language. And, in any case, if two interpretations of a provision are possible, we think that we ought to, in such a case, apply the principle that the interpretation which favours the assessee should be preferred." The court again made it clear that the language could have provided separate category for parched rice and puffed rice, but it has not done so. The court said that : "It was possible for the Government to lay down a separate category for parched rice and puffed rice, but it has not done so. Section 40 of the Act lays down the power of the State Government to modify, to alter or to cancel any item in the Schedule. The court said that : "It was possible for the Government to lay down a separate category for parched rice and puffed rice, but it has not done so. Section 40 of the Act lays down the power of the State Government to modify, to alter or to cancel any item in the Schedule. It can also notify, under section 9 of the Act, exemptions and reductions of tax." We fail to understand as to how the aforesaid case could have and is in any way related to the present controversy, which is as to whether if under section 14(i)(iii) of the CST Act "wheat" is declared goods, even its form, such as flour or fine-flour, i.e., maida and suji, and other food products substantially different from wheat, such food products having different identity than wheat can be said to be declared goods within the meaning of the aforesaid clauses. It may be stated that the aforesaid case of Alladi Venkateswarlu [1978] 41 STC 394 (SC) has been relied upon by the Patna High Court in the case of Dhanbad Flour Mills [1989] 75 STC 47 and the Karnataka High Court in its recent cases of New Swastik Flour Mill v. State of Karnataka (Writ Petitions Nos. 3600 and 3601 of 1990 decided by the Karnataka High Court on March 7, 1991) [Reported in [1992] 84 STC 49 (Kar)]. We will make reference to the aforesaid cases at a later stage of this order. 10. We have already extracted in the earlier part of this order clause (i)(iii) of section 14 of the CST Act. We are of the opinion, it will be proper to read the entire section 14 of the CST Act even if it may lead to repetition in so far as clause (i)(iii) is concerned. Section 14 of the CST Act reads as under : "Section 14 : Certain goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. We are of the opinion, it will be proper to read the entire section 14 of the CST Act even if it may lead to repetition in so far as clause (i)(iii) is concerned. Section 14 of the CST Act reads as under : "Section 14 : Certain goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. - It is hereby declared that the following goods are of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce - (i) cereals, that is to say, - (i) paddy (Oryza sativa L.); (ii) rice, (Oryza sativa L.) (iii) wheat (Triticum vulgare, T. compactum, T. sphaerococcum, T. durum, T. aestivum L., T. dicoccum); (iv) jowar, or milo (Sorghum vulgare Pers); (v) bajra (Pennisetum typhoideum L.); (vi) maize (Zea mays D.); (vii) ragi (Eleusine coracana gaertn.); (viii) kodon (Paspalum scrobiculatum L.); (ix) kutki (Panicum miliare L.); (x) barley (Hordeum vulgare L.); (ia) coal, including coke in all its forms, but excluding charcoal : Provided that during the period commencing on the 23rd day of February, 1967 and ending with the date of commencement of section 11 of the Central Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1972, this clause shall have effect subject to the modification that the words 'but excluding charcoal' shall be omitted (Central Act 61 of 1972); (ii) cotton, that is to say, all kinds of cotton (indigenous or imported) in its unmanufactured state, whether ginned or unginned, baled, pressed or otherwise, but not including cotton waste; (iia) cotton fabrics, as defined in item No. (19) of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (Central Act 1 of 1944); (iib) cotton yarn, but not including cotton yarn waste; (iic) crude oil, that is to say, crude petroleum oils and crude oils obtained from bituminous minerals (such as shale, calcareous rock, sand) whatever their composition, whether obtained from normal or condensation oil deposits or by the destructive distillation of bituminous minerals and whether or not subjected to all or any of the following processes :- (1) decantation; (2) de-salting; (3) dehydration; (4) stabilisation in order to normalise the vapour pressure; (5) elimination of very light fractions with a view to returning them to the oil-deposits in order to improve the drainage and maintain the pressure; (6) the addition of only those hydrocarbons previously recovered by physical methods during the course of the above-mentioned process; (7) any other minor process (including addition of pour point depressants or flow improvers), which does not change the essential character of the substance; (iii) hides and skins, whether in a raw or dressed state; (iv) iron and steel, that is to say, - (i) pig iron and cast iron including ingot moulds, bottom plates, iron scrap, cast iron scrap, runner scrap and iron skull scrap; (ii) steel semis (ingots, slabs, blooms and billets of all qualities, shapes and sizes); (iii) skelp bars, tin bars, sheet bars, hoe-bars and sleeper bars; (iv) steel bars (rounds, rods, squares, flats, octagons and hexagons, plain and ribbed or twisted, in coil form as well as straight lengths); (v) steel structurals (angles, joists, channels, tees, sheet piling sections, Z sections or any other rolled sections); (vi) sheets, hoops, strips and skelp, both black and galvanised, hot and cold rolled, plain and corrugated, in all qualities, in straight lengths and in coil form, as rolled and in rivetted condition; (vii) plates both plain and chequered in all qualities; (viii) discs, rings, forgings and steel castings; (ix) tool, alloy and special steels of any of the above categories; (x) steel melting scrap in all forms including steel skull, turnings and borings; (xi) steel tubes, both welded and seamless, of all diameters and lengths, including tube fittings; (xii) tin-plates, both hot dipped and electrolytic and tinfree plates; (xiii) fish plate bars, bearing plate bars, crossing sleeper bars, fish plates, bearing plates, crossing sleepers and pressed steel sleepers, rails - heavy and light crane rails; (xiv) wheels, tyres, axles and wheel sets; (xv) wire rods and wires - rolled, drawn, galvanised, aluminised, tinned or coated such as by copper; (xvi) defectives, rejects, cuttings or end pieces of any of the above categories; (v) jute, that is to say, the fibre extracted from plants belonging to the species Corchorus capsularies and Corchorus olitorius and the fibre known as mesta or bimli extracted from plants of the species Hibiscus cannabinus and Hibiscus sabdariffa - Varaltissima and the fibre known as Sunn or Sunnhemp extracted from plants of the species Crotalaria juncea whether baled or otherwise; (vi) Oil-seeds, that is to say - (i) Groundnut or Peanut (Arachis hypogaea); (ii) Sesamum or Til (Sesamum orientale); (iii) Cotton seed (Gossypium Spp.); (iv) Soyabean (Glycine seja); (v) Rapeseed and Mustard - (1) Toria (Brassica campestris var toria); (2) Rai (Brassica juncea); (3) Jamba - Taramira (Eruca Satiya); (4) Sarson, yellow and brown (Brassica campestris var sarson); (5) Banarsi Rai or True Mustard (Brassica nigra); (vi) Linseed (Linum usitatissimum); (vii) Castor (Ricinus communis); (viii) Coconut (i.e., Copra excluding tender coconuts) (Cocos nucifera); (ix) Sunflower (Helianthus annus); (x) Nigar seed (Guizotia abyssinica); (xi) Neem, vepa (Azadirachta indica); (xii) Mahua, illupai, Ippa (Madhuca indica M. Latifolia, Bassia, Latifolia and Madhuca longifolia syn. M. Longifolia); (xiii) Karanja, Pongam, Honga (Pongamia pinnata syn. P. Glabra); (xiv) Kusum (Schleichera oleosa, syn. S. Trijuga); (xv) Punna, Undi (Calophyllum inophyllum); (xvi) Kokum (Carcinia indica); (xvii) Sal (Shorea robusta); (xviii) Tung (Aleurites fordii and A. montana); (xix) Red palm (Elaeis guinensis); (xx) Safflower (Carthanus tinctorius); (via) Pulses, that is to say, - (i) gram or gulab gram (Cicerarietinum L.); (ii) tur or xzrhar (Cajanus cajan); (iii) moong or green gram (Phaseolus aureus); (iv) masur or lentil (Lens esculenta Moench, Lens culinaris Medic.); (v) urad or black gram (Phaseolus mungo); (vi) moth (Phaseolus aconitifolius Jacq); (vii) lakh or khesari (Lathyrus sativus L.); (vii) rayon or artificial silk fabrics, as defined in item No. (22) of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944); (viii) sugar, as defined in item No. (1) of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944); (ix) tobacco, as defined in item No. (4) of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944); (x) woollen fabrics, as defined in item No. (21) of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944)." Mr. Bapna, learned counsel for the Revenue, has contended that before the CST Act came into force an Act to declare under article 286(3) of the Constitution of India, certain goods to be essential for the life of the community was framed by the Parliament which was known as The Essential Goods (Declaration and Regulation of Tax on Sale or Purchase) Act, 1952 (for short "the Act of 1952") and Schedule was enacted under section 2 in which certain goods were declared as essential for the life of the community. Item 1 in the aforesaid Schedule, was as under : "Cereals and pulses in all forms including bread and flour including atta, maida, suji and bran (except when any such article is sold in sealed containers)." It was contended by Mr. Bapna, learned counsel, that rule of interpretation is that where two statutes dealing with the same subject-matter use different language it is an acknowledged rule of construction that one may be looked at as a guide to the construction of the other. Bapna, learned counsel, that rule of interpretation is that where two statutes dealing with the same subject-matter use different language it is an acknowledged rule of construction that one may be looked at as a guide to the construction of the other. If one uses distinct language imposing a penalty under certain circumstances and other does not, it is always an argument that the Legislature did not intend to impose a penalty in the later, for where they did so intend they plainly said so. Mr. Bapna referred to the "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" by Justice G. P. Singh, wherein the author at pages 167-168 said that : "Just as use of same language in a later statute as was used in an earlier one in pari materia is suggestive of the intention of the Legislature that the language so used in the later statute is used in the same sense as in the earlier one, change of language in a later statute in pari materia is suggestive that change of interpretation is intended. As was observed by Brett, J., 'Where two statutes dealing with the same subject-matter use different language, it is an acknowledged rule of construction of the other. If one uses distinct language, imposing a penalty under certain circumstances and other does not, it is always an argument that the Legislature did not intend to impose a penalty in the later, for where they did so intend they plainly said so.' Similarly it was stated by Cockburn, C.J., 'When the Legislature in legislating in pari materia and substituting certain provisions in that Act for those which existed in the earlier statute has entirely changed the language of the enactment it must be taken to have done so with some intention and motive. To the same effect are the observations of Lord Macmillan, when an amending Act alters the language of the principal statute the alteration must be taken to have been made deliberately'. To the same effect are the observations of Lord Macmillan, when an amending Act alters the language of the principal statute the alteration must be taken to have been made deliberately'. The dropping of the word 'reduce' and substitution of the word 'modify' in its place was on this principle construed to give to the word 'modify' a wider connotation so as to include not only reduction but also other kinds of alteration including enhancement." It was contended by the learned counsel for the Revenue that the Act of 1952 was repealed when the CST Act came into force and therefore it appears that the Legislature has not used the words "in all its forms" after the word "wheat" in clause (i)(iii) of section 14 and this goes to show the intention of the Legislature that only wheat as such can be said to be declared goods and not "maida and suji" which even otherwise in the commercial market are not known as wheat and they are different identity of wheat and therefore the restrictions contained in section 15 of the CST Act in respect of rate of tax as well as stage at which it can be, do not apply to flour and fine-flour, i.e., maida and suji. 11. Mr. Bhojwani, learned counsel for the petitioners, placing reliance on the aforesaid cases of the Patna and Karnataka High Courts contends that fine-flour, maida or suji, or atta are made out of wheat and they continue to possess the old identity and it is not a different identity and therefore, the fact that the Legislature in clause (i)(iii) of section 14 of the CST Act has only used the word "wheat", it has included in all its forms and it will not be confined to wheat alone. According to the learned counsel one has to apply the common sense rule and if one goes by the rule of common sense there is no dispute that all forms of wheat are wheat within the meaning of section 14(i)(iii) of the CST Act and will be subject to restrictions and conditions in respect of tax on sale or purchase as prescribed in section 15 of the CST Act. Mr. Bhojwani, has relied on the aforesaid two cases, namely, Dhanbad Flour Mills' case [1989] 75 STC 47 (Pat) and New Swastik Flour Mill's case [1992], 84 STC 49 (Kar). Mr. Bhojwani, has relied on the aforesaid two cases, namely, Dhanbad Flour Mills' case [1989] 75 STC 47 (Pat) and New Swastik Flour Mill's case [1992], 84 STC 49 (Kar). In the case of Dhanbad Flour Mills [1989] 75 STC 47 (Pat), reliance was placed on the case of Alladi Venkateswarlu [1978] 41 STC 394 (SC) and we have already said in the earlier part of this order that it has no application to the present controversy, because it was not a case where the issue was whether the commodity was declared goods under section 14 of the CST Act, and the issue was only in respect of entry 66(b) of the First Schedule. Learned Judges said in para 21 that the decision in the case of Alladi Venkateswarlu [1978] 41 STC 394 (SC) is of more relevance to that case and the apex Court held that preparations of parched rice and puffed rice, which are made out of rice by heating and parching come within the meaning of "rice" under entry 66(b) of the First Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. The court also referred to the decisions of the Assam High Court and Allahabad High Court in the cases of Kapildeoram Baijnath Prosad v. J. K. Das [1954] 5 STC 365, and Tilok Chand Prasan Kumar v. Sales Tax Officer [1970] 25 STC 118. It also referred to the case of Shri Kishan Satyanarain v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1983] 54 STC 25 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which in turn had followed the aforesaid case of Alladi Venkateswarlu [1978] 41 STC 394 (SC) and held that puffed rice and beaten rice will be treated as declared goods under section 14(i) of the CST Act. In the first of the aforesaid three cases, i.e., in the case of Kapildeoram Baijnath Prosad [1954] 5 STC 365 the Assam High Court construed and considered item 1 of Schedule 3 of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947, which exempted from taxation "all cereals and pulses including all forms of rice". The learned Judges held that both "chira" and "muri" were cereals, and that though they were made out of rice or paddy by the process of boiling or parching they did not lose their character as cereals. The learned Judges held that both "chira" and "muri" were cereals, and that though they were made out of rice or paddy by the process of boiling or parching they did not lose their character as cereals. It was said by Sarjoo Prosad, C.J. : "In my opinion, as long as a thing continues to be a cereal and retains its form as such, although it may have undergone some simple processes of boiling or parching, it is difficult to hold that it would not be covered by the exemption provided in serial No. 1 of Schedule 3 to the Assam Sales Tax Act." In that case, the Assam High Court was considering the exemption notification under which all cereals and pulses including all forms of rice were excluded. In the next case of Tilok Chand [1970] 25 STC 118, Pathak, J., as he then was, of the Allahabad High Court was considering the case of arhar dal in various forms. The petitioner in that case had purchased "dal" from dal mills and the contention of the petitioner in that case was that the dal purchased by him must be treated as a second purchase, the first purchase having been effected by the dal mills. The question for consideration arose whether the broken dal continued to be arhar dal. The learned Judges said at page 120, para 3 : "There is no essential physical change except that the dust is shaken off, the husk or covering is removed and the dal itself is broken down into smaller pieces." The court further said that : "Having regard to the processes leading to the preparation of the broken down dal purchased by the petitioner, we are unable to hold that it represents a new and different article from the original grain. There is nothing to show that it is commercially regarded as essentially of a distinctive character from the original grain either by virtue of its name, character or use." In the third of the aforesaid cases, namely, the case of Shri Kishan Satyanarain v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1983] 54 STC 25 the Madhya Pradesh High Court was dealing with clause (i)(ii) of section 14 of the CST Act, namely "rice". Placing reliance on the case of Alladi Venkateswarlu [1978] 41 STC 394 of the apex Court, the court said that the beaten rice and puffed rice would be taxable at the rate of 3 per cent and not at the rate of 10 per cent under the residuary entry 1 of Part VI of Schedule II to the Madhya Pradesh Act. The court agreed with the argument of the Government Advocate that the words "that is to say" which occur in section 14(i) after the word "cereals" clearly imply that nothing can be included in cereals which have not been enumerated in items (i) to (x) of section 14(i) of the CST Act. The Court said that : "We have no hesitation in accepting this argument which only means that if something is not included within the word 'rice' as normally understood that thing cannot be included within that entry and we cannot widen the term 'cereals' as defined in section 14(i)." 12. It can therefore be said on the basis of the aforesaid cases that the aforesaid cases were decided on their own facts and except in the last case the question for consideration was not under section 14(i) of the CST Act. So far as the last case is concerned, the entry "rice" was considered and it was said that puffed rice will also be included. It can also be said that one of the tests is whether the identity of the commodity has changed or essentially the identity continued to be the same as before and a commodity is commercially regarded as essentially of a distinctive character from the original grain. 13. Coming to the case of the Karnataka High Court (New Swastik Flour Mills) [1992] 84 STC 49 the court has no doubt taken a view that atta, maida and suji cannot be treated as goods different from wheat and in view of the court the term "wheat" in clause (i)(iii) of section 14 of the CST Act has to be read in wider sense and the provisions of section 15 of the CST Act will be applicable. It will appear that the court placed reliance on the aforesaid case of Dhanbad Flour Mills [1989] 75 STC 47 (Pat) and other cases. In the aforesaid case also the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Alladi Venkateswarlu [1978] 41 STC 394 was relied upon. It will appear that the court placed reliance on the aforesaid case of Dhanbad Flour Mills [1989] 75 STC 47 (Pat) and other cases. In the aforesaid case also the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Alladi Venkateswarlu [1978] 41 STC 394 was relied upon. We have already made a reference to the aforesaid case in the earlier part of this order and we have said that it is not a case directly on the point and the issue therein was not as to whether the provisions of sections 14 and 15 of the CST Act were attracted or not. That apart, there was no physical transformation of rice to a distinct cereal commodity and parched rice and puffed rice continued to be rice as such. The Karnataka High Court considered a number of cases and concluded that atta, maida and suji are not goods different from wheat. In taxing matters one has ultimately to take a common sense view of the matter. The terms as understood in the commercial sense and with reference to their use must be kept in view in order that a correct conclusion may be reached. The court should keep in mind whether one going to market to buy a commodity will purchase some different commodity offered to him. In this case, if a man goes to purchase wheat and if fine-flour, maida or suji is offered to him, will he purchase the same ? Though, there can be no dispute that the flour and fine-flour (maida and suji) continued to be cereals and that they are obtained by crushing wheat into flour or fine-flour but in physical appearance maida and suji are different commodities than wheat. In the case of Ram Chandra Badrinarayan v. State of Orissa [1974] 33 STC 83, a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court was considering a case of besan. R. N. Misra, J., as he then was, speaking for the Bench, was examining the question whether there has been breach of declaration of assessee that the goods purchased by him for resale in Orissa have really been so resold. So far as sale of mung dal and biri dal were concerned, the learned Judge was of the opinion that it can be taken to be sale of mung and biri, respectively and there was no breach of declaration. So far as sale of mung dal and biri dal were concerned, the learned Judge was of the opinion that it can be taken to be sale of mung and biri, respectively and there was no breach of declaration. But so far as besan is concerned, the learned Judge in para 9 said that : "Besan, however, must stand on a very different footing. Not only is there a change in the form, but there is also brought into existence a commodity of very different use. Adopting the same test as indicated above, besan cannot be accepted in the popular and commercial sense to be the same commodity as peas or chana. Besan does not have the same use as chana or peas and one needing chana or peas would not be prepared to accept its besan in its place. When the assessee purchases chana or peas with the undertaking that he would resell them in Orissa, but converts the same into its besan and sells, there is really a violation of the condition in the declaration giving rise to the tax liability under the proviso." In the case of Tungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer [1960] 11 STC 827, the apex Court was considering the case under rule 18(2) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules, 1939 and said the hydrogenated groundnut oil continued to be the groundnut oil. The court said that : "The oil in question must be from groundnut and secondly the commodity must be 'oil'. That the hydrogenated, oil sold by the appellants was out of groundnut not being in dispute, the only point is whether it continues to be oil even after hydrogenation .......... In its essential nature therefore no change has occurred and it remains an oil - a glyceride of fatty acids - that it was when it issued out of the press." The court therefore held that the assessee-company was entitled to the benefit of the deduction of the purchase price of the kernel or groundnut, under rule 18(2) which went into the manufacture of the hydrogenated groundnut oil from the sale turnover of such oil. In the aforesaid case it appears that the consideration was not of any declared goods, whether any goods are declared under section 14(i) of the CST Act to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce and whether in any specified goods as aforesaid as given thereunder restricted or exhaustive meaning was to be given. The court appears to have been primarily governed by the fact that there was no change which occurred in the essential nature of the commodity. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers [1967] 19 STC 24 (SC), the court was considering the case of "patasa", "harda" and "alchidana" and whether they fall within the definition of "sugar' in entry 47 of Schedule A to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The said item of the said Act defined "sugar" which means any form of sugar containing more than 90 per cent of sucrose. The court said that the Legislature used the words "any form" in a sense distinct and different from any variety. The words "any form of sugar" are intended to cover sugar in any form, by whatever name called. The qualifying words are that it must contain more than 90 per cent sucrose. It will therefore appear that the case was decided on the intention of the Legislature by using the words "any form, of sugar" and the court said that the use of the aforesaid words was intended to cover sugar any variety in whatever form it may be found and by whatever name it may be called. The court further said that : "In our view, the word 'form' would connote a visible aspect in which the thing exists or manifests itself. Sugar may manifest itself in the form of 'patasa' as a result of certain simple processes being carried out. It may similarly manifest itself in the form of 'alchidana' or small lumps of sugar or as 'harda'. Sugar may manifest itself in the form of 'patasa' as a result of certain simple processes being carried out. It may similarly manifest itself in the form of 'alchidana' or small lumps of sugar or as 'harda'. If sugar so manifests itself, it cannot be said that sugar has ceased to be sugar merely because it takes a particular shape or form which appeals to certain class of people on festive occasions." In the aforesaid case, the case of Jethmal Ramswaroop v. State [1959] 10 STC 270, was referred in which this Court was considering a notification granting exemptions from sales tax to "sugar including refined sugar, khandsari and palmyra sugar but excluding all preparations thereof such as sweets, sugar candy, confectionery, etc.". This Court in the aforesaid case held "misri" (sugar candy) batasa, makhana, ola and toys made from sugar were not merely sugar and were not covered by the exemption. It will therefore appear that the decision in the case rested primarily on the fact that as per definition of "sugar" in item 8 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, sugar means any form of sugar containing more than 90 per cent of sucrose. The importance appears to have been given to the words "any form of sugar". 14. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that "wheat" is genus and "maida and suji" and flour are species and therefore, flour, fine-flour, i.e., maida and suji will still be "wheat" and will be declared goods and governed by sections 14 and 15 of the CST Act. It will appear from the perusal of section 14 of the CST Act that in clause (i) the Legislature has used the word "cereals" that is to say (i) paddy, (ii) rice, (iii) wheat and so on. The phrase "that is to say" has come up for consideration before the courts and the Supreme Court in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra [1976] 37 STC 319, was considering the import of the phrase "that is to say" dealing with entry No. (iv) of section 14 of the CST Act as it originally worded prior to its, amendment vide Amendment Act 61 of 1972. The Supreme Court said that it was meant to enumerate separately taxable goods, viz., "iron and steel". The Supreme Court said that it was meant to enumerate separately taxable goods, viz., "iron and steel". Each sub-item in entry (iv) is a separate taxable commodity for purpose of sales tax and each of them forms a separate species for each series of sales although they may all belong to the genus "iron and steel". The court referring to the definition of that phrase in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edition, Volume 5, at page 2753, said - "The quotation, given above, from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary shows that, ordinarily, the expression 'that is to say' is employed to make clear and fix the meaning of what is to be explained or defined. Such words are not used, as a rule, to amplify a meaning while removing a possible doubt for which purpose the word 'includes' is generally employed. In unusual cases, depending upon the context of the words 'that is to say' this expression may be followed by illustrative instances. In Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia AIR 1947 PC 72, the words 'that is to say' with reference to a general category 'land' were held to introduce, 'the most general concept' when followed, inter alia, by the words 'right in or over land'. We think that the precise meaning of the words 'that is to say' must vary with the context. Where, as in Megh Raj's case AIR 1947 PC 72, the amplitude of legislative power to enact provisions with regard to 'land' and rights over it was meant to be indicated, the expression was given a wide scope because it came after the word 'land' and then followed 'rights over land' as an explanation of 'land'. Both were wide classes. The object of using them for subject-matter of legislation, was obviously to lay down a wide power to legislate. But, in the context of single point sales tax, subject to special conditions when imposed on separate categories of specified goods, the expression was apparently meant to exhaustively enumerate the kinds of goods on a given list. The purpose of an enumeration in a statute dealing with sales tax at a single point in a series of sales would, very naturally, be to indicate the types of goods each of which would constitute a separate class for a series of sales. The purpose of an enumeration in a statute dealing with sales tax at a single point in a series of sales would, very naturally, be to indicate the types of goods each of which would constitute a separate class for a series of sales. Otherwise, the listing itself loses all meaning and would be without any purpose behind it." It will therefore be clear that the meaning of the aforesaid phrase "that is to say" must vary with the context. It was contended by Mr. Bapna, learned counsel for the Revenue that even if in clause (i)(iii) after phrase "that is to say" is "wheat" it would not have made any difference in view of the aforesaid cases of the Supreme Court and each of maida and suji would have been liable to tax separately as provided under section 15 of the CST Act. He therefore, contends that when the Legislature only used "wheat" in clause (i)(iii) of section 14 of the CST Act and did not say "wheat in all its form", it intended that only wheat in its original form should be declared goods. According to the learned counsel at any rate so far as flour, fine-flour, maida or suji are concerned, and more so, maida and suji, they lose their identity and even by application of rule of common parlance they are different commodities and therefore cannot be said to be declared goods and cannot be included in wheat under clause (i)(iii) of section 14 of the CST Act and it is within the legislative competence of the State Government to issue notification for levy of sales tax on those commodities and if there is any such one it does not contravene the provisions of sections 14 and 15 of the CST Act. It has already been said in the earlier part of this order that the Act of 1952 was framed by the Parliament in exercise of its powers conferred on it under the then clause 286(3) of the Constitution. It has already been said in the earlier part of this order that the Act of 1952 was framed by the Parliament in exercise of its powers conferred on it under the then clause 286(3) of the Constitution. Under the then article 286(3) the Parliament could declare any goods to be essential for the life of community, and under clause (3) of article 286 of the Constitutibn which was brought in the statute book by the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982, the Parliament can declare by law and levy tax on the sales or purchase of goods declared to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce, but under the Act of 1952 under Schedule in, clause 1 the entry was "cereals and pulses in all forms including bread and flour, including atta, maida, suji and bran (except when any such article is sold in sealed containers)". The said Act was repeated by section 16 of the CST Act as it stood before it was repealed by Repealing and Amending Act, 1960 (58 of 1960), and the CST Act was framed by the Parliament and in exercise of article 286(3) of the Constitution it declared the goods provided in section 14 of the CST Act to be of special importance. It will appear from a comparative study of the Schedule and more so its entry 1 of the Act of 1952 as well as clause (i) of section 14 of the CST Act that it is not mentioned that wheat in all forms is declared goods. It will further appear that in clause (ia) of section 14 of the CST Act that the Legislature has used the words "coal, including coke in all its forms but excluding charcoal". Again in clause (ii) the words used are "cotton, that is to say, all kinds of cotton (indigenous or imported) in its unmanufactured state, whether ginned or unginned, baled, pressed or otherwise, but not including cotton waste". Similarly in clause (iii) the words used are "hides and skins, whether in a raw or dressed state". In clause (iv) the words used are iron and steel, that is to say ..... and then there are entries of different types of iron and steel from sub-clause (i) to sub-clause (xvi). Similarly in clause (iii) the words used are "hides and skins, whether in a raw or dressed state". In clause (iv) the words used are iron and steel, that is to say ..... and then there are entries of different types of iron and steel from sub-clause (i) to sub-clause (xvi). It will therefore be clear from a perusal of section 14 of the CST Act and its different clauses that whenever the Legislature has intended to do so, it has either included or excluded the item and has used the words "in all its form" or "excluding". At any rate, so far as the fine-flour, maida and suji are concerned, even if we go by rule of common parlance, it cannot be said that they continue to be wheat. If a customer goes to purchase wheat he will not certainly purchase "maida or suji". 15. We are therefore of the opinion that flour, fine-flour (atta, maida and suji) are not included in the term "wheat" as used in clause (i)(iii) of section 14 of the CST Act and the restrictions imposed under section 15 of the CST Act do not apply and the notification dated June 27, 1990, cannot be said to contravene the provisions of sections 14 and 15 of the CST Act. With due respect, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Patna and Karnataka High Courts. 16. Consequently, we find no merit in any of these writ petitions. They are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.