JUDGMENT 1. - Originally, this writ petition was filed by one Shri Somnath Shekhar and three others who are now the petitioners, against the respondents Nos. I to 8 on 4-10-90 but lateron. it appears that Shri Somnath Shekhar was included in the approved list of I.P.S. and, therefore, an application was filed on 3-12-1990 on behalf of Shri Somnath Shekhar that he does not want to proceed with the matter are his name may be deleted from the array of the parties and, therefore, the writ petition qua Shri Somnath Shekhar came to be dismissed and his name was deleted flora the array of the petitioners Thereafter, an application was filed for amendment of the writ petition and that came to be decided by the order of this Court dated 5-4-1991. The amended writ petition was filed on 8-4-91. Mr. Mridul further prayed that no relief is sought against the respondents Nos. 2 and 8 and, therefore, their names may be deleted and the remaining respondents may be renumbered as respondent Nos. 1 to 6. The names of the respondent Nos. 2 and 8 were ordered to be deleted from the array of the respondents. However, the amended cause title as regards the remaining six respondents was not filed but respondents Nos, 3 to 7 may now been read as respondent Nos. 2 to o. 2. The facts necessary to be noticed for the disposal of this writ petition briefly stated are that the petitioners and the respondents were members of the Rajasthan Police Service Senior Scale and their service conditions are governed by the Rajasthan Police Service Rules. 1954 (for short 'the Rules of 1954' hereinafter). By an order dated 7-3-198n. appointments to the selection scale were given in the promotion quota of the years 1985-86 which included the name of Shri Somnath Shekhar. 'This order has been placed on record as Annexure 2/A. SJ far as the petitioner Nose 3 is concerned he was promoted in the promotion quota of the years 1989-90 on adhoc basis and seniority cum merit quota. The order dated 7th March. 1986 whereby Shen Somnath Shekhar was appointed on the basis of the merit in the promotion quota of the years 1985-86 was challenged before the Rajasthan Civil Service Appellate tribunal. The order dated 7th March. 1986 whereby Shen Somnath Shekhar was appointed on the basis of the merit in the promotion quota of the years 1985-86 was challenged before the Rajasthan Civil Service Appellate tribunal. That appeal failed and, therefore, Shri Randhir Singh filed a writ petition before the Division bench of this Court bearing D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3223/87, Randhir Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Others . The writ petition has since been decided vide judgment dated 9.4.1990 a photo copy of' which has been filed as Annexure-3, the operative portion of the judgment is as under : "In the result, we allow this writ petition, set aside the order of the Tribunal dated 30-10.87 as also the selections made by the DPC which met in the year 1986. It is further directed that fresh DPC should be held for the purpose of considering the cases of eligible persons for promotion to the selection scale of RPS keeping in mind the observations made herein above, and specially following the language of Explanation to sub-rule 11 of Rule "8-A of the Rules of 1954 and the circulars issued by the Director General of Police, Rajasthan. Compliance of this order should be made within three months from today." 3. Consequent to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, the promotions made vide order date 7-3-1986 i.e. Annexure-2/A were quashed, the D.P.C. was reconvened and thereafter the private respondents came to be appointed to selection grade of R P.S. in the quota of 19&5.86 vide order dated 2-4-1990 marked as Anrexure-4. Twenty vacancies were there and, therefore, ten persons as per rules were to be appointed on the basis of seniority cum merit and ten on the basis of merit. In the earlier D.P.C., two persons belonging to S.T. and four belonging to S.C. were appointed. One of them i.e Shri Jagan Lal Meena being S.C. candidate was appointed on the basis of merit. The remaining four vacancies were crate feared to the general quota to be filled-up on the basis of the merit. This transfer of four vacancies to the merit quota was upheld by the Division Bench of this Court vide its order dated 9/4/90 passed in Randhir Singh's case (supra) However when order Annex. The remaining four vacancies were crate feared to the general quota to be filled-up on the basis of the merit. This transfer of four vacancies to the merit quota was upheld by the Division Bench of this Court vide its order dated 9/4/90 passed in Randhir Singh's case (supra) However when order Annex. 4 dated 24 9.1990 is examined, it transpires that 11 persons have been given appointment on the basis of seniority cum merit and nine by merit. Out of these vacancies, five have gone to the reserved categories on the basis of seniority CUM merit. Fifteen vacancies were filled-in from the general category, nine have been appointed on the basis of the merit and six on the basis of seniority cum merit. Vide Annex. 2/A dated 7.3.1986 in addition to Shri Somnath Shekhar, S/Shri Banwari Lai Sharma, Ramalnlabb Sharma, Virendra Kumar Godia, Jagdish Chand Kamat and Prahalad Rai were promoted but they have now been dropped and S/Shri Dinesh Chand sharma, P. D. Sharma, Kundan Lal, Liyaquat Ali, Padam Chand Kala and B Iagwati Prasad Vet ma have been appointed in the merit quota and, therefore, they have been joined as respondents. All these private respondents have cow become senior to Shri Somnath Shekhar. Shri Dinesh Chandra Sharma is junior to petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 now and the rest of the private respondents have become Senior to all the petitioners except Shri Padam Chand Kala who has become now senior to respondent No. 3. The review D. P. C as per the directions given by the Division Bench of this Court vide its judgment dated 9/4/1990 is proposed to be convened for the quota of the years 1986-87. 198:-88, 1988-89 and 19 9-S0 and this is certainly going to prejudicially affect the petitioners and, therefore, they assail the order Annex. 4. It has been claimed that S/Shri P. D. Sharmt, Kunuan Lai, Liyaquat Ali, Padam Chand Kala and Bhagwati Prasad were promoted to senior scale of R.P.S. in the years 1981, 1582 and 1983 and thus they have remained in senior scale for only three to four years. 4. It has been claimed that S/Shri P. D. Sharmt, Kunuan Lai, Liyaquat Ali, Padam Chand Kala and Bhagwati Prasad were promoted to senior scale of R.P.S. in the years 1981, 1582 and 1983 and thus they have remained in senior scale for only three to four years. They came to be considered for evaluation by the D. P. C. because the Committee has selected only those Officers whose record has been found to he consistently outstanding or consistently very good for seven years and in this process a candidate like Shri Somnath Shekhar has been rejected because his confidential reports were not consistently outstanding or very good for all the seven years and were so only for six years. Before making the order the D.P.C. or for that matter the Appointing Authority did not disclose to Shri Som Nath Shekhar or any other affected persons. the facts on the basis of which the D P.C. has been arrived at its decision. The A C. Rs. of Shri Somnath Shekhar which were considered not outstanding and not very good, were not communicated to the aforesaid Shri Somnath Shekhar and so he had no opportunity to make his submissions in this regard. The case of Shri Somnath Shekhar whose writ petition has already been dismissed as withdrawn has been cited because the explanation to sub rule 11 of r. 28 A has been challenged and the candidature of Shri Somnath Shekhar was rejected by the D.P C. on the aforesaid grounds and those very grounds are likely to prevail with the D P. C. for the years 1986-87, 1987.88, 1988-89 and 1'-8 90 and, therefore, the case of Shri Som Nath Shekhar is being cited as example although no relief is sought in favour of Shri Som Nath Shekhar. As regards the petitioners, it is submitted that they have earned outstanding and very goon entries for more than five years out of the seven years which have been considered by the Departmental Promotion Committee in the year l956. No adverse entry has been communicated to the petitioners so far. The entries which are not rated outstanding and very good or are only good or average have not been communicated to the petitioners nor they have been informed about this fact. This violates principles of natural justice. No adverse entry has been communicated to the petitioners so far. The entries which are not rated outstanding and very good or are only good or average have not been communicated to the petitioners nor they have been informed about this fact. This violates principles of natural justice. If there is any act which entails civil and evil consequences' on a particular person then the affected persons should be made aware of such fact and afforded an opportunity to explain the same. This has not been done and the matters adverse to the petitioners have been considered or are likely to be considered to their prejudice.In pursuance of the decision of the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court, the D.P.0 has rated only those candidates as meritorious who are having all entries for the seven years under consideration as out standing/very good for adjudging the merit of a person in the category 01 outstanding. The rules nowhere require that a person must have consistently outstanding service for all the seven years. The rules leave to the D.P.C. to adjudge the merit of a man whether it is outstanding or not on the basis of a service record and thus the D.P.C. has committed an error in classifying the Officers in the category of meritorious on such incorrect assumptions. If the finding of the Division Bench of this Court is taken to mean that a person can be considered as meritorious only if he has earned entries to be outstanding and very good for all the seven years then it was submitted that he Division Bench has committed an error in recording such a finding and the petitioners are entitled to challenge the decision of the Division Bench as none of them was party to the decision and moreover the Hon'ble Supreme Court has left the controversy open by permitting Shri Somnath Shekhar to withdraw his Special Leave Petition. It is alleged that a circular was issued by the Inspector General of Police on 7.7.80 'wherein it was ordered that expression 'very good' should he treated as equivalent to 'outstanding'. Another circular was issued by the Director General on 18.6.84 wherein it was pointed out that the grading of the Officers should be as adjudged in four categories viz; outstanding, above average, average and below average. Both these circulars have been filed with the writ petition as Annexs 5. and 6. Another circular was issued by the Director General on 18.6.84 wherein it was pointed out that the grading of the Officers should be as adjudged in four categories viz; outstanding, above average, average and below average. Both these circulars have been filed with the writ petition as Annexs 5. and 6. It is, therefore, clear that some of the Reporting Officers have used the expression 'outstanding' and some have used 'very good' while rating the performance of the Officers and that has seriously affected the career of many Officers. It has been submitted that the categorisation made by the circular dated 7.7.19x0 was without jurisdiction. 'Very good' cannot be treated as equivalent to 'outstanding' and 'good' cannot be treated as equivalent to above average. It has, therefore, been claimed that Annex 4 dated 24.9.90 in contrary to the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Judges of the Division Bench. It has also been claimed that Shri Randhir Singh could not have given promotion in seniority-cum merit quota because in all ten vacancies have been filled by merit quota and thus allocation of eleven vacancies to seniority-cum-merit quota was unwarranted. It may be straightway mentioned here that now no relief is being claimed against Shri Kandhir Singh who was included in the list of seniority cum merit which was challenged by Shri Somnath Shekhar but present petitioners have not challenged it and, therefore, this ground is of no avail. It was also submitted that while evaluating the record of the service of a person, if it is found that it is not outstanding or very good then it has the same consequence as that of an adverse confidential report &, therefore, it should have been communicated & the principles of conveying adverse they to the affected Officers should be recorded as applicable in such matters & therefore, the entries which were not outstanding or very good should have been communicated. The learned Judges of the Division Bench have referred to the Circulars issued by the Director General of Police dated 7.1.80 and 18.6.84 which consider 'very good' as equivalent to outstanding and, therefore, the con evidential reports considered lower than the ranking of outstanding should have been communicated to the Officers because that results in up gradation of certain Officers and down gradation of Officer like Shri Somnath Shekhar. In this respect, a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court reported in 1981 (2) S. C. C. p. 674 has been referred to wherein the right of expunging the adverse ream is of a particular officer affected the promotion chances of another officer and it was held by their lordship, of the Supreme Court that he had locus standi to file a writ petition to show that the Govt. acted beyond the scope of its power in expunging the adverse remarks in the confidential report of respondent No. 6. If a candidate had a right to challenge the expungement of adverse remarks of another person they the petitioners are very much entitled to have the necessary information on the basis of which they can be excluded from promotion on the basis of merit formula. The right of information is very much inherent in the principles of natural justice. The D. P. C. had not disclosed the entries to Shri Somnath Shekhar although his confidential report was `outstanding' and 'very good' for six years and others have been selected because they had those entries available to them for seven years. Thus, this is discrimination and is violative of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India because persons with outstanding record have been put at par by the D.P.C. with the persons who have merely very good record. Both are two separate words with separate meanings and, therefore, it results in treating unequals as equals. Even if it is assumed that principles of natural justice are not attracted then also it has been claimed that D P.C. has not been fair to Shri Somnath Shekhar. He was not afforded any hearing which was clearly warranted in the case because earlier he was selected and in the later review D.P.C.. he was rejected Some of the candidates were not selected in the later D.P C. but still by a miracle, they have found themselves in the D.P.C. merit list pertaining to the year 1985-86. The petitioners claim that even if a particular petitioner has outstanding record fur even a year immediately preceding the date on nebbich the vacancy has occurred, then also he is entitled to be selected. The petitioners claim that even if a particular petitioner has outstanding record fur even a year immediately preceding the date on nebbich the vacancy has occurred, then also he is entitled to be selected. The power to select a person on the basis of merit and on the basis of seniority come merit is vested in the D.P C. It is a statutory body and cannot be directed to exercise its discretion in a straight jacket formula to consider only seven years' record. That militates against the statutory provisions and in this respect, reliance has been placed on the decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court rendered in Gurnam Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Others, reported in 1971 (2) SLR p. 799 . As regards Shri P. D. Sharma, Kundan lal Lyakat Ali, Padam Chand Kale and Bhagwati Prasad, it has been claimed that they have served in the senior scale of R.P.S. only for 3-4 years and, therefore, their service record for rest of the years of the Junior scale has been considered and in this matter, it has been claimed that unequals have been treated as equals and that also is a violation or A ts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Consideration of service record pertaining to junior scale first for grant of Senior Scale and then fen Selection Scale is discriminatory and is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The validity of explanation to sub rule 11 of r. 28-A of the R.P.S. Rules of 1954 has also been challenged because it does not provide for any rationale for treating 'very good' as equal to 'outstanding' and leaves unguided, unchannaled and unprincipled direction to choose a person for having outstanding and very good record and that introduces the element of arbitrariness and it being in vagueness of the extreme types. It was claimed that any declination in performance limn 'very good' and 'outstanding' to any other lower category should have been communicated and the explanation should have been obtained. It gives Departmental Promotion Committee discretion to select a person as meritorious even if he has only one or two A.P.A. Rs outstanding within seven years. Such evaluation is totally contrary to the rules and unreasonable. It gives Departmental Promotion Committee discretion to select a person as meritorious even if he has only one or two A.P.A. Rs outstanding within seven years. Such evaluation is totally contrary to the rules and unreasonable. The word 'consistent' has been used only in relation to very good' and not in relation to outstanding' and, there fore, the criteria which has been applied by the Department Promotion Committee is admittedly contrary to the provisions of explanation to sub r. 11 of r. 28A. It has also been claimed that Circulars dated 7/7/80 and 18/6/84 are illegal. An above average should be treated as equivalent to very good and, therefore, it has been claimed that Annex. 4 be quashed, State may be forbidden from disturbing the present position of the petitioners, Explanation to sub rule 11 of r. 28-A of the Rules be declared invalid, Circulars it.sued by the I.G./D.G. dated 7/7/80 and 18/6/84 be declared illegal and struck down and the rating of Officer as meritorious, the Officer should have outstanding/very good entries for all the seven years as required by the D.P.C., should be held as illegal. 4. Earlier, a return was filed on behalf of the State Government on 20-2-91 but later when the amended writ petition was filed, amended reply was tiled it has been claimed that Shri Somnath Sharma has withdrawn his writ petition and. therefore, no grounds which were available to him, can be claimed by the petitioners. A fresh D. P. C. had to be held because earlier promotions have been held to be illegal by the Division Bench of this Court. The explanation to sub rule 11 of r 28-A is absolutely valid and constitutional. Out of twenty vacancies, eleven have been filled up by seniority-cum-merit & nine by merit because only nine candidates were available on the basis of merit. Against the Division Bench judgment, S.L.P. was filed before their lordships of the Supreme Court by Shri Somnath Sharma which came to be dismissed as not pressed and, therefore, that judgment of the Division Bench has now become final and whatever view has been taken in the judgment holds the field. The selection of junior persons on the basis of merit does not amount to supersession. The selection of junior persons on the basis of merit does not amount to supersession. No person junior to the petitioners or Shri Somnath Sharma has been selected on the basis of seniority cum merit and, therefore, the petitioner cannot have any grievance and they have no right to seek for the stay of the proceedings of the future D P. C. In the light of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench all the Lesions who were in the zone of consideration, have been considered by the DPC. They were eligible under the rules and have been rightly selected. The only consideration of the eligibility is that one should be substantive in lower grade and should be within the zone of consideration and it is neither the requirement of the eligibility nor of the zone of consideration whether a particular person has served on the next higher grade for a particular number of years. The earlier D.P.C. was quashed on the ground of nonobservance of explanation to sub r. 11 of r. 28A of the Rules, 1954 because persons wh3 did not hay: outstanding' or consistently very good record were promoted and it was in this context that the earlier DPC was quashed. The decision of the D. B. against which the 'LP has been rejected, cannot be challenged by way of this writ petition afresh. It is a judgment in rem and it is not necessary that these petitioners should have been made as parties to that writ petition. State was a necessary party and it has been made party and, therefore, all persons are bound by that judgment. The Circulars issued by the D.G./.1 G. dated 7.7.80 and 18.7.84 were referred to by the Division Bench and they have been approved and, therefore, they cannot be quashed. When the new selections have been made on the basis of the directions given by the Division Bench of this Court, it ought to have brought certain changes because if the earlier list was alright, there was no necessity to quash it and the D P.C. has evaluated the merit on the basis of the service record and this Court cannot sit in appeal to evaluate the comparative merit of the persons involved The circulars have been issued by the LG./1).G. rightly for the guidelines of the Officers concerned. Shri Somnath Shekhar's writ petition has been rejected and, therefore, the points which pertain to him cannot be allowed to be raised academically by others because he has already withdrawn his writ petition The evaluation of the merit by the D.P.C. suffers from no infirmity. A joint writ petition filed by these persons is not maintainable. As per High Court rules, the amended writ petition is beyond the scope of the order by which the amendments were allowed. The petitioners they raised the grounds pertaining to Shri Somnath Shekhar who has already withdrawn his writ petition and, therefore, those grounds cannot be agitated over and on. The petitioners have also failed to show that bow they are prejudiced by the D P.C. of the year 1985-86. They were in fact selected and promoted in the subsequent D.P.Cs. not in the D.P.C. of the year 1985-86. 5. We have heard Mr. Mridul appearing for the petitioners and Mr. M.1. Khan, Addl. Advocate General, appearing for the respondents. 6. First we deal with two circulars issued by i.G /D.G. dated 7.7.80 and 18.7.84. These two circulars were considered by the learned Judges of the Division Bench who rendered the earlier judgment marked Annex. 3 dated 9 4.1990 and a circular of the Government issued on 30 3 76 was also considered and it was after considering the merits of these circulars that the learned Judges of there Division Bench observed that D.P.C. itself should have assessed the individual case keeping in mind the circulars issued by the Director General of Police mentioned herein above F o that no disadvantage is caused to some or benefit is derived by another Offer. Thus. these circulars were considered by the learned Judges of the Division Bench of this Court and they were approved and the S.L P. against the D B. decision was also dismissed by their lordships of the Supreme Court Under these circumstances, the validity of these circulars cannot be challenged over again. Thus, it is clear that these two circulars have been considered by the learned Judges of the D.B. who decided the earlier writ petition and they have approved it rather they have given a direction hit D P C should have evaluated the service record of the Officers a o -ding to these Circulars. Thus, it is clear that these two circulars have been considered by the learned Judges of the D.B. who decided the earlier writ petition and they have approved it rather they have given a direction hit D P C should have evaluated the service record of the Officers a o -ding to these Circulars. Much has been said about the fact that -very good' should not have been equated with 'outstanding'. This explanation to sub rule 11 of rule 28-A came into force on 11.4.79 and prior to 11.4.79. the explanation was as under : "For purpose of selection on the basis of merit, the list of officers graded as -outstanding' and -very goon' shall be classified in the First category in the order of seniority, the Officers graded as Good' shall be classified in the second category in the order of seniority and the Officers graded as 'Average and Not Selected' shall be classified in the third Category. The officers graded and classified in the second category list shall be placed below the officers graded and classified in the first category list and such officers shall be appointed from this category only if the officers graded and classified in the first category list is exhausted otherwise they shall not be appointed to the service by promotion The officers graded and classified in the third category list shall not be considered for appointment by promotion." 7. The explanation that was appended to sub-rule 11 of rule 28-A even prior t 11 4.79 also provides that for purpose of selection on the basis of merit, the 1st of Officers graded as 'outstanding' and 'very good' shall be classified in the first category. Thus, even prior to 11.4 74, the rule itself said that outstanding will quited with very good and those persons who had outstanding or very good record, will he classified in the first category. Thus, it was treated as equivalent by the Rules that were framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The Inspector General of Police and Director General of Police have only reiterated this position which was very much there in the Rules and they have said that only four categories should be these viz. outstanding, above average, average and below average but at no point of time, 'very good' was equated with 'outstanding'. The Inspector General of Police and Director General of Police have only reiterated this position which was very much there in the Rules and they have said that only four categories should be these viz. outstanding, above average, average and below average but at no point of time, 'very good' was equated with 'outstanding'. It is true that there may be two words which may have different Dictionary meanings and connotations but for appreciation of the A.P.A.Rs., this is the consistent stand of the rules as also .circulars that persons who have 'outstanding' or 'very good' record should be equated and should be. put is one category. Earlier, persons with 'good record' were put below the first category i e. persons who had outstanding' and 'very good' record and they also could be considered for promotion according to the merit formula but by substituting this explanation on 11-.4-79, now it has been provided that for purpose of selection for promotion on the basis of merit, Officers with 'outstanding' or consistently very good record shall only be selected and their names shall be arranged in the order of seniority. It was argued by Mr. Mridul that the word 'consistently' has been used only to clarify 'very good'. It has not been u ed to clarify 'outstanding'. Earlier. in the explanation the words used were 'outstanding' and 'very good'. That explanation provided that the list of Officers for purpose of selection on the basis of merit, graded as -outstanding' and 'very good' shall be classified in first category. Thus, both these categories were clubbed together to put them in first category and, therefore, the word 'and' was used. Now the purpose of the present explanation is that the record of the persons for selection on the basis of merit must be outstanding' and if it is not outstanding then it should be consistently very good. If we read the explanation without the use of the words 'or consistently very good', it reads as under : "For purpose of selection for promotion on the basis of merit, Officer with outstanding record shall only be selected and their names arranged in the order of seniority. 8. The explanation clearly provides that only persons having outstanding record will be selected. There was no necessity to preface or clarify 'outstanding' with word consistently because it has only to be 'outstanding'. 8. The explanation clearly provides that only persons having outstanding record will be selected. There was no necessity to preface or clarify 'outstanding' with word consistently because it has only to be 'outstanding'. It only provides that if it is not 'outstanding', then it has to be consistently 'very good'. Thus, 'very good' has been equated with 'outstanding'. The Courts will not substitute their own wisdom for law framers. It appears that this has been the intention of the law framers that 'outstanding' and 'very good' Should be clubbed together and if a person's record is 'outstanding' or it is consistently 'very good' for seven years then alone he can be considered as meritorious and not otherwise. It has been submitted that this is a case where unequals have been made equals. We are unable to accept this contention. It is not a case of making unequals as equals. The rule specifically provides that for coming into the category of merit, one should have either a 'outstanding' or consistently 'very goo I' record and if he does not possess that then he cannot be considered to be meritorious and if that has been the intention of the rule framers then it has to be given effect because it does not militate against any principles of equality. The merit has been defined and it gives enough guidelines that only that person will be considered meritorious who has 'outstanding record' or consistently 'very good' record. It has been held by their lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Parvez Qadir v. Union of India, reported in 1975 (1) SLR p. 4 that adjustment of the suitability on the basis of confidential entries and other record is valid and the Court should not go into the question of judging suitability. This basis is valid because if any adverse entry is there. it has to be communicated to the person and the opportunity of explanation has to be given to him and after the explanation is given, the Superior Officer as well as the Government will ultimately decide whether that remark by the recording Officer has to be sustained or has not to be sustained and, therefore, this is a sound basis to evaluate the personality of a man. Almost, the same view has been expressed by their lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Gurnam Singh v. State of Rajasthan and others, reported in 1971 (2) SLR p. 799 wherein their lordships have observed that the various particulars in the annual confidential reports of an Officer. if carefully and properly noted, will also give a very broad and general indication regarding the merit of an Officer. In this respect, Mr. Mridul developed an argument that if some body's A.P.A.R. is not either 'outstanding' or 'very good' then it has to be communicated to him because it results in civil and evil consequences and in this respect a subsidiary argument was also developed that if somebody's performance weather 'outstanding' or 'very good' in a particular year and if it falls in the next year then also it has to be communicated to the Officer and in this respect, our attention was drawn to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Union of India and anr. v. F.J. Fernandiz, Commissioner of Income Tax, Bearing Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 14516 of 1983 preferred against the judgment and order dated 2.8.83 of the High Court of Gujarat decided on 12.3 84 It was a case where the Govt. resolution dated 2.3 68 followed by a resolution dated 20 5.72 clearly laid down that if there is a fall in the standards of an Officer's performance compared to his own past performance. the latter remark, though not directly or narrowly adverse, must be communicated to him because it has adverse effect on his future prospects. Thus, this was a case where the Govt. by a resolution dated 2.3.68 decided that such course should be adopted and that was followed by another resolution dated 972 whereby the fall in standards was ordered to be communicated and explanation to be obtained and it was in this context that their lordships observed that there is no getting away from the fact that as per the Government's above mentioned two resolutions, the remarks of Mr. T. Y. C. Rao at least for the year 1974-75 'good (average)' were required to be communicated to the petitioner. This authority has no application to the facts of the present case. Here, we were not taken through any circular order or resolution of the Govt. T. Y. C. Rao at least for the year 1974-75 'good (average)' were required to be communicated to the petitioner. This authority has no application to the facts of the present case. Here, we were not taken through any circular order or resolution of the Govt. or any rule that has been framed by the Government which may provide that if there is any fall in the standards of a particular Officer's performance, compared to an earlier performance, that has to be communicated. The only rule is that if the A.P.A.R. is adverse, then alone it has to be communicated and explanation has to be obtained. This particular view was expressed by their lordships of the Supreme Court in the light of the two resolutions of the Govt. itself. Here, in absence of any such resolution, circular, order or a rule, no such view can be taken that if the A.P.A.R. of a particular Officer is not 'outstanding' or 'very good' then also, it needs to be communicated. Thus such A.P.A.Rs. cannot be considered to be adverse because they will entitle him to a promotion on the basis of seniority cum merit. It is a different matter that when promotion is to be considered on the basis of the merit, the comparative merit of different persons has to be assessed and in doing so, if somebody is found more meritorious, it does not mean that the person who has a less meritorious record is in any way ineligible for promotion on the basis of the principles of seniority cum merit. Our attention was drawn in this respect to a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court rendered in Ram Kumar Singh v. The State of Raj. and Ors., reported in (1986) 2 Judicial Surveyor 196 wherein the learned Single Judge has observed that a promotion on the basis of merit and suitability stands on a different footing from promotion on the basis of seniority cum merit. Seniority cum merit means that given the minimum necessary merit requisite for efficiency of admiration, the Senior. though less meritorious, shall have priority. Seniority cum merit means that given the minimum necessary merit requisite for efficiency of admiration, the Senior. though less meritorious, shall have priority. In other words, for the put pose of making a promotion on the basis or seniority cum merit, what has to be seen is whether the person who ranks senior possesses the minimum necessary merit requisite for efficiency of administration and there is no question of assessing the comparative merit between two persons. The assessment of the comparative merit is done only in case of merit and not in cases of seniority cum merit and, therefore, this authority has no application. 9. In this respect. Mr. Mridul contended that as this results in civil and evil consequences, it is violative of principles of natural justice that neither explanation is obtained nor information is given nor a person is given an opportunity to explain. In this respect, he drew our attention to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court rendered in State of U.P. and Ors. v. Maharja Dharmander Prasad Singh and others, reported in (1989) 2 SCC 505 wherein para 64. their lordships observed alia on the point of denial of natural justice, we agree with the conclusion of the High Court, though not for the same reasons, that there has been such a denial in the proceedings culminating in the order of cancellation. The show cause notice itself is an impalpable congeries of suspicions and fears, of relevant or irrelevant matter and has included some trivia. On a matter of such importance where the stakes are heavy for the lessees who claim to have made large investments on the project and where a number of grounds require the determination of factual matters of some complexity, the statutory authority should, in the facts of this case, have afforded a personal hearing to the lessees. That was a case of cancellation of a leaned where heavy investment were made and lot of factual matters were there and, therefore, it was held that for cancelling the contract which has been granted, a right to complete that contract accrues and it could not have been cancelled without a notice and hearing. It has no application to the facts of this case. It has no application to the facts of this case. In this respect, our attention was also drawn to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court: in Amar Kant v. State of Bihar and Others, reported in 1984 (1) SLR p. 470 . That Was also a case where an adverse entry had to be communicated and an explanation was to be obtained and a decision had to be rendered before that entry was considered and in this respect, their lordships in para 9 observes that the system of maintenance of confidential rolls needs a change and it was suggested that A.P.A.R. should be written in the presence of the Officers so that they made explain whether those entries can be sustained or not ? Unless the rules are changed in the light of the guidelines that have been given by their lordships of the Supreme Court. this authority is of no avail. It was argued that even in the matters of administrative law, the administrative action has to be fair and reasonable and even if the rule of Audi Alterant Parent is not attracted, reasonableness and fair play in State action must be observed which emanates from the doctrine of natural justice. In this respect, reliance has been placed on the decision of their lordships. of the Supreme Court in Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Limited and another v. Union of India and Ors., reported in (1990) 3 SCC 223 . There is no denial of the fact that the State action has to be fair and reasonable and even in matters of administration, wherever necessary Audi Alteram Partem theory may be put in action but that is not true of every case. Our attention was also drawn to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court rendered in Ex-Naik Sardar Singh v. Union of India and Others, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 213 wherein it was held that punishment by the Court Martial has to be reasonable and fair. 10. In matters of service, what is required as regards promotion is that one should be considered along with all other eligible candidates. If cases of all the candidates are considered before appointment to such posts, there is no violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In this respect, reliance has been placed by the learned Addl. In matters of service, what is required as regards promotion is that one should be considered along with all other eligible candidates. If cases of all the candidates are considered before appointment to such posts, there is no violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In this respect, reliance has been placed by the learned Addl. Advocate General on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Sam Ram Sharma v. State of Raj. and Ors., reported in AIR 1967 SC p 1910 wherein their lordships at p. 1914 have observed as under : "We are of the opinion that the three posts of Inspector General of Police, Additional Inspector General of Police land Deputy Inspector General of Police in Rajasthan State are selection posts and outside the junior or senior timescales of pay. If these three posts are selection posts it is manifest that the State of Rajasthan is not bound to promote the petitioner merely because he stood first in the Gradation List. The circumstances that these posts are classed as "Selection Grade Posts" itself suggests that promotion to these posts is not automatic being made only on the basis of ranking in the Gradation List but the question of merit enters in promotion to selection posts. The principle is that when the claims of officers to selection posts is under consideration, seniority should not he regarded except where the merit of the Officer is judged to be equal and no other criterion is, therefore, available." 11. A letter of the Govt of India dated July 31 Aug. 1, 1954 was referred in which it was clarified that if a person, though junior in the gradation list, is appointed to the selection post in preference to his senior then his senior, presumably stands superseded as a matter of selection. If this is so, it would certainly not be unjustified to regard the officer so selected earlier, though junior in the gradation list, as senior to the other officer, as far as the selection posts are concerned, because all suppertime scale posts are selection posts and appointment thereto need not follow the order of seniority. If this is so, it would certainly not be unjustified to regard the officer so selected earlier, though junior in the gradation list, as senior to the other officer, as far as the selection posts are concerned, because all suppertime scale posts are selection posts and appointment thereto need not follow the order of seniority. It was observed by their lordships of the Supreme Court in para 9 that if the State of Rajasthan had considered the case of the petitioner along with the other eligible candidates before appointments to the selection posts, there would be no breach of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution because every ore who was eligible in view of the conditions of service and was entitled to consideration was actually considered before promotion to those selection posts were actually made. In the present case, there is no specific allegation by the petitioners in the writ petition that their cases have not been considered along with all other eligible candidates and that is what their lordships have observed in para 9 also and it has been held that if they have been considered. there can be no grievance. Their lordships further observed at p. 1916 in para 9 that the trouble with the seniority system is that it is so objective that it fails to take any account of personal bearing, Though the system of seniority cum merit may be fair to the official concerned, it is heavy burden on the public and a great strain on the efficient handling of public business. The problem therefore is how to ensure reasonable prospect of advancement to all officials and at the same time to protect the public interest in having posts filled by the most able man ? In other words, the question is how to find a correct balance between the seniority and the merit in a proper promotion-policy. In this connection,. their lordships quoted with approval certain observations made by leanard D. While which are as follows : "The principal object of a promotion system is to secure the best possible incumbents for the higher positions, while maintaining the morale of the whole organisation. The main interest to be served is the public interest. not the personal interest of members of the official group concerned. The main interest to be served is the public interest. not the personal interest of members of the official group concerned. The public interest is best secured when reasonable opportunities for promotion exist for all qualified employees, when really superior civil servants are enabled to move as rapidly up the promotion ladder as their merits deserve and as vacancies occur, and when selection for promotion is made on the sole basis of merit. For the merit system ought to apply as specifically in making promotions as in original recruitment." Our attention was also drawn by the learned Addl. Advocate General to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas and others, AIR 1976 SC 490 wherein their lordships observed that in regard to employment, like other terms and conditions associated with and incidental to it, the promotion to a selection post is also included in the matters relating to employment and even in regard to such a promotion to a selection post all that Article 16(1) guarantees is equality of opportunity to all citizens. Thus, in matters of promotion to selection scale post, what is guaranteed is a right of consideration. Our attention was next drawn to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. M.L. Capoor and Ors., reported in AIR 1974 SC 87 wherein their lordships observed in pars 22 as under : "The selection committee has an unrestricted choice of the best available talent, from amongst eligible candidates determined by reference to reasonable criteria applied in assessing the facts revealed by service records of all eligible candidates so that merit and not mere seniority is the governing factor. The required number has thus to be selected by a comparison of merits of all the eligible candidates of each year." 12. Their lordships in para 55 further observed that the selection to select list is primarily on the basis of merit and suitability, seniority being given secondary importance. In making selection or in reviewing or revising the select list, as a fresh list has to be prepared on the basis of merit and suitability of all eligible candidates including those whose names remain in the previous list. In making selection or in reviewing or revising the select list, as a fresh list has to be prepared on the basis of merit and suitability of all eligible candidates including those whose names remain in the previous list. With due regard to seniority their lordships further observed that there is no question of notice being given to a senior when he is proposed to be passed over No vested right is involved, no interest recognised and protected by law is in jeopardy. It cannot he laid down as a general proposition that whenever a selection is made on the basis of merit and suitability with due regard seniority, notice to a senior will be i required if he is proposed to be passed over in favour of a junior on the ground of the greater merit ant suitability. Thus, the theory in Audi Alterum Partem principles of natural justice and a notice of hearing n such matters is totally out of question as per this authority of their lordships of the Supreme Court. It is not a case of promotion by seniority cum merit. Actually, it is a case of promotion by merit where comparative merit has to be judged and then the best talent has to be selected. That naturally results in superseding some senior persons but that by itself gives them no right to be promoted by merit. The merit as described by explanation to sub r. 11 of r. 28-A of the aforesaid Rules of 1954 is where the record of the person is 'outstanding' or consistently 'very good' for seven years. This explanation is of general application. R. I I provides for selection by merit. Sub r. 7 to r. 28 provides for promotion by seniority cum merit and merit in the proportion of 50:50. This explanation is of general application. R. I I provides for selection by merit. Sub r. 7 to r. 28 provides for promotion by seniority cum merit and merit in the proportion of 50:50. R. I I provides that the Committee shall consider the cases of all senior most persons who are eligible and qualified for promotion and an explanation has been added to this sub r. 1 i of r. 28A which provides that for the purpose of selection on the basis of merit, officers with 'outstanding' or-consistently very good' shall only be selected Our attention has been drawn to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court rendered in S. Sundaram v. V.R. Pattabhi Raman, reported in AIR 1985 SC 582 which provides that while interpreting the statutes, what weight has to be given to a provision and what is meaning of an explanation, their lordships observed that it is now well settled that an Explanation added to a statutory provision is not a substantive provision in any sense of the term but as the plain meaning of the word itself shows that it is merely heart to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in the statutory provisions. The Rules provide for selection by merit. It may be held to be ambiguous because it gives no guideline as to what will be construed as merit and the explanation serves that purpose that merit will be as mentioned in explanation to sub rule 11 of r. 28-A and thus, it serves a very useful purpose. Our attention was also drawn to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court rendered in D.G. Mahajan v. The State of Maharashtra and another, reported in AIR 1977 SC 915 wherein pars 9 Bhagwati peaking for majority observed that it is true that the orthodox function of an explanation is to explain the meaning and effect o the main provision to which it is an explanation and to clear up any doubt or ambiguity in it. But ultimately it is the intention of the legislature which is paramount and mere use of a label cannot control or deflect such intention. The intention of the legislature is clear that for construing the merit of a man, he must have 'outstanding' or 'consistently very good' record. Thus. But ultimately it is the intention of the legislature which is paramount and mere use of a label cannot control or deflect such intention. The intention of the legislature is clear that for construing the merit of a man, he must have 'outstanding' or 'consistently very good' record. Thus. this explanation has no infirmity or illegality in it which may make it ultravirus because it gives ample opportunity to all eligible candidates to be considered and to judge their merit on the basis of this explanation and, therefore, this rule being of universal application does not militate against the principle of equality before law or equal protection of law. 13. It was claimed that it may be that out of seven years, a person may not have a very good or outstanding record for one year and that may mar his chances for promotion in two, three, four, five or six year, as the case may be. The promotion by merit is not an ordinary case of promotion by seniority-cum-merit. It is a out of turn promotion and it one has to get himself included in the promotion by merit then the standard have to be very strict and they must be strictly complied with so that others may not suffer at the hands of their juniors by an act of arbitrariness or unreasonableness on the part of the D.P.C. It was with this object 'hat this explanation was incorporated in the rules as a guideline for the D.P.C. to judge the merit of the eligible candidates. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary or unjust. It is absolutely fair and reasonable and, therefore, this explanation cannot be held to be ultravirus of either Article 14 or article in of the Constitution of India. In this respect, a subsidiary argument was developed that while seeing the record of only seven years, a restraint is put unnecessarily on the discretion of the D.P.C. Thus, this order of the Government to consider the record of the seven years ;s arbitrary and unreasonable because that circumscribes the discretion of the D.P.C. by Government instructions and, therefore, it should be struck down. It should be left to the D.P.C. to judge the merit of a man by taking into consideration his entire service record. It should be left to the D.P.C. to judge the merit of a man by taking into consideration his entire service record. In this respect, our attention was drawa to a latest decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Nagaraj Shivarao Karjagi v. Syndicate Bank Herd Office, Maniple and another, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 219 . That was a case of awarding punishment by the Disciplinary Authority. These disciplinary proceedings were governed by Syndicate Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. It appears that the Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division) issued a direction that the Banking Authorities will be bound by the advice, tendered by the Central Vigilance Commission. In this case, the matter was referred to the Central Vigilance Commission End as per the direction of the Ministry of Finance, the consultation and the acceptance of the advice by the Central Vigilance Commission was considered to be mandatory and that militated against the discretion vested in the Disciplinary authority. It was in this context that it was held that such a direction could not have been issued because that hampers the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority. Mr. Mridul also placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Guman Singh v. State of Rajasthan (supra) wherein their lordships have observed that if executive order gives instructions contrary to rules, the order will be invalid and consequently Govt. circular was held to be invalid because as observed by their lordships of the Supreme Court in para 49 the circular enjoined on the Committee to treat instructions and statutory service rules as a complete code and as observed in para 4 that the instructions given in the circular were so rigid that they were opposed to the selection to be made strictly on merit as provided under rr. 28-B and 32 or the Rajasthan Administrative Service Rules,1954. In para 49, their lordships of the Supreme Court observed that they have already indicated that the instructions in the 1966 circular contravene the rules and, therefore, the circular dated 27.8.1966 is bad and accordingly it was struck down. These two authorities have no application to the facts of the present case. Here, there is no rule that how much period of a service I as to be considered for assessing the merit of a particular candidate. These two authorities have no application to the facts of the present case. Here, there is no rule that how much period of a service I as to be considered for assessing the merit of a particular candidate. When there are no rules, framed by the Govt. then it has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sant Ram's case (supra) in para 8 that those lacuna can be filled-up by the State Govt. by issuing executive instructions which are not contrary to the rules. The view taken by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Sant Ram's case (supra) reads as under : "It is true that the Govt. cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, but if the rules are silent on any particular point, Govt. can fill up the gaps and supplement the rules and issue instructions not inconsistent with the rules already framed." 14. Consequently, their lordships observed that there is nothing in the terms of the Article 309 of the Constitution which abridges the power of the executive to act under Article 162 of the Constitution without a law. 15. This dictum in Sant Ram's case (supra) has been quoted with approval by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Guman Singh's case (supra). 16. A similar view has been taken by their lordships of the Supreme Court in T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem, reported in AIR 1961 SC 276 . Thus, when there is no provision in the rules, such a lapse in the rules can be supplemented by the executive instructions. In this respect, learned Addl. Advocate General has placed reliance on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Courc in Guman Singh'- case (supra) wherein the criteria of eligibility which allowed the Dr)C to consider ten times the number of vacancies having six years service. was considered to be reasonable restriction. This was a case where only six years record was to be seen. Here, seven year's record has to be seen. This point also cropped-up for consideration before the D. B. in the writ-petition filed by Shri Randhir Singh wherein the learned Judges observed that the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Writ Pet. Here, seven year's record has to be seen. This point also cropped-up for consideration before the D. B. in the writ-petition filed by Shri Randhir Singh wherein the learned Judges observed that the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Writ Pet. No. 359/1985, Mahesh Prasad v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors., decided on 18.7.1985) wherein this Court has upheld the view of the D.P.C. that it should take A. C. Rs. for the last seven years into consideration for the purpose of selection and promotion,. Their lordships alio noticed the decisions of their lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas and ors., AIR 1976 SC 490 and Ram Kumer Singh v. The State of Rajasthan and others, reported in (1986) 2 Judicial Surveyor 196 and have held that the seven years rule is not unreasonable. Thus, this period of seven years has been considered to be reasonable even by the Division Bench of this Court which has rendered judgment in Randhir Singh's case (supra). Thus, this submission of Mr. Mridul that this consideration of the record of seven years is arbitrary, cannot be sustained. It was next submitted by him that it is a case of treating unequals as equals because some of the persons have only worked for three to four years in the Senior scale e. g S/Shri P. D. Sharma, Kundan Lal, Liyaqat Ali, Padam Chand Kala and Bhagwati Prasad and they have been promoted in the senior sc de in the years 1981, 1982 and 1583 This argument has no legs to stand. Sub r. 3 of r. 28...A provides that no person shall be considered for promotion unless he is substantively appointed and con'irmed on the lower post or lower grade. Thus, the only eligibility criteria is that the person must be confirmed in the lower grade and it is not the case of the petitioners that these persons who have been considered. have not been confirmed in the lower grade. 17. Thus, the only eligibility criteria is that the person must be confirmed in the lower grade and it is not the case of the petitioners that these persons who have been considered. have not been confirmed in the lower grade. 17. Reliance was also placed on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court rendered in K.I. Shephard v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1988 SC 686 wherein it was observed that the alternative contention that the scheme making process being an executive activity or an administrative matter, rules of natural justice have not application, cannot be accepted. Even when a State agency acts administratively, rules of natural justice would apply. Rules of natural justice generally require that persons liable to be directly affected by propose administrative acts, decisions or proceedings can be given adequate notice of what is proposed so that they may be in a position to make representations on their behalf or to appear at a hearing or enquiry (if one is held) and effectively to prepare their own case and to answer the case (if any) they have to meet. That was a case where according to the petitioner under in amalgamation act, the scheme was prepared and intention was to exclude some employees. Those employees who were sought to be excluded, were not given any notice and it was in this context that it was held that they have a right to be heard on the basis of the principles of natural justice before they are excluded. Thus, the right vested in them was going to be divested and it was in this context that this decision was rendered. 18. In Sant Ram's case (supra), their lordships of the Supreme Court while referring P.C. Wadhwa v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1964 SC 423 observed that a person in the junior time-scale of the service is as much a cadre officer as one holding a post in the senior time-scale or a post above the time-scale and the whole scheme of the rules indicated that a person in the junior scale of pay had a right to hold a post on the senior scale of pay subject to the availability of a post in the senior scale of pay and his seniority in the junior scale of pay. Thus, a person in the junior scale cannot be excluded on this around that he has not worked for seven years in the senior s;:ale. When the eligibility qualification is satisfied, the person eligible has a right of consideration for promotion as any other person. Simply because a man holds higher post for a longer number of years, it does not mean that his duty was more onerous and more hazardous. Rather, it may be that duties of junior officers or of officers in the junior scale of pay may be more onerous and hazardous. So, it cannot set up a criteria that persons who have not served for seven year's in senior scale are not eligible for consideration to selection scale posts. If they are eligible then they get a right of consideration and thus it cannot be said that it is a case of treating unequals with equals. It is a selection on the basis of a merit and seven years' record of eligible officer has to be scrutinised whether he has been in senior scale for all the seven years or not ? In this respect, the learned Addl. Advocate General referred to a case of Mohd. Usman and others v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 1971 SC 1801 . It was a case of selection of state wise cadre of Sub-Registrars. For selection of a state wise cadre, the fortuitous circumstance that one may be L.D.C. in a particular district and U.D.C. in another district, could not be taken into consideration and all were held equally entitled if they came in the consideration zone. 19. In this respect, Mr. Mridul referred to a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court rendered in Aband Bihari and others v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, reported in 1991 (1) SLR p. 575 at page 579 . That was a case of drivers who had lost eye sight on account of the occupational hazard and the Corporation tried to treat the cases of such drivers who had to lose their eye sight on account of the occupational hazard in the same manner as it treated the cases of other workmen who on account of the reasons not connected with the employment suffered from ill-health or continued 11i-health and still they served till super-annuation and that was considered to be unjust, inequitable and discriminatory. Here, it is not a case where occupational hazards may be more for the officers in the senior scale and less in the lower grade of service and, therefore, this authority has no application. In this respect, Mr. Mridul further placed reliance on two decisions, one rendered in Indra Prakash v. State of Rajasthan, WLR 1991 (S) 111 wherein although it was provided that the promotion shall be first given to a Senior person but he was required to acquire particular type it experience on a lower post. However. his officer did not assign the necessary work to a senior man and took that work from the junior man so that the senior man may not acquire the necessary qualification for promotion and another Division Bench decision of this Court rendered in Abdul Sattar etc. v. State of Rajasthan and another, RLR 1988 (2) p. 618 where a particular grade to all male nurses i.e. Gr. I could be granted to a person only when he is posted in the particular category of hospital which was not in his hands. In both these cases, this Court held that the posting of a senior man on a particular type of rig or in a particular category of hospital, is not in the bands of the employee and, therefore, to accord promotion on that basis of such a fortuitous circumstance could not be permitted. Here, it is not a case and, therefore, these authorities have no application. Consideration of a person who is otherwise eligible according to the rules is not at all fortuitous circumstance. What is required is that a man's record should be meritorious before he is selected on the basis of the merit. Whether he acquired that merit in the junior scale or senior scale, it hardly matters. Such a consideration neither violates Article 14 or Article 16 nor results in hostile discrimination as has been claimed by Mr. Mridul on the basis of an authority of their lordships of the Supreme Court rendered in Air India v. Nargesh Meerza and others, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1829 . That was a case of two different categories of Air India Employees which were guided by different sets of rules. It is not the case here. All the employees are governed by the same set of rules of 1954. That was a case of two different categories of Air India Employees which were guided by different sets of rules. It is not the case here. All the employees are governed by the same set of rules of 1954. The eligibility rule also is the same and the inert rule also is the same The case of Satish Chandra v. State of U P & others decided by the learned Single [Judge] of Allahabad High Court, reported in 1975 (1) SLR p. 65 has also no application. That was a case of communication of adverse entries & here it is not a case where adverse entry has not been communicated rather it is a case where it has been canvassed that a good entry be communicated because it is less than 'very good' or 'outstanding'. Such a contention cannot countenanced in view of the rules that are in force at present. In view of the rules, that are in force, the authority of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Lakhi Ram's case (supra) has also no application. That vas a case where a Govt. servant's chances of promotion were sought to be affected on account of the expungement of adverse remark made against another person and they were beyond the scope of the State's authority and, therefore, a person who was going to be affected by it was permitted to challenge them by a writ petit on because if those adverse entries are not expunged, he was likely to be promoted It is not the case here. Here, all eligible persons have been considered according to the merit formula i. e. their comparative merit has been judged and those who are more meritorious than others, have been a, corded promotion and therefore that will certainly result in supers ion of some of the seniors. The merit formula as such is not under challenge and if that is not under challenge than the same when given effect-to is likely result in supersession of a senior and the junior, who is more meritorious than his senior and whose record is more outstanding, he will certainly go up in preference to his seniors. The merit formula as such is not under challenge and if that is not under challenge than the same when given effect-to is likely result in supersession of a senior and the junior, who is more meritorious than his senior and whose record is more outstanding, he will certainly go up in preference to his seniors. If they have to be pushed up on the basis of their merit, then cannot be done in seniority cum merit promotion but when the promotion is totally based on merit and word 'only' has been used in the explanation appended to sub r. 11 of r. 28 A i. e. only outstanding and only consistently very good persons have to be given promotions according to the merit formula then only those persons may be promoted and no other, whether they have a 'outstanding' or very good record for six years, or five years or four years, that hardly matters. If others have such a record for all the seven years, then they alone, will be promoted because that is what the intention of the Rule is and so this authority has no application whatsoever. Reliance has been placed on S. B. decision of this Court in Yashwant Kumar v. The State of Rajasthan, 1980 WLN (UC) 114 . That was a case where a person was sought to be reverted from the post of Excise Inspector Gr. 11 to that of L.D.C. without giving him an opportunity. That is not the case here. Likewise the case of Mohd. Rashid Ahmed v. The State of U.P. and another decided by their lordships of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1979 SC 592 also has no relevance because there a pmon's services were sought to be terminated without giving him a hearing. Their lordships observed in paras 40, 4', 44 and 47 that before terminating the services of a person, hearing should have been given. This too, has no application. Reference was also made to Gurjit Singh Sabota v. State of Punjab and another, reported in 1975 The Unreported Judgments (SC) p. 616 . Their lordships observed in paras 40, 4', 44 and 47 that before terminating the services of a person, hearing should have been given. This too, has no application. Reference was also made to Gurjit Singh Sabota v. State of Punjab and another, reported in 1975 The Unreported Judgments (SC) p. 616 . That was a case where ai person who was promoted to class 1 service was later reverted to class two service but his case was again considered for promotion to class I service.In doing so his record of service which pertained to the period when he served as class I officer was not considered. Their lordships observed that it could not have been excluded from consideration. This case has no application to the facts of the case, before us. Reliance was also placed on a decision of their lordships of the Supreme Court in Markandey Singh v. M.L. Bhanot, reported in (1988) 3 SCC p. 539 . That was a case where a particular year of allotment was given to a particular person The re fixation of the allotment of a particular year of service in favour of the appellant by the Govt. reversing its own earlier decision against another affected officer was held to be unreasonable in absence of a notice to that person and in absence of an opportunity of hearing granted to him. That was a right conferred on the Govt. servant on account of the Govt. orders as regards the allotment of a particular year of service and that advantage conferred on him was sought to be withdrawn and consequently it was held that he should have been given a notice of hearimt. This has no application to the facts of the present case. It may be that the word 'good' or word 'prejudice' or words 'very good' or 'outstanding' may have any dictionary meaning but we need not go into that controversy because it has been provided by the rules that 'outstanding' and very good' has to be treated as equivalent. When outstanding is equivalent to very good, then above average has to be treated as equivalent to good. It cannot be treated as equivalent to outstanding-very good. If a person has an outstanding or a consistently meritorious record, then alone, his case has to be considered for promotion on the basis of merit. When outstanding is equivalent to very good, then above average has to be treated as equivalent to good. It cannot be treated as equivalent to outstanding-very good. If a person has an outstanding or a consistently meritorious record, then alone, his case has to be considered for promotion on the basis of merit. Promotion on the basis of merit formula as Such has been approved by their lordships of the Supreme Court even in Gutman Singh's case (supra). 20. In the result, the explanation to sub r. 11 of r. 28-A of the aforesaid rules of 1954 is not ultravires and when it is not ultravirus, if the D,P C. has selected persons strictly on the basis of the instructions issued by the Division Bench of this Court marked as Annex. 3, then order Annex. 4 cannot be declared as invalid and quashed and if the compliance of this D. B. decision disturbs any person in any manner on the basis of merit, then that cannot be help:l and, therefore, the Govt. cannot be issued any direction that they will not disturb the inter se position of the Officers as regards their seniority while considering their cases for promotion to the selection scale on the basis of the merit. The circulars dated 7.7.80 and 18.7 84 have been approved by the Division Bench in Randhir Singh's case (supra) and, therefore, they cannot be treated as invalid or struck down rather the D. B. direction is that they should be complied-with and selection should be made strictly in accordance with them. The seven years rule supplied by the Government for scrutiny. of the record of the D. P. C. is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and, there tore, this writ petition has no force and it is hereby dismissed.Write Petition Dismissed. *******