( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against an order restraining the appellant from selling the cold-storage in question by inviting tenders and setting out certain other terms for repayment of the loan advanced to the respondent. ( 2 ) FROM the facts as they emerged on the record it appears that a loan of Rupees 25,00,000/- was sanctioned to the plaintiff for the construction of a cold-storage against which only a sum of Rs. 14,60,300. 00 had been advanced to the plaintiff by 31/03/1989. Up to 30th Sept. , 89 a sum of Rs. 8,02,208. 00and odd had also become due by way of interest. On being approached by the plaintiff the repayment of the outstanding loan was re-scheduled by the appellant vide its letter dated 13-7-1988 according to which interest amounting to 4. 50 lacs was repayable in four instalments. The first two instalments were due in Feb. , 1989 and August, 1989 but the plaintiff failed to pay them. The plaintiff does not deny having taken the loan of Rs. 14. 30 and admittedly he has also not complied with the conditions of reschedulement permitted by the appellant. It is also obvious from the record that he did not comply with the conditions subject to which temporary injunction was granted on 14-1-1990. The order ultimately stood vacated due to non-compliance of its condition. ( 3 ) THE application playing for temporary injunction by the plaintiff was founded on two main grounds. Firstly, it was alleged that the defendant Corporation cannot realise its dues by sale of plaintiffs property by inviting offers through tender and can do so only by sale through public auction. Secondly it was urged that the entire loan amount had not been advanced to the plaintiff and, therefore, the repayment instalment fixed under the original agreement had become irrelevant and unenforceable. To allow the plaintiff to pay back the loan, the instalments had to be fixed again in accordance with the amount of loan actually advanced. Both these grounds have found acceptance by the trial Court. ( 4 ) HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties we are unable to agree with the trial court on any of these points. To allow the plaintiff to pay back the loan, the instalments had to be fixed again in accordance with the amount of loan actually advanced. Both these grounds have found acceptance by the trial Court. ( 4 ) HAVING heard learned counsel for the parties we are unable to agree with the trial court on any of these points. On the first question the trial court appears to have based its opinion on several decisions of the Supreme Court and one decision of this Court but it appears to us that the learned Judge failed to understand the ratio of their decision. In fact all the Supreme Court decisions referred to by the trial court have been considered in 1989 ALJ 834 : ( AIR 1989 All 96 ), Durgesh Cold Storage v. U. P. Financial Corporation. Most of these cases dealt with arbitrary state action and most of them had nothing to do with sale of public property or rights therein by inviting tenders. In Durgesh Cold Storage the debtors property had been sold by the Financial Corporation for recovery of its debts by public auction. The sale was set aside because it had been held very hastily without making any proper publicity of it to public. The Court, therefore, held :"on the facts of the present case we find that the tender offered by respondent No. 3 was the sole tender which does not ensure that the offer of the highest or best price was received after due publicity but on the contrary it indicates that the public had not been given proper notice of the sale of the property inviting them to participate in an open auction and the sale has been made by negotiation and inviting tender for a price which according to the petitioner, is far below the price that could be expected for such a valuable property. Hence when the intention is to get the best price the sale of property ought to take place publicly and in an open auction where large number of people could offer their bids for the unit in an open auction. Hence we are of the opinion that the circumstances of the present case do not inspire confidence that the sale had been conducted in a fair manner publicly ensuring best price for the cold-storage. Hence we are of the opinion that the circumstances of the present case do not inspire confidence that the sale had been conducted in a fair manner publicly ensuring best price for the cold-storage. "in AIR 1988 SC 157 , Haji T. M. Bassan Rawther v. Kerala Financial Corporation, it was observed that generally the property owned by State should be sold by public auction or by inviting tenders because by adopting these methods the property can fetch highest price and will also ensure fairness in the State activity. According to the view expressed by the Supreme Court, State and its instrumentality should act fairly. Their action should be legitimate, dealings above board, transaction entered into without aversion or affection, discrimination should be absent and should not give an impression of bias, favouritism or nepotism. It was further observed that "ordinarily these factors would absent if the matter is brought to public auction or sale by tenders but these rules can be departed from if justified by acquisition of circumstances. The relevant part of the decision is as under :"the State Financial Corporation invited tenders for the sale of the disputed property under notification. The appellant submitted highest tender in response to the said notification. He was given all concessions for payment of the tender amount. But he did not. He negotiated with the Managing Director of the Corporation for facilities for payment by instalments. That was also granted to him. There again he failed. Thereupon the property was offerred to one J who was next in order i. e. the person who had submitted the second highest tender and was sold to the firm in which J was partner. Held that the auction of the Corporation in offering the property to J and selling the same at his request to the firm of which J was the partner was perfectly justified and could not be found fault with". ( 5 ) IT will be seen that in this case sale had taken place through tender and this, we hope, must have been considered by the trial court also. We are amazed how the court below has come to the conclusion on the basis of these cases that the sale through tender was invalid. ( 6 ) AS we have seen earlier, in Durgesh Cold Storage (Supra) the facts were quite peculiar. We are amazed how the court below has come to the conclusion on the basis of these cases that the sale through tender was invalid. ( 6 ) AS we have seen earlier, in Durgesh Cold Storage (Supra) the facts were quite peculiar. In that case the time given for inviting tender was too short because of which only one tender had been received. This fact was considered as indicative of unfairness on the part of the Corporation because of which sale was set aside. ( 7 ) THE main strain of the various decisions of the Supreme Court discussed in the above Allahabad decision also is that actions of the public authorities should be guided by fairness, reasonableness, regard for public interest, honesty and its action should be above board and open and devoid of secrecy. The Court in the case of Durgesh Cold Storage did not lay down that sale of property by inviting tenders was invalid or improper. What was held was that auction sale, whether by open public auction or by tenders must be fair and after full publicity to ensure best price for the property sold. ( 8 ) IN the instant case the sale has not yet taken place and only invitation for tenders was contemplated. There is no allegation that the appellant intends to hold the sale in secrecy limited only to a few persons of its choice or that the sale will not take place after wide publicity encouraging general participation to ensure the best price for the property. In these circumstances, we find it difficult to accept the view of the trial court that the Corporation had no right to invite tender for sale of plaintiffs property. ( 9 ) THE second ground on which the plaintiffs injunction application has been allowed is that the entire amount of loan sanctioned to the plaintiff had not actually been advanced and as such the instalments payable by the plaintiff had become irrelevant. Since the defendant had not refixed the instalment according to the amount actually advanced to the plaintiff by way of loan, the plaintiff cannot be said to be defaulter in payment of the amount. This line of reasoning is erroneous. Apart from this from the copy of the plaint filed as Annexure 5 to the affidavit in support of the stay application we do not find any whisper about this ground. This line of reasoning is erroneous. Apart from this from the copy of the plaint filed as Annexure 5 to the affidavit in support of the stay application we do not find any whisper about this ground. The plaint allegations basically are that the defendant had failed to perform its part of agreement in advancing the entire sanctioned loan. Even the relief makes a mention that the defendant should be directed to perform their part of contract by releasing the amount due to the plaintiff. It will thus be seen that the second ground considered by the trial court did not find any mention even in the plaint. ( 10 ) SECTION 29 of the State Financial corporations Act, 1951 empowers the Financial Corporation to take over management or possession of the Industrial concern to whom the loan has been advanced and also to transfer the same for realising its dues. This power is not subject to any condition that the entire amount promised by the Financial Corporation will have to be first disbursed and then only Section 29 can be resorted to for realisation of the loan. For exercising of power under S. 29, therefore, what is necessary is that there should be a loan advanced by the Financial Corporation and that the borrower should have failed to repay the same. If these two conditions are satisfied the Financial Corporation would normally be within its right to take possession over the property of the concerned to whom the loan was advanced. Accordingly, we cannot accept the view of the trial court that merely because the loan actually advanced, required refixation of instalment for its payment, cannot be a ground for restraining the Corporation from realising its dues by sale of plaintiffs property. ( 11 ) INCIDENTALLY, one other question has been raised by the plaintiff. According to it the loan had been advanced for the purposes of establishing a cold storage and this, according to it, was an agricultural purpose. Even if this be so we are unable to appreciate how this is going to help the plaintiff. ( 11 ) INCIDENTALLY, one other question has been raised by the plaintiff. According to it the loan had been advanced for the purposes of establishing a cold storage and this, according to it, was an agricultural purpose. Even if this be so we are unable to appreciate how this is going to help the plaintiff. The question as to how much amount has been advanced by way of loan and the amount of interest which has accrued thereon are matters of detail and can be gone into at the trial of the suit, but for the purposes of establishing prima facie case and balance of convenience this is not very relevant. As pointed out earlier the plaintiff does not deny having taken the loan or having executed an agreement in favour of the Corporation. It is also not denied that the loan taken by the plaintiff has not been repaid. In these circumstances the plaintiff had no prima facie case to restrain the defendant from proceeding against his property in accordance with law. We have already held above that the sale by inviting tender is not illegal and can be resorted to provided there are adequate safeguards to ensure realisation of proper price for it. ( 12 ) IN view of this we find merit in this appeal and we accordingly set aside the orders passed by the trial court and reject the application 77-C. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs. Appeal allowed. .