Judgment :- Nainar Sundaram, J. These two revisions stand posted before us as a Bench because question of jurisdiction of the appellate authority was raised and the learned single who was earlier seized of these two revisions, deemed fit to refer them to a Bench. 2. Before we take up the question of jurisdiction, it will be appropriate if we trace as to how these revisions have come to be preferred to this court. The tenants within the meaning the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Act 18 of 1960) hereinafter referred to as the Act, are the petitioners in these two revisions. The respondents are landlords within the meaning of the Act. The landlords sought the eviction of the premises question for demolition and re-construction under Sec.l4(l)(b) of the Act. The Controller dismissed the petitions for eviction. The landlords preferred appeals and they were heard and disposed of by the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur, Ramanathapuram District as appellate authority, under the Act. These revisions are directed against the decisions of appellate authority. 3. Mr.V.Venkataswamy, learned counsel for the tenants raises the question of jurisdiction the appellate authority in the following manner: According to him, the notification under Sec.23 of the Act, conferring jurisdiction as appellate authority under the Act on all Subordinate Judges, including those of Ramanathapuram district, was made in the year 1973 vide notification II-1 No.3006(f) of 1973 and the court of the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur came to be constituted only in the year 1982 and hence that notification cannot be of any avail for the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur to exercise the powers of appellate authority under the Act and hence the appeals entertained, heard and disposed by him, must be held to be “ without jurisdiction. Sec.23(1)(a) of the Act, reads as follows: ” The Government may, be general or special order notified in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, confer on such officers and authorities as they think fit, the powers of Appellate Authorities for the purpose of this Act, in such and in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order." The concerned notification confers on the officers mentioned in column (1) of the table powers of the appellate authority for the purposes of the Act. Amongst the officers mentioned in column (1) fall all Subordinate Judges within the respective jurisdiction, in area mentioned in column (2) which takes in Rama-nathapuram district According Mr.V.Venkataswamy, learned counsel for the tenants, on the date of the notification in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur, not having been constituted, the notification would not cover the Subordinate Judge, Srivilliputhur and thus, he must be to have lacked jurisdiction to exercise the powers of the appellate authority, under the In support of his submission learned counsel for the tenants places reliance on pronouncement of V.Balasubrahmanyan, J., in R.Purushothaman v. K.S.Vijayalakshmi, 1982 Mad. 308. There the learned single Judge was faced with a similar contingency and was of the view that only those officers and authorities who were actually in existence at time of the notification conferring the power could be competent to exercise such powers appellate authorities. The view of the learned single Judge has been expressed in following terms: "Necessarily therefore this process of conferment of appellate jurisdiction in terms of Sec23 requires as a pre-condition that the officers . and authorities in question must as on date, exist as authorities and officers. This at once excludes officers and authorities who not in existence or who are only in contemplation. Although a notification conferring jurisdiction by the Government under Sec.23 of the Act, when once it is properly done notified . will have force thereafter, whether it is modified or altered, the very conferment jurisdiction rests on the officers or authorities who exist as on the date of the notification are therefore the objects of the conferment of the power. This consideration of Sec.23 is consistent with the realistics of administration of justice. It is in my judgment reasonable understand the references to "such officers and authorities as they think fit" occurring Sec.23 of the Act as a reference only to those officers and authorities who were actually existence at the time of the notification conferring the power, but another step in reasoning to construe the notification dated 30.6.1973 in II-1 No.3008 (e) of 1973, as having reference only to existing Subordinate Judges and within their respective jurisdictions Kanyakumari District and other districts named in the notification. The result is that notification would severally exclude all Subordinate Judges in the Kanyakumari district were in unknown quantities at the time the notification was issued. The result is that notification would severally exclude all Subordinate Judges in the Kanyakumari district were in unknown quantities at the time the notification was issued. On the basis of determination of mine, I must hold that the learned Subordinate Judge, Kuzhithurai, came into being only by virtue of the notification dated 21.3.1974 and upon whom relative appellate jurisdiction was conferred under Sec.23 of the Rent Control Act, had jurisdiction to take on file the appeal, namely, H.R.A.No.1 of 1978, much less proceed hear and determine it." 4. As against the submissions made by Mr.V.Venkataswamy, learned counsel for the tenants, we heard Mr.R.Muthukumaraswamy, learned counsel, appearing for the landlords submitting that the notification is general in nature and the conferment of powers is also general official titles and this is permissible by virtue of Sec.17 of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891 and when such conferment of powers has been done, the powers could exercised by the holder for the time being in office and it is not necessary that the holder the office must be functioning at the time when the conferment of powers takes place this is the result of a combined reading of Sec.9 paragraph (f), Sec. 14 and Sec.17 Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891. The learned counsel for the landlords, draws attention to a pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Janardan v. The State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1234: (1978)2 S.C.C. 465 : 1978 S.C.C. (Crl.)277: 1978 Crl.L.J. where there was a lack of definition of "Commissioner of Police" under Sec.8 of the Bombay Prevention.of Gambling Act 4 of 1887 and yet, by virtue of Bombay Police Act 22 of 1951 an Assistant Commissioner of Police was enabled to discharge the functions of Commissioner of Police and the exercise of the powers by the Assistant Commissioner Police under the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act 4 of 1887 was upheld by adverting Sec.17 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1 of 1904 whose implications are similar to Sec.9 paragraph (f), Sec.14 and Sec.17 of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891. Learned counsel for the landlords also brings to our notice the pronouncement of S.Natarajan, J., he then was, in Dr. Learned counsel for the landlords also brings to our notice the pronouncement of S.Natarajan, J., he then was, in Dr. Uma Rani v. Meenakshisundaram and another, W.P.No.2285 of 1985 and W.M.P.No.3885 of 1985, Order dated 19.3.1985, wherein the learned single Judge took view at variance with the one taken by V.Balasubrahmanyan, J., in R.Purushothaman K.S.Vijayalakshmi, A.I.R. 1982 Mad. 308. 5. We must record that Mr.R.Muthu-kumaraswamy, learned counsel for the landlords, initially submitted that this Court should not show the indulgence of permitting the tenants to take up the question of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the appellate authority; assuming it is tenable contention; after the tenants contested the appeal before the appellate authority without any demur over jurisdiction, and after the decision at the hands of the appellate authority has gone against them; and if only the tenants had taken this objection and if had any substance and tenability, the landlords in their wisdom would have certainly chosen the proper forum having jurisdiction. Though it is possible to accept this submission put by the learned counsel for the landlords, on the principle that a party who, on account of own negligence and omission failed to assert the contention regarding jurisdiction at earliest point of time should not be allowed to raise it, assuming it has got substance tenability behind it, at a later stage and that too after participating in the proceedings before the authority concerned because on account of the lapse of time and other circumstance, will cause prejudice to the opponent party, we deemed fit to permit the tenants to raise question of jurisdiction so as to give a quietus to it without standing on technicalities and have allowed the applications taken in this behalf and we are proceeding to decide question on merits. 6. Sec.23(1)(a) of the Act, as could be seen from the extract made supra, speaks about conferment of the powers of appellate authorities for the purpose of the Act on such officers and authorities as the Government may think fit A plain reading of the language of Sec.23 (1)(a) of the Act does not convey to our mind that the conferment of the powers of appellate authorities under the Act should be on the basis of persona designata. It could be generally done on the officers and authorities named by their tides. It could be generally done on the officers and authorities named by their tides. It is also not possible to hold the officers and authorities named by their titles generally conferred with the powers of appellate authorities under the Act, should be actually functioning on the date of conferment of the powers. Such officers and authorities could assume office and function subsequently and the conferment of the powers generally done by title will certainly enable them to exercise the powers. It is in this connection, as rightly pointed out Mr.R.Muthukumaraswamy, learned counsel for the landlords, the provisions of Tamil General Clauses Act, 1891 do throw light as to how the conferment of general powers should be worked out Sec.17 of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, 1891 reads as follows: “ Whenever by an Act authority is given to confer powers or impose duties, such powers be conferred or duties imposed by name or by office or on classes of officials generally their official titles. ” Sec.14 of the said Act runs as follows: “ Where an Act confers a power or imposes a duty on the holder of an office, as such, the power may be exercised and the duty shall be performed by the holder for the being of the office. ” Paragraph (f) of Sec.9 of the said Act is in the following terms: “For the purpose of indicating the application of a law to every person or number of persons for the time being executing the functions of an office, it shall be sufficient to mention official title of the officer at present executing such functions, or that of the officer by whom the functions are commonly executed. ” When there could be a conferment of powers generally and that has been done by referring to the authorities and officers by their title, those powers could be competently exercised the bolder for the time being of the office. As and when the officers and authorities with the powers get constituted for the area mentioned in the notification under the Act, will be seized of the powers and they can exercise the powers competently. As and when the officers and authorities with the powers get constituted for the area mentioned in the notification under the Act, will be seized of the powers and they can exercise the powers competently. That is the of a combined reading of the above provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Clauses Act, We find that dealing with a similar situation, the Supreme Court in Janardan v. The Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1234: (1978)2 S.C.C. 465 : 1978 S.C.C.(Crl.) 277: Crl.L.J. 1102, has set down the guidelines as to how to construe the conferment of and work them out looking into the provisions of the General Clauses Act When we found the conferment of the powers on the basis of persona designate the conferment powers generally on officers and authorities by their title has got to be worked opt only context of implications of the relevant provisions of the General Clauses Act. S.Natarajan, as he then was, has expressed his view in the following terms in the pronouncement to above. “With very great respect of the learned Judge, I am wholly at variance with the view by him. Sec.23 confers exclusive powers on Government to confer the powers of authorities on such officers and authorities as it thinks fit. The section does not stipulate the Government is empowered to confer powers of appellate authorities only on persons or existing courts. The Government has, therefore, passed a general order G.O.No.3006(F)/1973, empowering all the Subordinate Judges in the districts of Tamil except Dharmapuri district to exercise the powers of appellate authorities. The words, general or special order “occurring in Sec.23, should not be lost sight of. The question is a general order, and by reason of it, every Subordinate Judge exercising powers within his respective jurisdiction, will stand automatically conferred with the of an appellate authority under the Act. Merely because a court has been constituted subsequently, it can by no stretch of imagination, be contended that the subsequently constituted Court will not derive the powers conferred on all Subordinate Judges Government order in question. Once a Court has been duly constituted, it automatically follows that it will have power to hear all the cases falling within its territorial jurisdiction. The view expressed by the learned Judge is in tune with the view expressed by us. that the writ appeal in Dr. Once a Court has been duly constituted, it automatically follows that it will have power to hear all the cases falling within its territorial jurisdiction. The view expressed by the learned Judge is in tune with the view expressed by us. that the writ appeal in Dr. Uma Rani v. Meenaksh-isundaram and another, W.P.No.2285 1985, preferred against the pronouncement of S.Natarajan, J, as he then was, has been dismissed by the First Bench of this Court on 15.11.1985. In the light of our above discussion, we are not able to sustain the contention advanced by the learned counsel for tenants that the appellate authority in the instant case, lacked jurisdiction to decide matters. 7. Each owing the contention regarding jurisdic-tion, we are obliged to take up the revisions and deal with them on merits, since these two revisions are of the year 1982 the reference to a Bench is not to consider merely the question of jurisdiction. 8. Mr.V.Venkataswamy, learned counsel for the tenants made his submissions on merits. According to the learned counsel for the tenants, the appellate authority ignored to take of and adjudicate a vital and a relevant factor namely, the existing condition of the building. Learned counsel for the tenants was at pains to impress upon us that the existing condition of the building does not warrant the upholding of the case of the landlords for demolition reconstruction. Mr.R.Muthukumara- swamy, learned counsel for the landlords, on the other hand would submit that there is no gainsaying that the condition of the building is a vital a relevant factor, but the appellate authority did advert to this aspect and has come to conclusion on facts that the existing condition of the building did Warrant the countenancing of the plea of the landlords to get at the same for demolition and reconstruction. We have been taken through the decisions of the two forums below. It is true that there in difference of opinion on this question between the Controller and the Appellate Authority. But Appellate Authority has in fact, referred to the ratio of the Supreme Court in Metalware Company etc. We have been taken through the decisions of the two forums below. It is true that there in difference of opinion on this question between the Controller and the Appellate Authority. But Appellate Authority has in fact, referred to the ratio of the Supreme Court in Metalware Company etc. v. Bansilal Sarma and others etc., A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1559: (1980)1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 1: (1979)3 S.C.C. 398 : (1979)2 S.C.J. 377, where it has been countenanced: “ .......we are clearly of the view that the existing condition of the building far from totally irrelevant is a vital factor which will have to be considered while pronouncing upon bona fide requirement of the landlord under that provision which has to be done by regard to all the circumstances....... ” Only after adverting to and analysing all the materials placed in. the case, the appellate authority has come to the conclusion that even the existing condition of the building warrant the countenancing of the pleas of the landlords under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Mr.R.Muthu-kumaraswamy, learned counsel for the landlords brings to our notice that subsequent pronouncement in M/s.P.Orr & Sons (P) Ltd. v. M/s.Associated Publishers (Madras) Ltd., (1990)2 M.L.J. 12, the Supreme Court while holding that the condition building is not only one of the various circumstances which may be taken into account Controller, but it is an essential condition, however, has laid down that in order to satisfy test under Sec.14(1)(b) the condition of the building need not have deteriorated extent of the building being in danger of crumbling down; but the condition of the must be such as to indicate the bona fide requirement for the timely, genuine and purposes of demolition and re-construction. When we take note of the latest ratio Supreme Court, we find that no exception could be taken to the decision of the appellate authority. 9. Be it so a case of reversing judgment, the powers of this Court under Sec.25 of are not wide enough to make them those of a second court of first appeal. It would different matter if the appellate authority has applied wrong tests and has proceeded decide the factual issues. Such is not the case here. 9. Be it so a case of reversing judgment, the powers of this Court under Sec.25 of are not wide enough to make them those of a second court of first appeal. It would different matter if the appellate authority has applied wrong tests and has proceeded decide the factual issues. Such is not the case here. We are convinced that there has advertence to the correct tests and there has been an appropriate consideration relevant factual materials over the questions, and the findings rendered by the appellate authority are not liable to be questioned in revisional jurisdiction. The result is, these revisions fail and they are dismissed. No costs. 10. At this juncture Mr.V.Venkataswamy, learned counsel for the tenants puts forth the for grant of time for his clients to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises question to the landlords. We find that the tenants had a very long time on account pendency of these two revisions. However, finding sincerity in the pleas for grant of time forth by the learned counsel for the tenants, we grant the tenants six months time from day to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises in question to the landlords. Petitions dismissed.