MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) IN this group of petitioners, a common question of vires of Sec. 15-B of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 as amended by Sec. 2 of the Gujarat Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1990 arises for consideration. It is the contention of the petitioners that the said provision is beyond the legislative competence of the State legislature. In order to appreciate this common grievance of the petitioners, it is necessary to note a few introductory facts : ( 2 ) I. Introductory facts : The petitioners are dealers registered under the provisions of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 (the Act for short ). They carry on the activity of manufacturing and selling various goods in this State. For that purpose, they require raw materials which are to be used in manufacturing the end product. The materials purchased by them in the State and used in the manufacturing process have been subjected to purchase tax by the impugned provision. The petitioners contend that the State Legislature has no competence to impose such tax as such tax does not fall within any of the entries of List ii of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, viz. ,the State list especially Entry 54 thereof. They have joined in these petitions State of Gujarat as respondent no. 1 and the authorities exercising powers under the Act as other respondents. As the petitions involve common questions of law, they were all heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 3 ) THE common grievance of the petitioners is required to be examined in the bacjground of the statutory settings and their historical backdrop. ( 4 ) II. Statutory setting : The Act has been enacted by the State legislature in exercise of its powers under Entry 54 of the State list. The said entry reads as under :"taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of Entry 92-A of List I". The said Act is operative in the State from 6-5-1970. By Sec. 2 of the Gujarat sales Tax (Third Amendment) Act, 1986, the legislature of the first respondent state had inserted Secs. The said entry reads as under :"taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of Entry 92-A of List I". The said Act is operative in the State from 6-5-1970. By Sec. 2 of the Gujarat sales Tax (Third Amendment) Act, 1986, the legislature of the first respondent state had inserted Secs. 15b and 15c from 1-4-1986 in the Act providing in substance levy of tax on the taxable goods consigned by the dealer outside the state of Gujarat to the extent of 2% of the purchase price of the raw materials used in the manufacture of such taxable goods so consigned. However, by the gujarat Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1987, Sec. 15c was deleted from 1-4- 1987 and new Sec. 15b was substituted from 1-4-1987 for old section. New sec. 15b so substituted read as under:"where any dealer liable to pay tax under this Act uses any goods other than declared goods purchased by him or through commission agent as raw or processing materials or consumable stores (irrespective of whether such goods are prohibited goods or not) in the manufacture of taxable goods and despatches any of the goods so manufactured to his own place of business or to his agents place of business situate outside the State but within India such dealer will be liable to pay, in addition to any tax paid or payable under other provisions of this Act, a purchase taxat the rate of four paise in the rupee on the purchase price of such raw or processing materials or consumable stores used in the goods so manufactured and despatched and accordingly he shall include the purchase price thereof in histurnover of purchases in his declaration or return under Sec. 40 which he is to furnish next thereafter : provided that where the raw materia;s so used is bullion or specie, the purchase tax payable on such bullion or specie under this section shall not exceed the agreegate of the rates of Sales Tax and the General Sales Tax payable on bullion or specie. "a similar provision was operative in the Maharashtra State being Sec. 13aa of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. "a similar provision was operative in the Maharashtra State being Sec. 13aa of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The said Bombay provision which was then existing read as under :"where a dealer, who is liable to pay tax under this Act, purchased any goods specified in Part I of Schedule C, directly or through commission agent, from a person who is or is not registered dealer and uses such goods in the manufacture of taxable goods and despatches the goods, so manufactured, to his own place of business or to his agents place of business situated outside the State within India, then such dealer shall be liable to pay, in addition to the Sales Tax paid or payable, or as the case may be, the purchase tax levied or leviable under the other provisions of this Act in respect of purchases of such goods, a purchase tax at the rate of two paise in the rupee on the purchase price of the goods so used in the manufacture, and accordingly, the dealer shall include purchase price of such goods in his turnover of purchases in his return under Sec. 32, which he is to furnish next thereafter. " ( 5 ) THE vires of the aforesaid Sec. 13aa of the Bombay Act came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 1990 (76) STC 71. In that case, the Supreme Court considered Sec. 13aa of the Bombay Act as well as identical pari-materia provisions in the haryana Act. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as he then was) sitting with Ranganathan, j. in the aforesaid case took the view that the said provision was ultra vires the state legislation as under the guise of purchase tax, what was sought toi be levied was consignment tax which was beyond the competence of the State legislature and was not covered on Entry 54 of the State List. Ranganathan, J. by a separate concurring judgment also endorsed the said view. The result was that such a provision was treated to be beyond Entry 54 of the State List and would be covered only by Entry 92-B of the Union List being tax on consignment. Ranganathan, J. by a separate concurring judgment also endorsed the said view. The result was that such a provision was treated to be beyond Entry 54 of the State List and would be covered only by Entry 92-B of the Union List being tax on consignment. Entry 92-B of the Union List reads as under:"92-B. Taxes on the consignment of goods (whether the consignment is to the person making it or to any other person) where such consignment takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. " ( 6 ) THEREAFTER, the Maharashtra Legislature substituted earlier Sec. 13aa of the Maharashtra Act which was faulted by the Supreme Court and replaced it by new Sec. 13aa of the Maharashtra Act with retrospective effect from 1-7-1982. For that purpose, earlier Maharashtra Ordinance No. 9 of 1989 was issued and thereafter it was followed by Maharashtra Act 2 of 1990 which replaced it. The said new Sec. 13aa introduced as aforesaid in the maharashtra Act may be styled as new Bombay provision. The said provision read as under :" (I) Where a dealer, who is liable to pay tax under this Act, purchases any goods specified in Part I of Schedule C, directly or through commission agent, from a person who is or is not, a registered dealer and uses such goods in the manufacture of taxable goods, then, unless the goods so manufactured are sold by the dealer, there shall be levied, in addition to the Sales Tax, paid or payable, if any, or as the case may be, the purchase tax levied or leviable, if any, under the other provisions of this act in respect of purchases of such goods, a purchase tax at the rate of two paise in the rupee on the purchase price of the goods, so used in the manufacture, and accordingly the dealer shall include purchase price of such goods in his turnover of purchases in his return under Sec. 32, which he is to furnish next thereafter. (2) A dealer who becomes liable to pay tax under sub-sec. (2) A dealer who becomes liable to pay tax under sub-sec. (1) shall, unless he has already furnished a return including therein the turnover of such purchases during the period commencing on the 1/07/1982 and ending on the day immediately preceding the date of commencement of the Bombay Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1990, or is exempted from furnishing such return, by a general or special order issued in this behalf by the Commissioner, furnish a consolidated return including therein the turnover of such purchases for the period aforesaid, within a period of three months from the date of the commencement of the said Act. "this provision was challenged by some of the dealers before the maharashtra High Court. A Division Bench of the Maharashtra High Court consisting of Bharucha and Shri Krishna JJ. by their decision dated 28-8- 1990 rendered in writ petition Nos. 477 of 1990 and group struck down the said provision by taking the view that the said provision sought to impose levy in the nature of excise which was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature and would not be covered by entry 54 of the State list, meaning thereby, if at all, it would be covered by Entry 84 of the Union list. Entry 84 of the Union List, reads as under:"duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India except: (a) alcoholic liquors for human consumption; (b) Opium, Indian hemp and other Narcotic Drugs and Narcotics, but including medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol or any substance included in sub-paragraph (b) of this entry. " ( 7 ) SO far as Gujarat provision of Sec. 15b was concerned, a number of writ petitions were filed in this Court challenging the vires of this provision on the basis of the Supreme Court decision in Goodyears case (supra ). It was contended that Gujarat provision of Sec. 15b was pari materia with the old Bombay provision of Sec. 13aa which was struck down by the Supreme court in the aforesaid decision and on parity of reasoning, it was required to be held that Gujarat provision of Sec. 15b was also ultra vires the State legislature being tax on consignment covered by Entry 92-B of the Union list and not by Entry 54 of the State List. This group of petitions was placed for final hearing before this Court, but before they could be proceeded further, the first respondent intervened and promulgated an Ordinance deleting old Sec. 15b from the statute book and instead, inserting rew provision of Sec. 15b. The said Ordinance being Ordinance 3 of 1990 was gazetted on 20-4-1990. By Sec. 2 of the said Ordinance, it was? laid down that during the period of operation of this Ordinance, Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 being the Principle act shall have effect subject to the amendment specified in Sec. 3. Section 3 of the Ordinance substituted new Sec. 15b for old Sec. 15bb to the following effect : "15b. Where a dealer who being liable to pay tax under this Act purchases cither directly or through a commission agent any goods specified in Schedule II or III (not being declared goods for use as raw or processing materials or consumable stores, in the manufacture of taxable goods, then there shall be levied in addition to any tax levied under the other provisions of this Act, a purchase tax at the rate of (a) two paise in a rupee on the turnover of such purchases made during the period commencing on the 1/04/1986 and ending on the 5/08/1988, and (b) four paise in a rupee on the turnover of such purchases made at any time after the 5/08/1988 : provided that where the raw materials purchased for use in the manufacture of goods are bullion or specie the rate of purchase tax on the turnover of purchases of such raw materials shall not exceed the aggregate of the rates of Sales Tax and general Sales Tax leviable on bullion or specie under entry I in Schedule III. " as the old Sec. 15bb was impugned in the pending petitions and it got substituted by new provision, each petitions were disposed of by the Division bench of the Court consisting of A. P. Ravani and S. A. Mehta, JJ. as infructuous. ( 8 ) THE aforesaid Gujarat Oridinance was followed by a gazetted notification of the Finance Department of the first respondent dated 1-5-1990 whereunder, the first respondent amended Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1950 and introduced a new rule being Rule 42-E after existing Rule 42-D. The said Rule 42- e reads as under :. as infructuous. ( 8 ) THE aforesaid Gujarat Oridinance was followed by a gazetted notification of the Finance Department of the first respondent dated 1-5-1990 whereunder, the first respondent amended Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1950 and introduced a new rule being Rule 42-E after existing Rule 42-D. The said Rule 42- e reads as under :. "in assessing the purchase tax levied under Sec. 15b and payable by a dealer (hereinafter referred to as the assessee) the Commissioner shall subject to conditions of Rule 47 insofar as they apply, and further conditions specified below, grant him a draw back, set off or as the case may be, refund of the whole of the purchase tax paid in respect of any earlier purchase of goods used by him, as raw materials, processing materials, or consumable stores, in the manufacture of taxable goods. Conditions (1) the assessee is a registered dealer. (2) the goods purchased are taxable goods other than declared goods. (3) the said goods have been used by the assessee within the State as raw materials or processing materials or consumable stores in the manufacture of taxable goods. (4) the goods so manufactured have been sold by the assessee in the State of Gujarat. "the aforesaid Gujarat Ordinance was repealed by Gujarat Act 6 of 1990 being Gujarat Sales tax (Amendment) Act, 1990. By that amending Act, earlier sec. 15bwas retrospectively amended and replaced by new provision of Sec. 15b which is challenged in the present proceeding. The said provision impugned in this group of petitions reads as under:"where a dealer who being liable to pay tax under this Act purchases either directly or through a commission agent any taxable goods (not being declared goods) and uses them as raw or processing materials or consumable stores, in the manufacture of taxable goods, then there shall be levied in addition to any tax levied under the other provisions of this Act, a purchase tax at the rate of- (a) two paisc in a rupee on the turnover of such purchases made during the period commencing on the 1/04/1986 and ending on the 5/08/1988, and (b) four paise in a rupee on the turnover of such purchases made at any time after the 5/08/1988, provided that. . . . . . . . . ". This newly inserted Sec. 15b is hereinafter referred to as new Gujarat provision. . . . . . . . . ". This newly inserted Sec. 15b is hereinafter referred to as new Gujarat provision. That has triggered off the present group of petitions. The question of vires of the impugned new Gujarat provision will have to be decided in the background of the aforesaid statutory settings and their historical backdrop. ( 9 ) THE following points arise for our determination :- (1) Whether impugned new Gujarat provision of Sec. 15b of the Gujarat sales Tax Act, 1969 is within the legislative competence of the State legislature ? (2) If not, to what reliefs are the petitioners entitled to ? (3) If the impurged provision is within the legislative competence, whether the validating provision of Sec. 4 (2) of the Gujarat Sales Tax (Amendment) act, 1990 can sustain all actions taken and all taxes paid and all assessments made under old Sec. 15b which is replaced by the impugned new Gujarat provision and whether even independently of the said Sec. 4 (2), the aforesaid actions can be sustained ? (4) If the answer to point No. 3 is in the negative to what reliefs are the petitioners entitled to ? ( 10 ) V. Discussion on points for determination : (1) Legislative competence for enacting Sec: 15b: this is the main contention which has fallen for consideration in the present proceedings. The rival contentions of learned Advocates of parties have projected the following controversies underlying this question :- (a) Whether Sec. 15b in substance imposes a consignment tax; (b) Whether it imposes a tax in the nature of excise; (c) Whether it imposes user tax. Questions (b) and (c) are raised in the alternative to question (a ). If all these three questions are answered in the negative, then only, the impugned levy can be sustained under entry 54 of- the State List as purchase tax. But if any of the three questions gets answered in the affirmative, then obviously levy would fail as it would go beyond the scope of entry 54 of the State list. It would, therefore, be profitable to deal with all these questions seriatim. But if any of the three questions gets answered in the affirmative, then obviously levy would fail as it would go beyond the scope of entry 54 of the State list. It would, therefore, be profitable to deal with all these questions seriatim. ( 11 ) QUESTION V (l) (a) : Whether Sec. 15b imposes tax on consignment: before taking up for discussion this aspect of the matter, it is necessary to keep in view the relevant constitutional frame work in the background of which the Supreme Court in Goodyear case (supra) while interpreting the impugned provisions before them held them to be beyond the scope of entry 54 of the State List by treating them as imposing consignment tax covered by entry 92-B of the Union List. We have already referred to these relevant statutory and constitutional provisions in Part II of this judgment. To recpitulate, it may be stated that before the 46th Amendment to the Constitution, eventhough the state legislatures had power to impose tax on sale and purchase of goods in the State and even though inter-State sales could be brought within the network of Parliaments legislative power under Entry 92-A of the Union List, which referred to taxes on sale or purchase of goods other than newspaper where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, by device of tax planning, the manufacturers in the State who used to purchase raw materials and utilise them in manufacture- of goods, used to consign such manufactured goods by dispatching them outside the State to their branches. Therefore, it could not be said that they had entered into any transaction of inter-State sale. A mere consignment of the manufactured goods by its owner to his own branches outside the State would obviously be not inter-State sale, which can be taxed by the Parliament by enacting appropriate provisions under entry 92-A. Such consignment also could not be brought to tax within the State as there was no sale of such manufactured articles within the State. Consequently, they remained untaxed. To plug this loophole, by 46th Constitutional amendment, entry 92-B was inserted in the Union List to cloth the Parliament with the power to tax such consignments outside the State. Consequently, they remained untaxed. To plug this loophole, by 46th Constitutional amendment, entry 92-B was inserted in the Union List to cloth the Parliament with the power to tax such consignments outside the State. When the Parliament was clothed with such power to tax consignments the moot question would naturally arise whether the State legislature could enter upon this forbidden field and under the guise of purchase tax on raw materials which had ultimately cultimated into finished manufactured products which were then cosingned to outside branches by the manufacturer/dealer in the State, could bring to tax such consignment. The. answer would obviously be in the negative and such provision could not be sustained under Entry 54 of the State List as such provision would be taxing provision exclusively in the competence of the Parliament under Entry 92-B of the Union List. This is precisely which is ruled by the Supreme Court in 76 STC 71 (supra ). This judgment requires a very close scrutiny as it has been the prime basis of the arguments of the learned Advocates for the petitioners whether they attacked the impugned provision of Sec. 15-B on the ground that it was beyond the legislative competence of the State legislature as it sought to impose consignment tax and in any case, in the light of the judicial dictionary of taxing event as laid down in the said decision, the impugned levy cannot be sustained within the ambit of Entry 54 of the State List. It has to be kept in view that the supreme Court bench consisting of Sabyasachi Mukharji (as he then was) and s. Rangnathan, JJ. in the aforesaid decision was concerned with the legislative competence of Sec. 9 of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act which sought to levy purchase tax from a dealer who purchased goods other than those specified in Schedule B from any source in the State and used them in the state in the manufacture of any other goods and either disposed of the manufactured goods in any manner otherwise than by sale in the State or dispatched them to a place outside the State in any manner otherwise than by sale in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of export outside the territory of India. In that decision, the Supreme Court was also concerned with pari-materia provision of the Maharashtra Act-Sec. 13aa which is already reproduced by us earlier in Part II of this judgment. In maharashtra provision as well as in Punjab and Haryana provision, three relevant events which ultimately culminated into taxing events were as under : (i) purchase of concerned goods (and material) by the concerned dealer or his commission agent. (ii) use of such goods in the manufacture of taxable goods; and (iii) despatch of the goods so manufactured to places outside the State but without entering into any sale of these despatched goods to outside agency. These three events clubbed together were treated by the Supreme Court to ultimately culminate into the taxable event which took place on the despatch of the manufactured articles outside the State without being subjected to inter- state sale and consequently, such event was treated to be imposing tax on consignment of goods outside the State. Obviously, such taxing measures would be covered by Entry 92-B of the Union List and could not be covered by entry 54 of the State List. It is precisely for this reason that those two impugned provisions were struck down by the Supreme Court by treating them as beyond the legislative competence of the State legislatures of Punjab and Haryana and Maharashtra respectively. While deciding as above, Sabyasachi Mukharji, j. at page 95 of the report laid down the contours of taxable event while dealing with the Punjab and Haryana provision as under :"taxable event is that which on its occurrence creates or attracts the liability to tax. Such liability does not exist or accrue at any earlier or later point of time. The identification of the subject-matter of a tax is to be found in the charging section. In this connection, one has to analyse the provision of Sec. 9 (2) (b) as well as Sec. 9 (l) (b) and 9 (1 ) (c ). Analysing the section, it appears to us that the two conditions specified before the event of despatch outside the State as mentioned in Sec. 9 (l) (b), namely (i) purchase of goods in the State, and (ii) using them for the manufacture of any other goods in the state, are only descriptive of the goods liable to tax under Sec. 9 (l) (b) in the event of despatch outside the State. If the goods do not answer both the descriptions cumulatively, even though these are despatched outside the State of Haryana, the purchase of those goods would not be put to tax under Sec. 9 (l) (b ). The total point in the expression "goods, the sale or purchase of which is liable to tax under the Act is the character and class of goods in relation to exigibility. In this connection, reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Andhra Sugars Ltd. v. State of Andhra pradesh, (1968) 21 STC 212; 1968 (1) SCR 705 . On a clear analysis of the said section, it appears that Sec. 9 (l) (b) has to be judged as and when liability accrues under that section. The liability to pay tax under this section does not accrue on purchasing the goods simpliciter, but only when these are despatched or consigned out of the State of haryana. In all these cases, it is necessary to find out the true nature of the tax. Analysing the section, if one looks to the purchase tax under Sec. 9, one gets the conclusion that the section itself does not provide for imposition of the purchase tax on the transaction of purchase of the taxable goods but when further the said taxable goods are used up and turned into independent taxable goods, losing their original identity, and thereafter when the manufactured goods are despatched outside the State of Haryana and only then tax is levied and liability to pay tax is created. It is the cumulative effect of that event which occasions or causes the tax to be imposed, to draw a familiar analogy, it is the last straw on the camels back". At page 111, while dealing with Maharashtra legislation, Mukharji, J. viewing the impugned Maharashtra legislation in the context of 46th Amendment to the constitution, laid down as under :"on an analysis we find that the goods which are despatched are different products from the goods on the purchase of which purchase tax was paid. The Maharashtra legislation has to be viewed in the context of Forty-sixth Amendment to the constitution. The Maharashtra legislation has to be viewed in the context of Forty-sixth Amendment to the constitution. The Forty-sixth Amendment introduced Art. 269 (l) (h) which lays down that the proceeds of the tax on consignment of goods (whether the consinment is to the person making it or to any other person) where such consignment takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, will be assigned to the States. The said amendment also introduced Entry No. 92b in List I of the Seventh Schedule. The said amendment was made on the consideration of the 61st Report of the Law Commission. Entry 92b in List I of the Seventh Schedule and Art. 269 (l) (h) of the Constitution bring within its sweep the consignment of goods by a person either to himself or to any other person in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. Art. 269 (3) gives the power to parliament to formulate the principles for determining when a consignment of goods takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce. If Entry 92b of List I is to be given the widest interpretation, as it should be, it would be clear that, as a result of the constitutional changes introduced by the Forth-sixth Amendment in Art. 269 read with the entry, the tax on consignment of goods now comes within the exclusive legislative field of Parliament. The true test to find out what is the pith and substance of the legislation is to ascertain the true intent of the Act which will determine the validity of the Act. If the Parliament in exercise of its plenary power under Entry 92b of list I, imposes any tax on the despatch or consignment of goods, Parliament will be competent to do so. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument that the chargeable event was lying dormant and is activated only on the occurrence of the event of despatch. The argument on the construction of the enactment is misconceived. The charging event is the event the occurence of which immediately attracts the charge. Taxable event cannot be postponed to the occurrence of the subsequent condition. In that event, it would be the subsequent condition the occurrence of which would attract the charge which will be taxable event. If that is so, then it is a duty on despatch. The charging event is the event the occurence of which immediately attracts the charge. Taxable event cannot be postponed to the occurrence of the subsequent condition. In that event, it would be the subsequent condition the occurrence of which would attract the charge which will be taxable event. If that is so, then it is a duty on despatch. In that view of the matter, this charge cannot be sustained. "ranganathan, J. concurring with the view of Mukharji, has made the following pertinent observations at page 114 of the report :"to me it appeared as plausible to describe the levy as a tax on purchase of goods inside the State (which attaches itself only in certain eventualities) as to describe it as a tax on goods consigned outside the State but limited to the value of the raw material purchased inside the State and utilised therein. I, therefore, had considerable doubts not only during the arguments but even sometime thereafter, as to whether so long as the tax purports to be a tax on purchase and has a nexus, though a little distant, with purchase of goods in the State, the State Governments competence to impose such a tax should not be upheld. But in deeper thought, I am inclined to agree with the conclusion of my learned brother. It is one thing to levy a purchase tax where the character and class of goods in respect of which the tax is levied, is described in a particular manner (vide Andhra Sugars Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1968) 21 STC 212 (SC) : 1968 (1) SCR 705 ) and a case like the present where the tax, though described as purchase tax actually becomes effective with reference to that totally different class of goods and, that too, only on the happening of an event which is unrelated to the act of purchase. The "taxable event, if one might use the expression often used in this context, is the consignment of the manufactured goods and not the purchase. I also agree with my learned brother that. the decision in State of Tamil nadu v. Kandaswami, (1975} 36 STC 191, though rendered on the context of an analogous provision does not touch the issue in the present case. I also agree with my learned brother that. the decision in State of Tamil nadu v. Kandaswami, (1975} 36 STC 191, though rendered on the context of an analogous provision does not touch the issue in the present case. " ( 12 ) IN the light of the aforesaid observations of the learned Judges of the supreme Court made in Goodyear case, it becomes at once clear that on the language employed by the impugned provisions before them, especially viewed in the light of the constitutional backdrop, provided by 46th Constitution Amendment, it was obvious that the impugned provisions examined by the Supreme Court squarely fell within the Parliaments exclusive power flowing from Entry 92-B of Union List and were clearly beyond the Entry 54 of the State List. It has to be kept in view that under Entry 54 of the State List, the State legislature has power to impose tax on sale and purchase of goods. The term sale of goods employed by Entry 54 has to be understood in the light of its meaning flowing from the provisions of Sale of Goods Act, 1930. This aspect of the matter is well settled by a series of judgments of the Supreme Court. We may refer to one such decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. C. Tax Officer. Madras v. Y. M. A. Madras, AIR 1970 SC 1212 wherein, Grover, J. speaking for the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court observed in para 11 of the report, while considering the question whether supply of various preparations by each club to its members involved a transaction of sale within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, that the State legislature being competent to legislate only under Entry 54, list II of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution, the expression sale of goods bears the same meaning which it has, in the above Act. It is, therefore, obvious that when the State Legislature seeks to impose tax on sale or purchase of any goods, such taxing provision would remain within the bounds of Entry 54 of the State List provided the concerned goods are purchased or sold within the State and they retain their identity as such goods. It is, therefore, obvious that when the State Legislature seeks to impose tax on sale or purchase of any goods, such taxing provision would remain within the bounds of Entry 54 of the State List provided the concerned goods are purchased or sold within the State and they retain their identity as such goods. In Goodyear case, the impugned provisions of the Punjab and Haryana and Maharashtra Acts were found to be so couched that the taxing event occurred when the manufactured goods were dispatched outside the State. These manufactured goods were not purchased by the dealers in the State. On the contrary, they had purchased raw materials or inputs which had got exhausted and had lost their identity and new products had emerged and these new products at the stage of their dispatch outside the State were sought to be brought within the taxing net. Such taxing net woven by the State legislation obviously cannot have any nexus with the purchase of inputs within the State. There was no nexus left between the two and hence, it was held by the Supreme Court that so called purchase tax on raw materials could not cover the dispatch of finished products manufactured within the State and, therefore, in pith and substance, the impugned legislations were imposing consignment tax. Hence, before the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment in Goodyear can be pressed in service. for voiding the impugned provision of section 15b, it must be found whether the impugned provision in substance seeks to tax purchased raw material and stop short by locating them and imposes tax on them, or whether it seeks to tax finished products manufactured out of them and which are sought to be dispatched out of State limits. If the impugned provision seeks to tax in substance the consignment of finished manufactured taxable goods in manufacturing of which purchased raw materials have gone in as inputs, then only, it can be said on the ratio of Goodyear case, that the impugned provision would fall within Entry 92-B of the Union List and not in Entry 54 of the state List. When we scrutinise the provision of Sec. 15b, we do not find even a whisper about consignment of manufactured goods prepared out of utilisation of purchased raw material and their dispatch outside State. When we scrutinise the provision of Sec. 15b, we do not find even a whisper about consignment of manufactured goods prepared out of utilisation of purchased raw material and their dispatch outside State. It may be that, having taken a clue from the Supreme Court decision, the State legislature might have thought it fit to put its house in order. But if it has retraced its steps from the forbideen field and enacted new provision which does not seek to levy any tax on consignment of finished products outside the State, it would be too much to hold that in substance and in disguised form, the said provision still amounts to tax on consignment on finished products. It has to be visualised that as clearly observed by Ranganathan, j. at page 114 of the report and Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. at page 111 of the report in Goodyear case, only because the impugned provisions before them sought to tax dispatch of manufactured goods outside the concerned State, that they came to the conclusion that such exercise directly collided with the parliaments exclusive power under Entry 92-B of the Union List. Such eventuality cannot occur on the express language of the impugned provision of Sec. 15b. The learned Advocates of the petitioners submitted that it is legislative device to get out of the decision in Goodyear case. We do not agree. If by process of tax planning, if a tax payer can so arrange his affairs as to avoid attraction of charging event, similarly, legislature also can put its house in order and can repeal obnoxious provision which might be beyond the legislative competence and enact a valid provision keeping its provisions within the bounds of the concerned entry in the State List. If such exercise is permissible and can be sustained by a given entry in the State List, it cannot be faulted on the ground that it is a device. It is merely putting ones house in order. Legislature can also validly do so on the same lines as a tax payer can put his house in order by resorting to permissible tax planning. If legitimate tax planning by a tax payer can be countenanced. Legislative planning tax by imposer cannot be a taboo. In this connection, it will be useful to refer to the Constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court in ganga Sugar Corpo. If legitimate tax planning by a tax payer can be countenanced. Legislative planning tax by imposer cannot be a taboo. In this connection, it will be useful to refer to the Constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court in ganga Sugar Corpo. v. State of U. P; AIR 1980 SC 286 . The question before the Supreme Court was whether Sec. 3 of the U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase tax) act, 1961 was beyond the scope of entry 54 of the State List and was governed by entries 52 and 97 of the Union List. Tracing earlier legislative history of the impost it was urged by the petitioners that in 1956 sugarcance cess was imposed by U. P. legislature. It was struck down by the Supreme Court in Diamond Sugar Mills case, AIR 1961 SC 652 holding such levy of cess as ultra vires State legislature. Hence the new purchase tax was a legislative device to impose similar impost as purchase tax, and it could not be countenanced. Repelling this contention, Krishna lyer, J. speaking for the constitution bench in this case made the following pertinent observations in para 18 of the report :"the cess under the 1956 Act was attacked and fell victim to a Constitutional challenge and this Court in Diamond Sugar Mills case (AIR 1961 DV 652) declared the Cess Act ultra vires. The consequence of this mortality was the incarnation of the U. P. Sugarcane Purchase Tax Act, 1961 which is being impeached as ultra vires in these appeals. When cess failed, the State would have been constrained to refund early half a hundred crores of rupees. Validation by Parliamentary legislation in conformity with the Constitution was, therefore, done. Eventually the levy of a purchase tax was enacted into law by the U. P. (Sugarcane Tax) Act, 1961 (referred to as the Act ). In a fiscal sense, the purchase Tax Act is a reincarnation of the Cess act but in a legislative sense, it is an independent statute with a different source of power, impact and structure. While the appellants have a case that this fiscal history substantiates their thesis that the present purchase tax is a disingenuous disguise, the State contends that its power to impose a purchase tax is well within List II entry 54. An appeal to history cannot impeach power. Plainly read, the Act, architecutres a typical tax scheme, leviable. While the appellants have a case that this fiscal history substantiates their thesis that the present purchase tax is a disingenuous disguise, the State contends that its power to impose a purchase tax is well within List II entry 54. An appeal to history cannot impeach power. Plainly read, the Act, architecutres a typical tax scheme, leviable. at the purchase point with one difference. " ( 13 ) REALISING the position that the express language of the section does not bring within its sweep any concept of consignment tax, the learned advocates for the petitioners submitted that this provision has to be read with Rule 42-E of the rules and when read together, the conclusion is inevitable that the impugned taxing measure was in substance imposing tax on consignment and would be still covered by Entry 92-B of the Union list and would go out of Entry 54 of the State List. We have already extracted earlier in Part II of the judgment, the said rule. If is true that the rule was promulgated by the State of Gujarat after the amending Ordinance was issued by the Governor and before the Gujarat Amending Act 6 of 1990 was enacted. But it has to be kept in view that the Act is enacted by the parent legislature, viz. . State legislature while the rule is enacted by the delegate of the legislature, viz; State, in exercise of its power under Sec. 86. Under sec. 86, the State Government is empowered by a notification in the official gazette to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. ( 14 ) PLACING reliance on a series of decisions of the Supreme Court on the point, viz. , Karimtharuvi v. State of Kerala, 48 ITR 83, J. K. Steel Limited v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1173 , Tata E. and L. Co. v. Gram Panchayat, pimpri, AIR 1976 SC 2463 , Collector of C. E. , Bombay v. M/s. Parle Exports, air 1989 SC 644 , Kailash Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 790 and P. S. E. Industries v. State of Gujarat, 49 STC 323 and a decision of this Court in 7. C. G. Tex. v. Gram Panchayat, pimpri, AIR 1976 SC 2463 , Collector of C. E. , Bombay v. M/s. Parle Exports, air 1989 SC 644 , Kailash Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 790 and P. S. E. Industries v. State of Gujarat, 49 STC 323 and a decision of this Court in 7. C. G. Tex. Industry v. S. M. Corporation, 25 (1) GLR 197, it was submitted by the petitioners that in order to cull out the real scope and ambit of the statutory provision, statutory rules framed under the act have also to be kept in view and both are to be harmonised and read together. The learned Advocate General did not dispute this proposition. However, his contention was that given all that, when the question of legislative competence of the parent legislature to enact the provision comes up, merely because the delegate has framed a rule in exercise of its delegated legislative function under the Act and which rule may be part of the Act, the rule cannot be pressed in service to denude legislative competence of the parent legislature to enact statutory provision of it. Even otherwise, it is within its competence. We find considerable substance in the aforesaid contention of the learned Advocate General. It has to be kept in view that Sec. 15b seeks to impose additional purchase tax. Gujarat Legislature has enacted the provision imposing purchase tax as per Sec. 15b of the Act. This is not in dispute. Its legislative competence to impose purchase tax under Sec. 15a is not in dispute. If that is so, it is difficult to visualise how additional purchase tax cannot be imposed under Sec. 15b if it remains otherwise within the compass of Entry 54 of the State List. Merely because rule framed by the delegate State of Gujarat in exercise of its delegated legislative function waters down the impact of the section, it cannot be said that the section is not within the legislative competence of the State legislature which is the paramount legislative body. It was further submitted by the learned advocates for the petitioners that Sec. 6 of the Act makes even the rules framed by the delegated legislative functionary a part of the charging provision, sec. 6 itself being a charging section. It is difficult to agree. It was further submitted by the learned advocates for the petitioners that Sec. 6 of the Act makes even the rules framed by the delegated legislative functionary a part of the charging provision, sec. 6 itself being a charging section. It is difficult to agree. Sec. 6 of the Act provides that subject to the provisions of this Act, and to any rules made thereunder there shall be paid by every dealer, who is liable to pay tax under this Act. Underlined portion makes it clear that liability to pay tax arises under Sec. 6 and other provisions. To that extent it may by a part of charging provisions. Still, so far as rules are concerned, they cannot be themselves create any charge. It is obvious that a delegate of legislature by exercising subordinate legislative power cannot create a new charge. It can only regulate its impact and sweep in given contingencies. Rules found under the Act which are referred to in Sec. 6 can regulate manner of payment of tax and assessment of liability. Therefore, the measure of tax and payment thereof may be regulated by rules but these rules by themselves cannot be treated as repository of the charging events emanating from the relevant statutory charging provisions. So far as this aspect is concerned, Mr, Pathak for the petitioners placed strong reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in 36 STC 191 (supra ). In that case, the supreme Court was concerned with Sec. 7a of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, which read as under :" (I) Every dealer who in the course of his business purchases from a registered dealer or from any other person, any goods (the sale or purchase of which is liable to tax under this Act) in circumstances in which no tax is payable under Sees. 3, 4 or 5, as the case may be and either - (a) consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise, or (b) disposes of such goods in any manner other than by way of sale in the State, or (c) despatches them to a place outside the State except as a direct result of sale or purchase in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, shall pay tax on the turn over relating to the purchase aforesaid at the rate mentioned in Sees. 3, 4 or 5, as the case may be, whatever be the quantum of such turn over in a year: provided that a dealer (other than a casual trader or agent of a non-resident dealer) purchasing goods (the sale of which is liable to tax under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3) shall not be liable to pay tax under this sub-section, if his total turn over for a year is less than twenty-five thousand rupees. . . "in that case, the Supreme Court took the view that Sec. 6 was additional charging section and in this connection, observed that the words under the Act will include a charge created by Sec. 7a also. Taking a clue from the above observations, Mr. Pathak argued that Sec. 6 of the Gujarat Act also employs the words dealer who is required to pay tax under this Act and these words themselves would make Sec. 6 charging section. Even accepting this contention we fail to see how Rule 42e can be said to be a part of the charging provisions envisaged by Sec. 15b. If at all, it whittles down or dilutes the charge envisaged by Sec. 15b, but does not. add to it. Even if Sec. 6 is a part of charging provisions rules referred to by it cannot get such a status. : ( 15 ) IT is not in dispute that Sec. 15b is a charging provision imposing additional purchase tax. Section. 3 is another such charging provision. This provision creates a charge and liability to pay tax. How payment in discharge of this liabilitys to be made will be regulated by the rules made under the Act. If we turn to Rule 42e, we find that it is part of Chapter 7 of the Rules which deals with grant of drawback, set-off and refund. This rule deals with regulation of assessment procedure and how certain drawbacks, set-off, refund are to be given to assessee once they have incurred liability to pay tax under the parent charging provision of the Act. Rule 42e is one such rule which has been inserted after Rule 42d and it also deals with drawback, set-off, etc. to be given to the concerned dealers who have become liable to pay tax under See. 15b provided the conditions laid down by Rule 42e are complied with by concerned assessees. Rule 42e is one such rule which has been inserted after Rule 42d and it also deals with drawback, set-off, etc. to be given to the concerned dealers who have become liable to pay tax under See. 15b provided the conditions laid down by Rule 42e are complied with by concerned assessees. It is well settled that charge or tax is a concept which is different from the concept of assessment of such tax liability and the quantification thereof. Instead of Rule 42e, if statutory provision was made by way of sub-clause to Sec. 15b, then the petitioners would have been justified in urging with some emphasis that it was part of the same legislative scheme and had to be read with the impugned provision. But it is not the case here. In fact, such was the situation which prevailed in connection with the impugned provisions of the W. B. Sales Tax Act which were considered by the Calcutta sales Tax Tribunal in R. N. case No. 10-283 and others on which reliance was placed by Mr. Kaji for some of the petitioners. As the charging provision and the relevant refund provisions were part and parcel of the same statutory record, the Tribunal took the view that both represented well knit integrated legislative scheme. Such is not the case here. The Rule is not framed by the same parent legislature which has enacted the section. Even otherwise, if enactment of the section is within the competence of the parent legislative body only because the delegate legislative functionary had thought it fit to dilute the rigour of the charge imposed by the legislature by enacting Sec. 15b, it cannot be said that the action of the delegate takes the impugned provision beyond the competence of the parent legislature. It would amount to throwing the baby out with bath water. On no principle, such argument can be countenanced nor any canon of construction of statutory provisions and statutory ruled can support such an argument. At this stage, we may refer to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Hindustan Lever v. State of Maharashtra. 79 STC 255. On no principle, such argument can be countenanced nor any canon of construction of statutory provisions and statutory ruled can support such an argument. At this stage, we may refer to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Hindustan Lever v. State of Maharashtra. 79 STC 255. Interpreting the impugned provisions of Sec. 13aa of the Maharashtra Act, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court speaking through S. P. Bharucha, J. repelled the argument which was submitted on the ground that the said section sought to impose consignment tax. It is pertinent to note that unlike the present provision, the Bombay provision was a composite provision which created a charge and laid down how it had to be worked out. Therefore, it was an integral scheme and it had provided that in the event of non-sale of manufactured goods in the State, when the goods were manufactured out of purchased raw materials tax was attracted. In view of the High Court, such provision did not amount to imposing a consignment tax, as event of non-sale would not necessarily mean consignment out of State. At page 267 of the report, the Division Bench noted the argument of the learned Advocate for the petitioners to the effect that "a dealer, they said, manufactured goods so as to sell them. What he did not sell within the State he sent for sale outside the State. The tax under the new Sec. 13aa was, therefore, as much a tax on consignment as was the old Sec. 13aa. The argument, attractive though it is, proceeds upon the assumption that what the dealer does not sell within the State be will send outside the State for sale. We cannot invalidate a taxing provision proceeding upon an assumption". We respectfully concur with the said view of the Bombay High Court. In the present case, evenassuming that Rule 42e is treated to be part and parcel of the taxing scheme envisaged under Sec. 15b, even then, on the combined operation thereof, the position that results is that if the goods manufactured in the State out of the purchased raw material are not sold by the assessee in the State of Gujarat, he would incur liability to pay tax under Sec. 15b, and would not be entitled to refund under Rule 42e. However, merely because goods are not sold in the State of Gujarat, there is no presumption that of necessity, that would be consigned outside the State. There may be many a slip between the cup and the lip. Manufactured goods might get destroyed. Manufactured goods may not be sold but might be gifted or manufactured goods may be so defective as cannot find local market and, therefore also, either may remain unsold or may be required to be destroyed. In all such contingencies, liability under Sec. 15b to pay tax on the value of purchased raw material would subsist and there would be no refund under Rule 42e and still, there may be no consignment of these goods outside the State. Therefore, even on combined reading of Rule 42e and Sec. 15b, it is impossible to hold that of necessity, their conjoint effect is to levy tax on consignment of manufactured goods outside State. Even taking the architects view of this provision and not masons view as Mr. Joshi would like to have it, even then, we do not find remotest trace of consignment tax embeded in the impugned provision. Accordingly, it is not possible to agree with the view of Calcutta Tribunal that such provision would impose any consignment tax. But even otherwise, we find considerable force in the argument of the learned Advocate General for the respondents that even if Rule 42e is repealed by the delegate State of Gujarat exercising delegated legislative function under Sec. 86, even then. Sec. 15b can exist on its own. When the two provisions stem from two different sources and even if these two provisions have to operate in the same field after getting fused subsequent to their birth, existence of one provision and especially paramount provision cannot be voided at its source only because after the subordinate provision gets fused in its operation with the parent provision, lesser liability results and the rigour of the parent provision gets diluted. The learned Advocate General also was right when he contended that if Rule 42e is deleted in future. Sec. 15b would operate with greater rigour and its impact would be felt by larger body of assessees. Because of Rule 42e, sweep of Sec. 15b gets curtailed and many assessees may go out of its taxing net. The learned Advocate General also was right when he contended that if Rule 42e is deleted in future. Sec. 15b would operate with greater rigour and its impact would be felt by larger body of assessees. Because of Rule 42e, sweep of Sec. 15b gets curtailed and many assessees may go out of its taxing net. But that does not mean that charge which is otherwise validly imposed by Sec. 15b, would get stultified or would cease to be effective at the very source. It is also not possible to agree with the contention of Mr. Pathak that while deleting the then existing Sec. 15b, and while enacting the present provision of Sec. 15b, the legislature wanted in substance, to re-enact the old provision by having the same wine in two bottles. It has to be visualised that it is not as if the same legislature has tried to put, earlier existing wine in two bottles instead of one, the process of manufacturing of bottles being the same but on the contrary, a new provision or wine is tried to be bottled in one bottle and ancillary provision even though allegedly containing similar wine, is sought to be bottled in another receptable like a can not manufactured by the same manufacturing process but by entirely different manufacturing process permitted to delegate of subordinate legislative functions. In short, only because Rule 42e tries to soften the rigour of Sec. 15b, it cannot be said that it drags main Sec. 15b out of legislative bounds of the State legislature flowing from Entry 54 of Part ii of 7th Schedule to the Constitution. We, therefore, hold that impugned provision of Sec. 15b does not seek to impose any tax on consignment of manufactured goods outside the Gujarat State even though such manufactured taxable goods are manufactured by utilising raw material purchased in the state. Whether Sec. 15b is read in isolation or is read alongwith Rule 42e, result is the same. In neither eventuality, it can be said to be imposing tax on consignment as discussed above. Therefore, the impugned provision does not offend entry 92b of the Union List nor does it get out of entry 54 of the State List on this Count. Contentions of the petitioners on this aspect are, therefore, rejected. In neither eventuality, it can be said to be imposing tax on consignment as discussed above. Therefore, the impugned provision does not offend entry 92b of the Union List nor does it get out of entry 54 of the State List on this Count. Contentions of the petitioners on this aspect are, therefore, rejected. ( 16 ) POINT V (1) (b) : Whether the impugned provision seeks to levy tax in the nature of excise. Learned Counsel for the petitioners in the alternative submitted that even assuming that the impugned provision does not impose consignment tax, in any case, it imposes tax in the nature of excise duty on the goods manufactured out of use of raw material purchased in the State. So far as this contention is concerned, we must keep in view Entry 84 of the Union List which empowers the Parliament to impose excise duty on manufacture of goods. The question is whether the impugned provision impinges on this entry. The analysis of the impugned provision of Sec. 15b indicates that the tax under the said provision is leviable if the following events take place : (1) Where a dealer failed to pay tax under this Act purchases either directly or through commission agent any taxable goods; and (2) Uses them as raw material or processing material or consumable stores in the manufacture of taxable goods. For attracting charge under the section no other event is contemplated. Adopting the judicial dictionary employed by the Supreme Court ingood-year case, taxing event is that which attracts tax and that charging event is the event the occurrence of which immediately attracts the charge and that charging event cannot be postponed to the occurrence of the subsequent condition. In that event, it would be the subsequent condition the occurrence of which would, attract the charge which will be taxable event. It has to be held that moment goods are purchased and used by the purchasing dealer as raw or processing material or consumable stores in the manufacture of taxable goods, levy gets immediately attracted under the section. As will be seen while discussing the question of user tax, taxing event is the purchase of raw materials, etc. , in the State and which are ultimately used in manufacture of taxable goods. That charging event centering round purchase of raw materials, etc. As will be seen while discussing the question of user tax, taxing event is the purchase of raw materials, etc. , in the State and which are ultimately used in manufacture of taxable goods. That charging event centering round purchase of raw materials, etc. , remains dormant till the goods are actually put to use in manufacture of taxable goods. It gets activised then. These events have nothing to do with the ultimate manufacture of taxable goods. It is easy to visualise that ultimately taxable goods may not be manufactured even if raw or processing material or consumable stores might have been utilised in the manufacturing process. For example, even after utilisation of such raw material in the manufacturing process, the finished goods may turn out to be defective goods which cannot be sold. Therefore, manufacture of the taxable goods may have been complete and whole lot may have to be destroyed even after utilisation of such material in the manufacturing process or before process gets completed, it may be intercepted and the final product may not emerge. Still, liability to pay tax under the section would emerge as user of raw material or processing material or consumable stores in the manufacturing process has taken place. Therefore, it is impossible to find nexus of the charge with the ultimate manufacture of taxable goods. It is now well settled that excise duty is a duty or levy on the manufacture of goods. Impost is on the manufacture of goods and the new goods which are manufactured have to bear the charge of tax. In the purchase tax levied on raw materials which are inputs, there is no contemplation of the ultimate out put. It is tax on purchased inputs which have been brought as inputs in the manufacturing process and there charge settles and gets exhausted. Consequently, by no stretch of imagination, such a charge can be said to be imposing excise duty on ultimate manufactured goods. The impugned section imposes tax on the dealer as purchaser and not as manufacturer of ultimate manufactured goods. We may in this connection profitably look at a few decisions of the Supreme Court and the Federal Court. Consequently, by no stretch of imagination, such a charge can be said to be imposing excise duty on ultimate manufactured goods. The impugned section imposes tax on the dealer as purchaser and not as manufacturer of ultimate manufactured goods. We may in this connection profitably look at a few decisions of the Supreme Court and the Federal Court. In the case of Ganga Sugar Corporation v. State of U. P. , AIR 1980 SC 286 the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether levy under U. P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961 was covered by Entry 54 of the State List or whether it was imposing excise duty which was beyond the legislative competence of the U. P. State legislature. Answering the question in favour of the State legislature, it was held that levy could squarely fall within Entry 54 of the State List and would impose no excise duty as the tax was imposed on purchase of sugarcane which was raw material and which was utilised in the manufacture of sugar. In para 53 of the report, Krishna lyer, J. speaking for the Supreme Court made the following pertinent observations :"nothing in these provisions regulates or controls the industry itself nor exacts any levy on the manufacture of sugar or its wider ramifications. Nothing more than prevention of escapement of purchase tax on cane case is done and what is done is legitimately indicental to the taxing power. Peripheral similarity between purchase tax and excise levy, does not spell essential sameness. Sugarcane tax operates in the neighbourhood of sugar excise but proximity is not identity. The tax is only on purchase of cane, not its convesion into sugar If the miller has his own cane farm and crushes it, he has no purchase tax to pay but cannot escape excise duty if any. " ( 17 ) WE may also refer to another decision in Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. Bihar State, AIR 1958 SC 452 . In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the vires of Sec. 4 (1) read with Sec. 2 (g) second proviso of Bihar Sales tax Act, which was a pre-Constitution Act governed by the provisions of the government of India Act, 1935. v. Bihar State, AIR 1958 SC 452 . In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the vires of Sec. 4 (1) read with Sec. 2 (g) second proviso of Bihar Sales tax Act, which was a pre-Constitution Act governed by the provisions of the government of India Act, 1935. Entry 45 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 gave exclusive power to the Central legislature to enact law pertaining to excise duty with respect to which the provincial Legislature could not, under Sec. 100 of the Act, make any law. Repelling the contention that the provision was in the nature of excise duty, the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court held that under the impugned provision, the producer or manufacturer became liable to pay the tax not because he produced or manufactured the goods but because he sold the goods. In other words, the lax was laid on the producer or manufacturer only qua seller and rot qua manufacturer or producer. A duty of excise is primarily a duty levied on a manufacturer or producer in respect of the commodity manufactured or produced. It is a tax on goods and not on sales or the proceeds of sale of goods. If the goods produced or manufactured in Bihar were destroyed by fire before sale the manufacturer or producer would not have been liable to pay any tax undet Sec. 4 (1) read with Sec. 2 (g) second proviso. In this connection, reliance was placed on the decisions reported in AIR 1945 FC 98 and AIR 1942 FC 33. We may also refer to a later decision of the Supreme court in Reliance Flour Mills Co. Ltd. v. CCF, 1989 (4) SCC 592 . In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the question as to when taxing event in case of excise duty arises. The Supreme Court examined this question and made the following pertinent observations :"even though the taxable event is the manufacture or production of an excisable article, the duty can be levied and collected at a later stage for admistrative convenience. The Supreme Court examined this question and made the following pertinent observations :"even though the taxable event is the manufacture or production of an excisable article, the duty can be levied and collected at a later stage for admistrative convenience. The scheme of the said Act read with the relevant rules framed under the Act particularly Rule 9a of the said Rules, reveals that the taxable event is the fact of manufacture or production of an excisable article, the payment of duty is related to the date of removal of such article from the factory. " ( 18 ) IN view of the aforesaid settled legal position, therefore, before any duty can be styled as one imposing excise, it has to be shown that taxing event is manufacture of excisable commodity by a person who is taxed qua such manufacture and not otherwise. As we have seen earlier, on the express language of the section, taxing event does not get extended upto the stage of manufacturing of final product out of purchased raw material and that charge of tax gets settled moment raw material is purchased and utilised in the manufacturing process of taxable goods. A dealer is being taxed as purchaser of raw materials. He is not being taxed as manufacturer of finished product. It is also pertinent to note that charge of tax attaches to purchased raw materials and does not attach to the final product produced out of them. Hence, it can never be styled as excise duty on ultimate manufactured goods. They are entirely of different class. They have nothing to do with purchase of raw materials or inputs. All inputs which get exhausted in the manufacturing process have nothing to do with nor have they nexus with the ultimate output. Excise duty is on output and not on inputs. Such type of tax is not contemplated by Sec. 15b. The submission of the learned Advocates for the petitioners that this section in substance imposes tax in the nature of excise because manufacture contemplated by the section is of taxable goods and, therefore, till taxable goods emerge, taxing event would not be complete, cannot be countenanced for obvious reasons. Taxable goods are defined by Sec. 2 (33) as goods other than those on the sale or purchase of which no tax is payable under Sec. 5 or Sec. 49 or a notification issued thereunder. Taxable goods are defined by Sec. 2 (33) as goods other than those on the sale or purchase of which no tax is payable under Sec. 5 or Sec. 49 or a notification issued thereunder. The learned Advocate General was right when he contended that which types of goods are covered by Sec. 4 or Sec. 49 are clearly indicated by the legislature. A manufacturer/dealer who proceeds to manufacture taxable goods knows very well at the stage the manufacturing process starts as to which goods are sought to be manufactured by utilising raw materials. Ultimately, whether the concerned goods which he produces bear full burden of tax or get partial or full exemption from payment of tax on the happening of certain contingencies will have nothing to do with the question whether raw materials etc. were utilised for manufacturing such goods. Measure of tax or ultimate liability to pay tax either wholly or partially on manufactured goods cannot have any impact on the question whether purchased raw materials were used or utilised in the manufacturing process for producing such manufactured goods. Reliance placed in this connection by the learned Advocate general on the decision of the Supreme Court in 36 STC 191 (supra) is justified. Referring to a similar question which arose in connection with Sec. 7a of the Tamilnadu Act, the Supreme Court in that case held that taxable goods would mean the goods, the sale or purchase of which is generally taxable under the Act. Notwithstanding the goods being taxable goods, there may be circumstances in a given case by reason of which the particular sale or purchase does not attract tax under Sees. 3, 4 or 5. Sub-sees. (4) and (5) of Sec. 7a with which the Supreme Court was concerned read as under:" (4) The goods purchased are "goods, the sale or purchase of which is liable to tax under this Act. (5) Such purchase is in circumstances in which no tax is payable under Sees. 3, 4 or 5, as the case may be. "analysing these ingredients in Sec. 7a, the aforesaid observations were made by the Supreme Court. It is true that in the present case, there is a clear definition of taxable goods; while in Tamilnadu Act, on the ingredients of sub-sees. (4) and (5), the Supreme Court held that these sub-sections contained definition of taxable goods. However, the result remains the same. It is true that in the present case, there is a clear definition of taxable goods; while in Tamilnadu Act, on the ingredients of sub-sees. (4) and (5), the Supreme Court held that these sub-sections contained definition of taxable goods. However, the result remains the same. Ingredients of sub-sees, (4.) and (5) of Tamil Nadu Act are parallel to the provisions found in the definition of taxable goods in Sec. 2 (33) of the Gujarat Act. Therefore, in must be held on parity of reasoning, that the phrase uses them as raw material or processing materials or consumable stores in the manufacture of taxable goods as employed by Sec. 15b would mean user of such raw material in the manufacturing process for manufacturing generally taxable goods under the act and ultimately, in given circumstances, such manufactured goods may not attract tax under the charging provision and still they would remain taxable goods. It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the contention of the petitioners that charging event under Sec. 15b would be manufacture of taxable goods. As already discussed earlier, charging event would stop short at the stage of utilisation of the raw material in the manufacturing process of taxable goods. Ultimately such taxable goods may emerge or not. That would be totally irrelevant, but the charge would operate under the section of its own moment goods are purchased and utilised as raw materials etc. in the manufacturing process of generally taxable goods. Our attention was also invited by the learned Advocates for the petitioners to a decision of this Court in nowroji N. Vakil and Co. v. State of Gujarat, 43 STC 238. In that case, the Division Bench of this Court was concerned with the question where the assessee who had purchased certain raw materials under a certificate was liable to pay purchase tax under Sec. 16, when it was found that the raw material purchased by him was not ultimately utilised for manufacturing of taxable goods. It is obvious that if raw material is utilised for manufacture of taxable goods, the goods would bear sales tax at the stage of sale. But if the manufactured goods are exempt from sales tax, then, the condition of the certificate would get breached and the liability to pay purchase tax on the raw material would subsist. It is obvious that if raw material is utilised for manufacture of taxable goods, the goods would bear sales tax at the stage of sale. But if the manufactured goods are exempt from sales tax, then, the condition of the certificate would get breached and the liability to pay purchase tax on the raw material would subsist. On the facts of the case, it was found that the assessee company which was manufacturing stone-ware pipes, firebricks and lime, required as raw material for its business, fireclay, which were taxable goods under the residuary Entry 13 of Schedule III of the Act. The assessee purchased fireclay against declaration in Form 19 without payment of tax. Out of the goods manufactured by using the goods so purchased, a certain quantity of goods was sold against a certificate in Form C, without recovery of any tax, to an electricity company, which was a certified electrical undertaking within the meaning of Entry 5 of the Schedule to the Government notification dated 29/04/1970. The sales tax officer took the view that the assessee, contrary to the certificate given by it in Form 19 at the time of purchase, had used the fireclay as raw material in the manufacture of goods, the sales of which could not be taxed and that, therefore, purchased tax was leviable under Sec. 16 of the Act in respect of such purchase of fireclay. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Sales tax and the Tribunal agreed with the view of the Sales tax officer. The High Court also agreed with the view of the Tribunal. It was held that in view of the language used in the certificate as well as in Sec. 16 (1) and in the context and collocation, the intention at the time of purchase or the taxable nature of the goods when manufactured arc wholly irrelevant factors. If taxable goods were purchased against the certificate in Form 19 without payment of tax and if such goods were used contrary to the certificate in the manufacture of goods for sale, which were not exigible to tax at the point of sale, then sec. 16 would come into picture and purchase tax would become leviable upon the turn over of purchases of purchasing dealer. 16 would come into picture and purchase tax would become leviable upon the turn over of purchases of purchasing dealer. The aforesaid view of this Court is confirmed by the Supreme Court in the later decision reported in 47 STC 377 (Hindustan Brown Boveri Ltd. v. State of Gujarat ). In our view, these decisions cannot be of any avail to the petitioners. If the condition of a certificate issued under Sec. 16 is breached, then on the express language of Sec. 16, liability to pay purchase tax would arise as the section in terms lays down that where any dealer or commission agent has purchased any taxable goods under a certificate given by him under Sees. 12 or 13, contrary to such certificate, the goods are used for another purpose or are not resold or despatched in the manner and within the period certified, then such dealer or commission agent shall be liable to pay tax on the purchase price of the goods purchased under such certificate. It is difficult to appreciate how these decisions can be of any avail to the petitioners. In the present case, once raw materials are purchased and utilised in the manufacturing process for manufacturing taxable goods which are generally taxable, under the Act, charge under section gets attracted. Ultimately, if the manufactured goods are found not to bear tax, then the question of refund at the stage of assessment may arise. But that by itself would not whittle down the charge or postpone it in any manner as suggested. It is also not possible to agree with the contention of the learned Advocates of the petitioners that under the present section, the charge would extend even beyond the manufacture of taxable goods till manufactured taxable goods actually bear the tax. Actual liability to pay tax is quite distinct from general taxability of the goods manufactured, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Kandaswamy case (supra ). In fact, once purchased raw material is utilised in the manufacturing process, charging event gets completed under the section and aspect whether ultimately the manufactured goods emerge or not, would pale into insignificance as seen earlier. It is not a taxing event under the section. Once taxing event takes place, subsequent event pales into insignificance. In fact, once purchased raw material is utilised in the manufacturing process, charging event gets completed under the section and aspect whether ultimately the manufactured goods emerge or not, would pale into insignificance as seen earlier. It is not a taxing event under the section. Once taxing event takes place, subsequent event pales into insignificance. Thus, it is not possible to agree with the contention of the learned Advocates of the petitioners that the impugned provision seeks to impose excise duty or tax in the nature of excise. Decision of the Bombay High Court in 79 STC 255 (Hindustan Lever v. State of maharashtra) strongly pressed in service by the learned Advocates of petitioners with respect cannot be agreed to. It is difficult to agree with the reasoning of the Bombay High Court in the aforesaid decision to the effect that under sec. 13aa, levy takes effect. on the occasion of manufacture and, therefore, levy is in the nature of excise. Such a line of reasoning is not countenanced by the section. Neither in Sec. 13aa of the Maharashtra Act nor in Sec. 15b of the present case, levy is imposed on the manufacture of taxable goods. As laid down by the Supreme Court in Goodyear case, taxable event is one on the occurrence of which charge gets immediately attracted. In our view, charge gets attracted when the raw materials are purchased and used in the process of manufacture of taxable goods and it has nothing to do with ultimate emergence of taxable goods. They may emerge or may not emerge, the, they may remain taxable goods or may not remain taxable goods. Charge under the section is not concerned with these eventualities. Under these circumstances, with respect, it is not possible to agree with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Hindustan Lever case (supra ). In our view, Sec. 15b does not cover the field envisaged by Entry 84 of the union List, and cannot be termed as imposing any duty in the nature of excise. In this connection, Mr. Kaji submitted that the impugned provision can be read as under : A dealer purchases raw material, processing material or consumable stores etc. and manufactures taxable goods out of them and accordingly, it would amount to imposing tax in the nature of excise. In this connection, Mr. Kaji submitted that the impugned provision can be read as under : A dealer purchases raw material, processing material or consumable stores etc. and manufactures taxable goods out of them and accordingly, it would amount to imposing tax in the nature of excise. It is not possible to agree with this contention, for the simple reason that the section which is couched in different terms cannot be re-read on the basis of supposed redrafting so as to make it one imposing excise duty, if the legislature has not thought it fit to utilise such terminology. On the other hand, the learnad advocate General was right when he contended that as per the phraseology employed by the section, tax becomes payable when the manufacturer/dealer purchases raw material, processing material or consumable stores and uses them in manufacturing of taxable goods. The section nowhere contemplates the phraseology like and uses them for manufacture of taxable goods. Consequently, moment goods are purchased as inputs and user of the purchased raw material etc. is made in the manufacturing process and they enter as inputs in the manufacture of generally taxable goods, charge under the Act gets completely settled and attracted. Such charge has nothing to do with ultimate stage of manufacture of taxable goods nor does it cover it in its sweep. ( 19 ) ACCORDINGLY, the contention of the learned Advocates of the petitioners to that effect stands rejected. ( 20 ) POINT V (l) (c) : That leaves out for consideration the last prong of challenge to the legislative competence for enacting Sec. 15b. It was vehemently contended by the learned Advocates for the petitioners that on a proper construction of the section, in any case, taxable event which can be culled out therefrom is the event when purchased raw materials etc. are used in the manufacturing process and, therefore, in substance, tax imposed is user tax or tax on consumption of these purchased raw materials etc. and that has nothing to do with the earlier purchase of these raw materials. It is not possible to agree with the aforesaid contention for obvious reasons. To be an user tax or tax on consumption, the legislation must directly aim at taxing user or consumption. In short, in pith and substance, the legislature must cover such topic or try to directly shoot at consumption or use of raw materials. It is not possible to agree with the aforesaid contention for obvious reasons. To be an user tax or tax on consumption, the legislation must directly aim at taxing user or consumption. In short, in pith and substance, the legislature must cover such topic or try to directly shoot at consumption or use of raw materials. If that happens, tax would fall under the residuary Entry 97 of the Union list and would go out of Entry 54 of the State List. When we look at Sec. 15b, we do not find anything to indicate that the legislature was aiming to directly hit transaction covering use or consumption of raw material. In short, that was not the focal point of levy or in other words, that was not the pith and substance of the levy. The pith and substance of the levy is purchase of raw material etc. in the State. . ( 21 ) IN this connection, the emphasis put by the learned Advocates for the petitioners on. the phraseology in the section to the effect "where a dealer purchases any "taxable goods and uses them as raw or processing materials or consumable stores in the manufacture of taxable goods then. . . " for submitting that taxable event occurs when purchased taxable goods are used as raw or processing material or consumable stores in the manufacturing process especially in the light of the word then used in the section, also cannot be of any avail. In this connection, the learned Advocate General rightly invited our attention to the fact that the word then. is an adverb and it connotes two eventualities- (i) reference to the time and (ii) references to the contingency, meaning thereby, it either means at that time or in that case. In the context to the. section, it is obvious that the word then does not refer to time when use is made in manufacturing process of such purchased raw materials etc. But it only means in the case, such purchased raw materials etc. are used in the manufacturing process. Taxable event under the section becomes complete when taxable goods, viz. , raw materials, consumable stores etc. are purchased in the State with the obvious intention of utilising them in the manufacturing process as inputs and moment such intention gets fructified by such actual user. are used in the manufacturing process. Taxable event under the section becomes complete when taxable goods, viz. , raw materials, consumable stores etc. are purchased in the State with the obvious intention of utilising them in the manufacturing process as inputs and moment such intention gets fructified by such actual user. It is apparent that taxable, event which becomes complete on purchase of such materials etc. in the State by the dealer, may remain dormant till such purchased material is actually used in the manufacturing process. Moment such use is made of the purchased raw material, charging event would get activised. It has to be kept in view that under Entry 54 of the State List, the State legislature is entitled to tax sales and purchases of goods. It is also. well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court right from Tata iron and Steel v. Bihar State, AIR 1958 SC 452 that the term sale of goods as employed under Entry 54 of the State List has the same meaning as assigned to it under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 as we have already noted earlier. Consequently, before a legislation can in pith and substance, be said to be dealing with sale or purchase of goods, it must be shown that it focusses its attention on such transactions of purchase or sale of goods. These goods remain the focal point and at: the centre of the charging event. If goods are so traced and dealt with by the section, their purchase or sale would be taxing event and the conditions in connection with payability of the tax on such transaction of sale or -purchase of these-goods would only imply description of the goods and condition subsequent to completion of taxable event. It must, therefore, be held, that Sec.-15b in pith and substance imposes purchase tax on purchase of concerned goods which are ultimately used in manufacturing process as inputs, arid the-later phraseology "uses them in mannureture" as employed in the section only deals with description of the -charged goods and represents subsequent event. In this connection, it is apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Goody ear case (supra) especially" observations at pages 95, 111 and 114 thereof which are already extracted in extenso in the earlier part of this judgment. In this connection, it is apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Goody ear case (supra) especially" observations at pages 95, 111 and 114 thereof which are already extracted in extenso in the earlier part of this judgment. A conjoint reading of these" observations makes it clear that the Supreme Court in that case was concerned with an eventuality wherein tax was imposed on dispatch of entirely different type of goods out of State, and it was held that it was tax in the nature of consigment tax covered by Entry 92b of the Union List and, therefore, tax on such goods would not remain within Entry 54 of the State List and that in view of such a taxture of the provisions, the argument of the learned Advocate for the State authorities that taxing event was to be taken effect at the time of purchase of inputs-raw materials which remained dormant and would get activised when the inputs embeded in the ultimately manufactured goods got despatched out of State was repelled as such argument could not be countenanced in the face of the express language of the provisions dealt with by the supreme Court and which clearly referred to and tried to tax enrirely different manufactured commodity which had nothing to do with original purchase of inputs. Such is not the position in the present case. As seen earlier, the section does not refer to the dispatch of ultimately manufactured goods out of State. It is, therefore, not levying any cosignment tax nor it is concerned with any levy on ultimately manufactured goods out of inputs. Consequently, it remains in the domain of purchased tax imposed on inputs which are purchased in the State and which are ultimately used in the manufacturing process. It is obvious that there would remain no occasion to collect any sales tax on such inputs as they are never put to sale in the State and they got used up in the manufacturing process. Hence qua such purchaser of raw materials who uses them in the manufacturing process as inputs, purchase tax can legitimately be imposed and it remains a genuine purchase tax. Hence qua such purchaser of raw materials who uses them in the manufacturing process as inputs, purchase tax can legitimately be imposed and it remains a genuine purchase tax. In the light of the express language of the section, therefore, the argument of the learned Advocates for the petitioners that the phrase uses them in the manufacturing of taxable goods denotes taxable event and not earlier part of the section dealing with purchase of such raw materials cannot be countenanced. We may note at this stage that the constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court in Andhra Sugar Limited v. State of Andha Pradesh, 21 STC 212 clearly answers the question against the petitioners and puts the controversy beyond the pale of any doubt. In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether tax imposed by the Andhra Pradesh legislation levying purchase tax on sugarcane required for use in manufacturing of Khandsari sugar can be legitimately imposed by the State legislature under Entry 54 of the State List, The constitution bench decision in terms held such tax to be within the legislative competence of the State legislature, as covered by Entry 54 of the State list and the taxing event was construed to be event of purchase of such raw material as required for use in the manufacturing process. The learned advocates for the petitioners submit that the phraseology in the aforesaid provision was different as compared to the present phraseology of Sec. 15b, as there, the words used were "required for use in manufacture", while here, the words used are "purchase of raw materials and use in the manufacturing process". In our view, this is a distinction without any difference. When raw materials are purchased as they are required for use, it is obvious that they have to be used for that purpose subsequently and when raw materials are purchased and are subsequently used as such in manufacturing process, it would become obvious that they were purchased only because they were required to be so used and were in fact used. Applying the ratio. of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it must, therefore, be held that in the present case also, taxable event is complete when taxable goods which are purchased as raw materials etc. and their subsequent use as such only fortifies such requirement underlying initial purchase. Applying the ratio. of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it must, therefore, be held that in the present case also, taxable event is complete when taxable goods which are purchased as raw materials etc. and their subsequent use as such only fortifies such requirement underlying initial purchase. It is also interesting to note that there are two decisions of the Supreme Court, wherein on construction of pari-materia provisions, it was held that tax sought to be imposed was purchase tax. One such decision is rendered in connection with madhya Pradesh legislation in the case of Ganesh Prasad v. Commr. of Sales tax, 24 STC 343. In t that case. Sec. 7 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales tax Act, fell for consideration of the Supreme Court. It provided that "every dealer who in the course of his business purchases any taxable goods, in circumstances in which no tax under Sec. 6 is payable on the sale price of such goods and either consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise or disposes of such goods etc. shall be liable to pay tax. The aforesaid phraseology ran almost parallel to the phraseology of Sec. 15b of the present Act. Such a tax was considered to be genuine purchase tax on construction of the provisions. It is true that in that case, the Supreme court was not concerned with the legislative competence of the Madhya Pradesh legislature. Still, from the point of view of taxable event, the decision clearly contra-indicates the contentions of the petitioners on such a pari-materia provision. Second decision of the Supreme Court is rendered in the case of state of Tamil Nadu v. Kanda-swami, 36 STC 191 (supra ). Section 7a of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 which was considered in the said decision provided as under :"every dealer who in the course of his business purchases from a registered dealer or from any other person, any goods (the sale or purchase of which is liable to tax under this Act) in circumstances in which no tax is payable under Sec. 3, 4 or 5, as the case may be, and either (a) consumes such goods in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise, etc. shall pay tax. shall pay tax. "it becomes at once clear that the relevant provisions of the aforesaid section of the Madras Act are also pari-materia with Sec. 15b of the present case, and on consideration of the above scheme, the Supreme Court took the view that it was imposing purchase tax and the section could operate of its own. It is also true that even in that case, the Supreme Court was not directly concerned with the legislative competence of the Tamil Nadu legislature in enacting this provision. However, on the question of pith and substance of this pari-materia provision, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court gets squarely attracted and indicates that such tax imposed by the State legislature as purchase tax would be genuine purchase tax. But even apart from this, there are two direct decisions of the Kerala High Court rendered in the context of the very same question of legislative competence of the State legislature under Entry 54 of the State list and dealing with the pari-materia provision like Sec. 15b. tn Malbar fruit Products v. S. T. O. , 30 STC 537, a learned single Judge at the Kerala high Court (P. S. Poti, J. as he then was) dealt with such identical question in connection with Sec. 5-A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1970. It provided as under :"every dealer who in the course of his business purchases from a registered dealer or from any other person any goods, the sale or purchased of which is liable to tax under the Act, in circumstances in which no tax is payable under Sec. 5, and either (a) consumes such good in the manufacture of other goods for sale or otherwise, xxx shall pay tax. "the argument that such tax imposed user tax and, therefore, was outside the legislative competence of the State legislature was reselled by P. S. Poti, j. Placing reliance on the Constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court in 21 STC 212 (supra ). In para 5 of the report, the learned Judge interpreting the aforesaid pari-materia provision, observed as under :"in the scheme of the section, it goes without saying that the purchase by the dealer who is taxed under the section becomes taxable in his hands only if the goods are consumed or disposed of in any manner other than as a result of inter- State purchases. These are all subsequent events and, therefore, the time at which tax is imposed is postponed to the happening of subsequent events, but by the very fact of purchase the dealer becomes liable to pay tax on the purchase. It depends upon subsequent contingencies and tax becomes payable when the event mentioned in the section happens "the contention that it was user tax was repelled by placing reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in Andhra Pradesh Sugar case (supra) to the effect that taxing event is purchase of goods and not use or enjoyment of what is purchased. This decision was upheld by the Division Bench of the kerala High Court in Yusuf Shabeer v. State of Kerala, 32 STC 359. It would be appropriate to note that the aforesaid two decisions of the Kerala High Court were rendered at the time Entry 92b of the Union List was not inserted as per 46th Constitution amendment and on the language of that section the Court was concerned with the short question as to what was the taxable event and the taxable event was found to be one of purchase of raw materials. The submission of the learned Advocates for the petitioners that the view of the kerala High Court would not stand in the light of the Supreme Court decision in Goodyear case and the judicial dictionary, about taxing event as laid down therein also cannot be accepted as we have already discussed earlier that goodyear case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the situation where the taxable event concerned an entirely different set of commodities which had emerged after manufacturing process which had exhausted the inputs and the despatch of such manufactured goods outside the State was the taxable event. As such is not the provision in Sec. 15b in the present case, or in pari-materia provision of the Kerala Act, the decision of the Kerala High Court on parimateria provision would get squarely attracted to the facts of the present case. Following the said decision, therefore, the conclusion becomes inescapable that sec. 15b does not impose user tax but it imposes genuine purchase tax. Following the said decision, therefore, the conclusion becomes inescapable that sec. 15b does not impose user tax but it imposes genuine purchase tax. It is also pertinent to note that the aforesaid two decisions of the Kerala high Court insofar as they construed the relevant provisions of the Kerala act, were referred to with approval by the Supreme Court in 36 STC 191 (supra) wherein also, the pari-materia provision of Tamil Nadu Act was construed by the Supreme Court. In view of this settled legal position and in the light of the express language of Sec. 15b, therefore, it has to be held that the section imposes purchase tax and not user tax as contended by the learned Advocates of the petitioners. We may now briefly refer to certain decisions on which reliance was placed by the learned Advocates for the petitioners in support of their contentions that section imposes use tax. In J. C. Mills v. State of Madhya pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 443, the Supreme Court was concerned with the question about tax on consumption of electricity. Such tax would squarely fall under entry 53 of the State List and it was upheld as such. The said decision is of no assistance to the petitioners. Similarly, a decision in Mis. Devi Das v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1895 instead of supporting the petitioners goes against them, as in that case, the Supreme Court in terms held that tax on purchase of raw materials for use as inputs in the manufacturing process would be covered by Entry 54 of the State List and would not be excise. Our attention was also invited to the decision in Commr. of Sales Tax v. N. L. Mehta, 61 STC 362. In that case, the Bombay High Court was not concerned with the legislative competence of the State legislature in enacting Sec. 13 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The only short question before the High court was as to whether a dealer who was a builder and who purchased send which was taxable commodity and who utilised the same in the manufacturing process by mixing it with cement and produced concrete mixture can be said to have manufactured any commercial commodity out of sand. The only short question before the High court was as to whether a dealer who was a builder and who purchased send which was taxable commodity and who utilised the same in the manufacturing process by mixing it with cement and produced concrete mixture can be said to have manufactured any commercial commodity out of sand. If he had produced commercial commodity, he could be said to be covered by net of Sec. 13 imposing purchase tax but if the answer was in the negative, charge under section would not get attracted qua such dealer. The High Court found that even though sand which was a taxable commodity was purchased by the builder and he had mixed it with cement to produce concrete mixture, as concrete mixture was not a commercial commodity, it cannot be said that the dealer had manufactured any commercial commodity" which would make him liable to pay purchase tax under Sec. 13. It is difficult to appreciate how this judgment can be of any assistance for deciding the present question whether tax imposed by Sec. 15b is user tax or purchase tax. As a result of the above discussion, it must be held that in pith and substance, Sec. 15b of the Gujarat Act levies purchase tax and does not impose any user tax which would take purchase tax out of Entry 54 of the State List and would telescope it in the residuary Entry 97 of the Union List. ( 22 ) BUT even assuming that it may be stated that to some extent, there is some over-stepping and while imposing purchase tax on raw materials as inputs, user of these inputs in the manufacturing process is also brought in focus or tax net by the State legislature and to that extent, there may be trenching or trespass on the field covered by residuary Entry 97 of the Union List, even then, it would be merely a marginal insignificant, peripheral and permissible trenching and it would not invalidate the basic exercise of the State legislature imposing purchase tax as per Sec. 15b. The learned Advocate General placed reliance on a series of judgments of the Supreme Court on this point. We may briefly refer to them. In Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Assn. The learned Advocate General placed reliance on a series of judgments of the Supreme Court on this point. We may briefly refer to them. In Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Assn. v. Union of india, 74 STC 102, the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether the Parliament was competent to impose expenditure tax under Entry 97 of the union List when incidentally the said provision trenched upon the field covered by Entry 62 of the List II which was in the exclusive domain of the State legislature, being tax on luxury. Upholding the legislative competence of the Parliament in enacting Expenditure Tax Act, the Constitution bench on the Supreme Court speaking through Venkatachalliyah, J. laid down the following propositions :" (I) Wherever legislative powers are distributed between the Union and the States, situation may arise where the two legislative fields might apparently overlap. It is the duty of the Courts, however difficult it may be, to ascertain to what degree and to what extent, the authority to deal with matters falling within these classes of subjects exists in each legislature and to define, in the particular case before them, the limits of the respective powers. It could not have been the intention that a conflict should exist, and in order to prevent such a result the two provisions must be read together, and the language of one interpreted, and where necessary modified, by that of the other. (ii) The law "with respect to" a subject might incidentally "affect" another subject in some way; but that is not the same thing as the law being on the latter subject. There might be overlapping; but the overlapping must be in law. The same transaction may involve two or more taxable events in its different aspects. But the fact that there is an overlapping does not detract from the distinctiveness of the aspects. (iii) It is trite that the true nature and character of the legislation must be determined with reference to the power of the legislature. The consequences and effects of the legislation are not the same thing as the legistivc subject-matter. It is the true nature and character of the legislation and not its ultimate economic result that matters. (iii) It is trite that the true nature and character of the legislation must be determined with reference to the power of the legislature. The consequences and effects of the legislation are not the same thing as the legistivc subject-matter. It is the true nature and character of the legislation and not its ultimate economic result that matters. "in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha, AIR 1978 SC 2015, another Constitution bench of the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whether Karnataka contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act was invalid inasmuch as it trespassed on Item no. 42 of List I which gave exclusive power to the Parliament to enact in connection with inter-State trade and commerce. ( 23 ) ANSWERING this question against the petitioners and in favour of the State of Karnataka, the Constitution bench laid down as under :"the pith and substance of the Act has to be looked into and an incidental trespass would not invalidate the law. Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act is not an Act which deals with any inter-State trade and commerce. Even assuming that carriage of passengers from one State to the other is in no sense a part of the inter- state trade and commerce, the impugned Act is not one which seeks to legislate in regard to the said topic. Primarily and almost wholly it is an Act to provide for the acquisition of contract carriages, the Inter-State permits and the other properties situated in the State of Karnataka In pith and substance it is an Act of that kind. The incidental encroachment on the topic of inter-State trade and commerce, even assuming there is some, cannot invalidate the Act. " ( 24 ) WE may also refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in R. S. Joshi v. Ajit Mills, AIR 1977 SC 2279 . In that case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the Gujarat Sales Tax Act itself. The question was whether sees. 37 (1) and 46 (2) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 were ultra vires the powers of the State legislature under Entries 54 and 64 of List II. By the impugned provisions, it was laid down that in case where a dealer purported to collect Sales Tax from purchasers when such levy was not legally permissible, the amount so collected shall be forfeited to the State as amount of penalty. By the impugned provisions, it was laid down that in case where a dealer purported to collect Sales Tax from purchasers when such levy was not legally permissible, the amount so collected shall be forfeited to the State as amount of penalty. It was contended that such type of confiscatory provision was beyond Entries 54 and 64 of the State List and it was a colourable legislation. This High court upheld this contention. Allowing the appeal of the State of Gujarat, the Constitution bench of the Supreme Court speaking through Krishna lyer, j. held that in pith and substance the provisions fell within Entries 54 and 64 of the State List and when the State legislation had legislative competence to legislate on the topic ancillary and incidental powers flowing from such legislative powers inhered in the State legislature. The following pertinent observations made by Krishna lyer, speaking for the Supreme Court are required to be noted in this behalf:"the true key to Constitutional construction is to view the equity of the statute and sense the social mission of the law, language permitting, against the triune facets of justice, highlighted in the Preamble to the Paramount Parliament, read with a specious signification of the listed entries concerned. If this programme is fed into the judicial cerebration with the presumption of Constitutionality superaded, the result would tell whether the measure is ultra vires or not. The doctrine of ancillary and incidental powers is also embraced within this scheme of interpretation. " ( 25 ) IT is, therefore, obvious that even if while mainly imposing purchase tax on raw materials, purchased within the State by the manufacturer/dealer, if Sec. 15b marginally entrenches on Entry 97 of the Union List by way of side effect of imposing tax on user of such materials as inputs, still in pith and substance, the provision remains in the domain of purchase tax covered by Entry 54 of the State List and such marginal and peripheral entrenchment or trespass would be permissible to the State legislature as exercise of ancillary power emanating from the main taxing power flowing from Entry 54 and would remain in the realm of permissible legislative exercise and would not invalidate the taxing provision. Consequently, even the last argument mounted by the learned. Advocates for the petitioners I on the legislative competence of the State legislature while enacting Sec. 15b also fails. Consequently, even the last argument mounted by the learned. Advocates for the petitioners I on the legislative competence of the State legislature while enacting Sec. 15b also fails. ( 26 ) THESE were the only challenges mounted for invalidating this section on the anvil of legislative competence and as they fail, the inevitable result is that the section has to be held to be within the legislative competence of the State legislature and has to be upheld. Point No. I will stand answered in the affirmative. ( 27 ) POINT No. II : As Point No. I is answered in the affirmative, Point no. II does not survive, ( 28 ) POINT No. Ill : The learned Advocates for the petitioners submitted that even assuming that Sec. 15b is within the legislative competence of the state legislature, in the absence of similar provision like Sec. 4 (2) of the gujarat Sales Tax Amending Act, 1990 validating the assessments made and levies effected under the repealed earlier provision of Sec. 15b which is replaced by the present provision of Sec. 15b, the old assessments and levies would not survive. This contention was tried to be met by the learned Advocate general for the respondents by submitting that when old provision was repealed and new provision was enacted with retrospective effect, necessary legal effect has to be given to such retrospective enactment of the new provision from 1-4-1986 and consequently, all the earlier acts would be deemed to have been done under the new provision which is deemed to be existing all throughout from 1-4-1986 on the statute book and as no judgment of any High Court had struck down old Sec. 15b, there was no occasion to enact any validating provision validating the past acts notwithstanding any judgment or order of any Court. It was next submitted, placing reliance on Sec. 9 of the Bombay general Clauses Act, 1904 that when old Sec, 15b was repealed and was re-enacted in modified form by the present Sec. 15b, reference is made to the earlier repealed provision in any instrument including orders of assessment by authorities would be treated to be references to the present re-enacted provision of Sec. 15b. It was also submitted that in fairness to the assessees, if any more tax is leviable under Sec. 15b as re-enacted with retrospective effect as compared to the tax which was levied on them under the old section as Rule 42e is not and cannot be enacted with retrospective effect, the commissioner of Sales Tax in exercise of his power under Sec. 55 would remit such extra levy and all assessees assessed earlier and who may be assessed under Sec. 15b now, will be treated alike and there would be no discrimination between them. ( 29 ) WE find considerable force in the aforesaid contention of the learned advocate General. It has to be kept in view that old Sec. 15b though challenged earlier before this Court was not struck down by this Court. Before that could happen, the State legislature itself repealed the said provision as the old provision was clearly hit by the decision of the Supreme Court in Good-year case. But having done so, the legislature in exercise of its paramount legislative power enacted present Sec. 15b with retrospective effect from 1-4-1986. This is very clear by Sec. 2 of the Amending Act 6 of 1990 which provides that "in the gujarat" Sales Tax Act, 1969, the following section shall be deemed to have been substituted, with effect on and from the 1/04/1986, namely. Sec. 15b. " Result is that from 1-4-1986 onwards, new Sec. 15b is deemed to be on the statute book and written with same pen and ink. This deeming provision has to be given its full effect as laid down by the Supreme court in M. S. T. Corporation v. Official Liquidator, AIR 1978 SC 476 . Therefore, all earlier orders passed by the taxing authorities under the old provision will have to be judged in the light of the new provision of Sec. 15b. There is no occasion for the State legislature to enact express provision for validating past acts as no Court had struck down earlier Sec. 15b. Therefore, all earlier orders passed by the taxing authorities under the old provision will have to be judged in the light of the new provision of Sec. 15b. There is no occasion for the State legislature to enact express provision for validating past acts as no Court had struck down earlier Sec. 15b. As old Sec. 15b is repealed and replaced by new Sec. 15b with retrospective effect, reference made in all old assessment orders to the Sec. 15b which is repleaed and replaced by present Sec. 15b, will have to be treated to be reference to newly enacted Sec. 15b which is deemed to be operative in this behalf by force of Sec. 2 of the Amending Act. This effect also clearly flows from Sec. 9 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 which in terms lays down that :"where this Act, or any Bombay Act or Gujarat Act made after the commencement of this Act, repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed, shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted. "we do not find any contrary intention in the Amending Act 6 of 1990. Hence, references made to old Sec. 15b in any assessment order can be said to be reference made to new Sec. 15b in an instrument as it is well settled by decisions of the Supreme Court that the term instrument as employed in the General Clauses Act and even otherwise, can cover in its sweep any written document including even a judicial order (Mohan Choudhryv. Chief Commr. , air 1964 SC 1737 and Purshottam v. V. B. Potdar, AIR 1966 SC 856 ). Consequently, it must be held that despite non-enactment of any express validating provision, the actions taken and assessments made under the repealed provision of old Sec. 15b will be treated to have been done under the newly enacted Sec. 15b with retrospective effect. As new Sec. 15b operates retrospectively from 1-4-1986, while Rule 42e which dilutes its rigour and impact operated prospectively from the date of its enactment, a situation may arise where taxing authorities can legitimately demand more tax from the concerned tax payers on account of wider net of new Sec. 15b de hors Rule 42e. As new Sec. 15b operates retrospectively from 1-4-1986, while Rule 42e which dilutes its rigour and impact operated prospectively from the date of its enactment, a situation may arise where taxing authorities can legitimately demand more tax from the concerned tax payers on account of wider net of new Sec. 15b de hors Rule 42e. But this apprehension on the part of the assessees gets nullified on account of the statement made by the learned Advocate General for the State authorities that under past assessments under the old provision of Sec. 15b which would be now deemed to be under the new provision of Sec. 15b, no additional purchase tax would be levied and such additional coverage or charge would be remitted under Sec. 55 of the Act by the Commissioner of Sales Tax and that old assessees and new assessees will be treated on par and will be uniformly governed by sec. 15b as existing today read with Rule 42e. As a. result of aforesaid discussion, there would remain no occasion to give any relief to the concerned petitioners on the supposition that validating provision of Sec. 4 (2) would not sustain all earlier actions, all taxes paid and all assessments made under old sec. 15b, as in our view, de hors Sec. 4 (2), of the Act, the aforesaid actions can be well sustained. Point No. Ill is answered accordingly in the affirmative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . RAY, C. J. I have read the judgment delivered today by my learned brother. He has elaborately dealt with the individual arguments advanced by the learned Counsel appearing in these groups of cases, where vires of Sec. 15b of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, as amended by the Gujarat act No. 6 of 1990 (Gujarat Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1990) are under challenge and I concur with the decision of my learned Brother. Initially i had some doubts as to whether or not Sec. 15b of the Gujarat Sales tax Act is essentially a tax on user of taxable goods but on further consideration, I agree with my learned Brother that Sec. 15b imposes tax on purchase and it is neither a tax on use or consignment nor a duty on finished product partaking the character of excise duty. While concurring with the decision of my learned Brother, I intend to add the following. ( 30 ) IN considering a case of legislative competence of a taxing statute, the law on the subject has now been well settled by the decisions of various high Courts in India and also the Supreme Court of India, and English Courts. It will be only profitable if such settled principles of law are enumerated before taking into consideration the disputes raised in the instant case. ( 31 ) IN construing a taxing statute for deciding the question of legislative competence, one must bear in mind that the Constitution is to be construed not in a narrow or pedantic sense and it is to be construed not as a mere law, but as the machinery by which laws are to be made. Such interpretation should be made broadly and liberally. It is also well settled that a reasonable construction of the taxing statute should be followed and literal construction may be avoided if that defeats the manifest purpose and object of the statute [ (1990) 76 STC 71 SC] Goody ear India Limited v. State of Haryana; 1 stc 1 (FC) In the matter of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 ). The entries in the Constitution only demarcates the Legislative fields of the respective Legislatures and do not confer Legislative powers as such (76 STC 71 (SC); 81 ITR 763 (SC) commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Kripashankar D. Vora, (1942) 10 ITR Suppl. 121 (H. L.) Income Tax Commissioner of City of London v. Gibbs ). ( 32 ) IN interpreting the taxing statute, the main object of which is to plug leakage and prevent evasion of tax, construction, which would defeat its purpose and in effect obliterate it from the statute book, should be eschewed. If more than one construction is possible, that which preserves its workability and efficacy is to be preferred to the one which would render it otiose or sterile (36 STC 191, State of Tamil Nadu v. Kandaswami, 76 STC 71 (SC ). ( 33 ) THE law with respect to a subject might incidentally affect another subject in some way but that is not the same thing as the law being on the latter subject. There might be overlapping, but the overlapping must be ignored. ( 33 ) THE law with respect to a subject might incidentally affect another subject in some way but that is not the same thing as the law being on the latter subject. There might be overlapping, but the overlapping must be ignored. The same thing may involve two or more taxable events in its different aspects, but the fact that there is overlapping does not detract from the distinctiveness of the aspects. The true nature and character of the legislation must be determined with reference to the power of the legislature. The consequences and effects of the legislation are not the same thing as the legislative subject-matter. It is the true nature and character of the legislation and not its ultimate economic result that matters. Nomenclature of an Act is nut conclusive,; and for determining the true nature and character of a particular tax with reference to the legislative competence, one should look into its pith and substance. It is well settled that while determining the nature of tax though the standard of measure on which the tax is levied may be a relevant consideration, it is not a conclusive consideration. Its pith and substance will only determine the category into which it will fall (74 STC 102 (SC) Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Association of India v. Union of India; 76 STC 71; 1 STC 135 (PC) - AIR 1945 PC 98 Governor General in Council v. The Province of Madras. , AIR 1980 SC 1088 R. R. Engineering Co. v. Zilla Parishad, 1936 AC 352 (PC) In Re - A reference into Government of Ireland Act, 1926 of Sec. 51 and Sec. 3 of Finance Act (Northern Ireland); 56 ITR 193 (SC) Navnit Lal Javeri v. K. K. Sen ). ( 34 ) IT is now well settled that taxing statutes are though not outside art. 14, having regard to the wide variety of diverse economic criteria that go into the formulation of its fiscal policy, the Legislature enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection of placing subject-matters, events etc. for taxation. The tests of vice of discrimination in a taxing law are less rigorous. In examining the allegations of a hostile discriminatory treatment, what is looked into is not its phraseology, but the real effect of its provisions. If there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law would not be discriminatory. for taxation. The tests of vice of discrimination in a taxing law are less rigorous. In examining the allegations of a hostile discriminatory treatment, what is looked into is not its phraseology, but the real effect of its provisions. If there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law would not be discriminatory. Decisions of the Supreme Court had permitted the Legislature to exercise an extremely wide discretion in classifying items for tax purposes, so long as it refrains from clear and hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes, but with all these latitudes, certain irreducible consideration of equality shall govern the classification for differential treatment in taxation laws as well. The differentia must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the law. The test could only be of palpable arbitrariness in the context of felt needs of the time and social exigencies informed by experience. There cannot be any precise or set formulae or doctrinaire tests or precise scientific principles of exclusion or inclusion (74 STC 102 (SC) ). ( 35 ) IT is not permissible to construe a fiscal provision by making assumptions and presumptions (76 STC 71; 12 STC 182 Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. , AIR 1971 SC 378 Baidyanath ayurvedic Bhavan (P) Ltd. v. Excise Commissioner ). ( 36 ) ORDINARILY, subordinate legislation made under the statute cannot be, referred to for the purpose of construing a provision in the statute itself unless it is to have the effect as if enacted in the statute. When a statute does not contain such a provision, if is clear that subordinate legislation cannot alter or vary the meaning of the statute even if the meaning is ambiguous (Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 26, page 401 ). ( 37 ) IN determining the limits of the weight and amplitude of the freedom guaranteed by Art. 301, a rational and workable test to apply would be - does the impugned restriction affect directly or immediately trade or its movement ? It is this free movement of trade from one part to another part of the country that is to be saved ( 1961 (1) SCR 809 Atibari Tea Co. v. State of Assam, 1963 (1) SCR 491 Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) v. State of Rajasthan ). It is this free movement of trade from one part to another part of the country that is to be saved ( 1961 (1) SCR 809 Atibari Tea Co. v. State of Assam, 1963 (1) SCR 491 Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) v. State of Rajasthan ). ( 38 ) IN construing whether a particular tax is a tax on sale or purchase, it is necessary to determine whether the transaction is one of sale of goods as known to law and in construing the character of sale or purchase, it is necessary to determine the true character of the transaction involved and not the point of time on which the duty becomes leviable. disposal means transfer of title in the goods to any other person and, therefore, it would not include mere despatch to ones ownself or to ones agents or branch offices or depots. Plainly a tax levied on sale must be, in the nature of things, a tax on the sale by the manufacturer when manufacturing process takes place, or on the producer but it is always levied upon him qua seller and not qua manufacturer 12 STC 429 (SC) = AIR 1961 SC 1534 J. K. Jute Mill v. State of M. P. Purchase and sale are two sides of one coin and if no sale has taken place in law, the occasion of purchase can never happen. The sale or purchase, as the case, may be, of goods results in change of ownership from one person to another. That must, by its very nature, be a bilateral transaction, with the seller on the one hand and the purchaser on the other. It is only when there is a contract, to which both are parties, that there can be sale or purchase (21 STC 212 (SC) The Ahdhra Sugars Ltd. v. State of A. P. ). ( 39 ) WHERE the transaction is one of sale of goods, as known to law, the power of the State to impose tax thereon is plenary and unrestricted subject only to the limitation which the Constitution may impose (9 STC 353 (SC) = AIR 1958 SC 560 Madras State v. M/s. Gannon Dunkarley and Co. ). 79. There is a fine distinction between tax on the sale of goods and the tax on the goods themselves. ). 79. There is a fine distinction between tax on the sale of goods and the tax on the goods themselves. The essence of a tax on goods manufactured or purchased is that the right to levy it accures by virtue of their manufacture or production. It is immaterial whether the goods are actually sold or consumed by the owner or even destroyed before that can be used. A duty on sale of goods cannot come into existence before the time of sale and it cannot also be levied if the goods are not sold. The power to tax sale of goods is also distinct from any right to impose tax on use or consumption. It cannot be exercised at the earlier stage of import or manufacture or production nor at the later stage of user or consumption but the power to tax sale of goods can be exercised only at the stage of sale. The successive stages of manufacture or production, sale use or consumption are separate and it is permissible to impose duty at any of these stages. If duty is imposed on the goods manufactured or produced when issued from the manufactory, then the duty becomes leviable independent of the purpose for which they leave it and irrespective of what happens thereafter [i STC 1 (FC)]. ( 40 ) TAXABLE event is that, occurrence of which creates or attracts liability to tax. Such liability does not exist or occur at any earlier or later point of time. The identification of the subject-matter of a tax is to be found in the charging section. In appreciating whether the tax is imposed on the purchase or sale, it is to be ascertained the true character of the taxable event. It is one thing to levy a purchase tax where the character of goods in respect of which the tax is levied is described in a particular manner and in a case where tax though described in a particular nomenclature actually becomes effective with reference to a totally different class of goods and that too on happening of an event unrelated to the purchase or sale of the commodity (76 STC 71) (emphasis supplied ). It is to be carefully ascertained as to whether or not ultimately the taxable event is on the sale or purchase of the goods which may be put to use in the manufacturing process but not on the user of such goods in such process and the tax is really not imposed on the final product. One must read the words in the context of the Act as a whole in construing the true nature and character of the taxing statute. The general rule in construing any document is that one should put oneself in the shoes of the maker or makers and take into account the relevant facts known to them when the document was made (76 STC 71; 1975 (1) AER 810 (HL) black Clawson International Limited v. Papierwerke Waldhof Aschaffenburg AG ). . ( 41 ) IN the backdrop of the aforesaid principles enumerated in various decisions of the High Courts and the Supreme Court and English Courts referred to hereinbefore, the exercise should be made to determine as to whether or not Sec. 15b of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, as amended, is beyond the legislative competence in as much as it does not come within the purview and ambit of entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Even if it may fall within the ambit of Entry 54 of List II, it is also necessary to determine whether the same offends Art. 14 and/or offends Art. 301 of the Constitution. It has been very strongly contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners that for a proper appreciation of the true nature and character of Sec. 15b, Sec. 15b must be read along with Rule 42e of the Sales Tax rules framed under the Act. It has been very strongly contended that the liability under the Sales Tax Act must be determined with reference to the Act and the Rules and Notifications issued thereunder. It has been contended that if Sec. 15b is read along with Rule 42e, it will be quite evident that the tax is not on the sale or purchase of the goods, but is imposed either for use of taxable goods in the manufacturing process of such goods or on the despatch of goods after the manufacturing process. It has been contended that if Sec. 15b is read along with Rule 42e, it will be quite evident that the tax is not on the sale or purchase of the goods, but is imposed either for use of taxable goods in the manufacturing process of such goods or on the despatch of goods after the manufacturing process. It is also possible, according to some of the learned Counsels, to construe Sec. 15b read with Rule 42e that a tax has been sought to be imposed ultimately on the goods so manufactured and it is thus really in the nature of excise duty. The learned Advocate General has very strongly contended that in deciding the question of legislative competence, the section itself should be construed. If the section, on its own without the aid of the Rules or Notifications is workable and does not go beyond the parameters of Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, the section does not become ultra vires for want of legislative competence. It is immaterial to consider what should be the effect of the incidence of tax and the burden on the tax payer because of the additional tax sought to be imposed under Sec. 15b. Such consideration is not at all germane for considering the question of legislative competence vis-a-vis Entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. He has contended that there is no doubt that the liability under the Sales Tax Act should ultimately depend not only on the section itself, but on the cumulative effect of the act and Rules and Notifications issued thereunder, but in deciding the case of legislative competence, the ultimate liability under the Gujarat Sales Tax act read with the Rules and Notifications is not at all a relevant consideration. He has submitted that the rule made under a delegated authority under the act cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the legislative competence. He has contended that the provisions of an Act do not get sustenance from the Rules framed thereunder, but the Rules so framed get sustenance under the Act. The aforesaid submission of the learned Advocate general must be accepted because such submission is based on well accepted principles of law since enumerated hereinbefore. He has contended that the provisions of an Act do not get sustenance from the Rules framed thereunder, but the Rules so framed get sustenance under the Act. The aforesaid submission of the learned Advocate general must be accepted because such submission is based on well accepted principles of law since enumerated hereinbefore. It is permissible to describe the taxable events by giving descriptions of the goods or events on which sale or purchase tax is imposed and it is necessary to determine the taxable event in the context of description of the goods and/or events. There is no manner of doubt that the Legislature of the State is not competent to impose a tax, which does not arise on the occasion of the sale, but is made to depend upon subsequent consumption and use of the goods or on the end products. In such cases, the tax must be a tax other than the Sales Tax and, therefore, beyond, the Entry 54 of List 11 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. It should, however, be remembered that although Sales Tax is a tax imposed on the occasion of the sale of goods, it has no reference to the point of time at which the sale or purchase takes place. Although in Sec. 15b, tax is sought to be imposed on goods intended to be used in the process of manufacture and actually put to use for such manufacturing process, the taxable event is not dependent on completion of such manufacturing process by which a finished product is obtained. Even if the goods used in such manufacturing process still remain intermediate goods requiring, further manufacturing process for a finished product capable of ultimate consumption as an end product, additional tax under Sec. 15b can be imposed on the goods so used in the manufacturing process. It is not necessary to take into consideration the burden of taxation under Sec. 15b in the absence of the provisions in the Rules or Notifications and ultimate effect of exemption or set off of the liability of additional tax under Sec. 15b as envisaged in Rule 42e. For upholding legislative competence, it will be sufficient to hold that by itself. For upholding legislative competence, it will be sufficient to hold that by itself. Sec; 15b imposes additional tax on purchase and such tax is not on the user of the goods or on the consignment or despatch of the goods as in the case of other statutes. A taxable event under Sec. 15b is not the same taxable event as in Sec. 13aa of the Bombay Sales Tax Act or the west Bengal Sales Tax statutes referred to by the learned Counsels for the petitioners. It may also be noted here that there is a distinction between the impugned provisions in Bombay and West Bengal Taxation statutes and Sec. 15b of Gujarat Sales Tax Act. In considering the vires of the impugned provisions of the Bombay Act (Sec. 13aa) and of the West Bengal Statutes (Sec. 4 (6) (ii) of Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act and Sec. 4 (l) (i) of West bengal Sales Tax Act), the impugned sections themselves had been interpreted. But for considering the vires of Sec. 15b of Gujarat Sales Tax Act on the score of legislative incompetence, attempt has been made to interpret the said section with the aid of Rule 42e of the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules. It has already been indicated that such attempt to interpret the section on the score of legislative competence is not permissible. It, therefore, cannot be argued that Sec. 15b as amended is outside the scope and ambit of Entry 54 of list II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The legislature has, therefore, the competence to enact the said Sec. 15b. Mr. Pathak, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners, has contended that Sec. 15b should be struck down as arbitrary and a piece of legislation in terrorem. I have already indicated that law has been well settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Association of India (supra) that although taxing statutes are not outside Art. 14 of the Constitution, but having regard to the wide variety of diverse economic criteria that go into the formulation of fiscal policy, the legislature enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection of placing subject-matters, events etc. for taxation. for taxation. The tests of vice of-discrimination in a taxing law are less rigorous and in examining the allegations of hostile discriminatory treatment, what is required to be looked into is not its phraseology, but the real effect of its provision. If there is equality and uniformity within each group, the law would not be discriminatory. The decisions of the Supreme Court have permitted the legislature to exercise extremely wide discretions in classifying the items of tax purposes so long as they refrain from clear and hostile discrimination against particular persons or classes. It has been very clearly indicated-by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision that the test could only be of palpable arbitrariness in the context of felt needs of the time and social exigencies informed by experience. Moreover, in deciding the test of vice of arbitrariness or discrimination offending art. 14 of the Constitution, the real effect of Sec. 15b must be considered with reference to Rule 42e and/or any other provisions of the Act, Rules and Notifications thereunder, and if Sec. 15b is considered in the context of the said Rule 42e, it is quite apparent that no arbitrariness or unreason-ableness can be found in the operation of Sec. 15b in the matter of imposition of additional tax and ultimate tax liability is also reasonable. There has not been any hostile discrimination palpably against any class or group of persons and everyone in the same group has been subjected to one common treatment. ( 42 ) THE challenge to vires of Sec. 15b on the ground that it-infringes art. 301 of the Constitution cannot also succeed. Section 15b does not in any way impose restriction on trade or movement of goods. It is to be remembered that incidence of tax varies from State to State and degree of taxation under the relevant sales tax laws in different States is also different. On that score, it cannot be reasonably contended that simply because the extent of the limits of taxation, are comparatively higher in a particular State and more goods have been brought within the fold of legislation for imposing sales tax or additional tax on sale or purchase, such imposition of tax offends the right to free movement of trade or right under the free movement of goods in inter-State transactions. In considering the case of restriction on inter- state trade or transaction as contemplated under Art. 301 of the Constitution, it is only necessary to consider whether any restriction directly and not remotely has been brought about on the free movement of goods and trade and not the quantum and degree of taxation in the State imposed on various articles. Viewed from this aspect, Sec. 15b cannot be held to have offended Art. 301 of the Constitution. ( 43 ) IN the result, all the Special Civil Application must fail and accordingly, they are dismissed with no order as to costs. ( 44 ) AFTER the judgment was delivered, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners have prayed for leave to appeal to the Honourable Supreme court. As we have followed the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in 21 STC 212 and also other decisions, we do not think that any authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court is necessary in the facts of this case. The prayer is, therefore, rejected. .