Judgment :- S. Srinivasan, J. On 2.9.1991, when C.M.P. No. 7693 of 1991. petition for grant of interim suspension of the order of stay granted by the Deputy Registrar came up for orders, at the request of both counsel, I directed the matter to be posted for hearing the appeal today. Unfortunately. it was not included in the list. Counsel on both sides made a representation in the morning that they were ready to go on with the appeal and wanted the appeal to be heard. Hence, I sent for the papers and heard the appeal. 2. This appeal is against an order of the Registrar of Trade Marks, staying the proceedings in opposition No. MAS 1913 to Application No. 383795 till after the disposal of Opposition to Application No. 358541 pending at Calcutta. The short facts are as follows : The appellant has been using the trade mark "SHARP", according to it, for more than thirty years on its goods. It is not necessary for me to set out the sales figures or the amount spent for advertisements, as the scope of this appeal is very limited. The appellant has obtained registration of the mark on four occasions in 1961, 1977, 1977 and 1980, with reference to different goods in the same class. It is stated that they are all subject matter of Applications for rectification filed by the respondent and those applications are said to be pending. The appellant filed Application No. 383795 for registration of the trade mark with reference to particular goods. That application was filed on 3.12.1981. It was accepted and advertised in the Trade Marks Journal on 1.3.1986. The respondent initiated Opposition Proceedings No. MAS 1913 in June 1986. When the proceedings were pending, the respondent applied for stay of those proceedings on the ground that it had already applied for registration of the same mark with reference to the goods specified in Class 9 in IV Schedule and that the application was pending from 13.2.1980. The reasons set out in the petition for stay were two-fold. One, the pendency of the earlier application for registration filed by the respondent before the Registrar at Calcutta and the opposition thereto by the appellant, which is also pending and two, the pendency of the rectification proceedings as regards the registrations obtained by the appellant earlier. 3. The reasons set out in the petition for stay were two-fold. One, the pendency of the earlier application for registration filed by the respondent before the Registrar at Calcutta and the opposition thereto by the appellant, which is also pending and two, the pendency of the rectification proceedings as regards the registrations obtained by the appellant earlier. 3. Both the grounds raised by the respondent were rejected by the Registrar. But, he proceeded to grant stay on the ground that certain issues were common to both the proceedings and there will be multiplicity of proceedings, if they are continued simultaneously. The Registrar also opined that it would be more convenient to decide the issues first in the Calcutta Proceedings. Accordingly, he granted an order of stay. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the Registrar having rejected the two grounds urged by the respondent, ought not to have granted stay on other grounds. According to learned counsel, there is no issue in common. It is submitted that the question of ownership of the mark does not arise at all. According to learned counsel for the appellant, it is open to both the parties to get registration under Section 12(3) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, under special circumstances. It is also argued that merely because there will be multiplicity of proceedings, there cannot be stay of one proceeding when the issues which arise for consideration in the Calcutta Proceedings do not arise in the Madras Proceeding. 5. The only question to be decided by me is whether the Registrar has exercised his discretion properly and in accordance with law while granting stay of the proceedings before him. It cannot be disputed that the Registrar has power to grant stay. No doubt, learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is no provision in the Act or the Rules, expressly empowering the Registrar to stay the proceedings. But, it is really a matter of inherent power. The Registrar is a Tribunal and any Tribunal can stay a proceeding before itself. Express conferment of power will be required only if a stay is sought for with reference to another proceeding. When a proceeding is pending before a Tribunal, it is open to the Tribunal to stay such proceedings. To put it in a simpler way, it is only an adjournment. Express conferment of power will be required only if a stay is sought for with reference to another proceeding. When a proceeding is pending before a Tribunal, it is open to the Tribunal to stay such proceedings. To put it in a simpler way, it is only an adjournment. Any Tribunal has got power to adjourn a proceeding for specific reasons. In this case, the Registrar has found it necessary to adjourn the proceeding in Madras till the proceeding in Calcutta is concluded. 6. In Narayanan's Trade Marks and Passing Off, Third Edition, at page 98, paragraph 213, the following passage is found : "There is no specific provision for stay of proceedings before the Registrar, but the Registrar as a Tribunal has got inherent jurisdiction to stay any proceedings before him for sound reasons. Where an infringement action between the parties is pending before a High Court, the Registrar may, in the exercise of his inherent jurisdiction, stay an opposition proceedings until the action is disposed of if certain issues are common to both the proceedings and if it appears to him that it would be more convenient for those issues to be decided by the High Court. Where the opponent wants to file an appeal against the decision of the Registrar, the Registrar may grant stay of registration pending the appeal." * 7. The relevant portion of the order of the Registrar reads thus : "However, Shri Shastri rightly argued that Section 12(2) cannot be invoked and it won't apply to proceedings subsequent to acceptance, for instance, when there is cross opposition. But I find here that certain issues are common to both proceedings like who is the owner of the trade mark "Sharp" in respect of goods other than those for which the Applicants are the registered proprietors. Further, I cannot ignore the possibility of multiplicity of proceedings with contradictory decisions in the event of allowing the subject application to proceed during the pendency of rival application at Calcutta. The plea that the opponents are not using their Trade Mark in India and that they have no market for their goods in India and also that it being a foreign brand name, that would inevitably be refused by the Central Government, are issues that can be more conveniently dealt with in the other proceedings pending at Calcutta. The plea that the opponents are not using their Trade Mark in India and that they have no market for their goods in India and also that it being a foreign brand name, that would inevitably be refused by the Central Government, are issues that can be more conveniently dealt with in the other proceedings pending at Calcutta. It would be unfair to draw adverse inference merely because it prima facie appears to be so without giving due opportunity to the opponents to meet the same." * 8. As an appellate court, I do not find any error in the view taken by the Registrar. It cannot be said that he has exercised his discretion arbitrarily or against the principles of law. He has taken into account rightly the fact that some of the issues will be common to both the proceedings. I do not agree with learned counsel for the appellant that there is no issue in common and both applicants can have registration under Section 12(3) of the Act. Section 12(3) of the Act will arise only in the case of honest concurrent use or other special circumstances. That provision has no relevance at this stage. The application by the respondent in Calcutta for registration is admittedly filed earlier to the application filed by the appellant in Madras. The application of the respondent was filed on 13.2.1980 whereas the appellant filed an application only on 3.12.1981. 9. Reliance is placed by the appellant's counsel on the fact that his application has been accepted and advertised earlier. But that does not confer any right on the appellant. In Metro playing Card Co. v. Wazir Chand Kapoor 1972 AIR(Delhi) 248), it is held that acceptance and advertisement in the Trade Marks Journal of an application for registration of a trade mark does not confer any right an the applicant. 10. I am of the view that the discretion of the Registrar having been exercised for acceptable reasons, I should not interfere with the order of the Registrar. A similar question arose before the Chancery Division in Flower dale Ltd. v. Hale Electric Co. Ltd. (LXVI RPC 333). In that case, the defendants in an action for an infringement of trade mark had applied for registration of the alleged infringing mark. The application was opposed by the plaintiffs in the action. A similar question arose before the Chancery Division in Flower dale Ltd. v. Hale Electric Co. Ltd. (LXVI RPC 333). In that case, the defendants in an action for an infringement of trade mark had applied for registration of the alleged infringing mark. The application was opposed by the plaintiffs in the action. The Registrar took the view that the opposition proceedings should be stayed until the action was disposed of. The defendants moved the court to stay the action until the opposition proceedings had been disposed of. The opinion of the Registrar was upheld by Vaisey, J. On appeal, it was accepted by the appellate Bench. Lord Justice Jenkins observed as follows : "... I am quite satisfied that, if in a case of this kind it appears to the Registrar that certain issues, which will have to be decided before the application before him can be dealt with, will be decided in an action pending in the Cancery Division, and he takes the view that it will be more convenient for those issues to be so decided, he is perfectly in order in exercising his inherent jurisdiction to say; I will adjourn this application until those issues have been dealt with in the High Court. It further seems to me that the fact that the Assistant Comptroller, after considering the pleadings and the issues to be tried, has come to that conclusion is a matter to which the Judge in the High Court on an application to stay proceedings before him is perfectly entitled to give great weight and I think that he ought to give great weight to it. Accordingly, in my judgment, Vaisey, J., was perfectly justified in holding that, having regard to the view taken by the Assistant-Comptroller, the proper course in this case would be to allow the action to proceed. As Lord Hanworth said in the case of James v. Wafer & Razor Coy (1922 49 RPC 597), the learned Judge has exercised his discretion and I am not prepared to interfere with it." * 11. That principle would certainly apply to the present case. Hence, I am not inclined to interfere with the order of the Registrar granting stay of the proceedings. 12. There is yet another reason for my disinclination to interfere with the order of stay. That principle would certainly apply to the present case. Hence, I am not inclined to interfere with the order of the Registrar granting stay of the proceedings. 12. There is yet another reason for my disinclination to interfere with the order of stay. It is represented by both parties that the proceeding before the Registrar at Calcutta is almost at an end. It is stated that the hearing was over and the appellants did attend the same and participate therein. It is also stated that the appellants has taken time to file certain documents. What remains, according to the respondent, is only the filing of documents and the decision by the Registrar. Learned counsel for the appellant is not in a position to state exactly as to what has happened at Calcutta but he has also get instructions to say that it has been heard, through according to him, his client has asked for a fresh hearing for filing certain documents. Whatever that may be, I am inclined to give a direction to the Registrar to dispose of the proceedings at Calcutta at an early date. That will certainly meet the ends of justice and protect the rights of parties. 13. An apprehension is expressed by the appellant that the proceedings in Madras would continue to be stayed even if the opposition proceeding in Calcutta is disposed of because of further appeals and further proceedings in higher forms. I do not think, there is any justification for that apprehension. In so far as the order of the Registrar is concerned, it is very clear that the stay will be in force only till the disposal of the opposition to the application No. 358541 pending at Calcutta. Once the opposition at Calcutta is disposed of, the stay granted by the Registrar ceases to exist. If any party wants to have the proceedings at Madras stayed further, it is for that party to approach the appropriate higher forum and certainly such forum will take into consideration the long pendency of the action and decide according to law and justice. 14. I am of the view that the interests of justice will be best served by directing the Registrar of Trade Marks at Calcutta to dispose of the Opposition No. CAL 1928 to Application No. 358541 now pending on his file at Calcutta on or before 31.12.1991. 14. I am of the view that the interests of justice will be best served by directing the Registrar of Trade Marks at Calcutta to dispose of the Opposition No. CAL 1928 to Application No. 358541 now pending on his file at Calcutta on or before 31.12.1991. Both parties represent that it will be possible for them to finish the proceedings before that time and the Registrar will be in a position to pass orders on the Opposition. 15. The appeal is dismissed with the above directions. There will be no order as to costs.