Judgment : 1. The 2nd respondent herein, who is the wife of the petitioner filed a complaint u/S. 7(2) of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (the Act) against her husband before the Ist Addl. Munsif Magistrate, Warangal, on the ground that her husband and father-in-law were liable to handover and deliver the amount and articles said to have been given to them at the time of her marriage and since they have failed to return the same they are liable for punishment under the Act. The said complaint was taken on file on 15-4-1987. 2. Pending disposal of the said petition, the husband filed an application u/S. 7(b) of the Act, requesting the Court to dismiss the complaint u/S. 7(2) of the Act on the ground that the same is barred by time. 3. The facts of the case are : the marriage between the petitioner and the defacto complainant i.e. the wife took place on 16-8-1984. The alleged payment of dowry was made, according to the complainant, to the father of the petitioner by her father on 9-7-1984 and 30-7-1984, i.e. prior to the marriage. The complaint was filed on 15-4-1987 one year after the date of the offence and therefore according to the petitioner, it is hit by S. 7(b) of the Act. The case of the wife is that the complaint is within time as the marriage took place on 15-8-1984 The learned Magistrate took the view that the limitation for filing the complaint expires on 16-8-1985 and the complaint is not maintainable u/S. 7 (b) of the Act as it stood prior to the Amendment of the Act and the amended section deleting the limitation of one year for filing the complaint from the date of marriage has no retrospective effect. Ultimately he allowed the application of the husband. 4. On revision, the learned Sessions Judge, Warangal took the view that by the time the limitation expired i.e. 15-8-1986 the new amended Act came into force and therefore the complaint of the wife is within time. 5. Aggrieved against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, the husband filed this revision case. 6. 4. On revision, the learned Sessions Judge, Warangal took the view that by the time the limitation expired i.e. 15-8-1986 the new amended Act came into force and therefore the complaint of the wife is within time. 5. Aggrieved against the order of the learned Sessions Judge, the husband filed this revision case. 6. Thelearned counsel for the petitioner argues that the benefit of the amended provision for extending the limitation cannot be taken advantage of by the wife or the Court cannot be allowed to consider that aspect as the offence alleged to have been committed was prior to the date of the Amended Act. Notices have been exchanged between the parties on 23-2-1987 and reply was given on 9-3-1987. Whether the benefit of the Amendment that has been brought into effect to S. 7 can be taken advantage of by the wife or not is the question now for consideration. 7. Section 6(1) and (2) of the Act reads as follows : "Section 6. Dowry to be for the benefit of the wife or her heirs :-(1) Where any dowry is received by any person other than the woman in connection shall transfer it to the woman - (a) if the dowry was received before marriage, within three months after the date of marriage; or (b) if the dowry was received at the time of or after the marriage, within three months after the date of its receipt; or (c) if the dowry was received when the woman was a minor, within one year after she has attained the age of eighteen years and pending such transfer, shall hold it in trust for the benefit of the woman. (2) If any person fails to transfer any property as required by sub-sec. (1) within the time limit specified therefore or as required by sub-sec. (3) he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years or with fine which shall not be less than five thousand rupees, but which may extend to ten thousand rupees or with both." Whether the dowry amount has been received by the father on (or) his sons before, or the husband, both are liable for the offence u/S. 6(2). The limitation for return of the articles and dowry is provided in clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 6. The limitation for return of the articles and dowry is provided in clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 6. Under S. 6, as it originally stood, it was made obligatory for the person receiving dowry either before marriage or at the time of marriage for transferring to the woman within one year after the date of marriage. By Act 63 of 1984 it was amended with effect from 2-10-1985 and the period of one year has been reduced to three months Admittedly the marriage between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent took place on 16-8-1984 and the one year period as prescribed under the original Act has expired on 15-8-1985. The section was amended and it came into effect from 2-10-1985. So by the time the amendment came into force, the one year period prescribed from the date of the marriage was over and the party has got a right to file complaint on or before 15-8-1986. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner argues that since the amount has not been returned in this case it becomes an offence only after 15-8-1985 and that right can be exercised within one year from that date. Since three years time has already been given and the amendment came into force on 2-10-1985 and the right to file a complaint has not been taken away after the commencement of the offence alleged to have been committed, the party in entitled to file a complaint within one year from the date of the original offence and during that time since the amendment has come into force i.e. on 2-10-1985, the complainant has got a right to file the same within three years from the date of the alleged offence said to have been committed. The non-return of the articles as contemplated under the Act is continuing offence till the return of the articles. If within such stipulated time, if the articles have not been returned and if the complaint is not filed, then only it can be said that it is barred by time and the continuing offence has lost its effect by virtue of the limitation that has been prescribed thereunder. 9. If within such stipulated time, if the articles have not been returned and if the complaint is not filed, then only it can be said that it is barred by time and the continuing offence has lost its effect by virtue of the limitation that has been prescribed thereunder. 9. In Union of India v. Sukumar Pyne AIR 1966 SC 1206 : (1966 Cri LJ 946), it has been laid down that a person accused of the commission of the offence has no vested right to be tried by a particular Court or a particular procedure except in so far as there is any constitutional objection any way of discrimination or the violation of any other fundamental right is involved. It is further observed that there is no principle underlying Art. 20 of the Constitution which makes a right to any course of procedure a vested right. 10. In that case the Director of Enforcement issued a notice on April, 23, 1958 to the petitioner following the recovery in 1954 of some foreign currency and Travellers Cheques at the business premises of the respondent calling on the petitioner to show cause within 10 days of the receipt of the notice why adjudication proceedings should not be held against him for contravention of S. 23(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. By Amending Act 39 of 1957 Section 23(1) was substituted and S. 23-D was added in the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947. The effect of the provision is that after the amendment of 1957, adjudication proceedings of criminal proceedings can be taken up in respect of a contravention mentioned in S. 23(1) while before the amendment only Criminal Proceedings before a Court could be instituted to punish the offender. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the view of the High Court that the new amendment does not apply to contravention which took place before the Amendment came into force is not correct. Further, the Supreme Court observed that the contention that there was no indication in the Amending Act that the new procedure would be retrospective cannot be accepted. For, in the matter of procedure it is not necessary that there should be a special provision to indicate that the new procedural law is retrospective. 11. Further, the Supreme Court observed that the contention that there was no indication in the Amending Act that the new procedure would be retrospective cannot be accepted. For, in the matter of procedure it is not necessary that there should be a special provision to indicate that the new procedural law is retrospective. 11. The same principle is also found in In re : Lingareddy Venkatareddy AIR 1956 AP 24 : (1956 Cri LJ 29), wherein a Division Bench of this Court relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Shiv Bhadur Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1953 SC 394 : (1953 Cri LJ 1480) and also the well known case of Philips v. Eyre (1870) 6 QB 1 observed : "It cannot, therefore, be doubted that the phrase "law in force" as used in Art. 20 must be understood in its natural sense as being the law in fact in existence and in operation at the time of commission of the offence as distinct from the law deemed to have become operative by virtue of the power of legislature to pass retrospective laws." 12. In a latest decision in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rameswar Rathod AIR 1990 SC 1849 : (1990 Cri LJ 1756), while construing Ss. 6-A and 7 (as amended by Act 30 of 1974) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the Supreme Court observed (at page 1757 (of Cri LJ)) : "S. 4 of the Amendment Act 1974 is only prospective and not retrospective. Not only that there are no specific words to indicate the provisions of retrospective effect, but the positive provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. 1 are to the effect that the amendment must be deemed to have come in effect on a particular date is a pointer and that puts the matter beyond doubt. There is no dispute in this case that the contravention of provisions of the Act is alleged to have taken in the instant case on the night of 15th March, 1972. The vehicle was seized on 10th December, 1974. The provisions of S. 6A as it stood on 15th March, 1972 only were applicable to the present case and S. 4 of the Amendment Act. The vehicle was seized on 10th December, 1974. The provisions of S. 6A as it stood on 15th March, 1972 only were applicable to the present case and S. 4 of the Amendment Act. In that case the offence was alleged to have taken place on the night of 15th March, 1972 and the vehicle was seized on 10th December 1974, The Supreme Court further observed (at page 1757) : "It is well settled that the normal rule of construction is that a provision in a statute is prospective but not retrospective, but however, in the case of statutes which are merely declaratory or which relate to only matters of procedure or of evidence, it may have retrospective effect if there are indications to that effect or the manifest purpose compels one to construe the Act as such." 13. InG. P. Nayyar v. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 1979 SC 602 : (1979 Cri LJ 589), the Supreme Court held (at page 593 of Cri LJ) : "Art. 20(1) deals with ex post facto laws though that expression has not been used in the Article. Though a sovereign legislature has power to legislate retrospectively, creation of an offence for an act which at the time of its commission was not an offence or imposition of a penalty greater than that which was under the law provided violates Art. 20(1). All that Art. 20(1) prohibits is ex post facto laws and is designed to prevent a person being punished for an act or omission which was done. It only prohibits the conviction of a person or his being subjected to a penalty under ex post facto laws." 14. Coming to the facts of the present case, since the amendment came into force on 2-10-1985 the reduction of the period from one year to three months cannot take away the right of the wife to claim the amount paid to her husband or father-in-law and the articles at the time of the marriage. Similarly, the right of the wife to file a complaint within one year has not been taken away and as the amendment came into force during that period and she has a right to file an application even during that time under the Amendment Act. The Amendment Act will give a right to the wife to file an application within three years. 15. The Amendment Act will give a right to the wife to file an application within three years. 15. It also must be remembered that the Dowry Prohibition Act 1961 is a social piece of Legislation the object of which is to prohibit the evil practice of giving and taking of dowry. The Act is intended for the benefit of the wife whose property is illegally retained and not returned by the wife (husband) or some other person who received the same on his behalf. Since the offence in this case is on 15-8-1985 as per the provisions then stood, the wife has got a right to file a complaint. That right has not been taken away by virtue of the amendment by reducing the period to three months, from one year for return of the articles. When once an offence has been (committed) duly taking into account the date as 15-8-1985 as the law then stood, she has got a right to file a complaint within one year i.e. on or before 15-8-1985 (15-8-86). The amendment to the Section came into effect from 2-10-1985. So the amendment enlarged the scope of limitation and the wife wants to file a complaint at any time she has got a right to file the same within three years from the date of the offence from 15-8-1985. The law as interpreted and as found by the lower appellate Court that the complaint is within time is perfectly correct. 16. The learned counsel has relied on a judgment of the High Court in K. Ramalingam v. The State of Tamil Nadu 1989 (2) Crimes 40 : (1989 Cri LJ NOC 65) (Mad). In that case the complaint was laid beyond one year from the date of offence as provided in S. 7(b) of the Act. The incident was allegedly committed in July, 1983 and the charge-sheet was filed in the year 1987. The Madras High Court held that the complaint has been filed beyond time u/S. 7(b) of the Act itself. Therefore, the above decision is not applicable to the case on hand. 17. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the learned Sessions Judge is upheld and the revision case is dismissed. Revision dismissed.