THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) THIS group of petition are filed by the petitioners under art. 226 of the Constitution of India for an appropriate writ, direction and/ or order directing the respondent-Board to declare the result of the students who have appeared in the New S. S. C. Examination and to permit them to prosecute further studies in Standard XI by quashing and setting aside the impugned orders cancelling the result of their examinations. ( 2 ) FOR the purpose of appreciating the controversy raised in this group of petitions, it is necessary to set out facts in the first matter, i. e. , Special civil Application No. 5771 of 1990 since the facts are almost similar in all the petitions. ( 3 ) THIS petition, i. e. , Special Civil Application No. 5751 of 1990 filed by jagrutiben, a minor girl of 16 years of age through Kalabhai Maganbhai, her father. It is her case that she was a student of Swaminarayan Dwi Satabdi Smarak high School, Lacarpur, Taluka and District Gandhinagar. She was having brilliant academic career to her credit and even in 8th and 9th Standard she had obtained 59% and 58% percentage of marks respectively. She appeared in Std. 10th (New s. S. C.) examination held by the respondent-Board in March 1990. Even in preliminary examination of the S. S. C. she obtained 52. 43% of marks. Her seat number in the Board examination was A. 52686. She attended all the papers and it is her case that she had done very well and was expecting first class with very good marks. To her utter shock and surprise, however, she was served with a notice dt. 20/06/1990, on Ju 22/06/1990. It was alleged in the notice that she had attempted to secure more marks indirectly with the help of the examiner/moderator or other persons and, therefore, her result was kept in abeyance. She was, therefore, called upon to show cause why proceeding should not be initiated and why punishment of cancellation of the result should not be imposed and she should not be debarred from appearing in four subsequent examination. The petitioner replied vide her letter dt. 22/06/1990 denying the allegations levelled against her. She was, therefore, called upon to show cause why proceeding should not be initiated and why punishment of cancellation of the result should not be imposed and she should not be debarred from appearing in four subsequent examination. The petitioner replied vide her letter dt. 22/06/1990 denying the allegations levelled against her. It was stated by Jagrutiben as well as by her father Kalabhai that neither the petitioner nor her father had made any attempt to get the marks increased and that they were not knowing anything about the alleged act. The petitioner was asked to remain present on 6/07/1990 before the Committee constituted by the respondent-Board. On that day, she was asked whether she would admit the guilt in respect of the illegality and irregularity alleged to have been committed by her and when she denied to admit the same, the impugned order was passed by the Board on 25/07/1990 cancelling the result of the examination in which she appeared and also imposing punishment of debarring her from appearing in four subsequent examinations. It is this order which is challenged in the present petition. Similar orders are passed against some other students and they are challenged in this group of petition. ( 4 ) I have heard Mr. Girish Patel, and Mr. P. G. Desai Advocates appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Shelat for Mr. M. C. Bhatt for the respondent-Board. ( 5 ) IT is submitted in behalf of the petitioners in all these petitions that the impugned orders are required to be quashed and set aside on a number of grounds. It is contended that no inquiry worth the name has been conducted or held by the respondent-Board and in absence of the inquiry, the students cannot be punished. It is also contended that these are cases of "no evidence" and in absence of "any evidence" no order of cancellation of the examination and/or debarring from appearing in subsequent examinations can be passed by the respondent-Board. It is argued that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that some over-enthusiasm has been shown by the parents of the students appearing at the examination, it cannot be said to be a fault on the part of the students and they cannot be blamed or punished for some acts of their parents. It is argued that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that some over-enthusiasm has been shown by the parents of the students appearing at the examination, it cannot be said to be a fault on the part of the students and they cannot be blamed or punished for some acts of their parents. Lastly it is contended that the quantum of punishment which is the maximum in the instant case, is not called for and justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. ( 6 ) MR. Shelat on the other hand appearing for Mr. M. C. Bhatt supported the order passed by the respondent-Board and submitted that since the Court is not exercising appellate power, it cannot re-appreciate the evidence and cannot substitute its finding for the findings arrived at and recorded by the respondent-Board and the petitions are liable to be dismissed. ( 7 ) I am of the considered opinion that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are well founded and all these petitions are required to be allowed. ( 8 ) SO far as the notice Annexure "b" to the petition is concerned, it is delightfully vague. It is alleged in the said notice that looking to the record, it appears that an indirect attempt appears to have been made by the student by contacting Examiner/moderator or other concerned persons. Thus, so far as notice is concerned, no specific averments or allegations have been made as to who was contacted by the student. However, I am not basing my conclusion only on this basis inasmuch as it is a starting point of inquiry and it may be that at that time when the inquiry was still to be conducted by the respondent-Board and allegations are required to be made that the allegations may be of a general nature. ( 9 ) AS stated above, those allegations have been denied by the students and by their parents. It is also clear that the students were asked to appear before the committee and then impugned orders were passed. Now, the order is annexed at Annexure "d" to the petition in Special Civil Application No. 5751 of 1990 and it gives an interesting reading. It is also clear that the students were asked to appear before the committee and then impugned orders were passed. Now, the order is annexed at Annexure "d" to the petition in Special Civil Application No. 5751 of 1990 and it gives an interesting reading. In the said order it is stated that either the parents or the representatives of examine (student) had attempted to get more marks by contacting any examiner at the place of assessment which was established from the marks which were found on the answer book. Then the marks were mentioned and they were as under : ( 21 ) IT is, thus, clear that "no evidence" does not mean only total dearth or evidence. It extends to any case where the evidence taken as a whole is not reasonably capable of supporting he finding; or where, in other word, no tribunal could reasonably reach that conclusion on that evidence. It is well established that to reach a conclusion on "no evidence" is to commit an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Again to base a decision on "no evidence" is that the decision is perverse, unreasonable and ultra vires. ( 22 ) A similar question arose in Chetan Savala v. Gujarat University and Anr. , in Spl. C. A. No. 5528 of 1987 decided by R. C. Mankad, J. In that case also, the allegation was levelled against the petitioner that he was permitting one Heena a candidate who was sitting behind him to copy from his answer book. The observer of the University saw him allowing to copy from the answer book of the petitioner and after holding inquiry, the punishment was imposed. He approached this Court by filing a petition challenging the order of punishment. Even though it was the case of the observer that he had seen the petitioner allowing Heena to copy from his answer book, this Court allowed the petition holding that there was no evidence in the eye of law, on the basis of which the petitioner could be punished. The petitioner denied having allowed Heena to copy from his answer book in his statement. Similarly Heena had also in her statement denied that she was copying from the answer book of the petitioner. In these circumstances, according to this Court, the case was of suspicion and not of evidence. The petitioner denied having allowed Heena to copy from his answer book in his statement. Similarly Heena had also in her statement denied that she was copying from the answer book of the petitioner. In these circumstances, according to this Court, the case was of suspicion and not of evidence. The Court observed :"in view of this total denial by the petitioner, it was necessary to establish the charge against the petitioner by other evidence. In other words, in the absence of admission by the petitioner, the charge against the petitioner had to be established by relevant, cogent and reliable evidence. In the inquiry, the Examination Committee recorded the statements of the petitioner and the observer Kanubhai. In his statement the petitioner stated that in order to properly support his answer book, he was sitting in an oblique manner or at an angle on the bench. He was not knowing whether or not hina was copying from his answer book. According to the petitioner, he was engrossed in writing answers. Observer Kanubhai in his statement stated that the petitioner was sitting and writing in such a manner that Hina could see. He added that this is what he believed. It would appear from the statement of the observer that he believed or inferred from the manner in which the petitioner was sitting and writing that Hina could see and it was on that basis that he inferred that the petitioner was allowing Hina to copy. It would thus appear that it was only from the manner in which the petitioner was sitting that the observer believed that he was allowing hina to copy from his answer book. It further appears that no attempt whatsoever has been made to compare the answer books namely that of the petitioner and of hina to find out whether Hina had copied from the petitioners answer book. Further, Hina herself had stated that the petitioner was innocent and that he did not know that she was copying from his answer book. It is pertinent to note that the Examination Committee while considering the case against the petitioner has not at all taken into consideration the statement which Hina made before the senior Supervisor or the observer. Her statement is also not recorded in the inquiry against the petitioner. Thus Hinas version has not been taken into consideration at all by the Examination Committee. Her statement is also not recorded in the inquiry against the petitioner. Thus Hinas version has not been taken into consideration at all by the Examination Committee. Therefore the only evidence against the petitioner is the belief or inference of the observer based on the manner in which the petitioner was sitting to hold petitioner guilty of the charge of allowing Hina to copy from his answer book. Such belief in my opinion, can hardly be considered to be evidence or proof of guilt. It is only suspicion which the observer entertained when he came to inspect the examination hall. " ( 23 ) MR. Shelat, however, drew my attention to the case of Master Pragneshkumar krishnavadan Desai v. South Gujarat University, Surat, in Special Civil Application no. 1724 of 1977 decided on 15/12/1977. In that case after recording a finding of fact that the examiner had altered marks from 36 to 50 of the petitioner, dismissed the petition holding that no examiner would be interested in any student unless the student or any one on his behalf had approached him. ( 24 ) MR. Shelat also drew my attention to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U. P. v. Bangleshwar Prasad, AIR 1966 SC 875 . He particularly relief on para 12 of the judgment which reads as under :"in dealing with petition of this type, it is necessary to bear in mind that educational institutions like the Universities or appellant No. 1 set up Enquiry Committees to deal with the problem posed by the adoption of unfair means by candidates, and normally it is within the jurisdiction of such domestic Tribunals to decide all relevant question in the light of evidence adduced before them. In the matter of the adoption of unfair means direct evidence may sometimes to available, but cases may arise where direct evidence is not available and the question will have to be considered in the light to probabilities and circumstantial evidence. This problem which educational institutions have to face from time to time is a serious problem and unless there is justification to do so, Courts should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the domestic Tribunals appointed by educational bodies like the Universities. This problem which educational institutions have to face from time to time is a serious problem and unless there is justification to do so, Courts should be slow to interfere with the decisions of the domestic Tribunals appointed by educational bodies like the Universities. In dealing with the validity of the impugned orders passed by Universities under Art. 226, the High Court is not sitting in appeal over the decision is question, its jurisdiction is limited and though it is true if the impugned is not supported by any evidence at all, the High Court would be justified to quash that order. But the conclusion that the impugned order is not supported by any evidence must be reached after considering the question as to whether probabilities and circumstantial evidence do not justify the said conclusion. Enquiries held by domestic Tribunals in such cases must, no doubt, be fair and students against whom charges are framed must be given adequate opportunities to defend themselves, and in holding such enquiries, the Tribunal must scrupulously follow rules of natural justice, but it would, we think, not be reasonable to import into these enquiries all considerations which govern criminal trials in ordinary Courts of law. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 25 ) THERE cannot be any dispute about the proposition of law laid down by the supreme Court and I am bound by it. The ratio laid down in the said judgment, however, does not apply to the facts of the instant case. Bangleshwar Prasads case (supra) has been extensively considered by the Division Bench in S. M. Sharmas case (supra) and the Division Bench has rightly observed that a number of circumstances were considered by the Supreme Court. The ratio laid down in the said judgment, however, does not apply to the facts of the instant case. Bangleshwar Prasads case (supra) has been extensively considered by the Division Bench in S. M. Sharmas case (supra) and the Division Bench has rightly observed that a number of circumstances were considered by the Supreme Court. They were :" (i) as a result of the unhealthy atmosphere prevailing at the centre, examinations had not been held there for some years, but on account of public pressure they were restarted, (ii) at the examination held at the centre, unfair means were adopted on a very large scale by a large number of the students and the examination appeared to have been conducted in the atmosphere which was not at all congenial to the enforcement of the discipline which has to be observed in conducting examination; (iii) the invigilators themselves were so frightened by the prevailing rowdysim and by pressure from influential people that they found themselves powerless to maintain discipline in the examination hall and to prevent copying and some of the invigilators had to be warned to be careful in future; and (iv) on the day on which the examination in English was held and while the students were answering the paper, an answer paper by some outsider was dropped into the room fifteen minutes before the time to answer questions was over and the room in which the answer paper was thrown was the same in which the delinquent candidate was appearing for the Hindi examination. " ( 26 ) I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Division bench of this Court in S. M. Sharmas case (supra ). It is undoubtedly true that the problems which the educational institutions have to face from time to time are serious problems and unless there is justification to do so, Courts should be slow to interfere with the decision of the domestic Tribunal appointed by educational bodies like the respondent-Board. But at the same time the orders passed by the authorities like the respondent-Board must be supported by some evidence. It may be in form of direct evidence or indirect and circumstantial evidence. But at the same time the orders passed by the authorities like the respondent-Board must be supported by some evidence. It may be in form of direct evidence or indirect and circumstantial evidence. As mentioned above, in Bangleshwars case (supra) though there was no direct evidence, indirect evidence in form of a number of circumstances was there which was considered by the University as sufficient and when the action was quashed by the High Court, the Supreme Court rightly set aside the order of the High Court observing that it was for the authorities to consider the evidence and the High Court was not justified in interfering with the said order. The high Court was not a Court of appeal and cannot enter into sufficiency, adequacy or otherwise of the evidence before the authority. At the same time, however, it should not happen that a student is punished or his cared is jeopardised only on the basis of suspicious, surmises and conjectures without there being any evidence worth the name. In my opinion, in this case there is no evidence whatsoever which has some probative value in the eye of law and merely on the basis of suspicion that the impugned action is taken by the respondent-Board which is arbitrary, irrational, perverse and no reasonable man in the facts and circumstances of the case would reach to that conclusion and, therefore, it is required to be interfered within the exercise of the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 27 ) MR. Patel, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that in overenthusiasm if the parents or guardians of student commits some mistake by contacting the Examiner/moderator or any Officer of the Board for the purpose of getting more marks of their wards, the students should not suffer. He attempted to draw a dividing the line and distinction between the irregularity committed by students themselves in the examination hall, for instance, copying a paper etc. and other cases. In the former class of cases, obviously the student is to be blamed and he will have to face consequences of his action. But if on the other hand, without his consent or even his knowledge, the parents indulge into irregular activities, why should be student suffer. and other cases. In the former class of cases, obviously the student is to be blamed and he will have to face consequences of his action. But if on the other hand, without his consent or even his knowledge, the parents indulge into irregular activities, why should be student suffer. However, in view of the fact that I am allowing the petition on the ground that there is "no evidence" to hold the student guilty. I am not expressing any final opinion on the above argument advanced by mr. Patel. ( 28 ) LASTLY, Mr. Patel submitted that even if it is assumed that the petitioner is guilty of the charge levelled against her in the facts and circumstances of the case, the maximum punishment of cancellation of the result and debarring her from appearing at four subsequent examinations must be held to be harsh, excessive and grossly disproportionate. Here also, Mr. Patel attempted to draw a distinction between irregularly committed by an examine in the examination hall itself and some irregularly said to have been committed by the parents. In the first category of cases, the examine is directly responsible and he is the only person responsible for such activity. But so far as the second category is concerned, it is not the student who is directs responsible for the act in question. At the most it can be said that he is indirectly responsible. But then the respondent- board is bound to apply is mind to the above distinction. In the instant case, the Board has not applied its mind at all to the above circumstance and since the petitioner refused to confess the guilt which she had not committed, a mechanical order of imposing maximum punishment was passed and it require to be interfered with by this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. ( 29 ) PRIMA facie I am of the opinion that the submission made by Mr. Patel appears to be well founded. It is not that in every case, the maximum punishment should be awarded to the students. Mr. Patel is right in drawing a distinction between the two classes of students. When I am allowing this petition in its entirety and quashing and setting aside the impugned order, it is not necessary to deal with the above argument. It is not that in every case, the maximum punishment should be awarded to the students. Mr. Patel is right in drawing a distinction between the two classes of students. When I am allowing this petition in its entirety and quashing and setting aside the impugned order, it is not necessary to deal with the above argument. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, even if the petitioner can be said to be responsible and some punishment can be imposed on her in my opinion, ends of justice would be met if the quantum of punishment is reduced and over and above, cancellation of result of the examination in which the petitioner appeared, she may be debarred from appearing in two subsequent examinations rather than four subsequent examination. ( 30 ) IN the result, all these petitions are allowed and the orders passed by the respondent-Board cancelling the result of the petitioners of S. S. C. Examination held in March 1990 and debarring them from appearing in four subsequent examinations are hereby quashed and set aside. The respondent-Board is directed to assess the petitioners answer books in accordance with law and declare results within two weeks from today. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to cost. .