Judgment : 1. The respondent was the accused in S.T.R.No.702 of 1983 on the file of the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Pollachi. 2. She was transacting business in provisions after obtaining a licence for running of such a shop in the name of her son Marimuthu at Pethanaickanur. 3. On 9.7.1983 at 12.30 p.m. the Food Inspector, P.W.1 inspected the grocery shop and took sample of coconut oil, after observing ail formalities for the purpose of analysis. One such sample so taken was sent to the Public Analyst. On analysis the Public Analyst found the sample to be adulterated, in the sense of the same being a mixture of about 40% of groundnut oil and 60% of coconut oil. After the receipt of the report of the public Analyst by the Local (Health) Authority prosecution had been launched against the accused on 6.9.1983 for the alleged offences under Secs.7 and 16v, read with Secs.2(1a)(a) and (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (for short the Act). A copy of the report of the Public Analyst had been sent to the accused on 27.9.1983. 4. Learned Magistrate, on consideration of the materials placed before him, acquitted the accused on the sole and lone ground that there was a delay of 20 days in sending a copy of the report of the public Analyst to the accused. The Slate has come forward with the present appeal challenging the verdict of acquittal so rendered. 5. Learned Government Advocate would submit that the verdict of acquittal rendered by learned Magistrate is perverse requiring it to be set aside inasmuch as the provisions adumbrated under Sec.13(2) of the Acts and 9-A of the Rules framed thereunder as respects the despatch of the copy of the report immediately after the launching of the prosecution are not at all mandatory, but only directory, as has been held by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Tulsiram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1984 Crl.L.J. 1731. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent/ accused would however repel such submissions. 7. No doubt true it is, the salient provisions adumbrated under Sec.13(2) of the Acts and 9-A of the Rules framed there under require a copy of the report of the public Analyst to be sent to the person from whom sample was taken, immediately after launching the prosecution. 7. No doubt true it is, the salient provisions adumbrated under Sec.13(2) of the Acts and 9-A of the Rules framed there under require a copy of the report of the public Analyst to be sent to the person from whom sample was taken, immediately after launching the prosecution. Rule 9-A had been amended with effect from 9.7.1984 requiring the Local Health Authority to furnish a copy of the report of the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken, within a period of 10 days, after the institution of the prosecution. The old Rule which was in force prior to 9.7.1984 required the Local Health Authority to furnish a copy of such report, immediately after launching of the prosecution. In the case on hand, the sampling operation had been effectuated on 9.7.1983 when the old Rule 9-A was in force. 8. The interpretation of the old Rule came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, cited by learned Government Advocate. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were clearly of the view that the idea is to avoid dilatoriness on the part of officialdom and prevention of unnecessary harassment to the accused and that the idea is not to penalise the prosecution and to provide a technical defence. They further stated that first to construe ‘immediately’ as meaning ‘at once’ or ‘forthwith’ and next to hold delay to be fatal to the prosecution would perhaps be to make Rule 9-A ultra vires Sec. 13(2), that it is not permissible to interpret Rule 9-A in such a way, that the real question is, was the Public. Analysts report sent to the accused sufficiently early to enable him to properly defend him by giving him an opportunity at the outset to apply to the court to send one of the samples to the Central Food Laboratory for analysis and that if after receiving the Public Analysts report he never sought to apply to the court to have the sample sent to the Central Food Laboratory, he may not be heard to complain of the delay in the receipt of the report by him unless of course, he is able to establish some other prejudice. 9. The decision of the Supreme Court, as mentioned above, is squarely applicable to the facts of the case on hand. 9. The decision of the Supreme Court, as mentioned above, is squarely applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Nothing is shown as to any prejudice having been caused to the accused by the belated receipt of the Public Analysts report. One can very well understand that if the report of the public Analyst had been received by the accused in such a belated fashion preventing her from exercising the statutory right given to her under sec. 13(2) of the Act to have the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory, it will have the effect of superseding the report of the Public Analyst. It is not at all the case of the accused that she had made any application to the court for sending one such sample to the Central Food Laboratory. If she did make an application and the sample so sent had been found to be not fit for analysis, she can very well contend that she had been greatly prejudiced in her defence by defeasance of her statutory right given to her under Sec. 13(2) of the Act. Such is not the situation here at all. Consequently, there can be no prejudice having been caused to the accused by the belated receipt of the copy of the Public Analysts report. As such, the finding for the verdict of acquittal rendered by the Court below is rather perverse which requires to be set aside. 10. I am rather reluctant in setting aside the verdict of acquittal on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Notwithstanding the acquittal, as already indicated which was rather on perverse reasoning in the sense of not reflecting the real legal position, the sampling operation as had been referred to earlier had been done on 9.7.1983, i.e., some 7 1/2 years before. The verdict of acquittal had been rendered on 8.11.1984 and it had been in force all along, though the State had filed this appeal against such acquittal in 1986. In such state of affairs, it can very well be stated that the agony and anguish of the likelihood of 1st prosecution ending in conviction as Damocles Sword hanging over the head of the accused/ respondent all along cannot be disputed. In this view of the matter, I am not inclined to disturb the verdict of acquittal, though I have stated the legal positions in clear cut terms. 11. In this view of the matter, I am not inclined to disturb the verdict of acquittal, though I have stated the legal positions in clear cut terms. 11. Subject to the above observations, the appeal shall stand dismissed.