Judgment :- The petitioner abovenamed has filed the present writ petition for the following relief: To issue a writ of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction, calling for the records of the 1st respondent culminating in the order dated 20.11.1987 in T.S.E.A.No.27 of and quash the same. 2. In brief, the relevant facts of the case are as follows: Air France has an office at Madras and the 2nd respondent was the District Manager, along with five other employees. petitioner management decided to close its Madras office for economic reasons. compliance with the requirements of Sec.25 FFA, under which a statutory notice of days to various authorities of the State and the affected parties has to be given, by dated 8.1.1987, the notice intimating the management’s intention to close its Madras with effect from 31.3.1987 was sent to all the authorities prescribed under the Act as well to the affected parties. The services of the workmen were terminated in accordance with and they were offered their full terminal compensation. 3. The conditions of service of the supervisory and managerial staff are governed regulations and conditions of service agreed by the parties. In terms of Clause 8.1 of said Regulations, by letter dated 27.2.1987, the services of the 2nd respondent terminated with effect from 31.3.1987. But, as the 2nd respondent has averred that the letter reached him only on 6.3.1987, the petitioner management paid him his salary April, 1987 also, ineffect, his services stand terminated from 1.5.1987. The 2nd respondent was admittedly the District Manager of the Madras office of the petitioner and therefore, Sec.4(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as the Act) excludes its applicability to the 2nd respondent. The above section has included in the Act by the competent Legislative Assembly of the State of Tamil Nadu. power to legislate for State vests in the State Legislative Assembly and that the Legislative Assembly alone is competent to amend, modify or repeal any substantive provision of the Act. There is no change made in Sec.4(l)(a) of the Act by the Legislative Assembly. 4. However, the 2nd respondent contended in his reply affidavit before the respondent/Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals) that by G.O.Ms.No.4074, Industries, Labour and (Labour), dated 5.10.1966, all the provisions of the Act have been made applicable to of persons mentioned in Clause (a) of sub-sec(l) of Sec.4 of the Act. 4. However, the 2nd respondent contended in his reply affidavit before the respondent/Deputy Commissioner of Labour (Appeals) that by G.O.Ms.No.4074, Industries, Labour and (Labour), dated 5.10.1966, all the provisions of the Act have been made applicable to of persons mentioned in Clause (a) of sub-sec(l) of Sec.4 of the Act. The aforesaid G.O., issued by the Governor of Tamil Nadu in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec.5 Act. According to the petitioner, Sec.5 of the Act has delegated powers to the State to the provisions to any class of persons by notification, but the power does not go and go to the extent of allowing the delegate (in this case the State) to amend or change substantive provision of the Act itself. This is a function which can be done only by Legislative Assembly. That apart, Sec.4(1) (a) of the Act deliberately excludes applicability of the Act to persons employed in any establishment in a position management. It is settled law that conditions of service of management employees governed by the conditions of service entered into by the parties under the common master and servant. In the circumstances, it is submitted by the petitioner/management even if it is assumed that Sec.4(1)(a) of the Act has lost its force by virtue of the mentioned notification of the State Government, the said notification will be hit by the Constitution of India and be void to the extent of its repugnancy in its application managerial or supervisory officers whose conditions of service are governed by agreements entered into by the employees and employers under the Contract Act, which is a Central. 5. According to the petitioner/management, the termination of service of the 2nd respondent is in full conformity with Rule 8.1 of the Regulations and Conditions of Service entered by the parties, which is extracted hereunder “ 8. Termination of employment. 8.1 Resignation-Discharge. After the expiry of the probationary period, an employee who resigns must give one notice, otherwise the Company shall be entitled to deduct one month ’ s salary in lieu last salary. Conversely, the Company may not discharge any employee, except in misconduct, without giving one month’s notice, or paying one month’s salary.” 6. Termination of employment. 8.1 Resignation-Discharge. After the expiry of the probationary period, an employee who resigns must give one notice, otherwise the Company shall be entitled to deduct one month ’ s salary in lieu last salary. Conversely, the Company may not discharge any employee, except in misconduct, without giving one month’s notice, or paying one month’s salary.” 6. Thus, according to the petitioner/management, it is obvious that the clause recognizes rights of either party to terminate the service by giving one month’s notice or in notice, on paying a month’s salary in the case of the employer, and in the case employee, to surrender one month’s salary. The word ‘except’ in case of misconduct, to Clause 13 of the terms and conditions of service under which the employer can dismiss employee without notice in a case of misconduct. It is further submitted that Clause the conditions of service only lays down the age on which the employer normally terminates. It does not confer any right on any employee to work till the age of 60. In any event, submitted that Sec.41(2) of the Act only requires that the termination will be bad where there is no notice and no reasonable cause for termination and it is admitted notice was given in this case before termination of the services of the 2nd respondent. 7. The 1st respondent, who heard the appeal (T.S.E.No.27 of 1987) by his judgment 20.11.1987, allowed the appeal and set aside the order of termination dated 27.2.1987 the service of the 2nd respondent. The said judgment and the reasons for rejection contentions raised on behalf of the management are void and without jurisdiction. Therefore, the said judgment is liable to be quashed. The petitioner/management has, therefore, the above writ petition for the relief asked for therein. 8. The petitioner has also filed two W.M.Ps., during the pendency of the writ petition W.M.p.Nos.25907 and 25908 of 1991 to implead the State of Tamil Nadu represented Secretary, Labour Department as 3rd respondent in the above writ petition and permit the petitioner/management to raise additional grounds in the writ petition that of the Act is invalid and void and has to be struck down as ultra vires. The following additional grounds raised in W.M.P.No.25908 of 1991: “5. The following additional grounds raised in W.M.P.No.25908 of 1991: “5. That the petitioner desires to raise an additional ground that Sec.5 of the Tamil Shops and Establishment Act, 1947, hereinafter called the Act, itself is invalid and void suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. 6. That as the validity of the provision of Sec.5 of the Act is being challenged, it is necessary to implead the State of Tamil Nadu also party in the said writ petition.” 9. The 2nd respondent has filed his counter affidavit dated 11.4.1988. According to the 2nd respondent, the petitioner, without any justification and in blatant violation of the mandatory requirement of Sec.41 of the Act, terminated the services with effect from 31.3.1987, purporting to be under Clause 8 of the Staff Regulation, under a communication dated 27.2.1987. Aggrieved by the same, he filed an appeal under Sec.41 (2) of the Act before 1st respondent. The petitioner/management filed a counter and contested the said appeal. The 1st respondent found that by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.4074, Industries, Labour and Mousing (Labour), dated 5.10.1966, the provisions of the Act have been made applicable to class persons mentioned in Sec.4(1)(a) of the Act and therefore, the appeal filed by the 2nd respondent was maintainable in law. It was further held by the 1st respondent that contract between the employer and the person employed cannot override the express statutory provisions. It was the further finding of the 1st respondent that petitioner/management is obliged to mention the reasonable cause in the order termination for enabling him to apply his mind to determine the reasonableness of reason for termination. It is untenable to contend that the District Manager like the 2nd respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal. Persons in the position management are specifically brought within the purview of the Act in exercise of statutory powers. Sec.5 of the Act is an overriding provision as could be seen from opening lines of the said section. G.O.Ms.No.4074, Industries, Labour and Housing (Labour), dated 5.10.1966 is not in conflict with the unwritten law of master and servant. The provisions of the Act themselves make an inroad into the ordinary law of master and servant. Sec.5 of the Act is an overriding provision as could be seen from opening lines of the said section. G.O.Ms.No.4074, Industries, Labour and Housing (Labour), dated 5.10.1966 is not in conflict with the unwritten law of master and servant. The provisions of the Act themselves make an inroad into the ordinary law of master and servant. The effect of an order made by the Appellate Authority setting aside an order termination is that the order of termination is non est and never existed and that employee who was removed from service continues in employment without any interruption or break. For the reasons aforementioned, the 2nd respondent has prayed that the writ petition may be dismissed. 10. The petitioner/management filed a reply affidavit. As. the 2nd respondent was occupying a managerial post, the Act did not apply in his case and his appeal under Sec.41 of the Act was misconceived and not maintainable in law. Sec.5 of the Act only delegate certain powers to the State and the State, as delegate, cannot efface a substantive provision of the Act by a notification under Sec.5 of the Act. Even assuming for arguments sake that the language of Sec.5 of the Act is so wide as to include the powers to change Sec.4 of Act itself, Sec.5 of the Act itself will be invalid in law as it will hit by the vice of excessive delegation. The Constitution has granted the power to the Slate Legislature to legislate the topic. Excessive delegation of power is not permissible in law and the Legislative body has to exercise some control over delegated legislation. In any event, the law of master and servant is a Central Law and conditions of service between employers and employees occupying managerial post are governed by the Central Law and therefore, any State provision of Law in conflict with the Central Law will be void to the extent of the conflict. 11. I have heard the elaborate arguments of Mr.S.Govind Swaminathan, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of M/s.N.S.Sivam and K.Madhavan, for the petitioner Mr.A.L.Somayaji of M/s.Aiyar and Dolia, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent. 12. 11. I have heard the elaborate arguments of Mr.S.Govind Swaminathan, learned Senior Advocate on behalf of M/s.N.S.Sivam and K.Madhavan, for the petitioner Mr.A.L.Somayaji of M/s.Aiyar and Dolia, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent. 12. W.M.P.No.25908 of 1991 has been filed by the petitioner during the pendency of the petition seeking permission to raise the additional ground that Sec.5 of the Act is invalid void and has to be struck down as ultra vires and the said petition was ordered S.Ramalingam, J., on 10.12.1991. In the affidavit filed in support of the above W.M.P., stated that Sec.5 of the Act is invalid and void because it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. 13. Mr.S.Govind Swaminathan, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, has raised contention that power to withdraw the exemption granted under Sec.4 of the Act could exercised only by the Legislature itself and the said power to withdraw the exemption cannot be delegated. In other words, it is the contention of Mr.S.Govind Swaminathan, that delegation of the power under Sec.5 of the Act is an unconstitutional delegation-of Legislative power. 14. Per contra, Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, would submit the delegation of the power under Sec.5 of the Act to remove the exemption granted accordance with law the accepted legislative practice and is not unconstitutional. 15. In support of his contention, Mr.S.Govind Swaminathan would invite my attention to following decisions, reported in In re. Art 143, Constitution of India, etc., 1951 S.C.J. 1951 S.C.R.747: A.I.R.1951 S.C. 332 -paragraph 74 at page 355; Harishankar Bagfa State of Madhya Pradesh, (1955)2 M.L.J. 211 : 1954 M.W.N. 749: 1954 S.C.J. 637: S.C.R. 380: 55 Cr I.L.J. 322: A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 465 - Head-note (c) at page 466 paragraph 9 at page 468, Hamdard Dawakhana v. The Union of India, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. paragraph 29 at page 556 and paragraphs 34 and 35 at pages 567 and 568, Makhan Tar-sikka v. The State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 381: 1964 Crl.L.J. 262 paragraph page 400 and Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. paragraph 17 at page 1464. 16. Mr. A.L.Somayaji, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would invite my attention the following decisions in support of his contention that Sec.5 of the Act is valid constitutional. 16. Mr. A.L.Somayaji, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would invite my attention the following decisions in support of his contention that Sec.5 of the Act is valid constitutional. They are reported in Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Pradesh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 909, The Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. In re., (1950)2 L.L.J. The Management of Blue Star & Co. Ltd. v. The Assistant Commissioner, Madras- L.L.J. 233, which in turn followed The Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. In re., (1950)2 1043, Mohmedalli v. Union of India A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 980: 24 F.J.R. 221: (1964)1 S.C.J. State Bank of Travancore v. Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Coimbatore, (1981)1 393, Basant Kumar Sarkar v. The Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd. A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1260: S.C.J. 586, M/sJalan Trading Co. Private Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Sabha,A.I.R.1967 S.C. F.I.R. 468 (1966)2 Lab.L.J. 546: (1962)1 S.C.C. 189: (1967)1 S.C.R. 15, The Edward Co. Ltd., Beawar v. The State of Ajmeer,A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 25: (1955)1 S.C.R. 735 , Yamasa Kshatriya (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1591: (1963)1 Lab.L.J. (1963-64)24 F.J.R. 429 and Syed Mohamed & Co. v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. (1952)2 M.L.J. 598 : 54 Crl.L.J. 277: 1952 M.W.N. 847. 17. In order to appreciate the respective contentions of the parties, it is necessary to the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. “4. Exemptions: (1) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to- (a) persons employed in any establishment in a position of management; (b) persons whose work involves travelling; and persons employed as canvassers caretakers; (c) establishments under the Central and State Governments, local authorities, the Bank of India, a railway administration operating any railway as defined in clause Art.366 of the Constitution and cantonment authorities; (d) establishments in mines and oil fields; (e) Establishments in bazaars, in places where fairs or festivals are held temporarily period not exceeding fifteen days at a time; (f) establishments which, not being factories within the meaning of the Factories Act, are in respect of matters dealt with in this Act, governed by a separate law for the time in force in the State. (2) Nothing contained in Sec.7 or Sec.13, as the case may be, shall apply to. (2) Nothing contained in Sec.7 or Sec.13, as the case may be, shall apply to. (a) hospitals and other institutions for the treatment or care of the sick, the infirm, destitute or the mentally unfit; (b) such chemists’ or druggists’ shops as the State Government may, by general or order, specify; (c) clubs and residential hotels, hostels attached to schools or colleges, and establishments maintained in boarding schools in connection with the boarding and lodging of pupils resident masters; (d) stalls and refreshment rooms at railway stations, docks, wharves or ports. 5. Power of Government to apply Act to exempted persons or establishments: Notwithstanding anything contained in Sec.4, the State Government may, by notification, apply all or any of the provisions of this Act to any class of persons or establishments mentioned in that ‘ Section, other than those mentioned in Clauses (c) and (f) of sub and modify or cancel any such notification.” 18. Under Sec.4 of the Act, exemption has been granted in respect of certain employed in establishments. But, for the exemption, the category of ‘persons employed ‘establishment’ would be governed by the provisions of the Act. Sec.5 of the Act has given overriding effect as it opens with non obstante clause. Therefore, the provision of of the Act is subject to the provisions of Sec.5 excepting in regard to establishments mentioned in Clauses (c) and (f) of sub-sec(1) of Sec.4 of the Act. The State Government has been further empowered to or cancel any notification made under Sec.5 of the Act. A reading of the various provisions the Act makes it clear that the enactment not only provides for regulation of conditions work in shops and commercial establishments, but also provides the grounds of termination of services of employees and gives right of appeal against the arbitrary and termination of services of persons employed. The expression “persons employed “establishment” has been defined in subclauses (12) and (6) of Sec.2 respectively. 19. The Legislative policy is very clear that the exemption granted in respect of persons establishment except in regard to establishments enumerated in clauses (c) and (f) sec(1) of Sec.4 of the Act is subject to the provisions of Sec.5 of the Act. Sec.5 of does not run counter to the essential features of the Act or policy of the enactment. The Legislative policy is very clear that the exemption granted in respect of persons establishment except in regard to establishments enumerated in clauses (c) and (f) sec(1) of Sec.4 of the Act is subject to the provisions of Sec.5 of the Act. Sec.5 of does not run counter to the essential features of the Act or policy of the enactment. withdrawing the exemption granted under Sec.4 of the Act, the essential features and of the enactment are not in any way changed. On the other hand, the coverage of the my opinion, is widened. 20. The contention raised by Mr.S.Govind Swami-nathan, learned Senior Counsel petitioner was that under Sec.5 of the Act, there is an unconstitutional delegation legislative power. The Apex Court had occasion to consider a similar question in the reported in Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. That case arose under the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. Sub Sec.6 of the said Act provided that no tax shall be payable under this Act on the goods specified in the second column of Schedule II and sub-section 2 of the said provided that the State Government may, after giving notice by notification amend Schedule and thereupon such Schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly. contention raised in that case was, that the power conferred on the State Government Sec.6(2) of the said Act to amend the schedule relating to exemption was unconstitutional because it amounts to delegation of legislative power and that it is impermissible in law. contention was repealed by the Apex Court in the following terms: We are, therefore, of the opinion that the power conferred on the State Government Sec.6(2) to amend the schedule relating to exemption is in consonance with the legislative practice relating to the topic, and is not unconstitutional. 21. While taking the above view, the Apex Court had referred to with approval the judgment of our High Court reported in Syed Mohamed & Co. v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. In that case, the Madras High Court has held that the delega-tion of authority under (vi) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act to the rule making authority to determine at single point in the series of sales by successive dealers, the tax should be levied, was the permissible constitutional limits. v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. In that case, the Madras High Court has held that the delega-tion of authority under (vi) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act to the rule making authority to determine at single point in the series of sales by successive dealers, the tax should be levied, was the permissible constitutional limits. In the decision reported in The Edward Mills Beawar v. The State of Ajmeer,A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 25, the Supreme Court upheld the given to the State Government under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 to add to the employment mentioned in the schedule and extend the Act to that employment. 22. In the decision reported in Mohmedalli v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 980, Supreme Court upheld the provisions of Sec.1(3) of the Employees ’ Provident Funds 1952, authorising the Central Government to bring within the purview of that Act establishment as it might specify under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) of Sec.1 the said Act, applying to factories and establishments specified therein in which 20 or persons are employed. Hence, Sec.1(3)(a) and (b) of the said Act excludes from its factories and establishments in which less than 20 persons are employed. But, under Proviso to Sec.1(3), the Central Government is given the power to apply the provisions Act, by notification, to any establishments employing less than 20 persons. The provision has been upheld by the Supreme Court and it has been observed as follows: “It has been contended (1) that Sec.1(3)(b) under which the notification including restaurants and hotels were brought under the operation of the Act, is invalid because confers uncontrolled and uncanalised power on the Government; (2) that the Act intended to apply to mere wage-earners and not to salaried people and that, therefore, two notifications as a result of which the petitioners ’ employees have been brought within purview of the Act are bad inasmuch as they are salaried employees and not mere wage-earners, and (3) that the scheme is bad under 14 of the Constitution because it is discriminatory.... By Sec.4, the Central Government been authorised to add to the Schedule any other industry in respect of the employees whereof it is of opinion that a provident fund scheme should be framed under the Act, when such a notification is issued, the industry so added shall be deemed to be an specified in the Schedule. By Sec.4, the Central Government been authorised to add to the Schedule any other industry in respect of the employees whereof it is of opinion that a provident fund scheme should be framed under the Act, when such a notification is issued, the industry so added shall be deemed to be an specified in the Schedule. The general rule as to the application of the Act has been laid in that sub-section. By way of exception to that general rule, the Appropriate Government has been authorised by Sec. 17 to exempt from the operation of all or any of the provisions of any scheme framed under the Act. The scheme is to be framed by the Government, under Sec.5 for the establishment of provident fund under the Act employees or any class of employees, in pursuance of the provisions of the Act." 23. In the case of Registrar of Co- operative Societies, Trivandrum v. K.Kunhambu, 1980 S.C. 350: (1980)2 S.C.R. 260 , the Supreme Court upheld Sec.60 of the Madras operative Societies Act, 1932, which gave power to the State Government to exemption to any society from any of the provisions of the Act, as well as the power to the provisions of the Act to any specific society, and it has been observed as follows: "The policy of the Act is there and so are the guidelines, why the legislation? To facilitate formation and working of Co-operative Societies’ . Co-operative Societies, for what purpose? ‘For the promotion of thrift, self-help and mutual aid’. Amongst whom 7 among’ agriculturists and other persons with common economic needs’. To what end? To bring about better business and better methods of production’. The objectives are clear; the guidelines are there. There are numerous provisions of the Act dealing with registration of societies, rights and liabilities of members, duties of registered societies, privileges of registered societies, property and funds of registered societies, inquiry and inspection, supersession committees of societies, dissolution of societies, surcharge and attachment, arbitration We refrain from referring to the details of the provisions except to say that they are generally designed to further the objectives set out in the preamble. But, numerous as the provisions are, they are not capable of meeting the extensive demands of the complex situations may arise in the course of the working of the Act and the formation and the functioning the societies. But, numerous as the provisions are, they are not capable of meeting the extensive demands of the complex situations may arise in the course of the working of the Act and the formation and the functioning the societies. In fact, the too rigorous application of some of the provisions of the itself occasionally result in frustrating the very objects of the Act instead of advancing It is to provide for such situations that the Government is invested by Sec.60 with relax the occasional rigour of the provisions of the Act and to advance the objects Sec.60 empowers the State Government to exempt a registered society from provisions of the Act or to direct that such provision shall apply to such society with modifications. The power given to the Government under Sec.60 of the Act is to be so as to advance the policy and objects of the Act, according to the guidelines gleaned from the preamble and other provisions which we have already pointed clear. We are therefore of the view that Sec.60 is not void on the ground of delegation of legislative power. We so declare and otherwise dismiss the appeal. 24. Sec.1(3) of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948, was held to be example of conditional legislation in the decision reported in Basant Kumar Sarkar Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd., A.I.R 1964 S.C. 1260 and the law has been stated in the terms: "Sec. 1(3) is not an illustration of delegated legislation; it is what can be properly as conditional legislation. Sec.3(1) of the Act purports to authorise the Central to establish a corporation for the administration of the scheme of Employees ’ State by a notification. In other words, when the notification should be issued and in what factories it should be issued, has been left to the discretion of the Central and that is precisely what is usually done by conditional legislation. Assuming that element of delegation, the plea that the discretion conferred by Sec.1(3) is not guided legislative provision is unsustainable, because there is enough guidance given by the relevant provisions of the and the very scheme of the Act itself. In the very nature of things, it would have been impossible for the legislature to decide in what areas and in respect of which factories Employees ’ State Insurance Corporation should be established. In the very nature of things, it would have been impossible for the legislature to decide in what areas and in respect of which factories Employees ’ State Insurance Corporation should be established. It is obvious that a scheme this kind, though very beneficent, could not be introduced in the whole of the country all once. Such beneficial measures which need careful experimentation have sometimes to adopted by stages and in different phases, and so, inevitably, the question of extending statutory benefits contemplated by the Act has to be left to the discretion of the appropriate Government. The course adopted by modern legislatures in dealing with welfare scheme has uniformly conformed to the same pattern. The legislature evolves a scheme of socio economic welfare, makes elaborate provisions in respect of it and leaves it to Government concerned to decide when, how and in what manner the scheme should introduced. That cannot amount to excessive delegation. (S) The Edward Mills Company Ltd. v. The State of Ajmeer, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 25 and A.I.R 1963 S.C. 306 and Bhikusa Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. The Union of India, A.I.R.1963 S.C. 1591 Rel. on. I.L.R. 40 Pat 193, Affirmed" Hence, I am of the view, that the provision of Sec.5 of the Act is valid and does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation as contended by the learned Senior Counsel for petitioner. 25. The Act in question being a welfare legislation, the court should lean in favour of wider delegation of legislative power as observed by the Supreme Court in the case reported Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Trivandrum v. K.Kunhambu, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 350 (1980) 2 S.C.R. 260 , which is as follows: "A good deal of latitude has been held to be permissible in the case of taxing statutes and the same principle a generous degree of latitude must be permissible in the case of welfare legislation, particularly those statutes which are designated to further the Directive Principles of Slate Policy." 26. The State Government has not usurped the functions of the State Legislature. Further, Sec.5 of the Act does not contravene any constitutional provision. It is not the case of petitioner that Sec.5 of the Act contravenes any of their fundamental rights or ultra vires powers of the State. I have found already that Sec.5 of the Act does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation. Further, Sec.5 of the Act does not contravene any constitutional provision. It is not the case of petitioner that Sec.5 of the Act contravenes any of their fundamental rights or ultra vires powers of the State. I have found already that Sec.5 of the Act does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation. As already mentioned, the Legislature has enacted Secs.4 and 5 with clarity. Sec.5 overrides the provisions of Sec.4 Since the exemption contained in Sec4 subject to the provisions of Sec.5, the delegated authority, by issuing the notification withdrawing the exemption, is not altering the statute or acts contrary to the statute. Sec.5 limits the powers of the delegated authority and the power of the State Government defined clearly. Delegated power under Sec.5 of the Act cannot extend to the withdrawal exemption granted under Clauses (c) and (f) of sub-sec.(1) of Sec4 and sub-sec(2) of Sec.4 of the Act. 27. Further, Sec.5 of the Act has to be construed liberally, being a social welfare legislation, and it is also a pre-constitutional enactment. In this connection, reference can be usefully made to the decision of the Apex Court reported in M/s.Harihar Polyfibres v. Director, E.S.I. Corporation, (1984)4 S.C.C. 324 , wherein it has been observed as follows: "The Employees’ State Insurance Act is a welfare legislation and the definition of designedly wide. Any ambiguous expression must receive beneficent construction... The E.S.I. Act being a social welfare legislation must be given a liberal interpretation beneficial the interests of the employees so as to serve the purpose and objects of the Act." 28. In the above view of mine, there is no need to refer in detail the judgments relied on the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, for, there cannot be any demur to proposition made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that there cannot be delegation of legislative function. 29. Sec.5 of the Act does not delegate essential legislative function to the State Government. Exemption granted under Sec.4 is subject to withdrawal under Sec.5 and the power withdraws the exemption does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation. Legislative policy is contained in Secs.4 and 5 of the Act. Standards and guidelines are discernible from the various provisions, and scheme and object of the Act. Therefore, I hold that Sec.5 of Act is valid and legal. 30. Legislative policy is contained in Secs.4 and 5 of the Act. Standards and guidelines are discernible from the various provisions, and scheme and object of the Act. Therefore, I hold that Sec.5 of Act is valid and legal. 30. This Court has been taking the consistent view that the employer is bound to disclose reasons for termination in the order of termination itself and failure to do so would the order of termination void and non est as could be seen from the following decisions. the decision reported in The Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (1950)2 L.L.J. P.V.Rajamanner, C.J.,and A.V.Viswanatha Sastri, J., it has been observed as follows: "Under Sec.41(1) of the Act, the services of a person like the first respondent who has employed continuously for over a period of six months can be dispensed with reasonable cause after giving the person at least a month ’ s notice or wages in lieu of notice or on a charge of misconduct supported by satisfactory evidence recorded enquiry held for the purpose in which case notice would not be necessary. From the order the company dispensing with the services of the 1st respondent, the only reason appearing the non-requirement of his services. The order does not state anything else. The question, therefore, for the appellate authority was to determine whether that ground said to be reasonable cause. The authority held that it could not be and we agree with. 31. In the decision reported in State Bank of Travancore v. Deputy Commissioner of Coimbatore, (1981)1 L.L.J. 393 , Nainar Sundaram, J.,as he then was), it has been observed as follows: "The first ground is that the proceedings under Sec.41 of the Act before the first respondent are incompetent because the petitioner has passed the order of termination against second respondent under paragraph 522 (1) of the Sastri Award. His submission tenable because it cannot be disputed that so far as the employment in question concerned, the provisions of the Act are definitely attracted. The petitioner satisfies definition of an employer and the second respondent satisfies the definition of a employed within the meaning of the Act and any contract between the employer and person employed cannot override the express provision of the Act, or, in particular, thereof. The petitioner satisfies definition of an employer and the second respondent satisfies the definition of a employed within the meaning of the Act and any contract between the employer and person employed cannot override the express provision of the Act, or, in particular, thereof. The learned counsel for the petitioner is not in a position to cite any direct authority that wherever there is a contract governing the relationship between the employer and person employed the provisions of the Act will have to be ignored and there is no necessity to adhere to and satisfy the formalities laid down under Sec.41 of the Act. Hence, I am able to appreciate and accept the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The second ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even otherwise petitioner has dispensed with the services of the second respondent for a reasonable and there has been strict compliance with the first limb of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.41 of the sense the second respondent has been paid more than a month’s wages in lieu notice contemplated. In the instant case, a memo was issued to the second respondent 11th May, 1976 and an explanation was obtained on 10th June, 1976. The order termination dated 17th March, 1977 does not disclose as to whether the explanation accepted or not and the factors which weighed with the petitioner to pass the order termination on the basis of reasonable cause. If the termination is to be on the ground reasonable cause, it is incumbent on the part of the employer to disclose the reasonable cause in the order of termination and in the absence of a disclosure it is not possible for authority, and in particular the Appellate Authority under Sec.41(2) of the Act to determine as to whether the grounds put forth by the employer can be stated to constitute a reasonable cause and as to whether the order of termination has been passed bona fide. The necessity to disclose the reasonable cause in the order of termination has been stressed by a Bench this Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd, (1950)2 L.L.J. 1043." 32. In the decision reported in The Management of Blue Star & Co. The necessity to disclose the reasonable cause in the order of termination has been stressed by a Bench this Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd, (1950)2 L.L.J. 1043." 32. In the decision reported in The Management of Blue Star & Co. Ltd, v. The Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Madras-6, (1989)1 L.L.J. 233 , Shanmukham, J., has held follows: "From the above evidence, it is clear it is the practice of the management not to put the reasons in writing in respect of managers, but to inform verbally and according practice, reasons were verbally stated and not stated in the letter. Thus, not only documentary evidence emanated from the management but also the evidence management itself will give a direct lie to the stand taken by the management that because of the specific request made by the 2nd respondent, the reasons for termination were not disclosed in the order of termination dated 3rd January, 1980. If so much is established, it follows the order has to be struck down as illegal in view of the decision of this Court in State of Travancore v. Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Coimbatore and another, (1981)1 393, which in turn followed the decision of this Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd, L.L.J. 1043. Mr.Justice Nainar Sundaram in State Bank of Travancore v. Deputy Commissioner of Labour, (1981)1 L.L.J. 393 at 395." It is also seen from the above decision, the learned Judge has followed the decision of Court in State Bank of Travancore v. Deputy Commissioner of Labour, (1981)1 L.L.J. which in turn followed the decision of this Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (1950)2 L.L.J. 1043. 33. It is admitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that if Sec.5 of the held to be valid, the notification viz., G.O.Ms.No.4074, Industries, Labour and Housing (Labour), dated 5.10.1966 would be valid and consequently, the 2nd respondent can invoke the remedy under Sec.41 (2) of the Act, and since no reason has been given in the order termination, the order of termination, in my view, is void and non-est. The order termination, which is marked as Ex.A-1 before the Appellate Authority/1st respondent, also reproduced hereunder: "Air France General Management - India and Nepal 50-B, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi-10 021. Phone 604775 - Grams Airfrans - Telex 2480 DEL.DA.0411/CC.AC. Mr.K.R.Gopalan 68, Abhiramapuram IV St., Madras-600 018. The order termination, which is marked as Ex.A-1 before the Appellate Authority/1st respondent, also reproduced hereunder: "Air France General Management - India and Nepal 50-B, Chanakyapuri, New Delhi-10 021. Phone 604775 - Grams Airfrans - Telex 2480 DEL.DA.0411/CC.AC. Mr.K.R.Gopalan 68, Abhiramapuram IV St., Madras-600 018. Re: Notice of termination of Services. Registered A/C. New Delhi 27th February, 1987. Sir, In terms of our agreement Clause 8, we hereby terminate your services in Air France effect from 31st March, 1987. 34. Therefore, the view of the Appellate Authority Act respondent exercising powers Sec.41 (2) of the Act, that the order of termination issued by the writ petitioner to the respondent does not contain reasonable cause and that therefore, the same is liable set aside does not call for any interference by this Court. The writ petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and accordingly, the same is dismissed. However, there will order as to costs. Petition dismissed Yours Faithfully, Air France (Sd.) P.J.Borgne, General Manager."