M. C. JAIN, J. ( 1 ) BY this writ petition, the petitioner Shri Surinder Singh Ahiuwalia, at present the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, seeks to quash the FIR No. RC-1/ 87-ACU (1) dated 24-3-1987 registered by Delhi Special Police Establishment under Section 5 (2) read lal Sec. 5 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the investigation pursuant to the said First Information Report. ( 2 ) WE may state a few relevant facts leading to the present writ petition. The petitioner was commissioned on 3-5-1964 as an Emergency Commission Officer in the Army when he was officiating Captain in the Army, be appeared in the Indian Administrative Service and other Central Government Services Competitive Examination held in 1968 by the Union Public Service Commission. The petitioner was inducted in the Indian Administrative Service Cadre having regard to his order of merit, and was allocated to the State of Nagaland. From 1971 to 1987, the petitioner served in various capacities as under:- " (A) Under Secretary, Supply Department, Government of Nagaland-1971 (July-September ). (B) Additional Deputy Commissioner, Kohima-1971 (Sept.-December ). (C) Additional Deputy Commissioner, Zunheboto- December, 1971-February, 1973. (D) Director of Supplies, Government of Nagaland-February, 1973-October, 1974. (E) Joint Secretary, Planning Department and Joint Development Commissioner, Nagaland-October, 1974 to June, 1975. (F) Deputy Commissioner-Kohima District-June, 1975-December, 1976. (G) Secretary to Government of Nagaland, Forest Department and Weights and Measures Department- December, 1976-June, 1978. (H) Director, Police Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi-July, 1978__ August, 1979. (I) Director in. the Policy Planning Division, Department of Personnel, and Administrative Reforms, New Delhi. (J) Attended Diploma Course in Advanced Studies in Development Administration at the University of Manchester (U. K.)-September, 1980-June, 1981. (K) Reposted as Director in the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, Training Division, June, 1981-March, 1984. (1) Financial Commissioner and Finance Secretary, Government of Nagaland, Kohima-April, 1984-November, 1986. (M) Transferred to the post of Commissioner and Secretary, Labour and Employment Department, Government of Nagaland, Kohima. ( 3 ) ON 4-12-1986, the Chief Minister Shri Hokisha Sema wrote a D. O. letter (Annexure A-l) to Shri P. Chidambaram, Union Minister of State for Home, regarding the questionable conduct relating to extortion of businessmen of Dimapur and transaction related to a hand loan of Rs. ( 3 ) ON 4-12-1986, the Chief Minister Shri Hokisha Sema wrote a D. O. letter (Annexure A-l) to Shri P. Chidambaram, Union Minister of State for Home, regarding the questionable conduct relating to extortion of businessmen of Dimapur and transaction related to a hand loan of Rs. 60,000 and involvement in shoddy gunny bags transaction and in the conduct of State lotteries in the capacity as the Director of State lotteries. It was stated by him that Shri Ahluwalia is reported to have acquired assets disproportionate to his known sources of income, some of such are, Air-conditioned cinema house in Agra, valuable residential property in F-5, South Extension Part II, New Delhi, in the name of Mrs. Kamaljit Walia and another residential property in W-7. Greater Kailash Part I, New Delhi and some landed property in Gwalior and Chandigarh. It was also stated that in this regard a Memorandum no. 500724 dated 13-2-1985 from the Prime Minister s Office alleging corrupt practices by Shri Ahiuwalia did not evoke requisite response by predecessor Government, it was further stated in the letter that the Government of Nagaland does not have proper machinery to conduct thorough investigation into all the ramifications of the case, comprehensive enquiry by a well reputed investigative agency like the CBI is, therefore, absolutely necessary and the State Government, therefore, conveys its consent for investigation by the CBI. The letter was accompanied by the names and addresses of Nagaland lottery agents and also a note relating to the petitioner serving as Financial Commissioner of Nagaland at that time. ( 4 ) SUPERINTENDENT Police, CBI, Special Police Establishment, Delhi, ACU-I Branch registered FIR (Annexure P-l) on 24th March, 1987 at 1400 hrs. It would be profitable to reproduce the FIR as in connection with the FIR, much arguments have been advanced before us. So, we reproduce the same : "delhi SPECIAL POLICE ESTABLISHMENT -ACU (I) BRANCH FIRST INFORMATION REPORT. (Recorded-154 Criminal Procedure Code.) Crime No. RC-I/87 ACU (I) Date and time for report : 24-3-1987 at 400 hrs. Place of occurence : Delhi Nagaland and other places. with State Date and time of occurence : 1975 to 31-12-1986 Name of complainant or informant with address : Source Offence : U/s 5 (2) r/w 5 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act 11 of 1947 ). 1. Sh. S. S. Ahluwalia, Indian Administrative Service. Place of occurence : Delhi Nagaland and other places. with State Date and time of occurence : 1975 to 31-12-1986 Name of complainant or informant with address : Source Offence : U/s 5 (2) r/w 5 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act 11 of 1947 ). 1. Sh. S. S. Ahluwalia, Indian Administrative Service. Secretary and Commissioner, Labour and Employment Govt. of Nagaland, Kohima. 2. Delhi Address : D-11/49, Pandara Road, New Delhi. Home Town and Address : Mohalla Pandian, Zira Distt. Ferozepur (PB ). ACTION taken : A regular case is registered. INVESTIGATING Officer : Sh. D. K. Papriwal, Deputy Supdt. of Police, SPE SIC-I, New Delhi. INFORMATION has been received through a reliable source that Shri S. S. Ahluwalia, Indian Administrative Service. , a Public Servant while functioning in different capacities in Nagaland and Delhi from 1975 to 31-12-1986 has been indulging in corrupt activities and malpractices and amassed assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. It has been learnt that the money so illegally acquired by Shri Ahiuwalia has been invested in various movable and immovable properties at Delhi, Gwalior and other places in the name of his wife, son and other relatives/closed persons. 2. Information received has disclosed acquisition of the following movable and immovable properties on the parts of Shri S. S. Ahluwalia: (I) A double-storeyed house at No. F-5, South Extension Part-11, New Delhi, purchased for several lakhs in the name of his wife Smt. Guljit Kaur in Feb. 1985. This property is reported to have been under valued on papers showing purchase price as only Rs. 4,95,000 and it is also alleged that one Mr. Anil Wahi, Chartered Accountant of M/s. Wahi and Co. New Delhi, residing at N-158, Greater Kailash Part I, New Delhi, a close friend of Sh. S. S. Ahluwalia has assisted him in this transaction and is in possession of the transaction papers and accounts in respect of renovations being carried out to the said property. (II) A plot of land measuring 1000 sq. metres at Gwalior purchased in the name of his son Manjit Singh for Rs. 44,500 sometime in 1976. (III) A Truck no. NLK-444 worth about Rs. 1. 60 lakhs purchased in the year of 1976 in the name of his brother-Mohinder Singh. (IV) Sh. (II) A plot of land measuring 1000 sq. metres at Gwalior purchased in the name of his son Manjit Singh for Rs. 44,500 sometime in 1976. (III) A Truck no. NLK-444 worth about Rs. 1. 60 lakhs purchased in the year of 1976 in the name of his brother-Mohinder Singh. (IV) Sh. S. S. Ahluwalia, IAS, is also reported to be in possession of other moveable properties in the form of vehicles costly jewellery and other costly gadgets and that he is leading a luxurious life beyond his known means. 3. His income from the known sources from 1975 onwards till December, 1986 is reported to be about Rs. 4,50,000. ( 5 ) THE above facts disclose commission of an offence punishable u/s 5 (2) r/w5 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act II of 1947) by Sh. S. S. Ahluwalia, lxs, Secretary and entrusted to Shri D. K. Papriwal, Deputy Supdt. of Police SIC/i SPE-CBI New Delhi, for investigation. (J. K. Dutt) Supdt. of Police CBI/spe/acu-I, New Delhi. " ( 6 ) SHRI P. N. Lekhi, learned counsel for the petitioner s main challenge is that there is no consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (Act no. 26 of 1946), for short, the DSPE Act, and there never was any consent by the Government of Nagaland. The petitioner has attacked the general consent dated 8-11-67 on the ground that there was no schedule annexed with the letter of the Joint Secretary to the Government of Nagaland Shri 1. Long Kumer, as deposed by 1. Long Kumer in his affidavit placed on record of the case. So, the aforesaid general consent dated 8-11-67 is of no avail and in pursuance thereof, no investigation can be conducted by the CBI in any area of the State of Nagaland. In any case, the consent has been withdrawn vide notification dated 23-11-89. So, no investigation can continue thereafter. Mr. P. N. Lekhi submitted that the FIR registered against the petitioner was nothing but a follow-up of the letter dated 4th December, 1986 of the Chief Minister Mr. Hokisha Sema to the Union Home Minister. The letter of Mr. Hokisha Sema cannot be pressed into service tor the purpose of consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act. Mr. P. N. Lekhi submitted that the FIR registered against the petitioner was nothing but a follow-up of the letter dated 4th December, 1986 of the Chief Minister Mr. Hokisha Sema to the Union Home Minister. The letter of Mr. Hokisha Sema cannot be pressed into service tor the purpose of consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act. According to him, it is an elementary principle of jurisprudence that the corpus delicti cannot be and is not separable. The petitioner under investigation having been placed out of bound by the State Government in exercise of the lawful authority, so it is not legally competent for the CBI to continue with the investigation under the aforesaid FIR. His further contention is that the allegations made in the FIR are not co-related to Section 5 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and as such on these grounds, the FIR as well as the investigation conducted by the CBI in respect of the said FIR are liable to be quashed. ( 7 ) SHRI Satpal, learned counsel for respondents I to 3, on the other hand, submitted that consent dated 8-11-67 was a general consent and the consent is a valid one. It is true that vide notification dated 23-11-1989, the consent was withdrawn but the same was restored back vide order dated 9-5-90 (Annexure-Y) in relation to the petitioner and the general consent was also restored. The Government of Nagaland further issued order dated 6th November, 1990 reiterating that the order of 23rd November, 1989 withdrawing the consent stands valid and by the order dated 6th November, 1990, the order dated 9-5-90 was cancelled. From the side of the petitioner, another order dated 8-1-91 has been placed on record wherein it is stated that the Government of Nagaland has already reiterated its order dated 23-11-89, withdrawing the consent against the petitioner in respect of the aforesaid FIR, and the order dated 8-1-91 also records that for the sake of removal of doubts and as a logical consequence of the order dated 23-11-89, it is clarified that the Government of Nagaland have now also decided not to accord any sanction for prosecution of the petitioner on irrevocable basis on the basis of the aforesaid FIR or for initiating prosecution proceeding against the officer. Mr. Mr. Satpal submitted that the Government of Nagaland has been changing its stand from time to time for reasons best known to the Government but he vehemently urged that the general consent dated 8-11-67 was valid and in pursuance of the said consent, the CBI conducted investigation for the offence u/s 5 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, as the offences under the said Act find mention in the schedule at item no. 2 annexed to the consent letter of the Government of Nagaland dated 8-11-1967. This consent was for the first time withdrawn on 23-11-89. So, whatever investigation has been conducted in respect of the petitioner and further conducted after the withdrawal of the consent under order dated 9-5-90 can be made use of by the CBI and besides that, he urges that the offence under Section 5 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is a cognizable offence and when in relation to a cognizable offence, FIR has been registered, then the CBI is competent to investigate the offence not only in respect of the commission of the offence in the State of Nagaland but also at Delhi and other places and there are clear and categorical allegations mentioned in the FIR constituting the offence u/s 5 (1) (e ). So, the FIR correlate with the offence under Sec. 5 (1) (e ). He also submitted that the FIR is under investigation which is now almost complete and the CBI is ready to file a chargesheet. It was urged that it is not a fit case for exercise of extraordinary power of this court, for preventing the CBI to investigate the offence and for quashing the FIR. He submitted that there are good grounds for charging the petitioner of the said offence. ( 8 ) FIRST we may proceed to examine the relevant provisions of the DSPE Act. ( 9 ) THE Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 is a short enactment of 7 sections. Section 2 thereof relates to the Constitution and Powers of Special Police Establishment. Section 3 lays down that the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette specify the offences or class of offences which are to be investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment. Section 4 provides for superintendence and administration of special Police Establishment. For our purposes. Section 2 thereof relates to the Constitution and Powers of Special Police Establishment. Section 3 lays down that the Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette specify the offences or class of offences which are to be investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment. Section 4 provides for superintendence and administration of special Police Establishment. For our purposes. Sections 5 find 6 are material which read as under :- 5. Extension of powers and jurisdiction of special police establishment to other areas.- (1) The Central Government may by order extend to any area (including Railway areas), [in a State, not being a Union Territory] the powers and jurisdiction of members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment for the investigation of any of offences or classes of offences specified in a notification under section 3. (2) When by an order under sub-section (1) the powers and jurisdiction of members of the said police establishment are extended to any such area, a member thereof may, subject to any orders which the Central Government may make in this behalf, discharge the functions of a police officer in that area and shall, while so discharging such functions, be deemed to be a member of the police force of that area and be vested with the powers, functions and privileges and be subject to the liabilities of a police officer belonging to that police force. (3) Where any such order under sub-section (1) is made in relation to any area, then, without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (2) any member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment of or above the rank of Sub-Inspector may subject to any orders which the Central Government may make in this behalf, exercise the powers of the officer in charge of a police station in that area and when so exercising such powers, shall be deemed to be an officer incharge of a police station discharging the functions of such an officer within the limits of his station".6. Consent of State Government to exercise of powers and jurisdiction.-Nothing contained in section 5 shall be deemed to enable any member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to exercise powers and Jurisdiction in any area in [a State, not being a Union Territory or railway area], without the consent of the Government of that State. Consent of State Government to exercise of powers and jurisdiction.-Nothing contained in section 5 shall be deemed to enable any member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to exercise powers and Jurisdiction in any area in [a State, not being a Union Territory or railway area], without the consent of the Government of that State. " ( 10 ) IT would appear from the provisions contained in Section 5 that the Central Government may by order extend the powers and jurisdiction to members of DSPE to any area for the investigation of any offences or classes of offences specified in a notification under Section 3. While exercising that power, the members of the DSPE would be deemed to be members of the police force of that area and be vested with the powers, functions and privileges and would be subject to the liabilities of a police officer belonging to the police force of that area, i. e. the members of the DSPE will discharge the functions of the police officer of that area. Further the members of the D. S. P. . E. of or above the rank of Sub Inspector shall be deemed to be incharge of the police station discharging the functions of such an officer within the limits of his police station. So, for all purposes, the members of DSPE would be police officers of that particular area, exercising all powers functions and privileges and subject to all liabilities of a police officer of that area. Section 6 is an overriding provision. It begins with a non-obstanate clause. It overrides the provisions of Section 5. According to this provision, the powers would not be exercisable by any member of the DSPE unless the Government of the State gives its consent. By virtus of Section 5, any member of DSPE would not be able to exercise power and jurisdiction in any area in a State, without the consent of the Government of that State. This consent of a State is a pre-condition for exercise of powers and jurisdiction in that area of the State by any member of the Delhi Special Police Estabtishment. Thus, it would appear that consent of the State of Nagu. land is necessary for investigating the offence under Section 5 (1) (e) in respect of the aforesaid F. I. R. relating to the offences in the State of Nagaland. Thus, it would appear that consent of the State of Nagu. land is necessary for investigating the offence under Section 5 (1) (e) in respect of the aforesaid F. I. R. relating to the offences in the State of Nagaland. ( 11 ) THE controversy with regard to the general consult is that the schedule annexed to the letter dated 8-11-67 is not a signed one and according to Shri P. N. Lekhi, the schedule has been inserted in the original file which was submitted by Shri Satpal for perusal of the court and the petitioner has tried to support its case by placing on record the affidavit of Shri 1. Longkumar. Director, Administration, Kohima. He has stated in his affidavit that the letter dated 8-11-67 (Annexure-H) is filed alongwith the additional affidavit dated 21-12-88 of Shri R. K. Bhatia, Superintendent of Police, CBI. Annexed to the said letter is a schedule. He further stated that if the schedule was attached to that letter dated 8-11-67, then that schedule should also bear his signature and, therefore, unsigned schedule with the official letter signed by him has no meaning. As against his affidavit, there is an affidavit of Shri M. S. Manchanda, Section Officer, A. V. D.-II, Department of Personnel and Training, North Block, that the photo copy of the letter dated 8-11-67 and that of the schedule annexed with the letter were supplied by him from the relevant file to Shri R. K. Bhatia, Superintendent of Ponce and Shri N. C. Jha, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Investigation Cell-1 has deposed that Annexure-H, filed with the additional affidavit dated 21-12-88 is genuine document and the schedule annexed thereto is a part of the document in the file of Ministry of Home Affairs (now DP and T), New Delhi. On the basis of this, the Govt. of India vide order no. 228/5/67/avd. II dated 17-4-68 (Annexure C to the counter-affidavit) extended the powers and jurisdiction of the members of DSPE for the investigation in the State of Nagaland for definite categories of -offences. including those under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. From the contents of order dated 17-4-68 (Annexure C), it appears that the copies of the said order have been forwarded to all State Governments, including Union Territories. including those under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. From the contents of order dated 17-4-68 (Annexure C), it appears that the copies of the said order have been forwarded to all State Governments, including Union Territories. It is true that from the perusal of the file produced by Shri Satpal, the signed copy of the Schedule to letter dated 8-11-67 by Shri 1. Longkumar, is not enclosed but the file further reveals that a copy of that letter alongwith the schedule was sent by the Government of Nagaland with its letter D. O. NO. N 11. / 551 (29)67 L/25-11-67 by Shri M. L. Kampani, Deputy Secretary. Ministry of External Affairs to Shri A. P. Veera Raghvan, Dy. Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs. Shri Lekhi submitted that the enclosure with the copy is a subsequent insertion. We find no justification for such a submission. If the schedule had been inserted later on, then a copy of the schedule could have been inserted alongwith the signed copy of the letter dated 8-11.-67. Thus. having regard to the affidavits of Shri R. K. Bhatia, Shri M. S. Manchanda and Shri N. C. Jha, and having regard to Annexures H and C, coupled with the perusal of the file produced by Shri Satpal, we are of the opinion that the schedule was forwarded to the Union Government alongwith the letter dated 8-11-67 and it is on the basis of that letter that the order Annexure-C was issued by the Union Government, u/s 5 of the DSPE Act by which order, the powers and jurisdiction of the members of the DSPE were extended to the State of Nagaland for the investigation of the offences specified in the schedule. Item B of the schedule relates to offences under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Thus, there was a pre-existing consent at the time of registration of the case by the CBI on 24-3-87. It is true that in respect of the petitioner, the consent was withdrawn on 23-11-89 and it was again restored vide order dated 9-5-90 and further byorder dated 6-11-90, order dated 9-5-90 was cancelled and in respect of the order of withdrawal, it was stated that that stands valid and further it was reiterated vide order dated 8-1-91. It is true that in respect of the petitioner, the consent was withdrawn on 23-11-89 and it was again restored vide order dated 9-5-90 and further byorder dated 6-11-90, order dated 9-5-90 was cancelled and in respect of the order of withdrawal, it was stated that that stands valid and further it was reiterated vide order dated 8-1-91. It is really strange, how the State Government functioned in relation to the giving of consent for investigation of offence u/s 5 (1) (e) in respect of the petitioner. In any case, the general consent still holds good and it is only in relation to the petitioner that it is withdrawn. After the withdrawal of the consent, it is correct that the CBI has no jurisdiction to investigate the offence against the petitioner under the aforesaid FIR. As it is clear from the provision contained in Section 6 that the members of the DSPE will have no jurisdiction to exercise any power in any area of the State of Nagaland without the consent of the Government of Nagaland. ( 12 ) WE may also mention Here that in the MR. "nagaland, Delhi and other places" have been mentioned as places of occurrence. The offence has no relation only with the State of Nagaland but it has relation with Delhi and other places as well. And as such, the CBI is competent to investigate into the offence as mentioned in the FIR against the petitioner with respect to Delhi and other places but no investigation after the withdrawal of the order dated 9-5-90 can be conducted by the CBI in any area of the State of Nagaland with respect to the petitioner. ( 13 ) IN view of this discussion, it is not necessary to examine whether the consent given by the Chief Minister in his letter dated 4-12-86 (Annexure A-l) is a consent which fulfils the requirements of law. ( 14 ) WE may also refer here the submission of Shri P. N. Lekhi that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has no application, and so, no investigation can be conducted under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 1 (2) of the Code reads as under:- "1. Short title, extent and commencement. ( 14 ) WE may also refer here the submission of Shri P. N. Lekhi that the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has no application, and so, no investigation can be conducted under the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 1 (2) of the Code reads as under:- "1. Short title, extent and commencement. (2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir; Provided that the provisions of this Code, other than those relating to Chapters VIII, X and XI thereof, shall not apply- (a) to the State of Nagaland, (b) to the tribal areas, but the concerned State Government may, by notification, apply such provisions or any of them to the whole or part of the State of Nagaland or such tribal areas, as the case may be, with such supplemental, incidental or consequential modifications, as n,ay be specified in the notification. " ( 15 ) CHAPTER VIII of the Code relates to Security tor keeping the peace and for good behaviour. Chapter X deals with maintenance of public order and tranquillity and Chapter XI with Preventive action of the Police. These Chapters have application to the State of Nagaland and to the tribal areas and rest of the provisions of the Code do not apply. In this connection, Shri Lekhi invited our attention to State of Nagaland v. Rattan Singh, AIR 1967 S. C. 212, (1) where their Lordships said that the Rules of 1937 were enacted by notification and as notifications were saved after the repeal of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874 by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1937, the Rules in the notification were also saved. After the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Rules of 1937 were successively preserved by Ss. 292 and 293 of the Government of India Act, 1935, S. 18 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and Art. 372 of the Constitution. ( 16 ) REFERENCE was also made by Shri Lekhi to the decision of the Supreme Court in V. L. Rohlua v. Deputy Commissioner, Aijal, District Mizo, 1970 (2) SCO 908. (2) Their Lordships said that the fact of the matter, however, is that he Criminal Procedure Code is not applicable by reason of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution in this area. This was laid down in the State of Nagaland v. Rattan Singh (supra ). (2) Their Lordships said that the fact of the matter, however, is that he Criminal Procedure Code is not applicable by reason of Sixth Schedule to the Constitution in this area. This was laid down in the State of Nagaland v. Rattan Singh (supra ). Only the spirit of the Criminal Procedure Code applies. In that case, the question was the applicability of Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In that regard, their Lordships said that strict compliance with the provisions of Section 344 of the Code cannot be insisted and on account of the non-compliance of Section 344 detention cannot be held to be illegal. ( 17 ) TO the same effect is Mown vs. The Superintendent, Special Jail, Nowgong, Assam and others, 1971 (3) SCC 936 (3) It was held in that case that the Code of Criminal Procedure is not applicable in Nagaland in view of the Rules for the administration of justice and Appeals in Naga Hills District, 1937. Only spirit of the Code is applicable. ( 18 ) SUFFICE it to say that the Members of the CBI have to investigate as if they are the members of the Police force of the State of Nagaland in accordance with the notifications or the Rules applicable in the State of Nagaland. However, the principles of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be applicable. The CBI has only limited job to be performed i. e. the investigation. Powers and jurisdiction have been conferred on the members of the DSPE only for the purpose of investigation. ( 19 ) MR. Satpal submitted that the offence under Section 5 (1) (and) is a cognizable offence and the commission of that offence is also said to have taken place at Delhi and so, the CBI has jurisdiction to investigate into the offence. In this connection, he referred to Sections 177-178 of the Code. Section 177 makes a provision for ordinary place of enquiry and trial. It lays down that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. In this connection, he referred to Sections 177-178 of the Code. Section 177 makes a provision for ordinary place of enquiry and trial. It lays down that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. And Section 178 lays down that when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Shri Satpal supported his contention by Nasiruddin Khan v. State of Bihar, AFR 1973 SC 186. (4) That was an offence under Section 5 (f) of the Bengal Military Police Act. The sepoy was employed in Bihar Military Police. He deserted the service while on active service. His trial was conducted at Patna for offence of deserting in Kashmir. It was held that the trial was not vitiated. There was no exclusive jurisdiction of a particular court to try that offence. ( 20 ) HE also referred to Union of India vs. AD Ball, 1978 Cri. LJ NOC 14 (HIM PRA ). (5) It was a case of grant of sanction for prosecution. Authority competent to grant sanction for prosecution is to be determined under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution of India. This case has no relevance. ( 21 ) COMING to the next submission of Shri P N Lekhi, we may state that the report makes sufficient allegations in respect of the offence under Section 5 (1) (e ). Section 5 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is as under :- "5. (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct:- (E) if he. or any person on his behalf is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession, for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property dis-proportionate to his known source of income. (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct:- (E) if he. or any person on his behalf is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession, for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property dis-proportionate to his known source of income. " ( 22 ) SECTION 5 takes into consideration the criminal miscinduct in the discharge of the official duty if public servant s conduct falls in any of the clauses (a) to (e ). Then it can be said that the public servant has committed the offence of criminal misconduct. What amounts to criminal misconduct is provided and-clauses (a) to (e) and clause (e) states that if the public servant or anyone on his behalf is in possession or has at any time during the period of his office been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or proper disproportionate to his known sources of income, the public servant will be said to have committed the offence of criminal misconduct. The essential ingredients of Section 5 (1) (e) therefore, are : (1) That the public servant should either be in possession or someone else on his behalf may be in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income or the public servant or any person on his behalf at any time during the period of his office been in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income in respect of which the public servant may not be able to satisfactorily account. The FIR clearly recites information has been received through a reliable source that Shri S. S, Ahluwalia while functioning in different capacities in Nagaland and Delhi from 1975 to 31-12-1986 has been indulging incorrupt activities and malpractices and amassed assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. It is noteworthy that the petitioner remained in Delhi from July, 1978 to March, 1984. Shri Lekhi submitted that there is no allegation that during this period, the petitioner acquired any property in Delhi. As per the allegation in the FIR, the petitioner is said to be in possession of movable and immovable properties as mentioned in para 2 ol the FIR. Shri Lekhi submitted that there is no allegation that during this period, the petitioner acquired any property in Delhi. As per the allegation in the FIR, the petitioner is said to be in possession of movable and immovable properties as mentioned in para 2 ol the FIR. In clause (iv) of para 2, further it is mentioned that Shn S. S. Ahluwalia, Indian Administrative Service is also reported to be in possession of other movable properties in the form of vehicles costly jewellery and other costly gadgets and that he is leading a luxurious life beyond his known means, and during his entire period from 1975 to December, 1986, the known sources of income are of about Rs. 4,50,000. From the allegations made in the FIR, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the allegations do not in any way correlate with the offence under Section 5 (1) (e ). So, in this submission of Shri Lekhi, we find no force that the FIR does not disclose any offence or it does not correlate with the offence under Section 5 (1) (e ). ( 23 ) MR. Satpal vehemently urged that this court should not interfere with the investigation of cognizable offence under Article 226 of the Constitution. Reliance was placed by him on State of Bihar vs. JAC Saldanna and others, AIR 1980 SC 326 . (6) Their Lordships in this case observed as under :- "there is a clear cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the in- vestigating officer submits report to the Court requesting the Court to take cognisance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end. On a cognisance of the offence under Section 190 of the Code its duty comes to an end. On a cognizance of the offence being taken by the Court, the police function of investigation comes to an end subject to the provision contained in Section 173 (8), there commences the adjudicatory function of the judiciary to determine whether an offence has been committed and if so, whether by; the person or persons charged with the crime by the police in its report to the Court, and to award adequate punishment according to law for the offence proved to the satisfaction of the Court. There is thus a well defined and well demarcated function in the field of crime detection and its subsequent adjudication between the police and the Magistrate. This has been recognised way back in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed, (. 1944) 71 Ind App 203 at p. 213, where the Privy Counsel observed as under : "in India, as has been shown, there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interferd with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the court s functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then. THIS view of the Judicial Committee clearly demarcates the functions of the executive and the judiciary in the field of detection of crime and its subsequent trial and it would appear that the power of the police to investigate into a cognizable offence is ordinarily not to be interfered with by the judiciary. " ( 24 ) INVESTIGATION is the stage of crime detection. The role of judiciary is not to interfere in the investigation unless there is miscarriage of justice. Cases have arisen under Section 561-A of the old Code and Section 482 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. It would be useful to refer to those cases as well. ( 25 ) IN State of West Bengal v. N. Basak, AIR 1963 S. C. 447. (7) In this case as well, the passage from Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18 (8) was extracted which reads as under:- "section 154 deals with information in cognizable offences and S. 156 with investigation into such offences and under these sections) the police has the statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any alleged cognizable offence without authority from a Magistrate and this statutory power of the police to investigate cannot be interfered with by the exercise of power under S. 439 or under the inherent power of the Court under S. 561a, when there was no case pending at the time excepting that the person against whom the investigation has started had appeared before the court, had surrendered and had be in admitted to bail. " ( 26 ) IN Eastern Spinning Mills Shri. Virendra Kumar Sharda and another v. Shri Rajiv Poddar and others, AIR 1985 S. C. 1668, (9) their Lordships observed that, "we consider it absolutely unnecessary to make reference to the decision of this Court and they are legion which have laid down that save in exceptional case where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. " ( 27 ) THAT was a routine case where information of an offence or offences has been lodged, investigation commenced, search and seizure followed and the suspects arrested. " ( 27 ) THAT was a routine case where information of an offence or offences has been lodged, investigation commenced, search and seizure followed and the suspects arrested. ( 28 ) IN State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh and others, 1987 (Supp) S. C. C. 89, (10) the High Court allowed the petition under Section 482 and quashed the FIR registered against the respondents and the proceedings taken in pursuance thereof. Their Lordships said that the order of the High Court cannot be sustained because the Police authorities are enjoined by law to register a case and conduct investigation whenever information is lard regarding the commission of cognizable offences. As such the quashing of a first information report will amount to restraining he police authorities from performing the duties enjoined upon them by law. The appeal was allowed and the order of the High Court was set aside and it was observed that the FIR will stand restored to file and further investigation will be proceeded with in accordance with law. ( 29 ) THE next case in the series is State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan and others, AIR 1989 S. C. I. (II) That was a case under Wild Life Protection Act. Their Lordships observed in para 6 as under : "the second ground takes into consideration the merits of the matter. It cannot be said that the complaint does not spell out the ingredients of the offence alleged. A complaint only means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence. It is trite that jurisdiction under S. 482 Criminal Procedure Code. which saves the inherent power of the High Court, to make such orders as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, has to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. In exercising that jurisdiction, the High Court would not embark up an an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate when the evidence comes before him. In exercising that jurisdiction, the High Court would not embark up an an enquiry whether the allegations in the complaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate when the evidence comes before him. Though it is neither possible nor advisable to lay down any inflexible rules to regulate that jurisdiction, one thing, however, appears clear and it is that when the High Court is called upon to exercise this jurisdiction to quash a proceeding at the stage of the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence the High Court is guided by the allegations, whether those allegations, set out in the complaint or the chargesheet, do not in law constitute or spell out any offence and that resort to criminal proceedings would, in the circumstances, amount to an abuse of the process of the court or not. " ( 30 ) THERE are a host of decisions. The last and the latest in the series is State of Haryana and others v. Chowdhary Bhajan Lal and others, reported in J. T. 1990 (4) S. C. 650. (12) Law relating to quashing of F. I. R. and investigation has been exhaustively dealt with and categories of cases by way of illustration have been. given wherein such power could be exercised. In that case, on the complaint presented by one Dharam Pal, the S. H. O. registered a case under Section 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code. and Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The High Court quashed the entire criminal proceedings inclusive of the registration of the Information Report. However, the Supreme Court set aside the judgement of the High Court quashing the F. I. R. as not being legally and factually sustainable in law for the reasons mentioned in the Judgment. ( 31 ) IN the light of what we have considered above, and also in the light of the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, we find no justification whatsoever for interference in investigation of the offence as alleged in the FIR in question. ( 32 ) NO other point has been pressed before us nor any other point survives for consideration. In the result, we find no force in this petition. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.