S. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order of the learned single Judge of this Court summarily dismissing the first appeal of the appellants and as confirming the decree passed against the appellants by the learned Additional Principal Judge of the City Civil ahmedabad in Civil Suit No. 3051 of 1978 Respondent No. 1 is the original plaintiff, the appellants and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are the original defendants, in the said suit. For the sake of convenience, we will refer to the parties as original plaintiff and defendants - The dispute centres round possession of residential house situated in Kalupur ward No. 2 of this city especially its first floor. The defendants who are the mother and children are staying in the suit premises. The plaintiff is the father of defendants Nos. 2 to 6 and ex-husband of defendant No. 1. The plaintiffs contention is that he has divorced defendant no. 1 on 4-6-1977. That prior to divorce, the plaintiff and defendants were residing together but after divorce, the defendant No. 1 has no right to remain in possession of the premises as she is a divorced wife. Other defendants, viz. , the plaintiffs children have no right to remain in possession of the premises as they were merely licensees and he has terminated their licences to stay in the premises. The suit was accordingly filed for possession on the strength of title the defendants treating them as ex-licenses whose licences are terminated and who have become trespassers. The learned trial Judge after recording evidence offered by the parties came to the conclusion that the defendants had no right to remain in possession of the premises against the wishes of the plaintiffs after defendant No. 1 was divorced on 4-6-1977 and as their licences are terminated by the plaintiff and as the plaintiff is entitled to restoration of possession, the suit was decreed against defendants Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6. There was no decree against defendants Nos. 4 and 5 they were not in possession of the premises. This decree for possession was challenged by the concerned defendant by filing first Appeal No. 1446 of 1982 before this Court. The said appeal came to be dismissed summarily by one word "dismissed". 1, 2, 3 and 6. There was no decree against defendants Nos. 4 and 5 they were not in possession of the premises. This decree for possession was challenged by the concerned defendant by filing first Appeal No. 1446 of 1982 before this Court. The said appeal came to be dismissed summarily by one word "dismissed". As stated earlier, this order has been challenged in the present Letters Patent Appeal. ( 2 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellants vehemently submitted that the learned trial Judge was patently in error when he took the view that the defendants are trespassers and are liable to be evicted from the suit premises. He invited our attention to the admitted facts of the case, which are as under : (a) The suit premises were originally taken on lease by the plaintiffs father gulam Ali Mansuri; (b) The said original tenant expired on 20-12-1948. (c) At the time of his death, the plaintiff, i. e. , the tenants son, defendant no. 1 (plaintiffs wife), i. e. , daughter-in-law of the original tenant and certain children born to the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, out of lawful wed-lock, were staying in the suit premises at the time of tenants death. (d) Other children who were staying in the suit premises at the relevant time on 20-2-1948 are not parties to the present proceedings and have left the premises and hence the appellants say nothing about it. Other defendants Nos. 2 to 6 were born to the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 after 20-12-1948. There is no dispute about these facts stand well established on record. In the light of this admitted position, the learned Advocate for the appellants submitted that appellant No. 1 - ex-wife of the plaintiff had become co-tenant with the plaintiff of the suit premises by virtue of Sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Rent Act as applicable to the premises in those days. He invited our attention to the fact that the Rent Act was made applicable to the Ahmedabad City on 19-1-1948. That 11 months thereafter, the original tenant died in the suit premises. At the time of his death, the plaintiff on the one hand and defendant No. 1-his wife, on the other, were residing with the tenant. He invited our attention to the fact that the Rent Act was made applicable to the Ahmedabad City on 19-1-1948. That 11 months thereafter, the original tenant died in the suit premises. At the time of his death, the plaintiff on the one hand and defendant No. 1-his wife, on the other, were residing with the tenant. They, therefore, become entitled to become co-tenants of the suit premises by virtue of Sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Rent act as applicable in those days. The said provision, at the relevant time, stood as under :"tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes - any member of the tenants family residing with him at the time of his death as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court. "a mere reading of this provision shows that as the first defendant ex-wife of the plaintiff had stayed with her father-in-law (original tenant) as a member of his family alongwith her husband-the plaintiff, she became co-tenant of the suit premises alongwith the plaintiff. Her statutory tenancy which was co-tenancy entitled her to remain in possession every part of the suit premises till her statutory tenancy was legally determined. It is nobodys case that her co-statutory tenancy at any time has been determined by the landlord. Other defendants who are her children and also the children of the plaintiff admittedly claim through her. Therefore, neither defendant No. 1 nor other defendants can be ever treated as trespassers in the suit premises. Merely because the plaintiff divorced defendant No. 1 years thereafter in 1977 co-tenancy rights inhering in defendant No. 1 and protected under Sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Rent Act would not automatically get destroyed or terminated. In any case, one co-tenant like the plaintiff has no right to terminate co-tenancy of other co-tenant even though both may be co-statutory tenant. That is the privilege of the landlord. The landlord has never done so. Similarly, in the absence of partition of co-tenancy rights between the co-tenants, both co-tenants would be entitled to occupy every part of the suit premises. For convenience sake, the plaintiff is residing on the ground floor and the defendants are residing on the first floor, but that would not mean that there is partition of co-tenancy right between the co-tenants. Similarly, in the absence of partition of co-tenancy rights between the co-tenants, both co-tenants would be entitled to occupy every part of the suit premises. For convenience sake, the plaintiff is residing on the ground floor and the defendants are residing on the first floor, but that would not mean that there is partition of co-tenancy right between the co-tenants. Consequently, it cannot be said that the defendants are not protected by the provisions of the rent Act. The learned trial Judge, with respect, was in error when he took a contrary view on this aspect. Unfortunately, the aforesaid salient facts were not brought to the notice of the learned Judge in the light of Sec. 5 (11) (c) as applicable in those days. Consequently, a wrong decree for possession came to be passed against the defendants on the supposition that they were trespassers. They cannot be said to be trespassers from any view point qua the plaintiff. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondents was not in a position to controvert this legal position, which has well sustained on record in the light of the admitted facts as mentioned by us earlier. In these circumstances, the decree for possession as passed by the learned trial Judge in favour of the plaintiff cannot be sustained. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the decree of dismissal of appeal as passed by the learned single Judge and also the decree for possession as passed by the learned trial Judge and dismiss the suit of the respondent-plaintiff. However, in view of the relationship that existed between the defendant No. 1 on the one hand and the plaintiff on the other as they were husband and wife prior to divorce and the admitted relationship of the father and children that exist between the plaintiff on the one hand and defendants nos. 2 to 6 on the other, we deem it fit to direct that all the parties will bear their own costs all thought. No orders on civil application. .