Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. This application is directed agaiust an order dated 30th may.198l passed by Sri Jordon Kachhap, Subordinate Judge, Palamau, in m. S.37/79 whereby and whereunder the said learned court rejected an application filed by the petitioners tor passing decree as against defendants/ opposits party in terms of Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. By an order dated 20-5-1987, a learned Single a Judge referred this matter to a Division Bench stating the question as to whether the statements made out of court admitting claims can be said to be admission within the meaning of this Rule or this Rule is attracted only on an admission made under Rule 4 of Order XII, of the Code of Civil Procedure. 3. Before embarking upon the discussion with regard to the Order XII, rule 6 ot the Code of Civil Procedure, it is necessary to consider the fact of the matter oriefty. 4. The plaintiff/petltioner filed a suit for a decree against the respondents for a sum of Rs.49,13,218.15 ps. on the basis of the allegations which have been briefly stated in the civil revision application in the following maner :- " (a) there had been a long course of dealing between the petitioner and the respondents and particularly respondents 1 to 3, respondents 2 and 3 being partners of respondent No.1. All the respondents in pursuance of which cheque drawn is their favour on out station Banks were purchased by the petitioner-Bank and the respondents presenting those cheques were given immediate credit in their accounts with the petitioner Bank. (b) In other words, all the respondents presented cheques from time to time and receiver money from the petitioner Bank (by crediting their accounts to the extent of the value of the cheque) before the petitioner Bank could realise the amounts from their Bankers, that is, the drawn Banks, (c) During a period of about three weeks from 24th February, 1979, to March 17, 1979, 109 cheques were presented to Daltonganj branch for which the respondents received immediate credit in their account with the petitioner. All these cheques were dishonoured. These cheques were drawn by respondents 1 and 2. Some of them were presented for D. D. purchases by respondents 1 to 3 and the rent were presented by the other respondents. All these cheques were dishonoured. These cheques were drawn by respondents 1 and 2. Some of them were presented for D. D. purchases by respondents 1 to 3 and the rent were presented by the other respondents. Details of these D. D. purchases are given in the Schedule to the plaint. (d) On 31st March, 1979, four undertakings, two by respondents 2 and 3 as partners of the firm (respondents No.1 and 2 by respondent no.2 were executed admitting :- (i) that the value of the cheques was received from the petitioner bank on presentation; (ii) that the cheques were dishonoured ; (iii) that the amounts mentioned therein have become due together with interest at 18 per cent per annum. These undertakings further contain promise to pay the outstanding amounts with interest and the made of payment was indicated therein. These undertakings in original have been tiled in the court below. " 5 Allegedly a written statement was filed whereby the purported undertakings of the defendants referred to in the plaint was answered thus :- "that they are invalid in law. (b) that the signature of defendants 2 and 3 (respondents 2 and 3)were obtained not only under duress and coarcion but also under misrepresentation made by or on behalf of the plaintiff that fresh d. D purchase facility accorded to the defendents will be resumed forthwith," (c) that the original draft was in the pen of Sri M. S. Verma, the than Regional Manager, Region No.3 and these defendents were given no alternative but to agree to put their signature over the typed copies of that craft. " (d) that these undertakings having been procured by and on behalf of the plaintiff under duress, coercion and mis-representation are voidable and these defendants hereby avoid the same. " 6. However, from a perusal of the written statement and particularly paragraphs 17, 18 and 19, it appears that the defendants denied or disputed the correctness or otherwise of the claim made on behalf of the plaintiffs. The defendants further inter alia contended that the signatures of the defendant nos.2 and 3 were obtained under duress, coercion and mis-representation. 7. The petitioner apart from the said purported undertakings relied upon certain admissions made in an application for anticipatory bail. The said application is contained in Annexure-5 to the civil revision application. The defendants further inter alia contended that the signatures of the defendant nos.2 and 3 were obtained under duress, coercion and mis-representation. 7. The petitioner apart from the said purported undertakings relied upon certain admissions made in an application for anticipatory bail. The said application is contained in Annexure-5 to the civil revision application. From a perusal of Annexure-3, it appears that Ranjit Kumar Biswas and Bishwanath Biswas weve being prosecuted for commission of non-bailable offence under Sections 120-B, 409, 418, 468 and 477-A of the Indian penal Code read with Sections 5 (2) and 5 (1) (o) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 8. Mr. Debi Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the defendants-opposite parties did not deny the execution of the Undertakings but has merely alleged that the said undertakings are voidable, the same would amount to an admission on the part of the defendants/opposite parties on the basis whereof learned court below should have passed a decree on admission. Learned counsel further submitted that in view of the statements made in the application for anticipatory bail also, a decree under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure should have been passed. 9. Mr. P. Ghosh and Mr. P. C. Roy, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties, on the other hand, submitted that for the purposr of passing a decree in terms of Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, admission of a defendant must be a clear unequivocal and unconditional one and as in the instant case, the defendants in the written statement categorally denied or disputed the claims of the plaintiffs/petitoners, no decree could have been passed on the basis of purported admission made by them in terms of Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Learned counsel in this connection has relied upon Union of India V/s. M/s ferote and Co. reported in AIR 1962 J and K 66 ; M/s Simla Wholesale Mart v. M/s Baishnodas Kishori Lal Bhalla, AIR 1977 H. P.29 and State Bank of India V/s. M /s Midland Industries and others reported in AIR 1988 Delhi 153. 10. By reason of the provisions contained in Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act.1976, various measures were taken for expenditious disposal of the suit. 10. By reason of the provisions contained in Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act.1976, various measures were taken for expenditious disposal of the suit. One of such provisions was Order XII, Rule 6 of the code of Civil Procedure. The other provisions which are material for the purpose of this case ace order VIII Rule 5 (2) of the Code of Civil Proceduer and Order VIII, Rule 10 of the code of Civil Procedure. 11. In Mathew Elenjical and another V/s. Nagpur Roman Catholic diocesan Corp. (P) Ltd. reoorted in AIR 1978 M. P.39, it was held that taking into consideration the Rule 1, Rule 5 (2) while considering Order viii. Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has to be held that the exercise of power under Order VIII, Rule 10 is discretionary. The Court held :- "the rule, no dopbt, says initially that the Court shall pronounce judgment against the defendant on his failure to file the written statement required under Rule 1 or Rule 9 but it then proceeds to enable the Court to make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. The use of the word or which is normally disjunctive, after shall pronounce judgment against him to separate it from the words make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit shows that the discretion of the Court has been retained in suoh a situation as well. Moreover, the latter expression would be refundent and meaningless if the Court had no option except to pronounce judgment against the defendant". 12. Order XII, Rule 6, however, on the face of It appears to be discretionary as the word may has been used. 13. Prior to the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 order XII, Rule 6 read thus : "any part may at any stage of a suit, where admissions of fact have been made, either on the pleadings, or otherwise, apply to the court for such judgment or order as upon such admissions he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, and the court may upon such application make such order, or give such judgment, as the court may think just. " In terms of the said rule, an anabling provision has been made whereby the plaintiff has become entitled to a particular order or judgment when there is no dispute between the parties or an admission has been made on the pleadings or otherwise so that a decree may be pasted at once. 14. On a plain reading of the said Rule, therefore, it is evident that the same is not meant to apply when there is a serious dispute with regard to the claim of the plaintiff. In this case, evidently the legality of the purported undertakings of the defendants have been questioned. 15. According to the defendants, they did not execute the said purported undertakings voluntarily. It is, therofore, clear that according to the defendants, the said documents are voidable. In this view of the matter the court is bound to frame an issue as to whether the undertakings aformrationed have been obtained by the plaintiff from the dafandants by coercion, threat or mis-representation or not. If the aforementioned issue decided that against the plaintiff, the question of passing any decree on the basis of the said undertakings would not arise. An allegation of coercion, threat or misrepresentation in containing a document is essentially a question of fact. It is now well Known that before a court may act in terms of Order XII rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the admission relied upon must be clear and unambiguous (Sec. AIR 1977 HP 29 ). 16. In Union of India V/s. M/s. Feme and Co. , reported in AIR 1962 j and K 66, a Division Bench of the Janmmu and Kashmir High Court held that as the admission of the defendant was not an unconditional, unambiguous, and full admission, no decree under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil procedure could have been passed. 17. In State Bank of India V/s. Midland Industries and other reported in AIR 1988 Delhi 153, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court inter alia relied upon the decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court aforementioned as also a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Premsuk Das assaram V/s. Udairam Ganga Bux reported in AIR 1918 Calcutta 467. and held :- "the purpose of Order XII Rule 6 C. P. C. is to avoid waiting by the plaintiff for part of the decree when there is clear, unequivocal, unambiguous and unconditional admission of the defaadant in respect of the claim of the defendant. The rule only secures that if there is no dispute between the parties, and if thers is on the pleadings or otherwise such an admission as to make it plain that the plaintiff is entitled to a particular order or judgment he should be able to obtain it at once to the extant of admission. But the rule is not intended to apply where there are serious questions of law to be asked and determined. Likewise where specific issues have been raised inspite of admission on the part of the defendants the plaintiff would be bound to lead evidence on those issues and prove the same before he becomes entitled to decree and the plaintiff in that event cannot have a decree by virtue of provision of Order XII, Rule 6 CPC without proving those issues. " 18. It is now well settled that admission has got to be construed as a whole. If a question arises as to whether a statement made by a party to the suit in a pleading or any other document as admission of fact, such a pleading or the instrument in which the purported admission is contained must be read as a whole. Thus, if on reading of the pleading or any other document, a clear, unequivocal and unconditional admission cannot be spelled out, recourse to the provisions of Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil procedure cannot be resorted to. 19. It true that such an admission need not be confined to a pleading. Such an admission need not necessarily be in writing but may be an oral admission. Thus even if a defendant has admitted a claim of the plaintiff in a letter prior to or after the institution of the suit, such a letter if undisputed may give rise to passing of a decree on admission. It has, therefore, to be held that a decree can be passed under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of civil Procedure, even if the admission has not been made in the suit itself. But such admission must be undisputed, clear and unambiguous. 20. It has, therefore, to be held that a decree can be passed under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of civil Procedure, even if the admission has not been made in the suit itself. But such admission must be undisputed, clear and unambiguous. 20. However, in this case, as noticed hereinbefore, the defendants in their pleadings denied or disputed the claim of the plaintiff. The purported admission made in the bail application is also of no avail inasmuch as the same was done by two partners which are not binding upon the firm or its other partners. 21. Section 18 of the Partnership Act reads as follows :- - "19. Implied authority of partner as agent of the firms : (1) Subject to the provisions of Sec.22, the act of a partner which is done to carry on, in the usual way, business of the king carried on by the firm, binds the firm. The authority of a partner to bind the firm conferred by this section is called his implied authority. (2) In the absence of any usage or custom of trade to the contrary, the implied authority of a partner does not empower him to :- (e) admit any liability in a suit or proceeding against the firm. " 22 The partnership deed has not been brought on record to show that any partner could admit a claim of a third party on behaif of the firm or on behalf of other partners. 23. In the application for anticipatory bail, the main thrust was that in view of the conduct of the parties, no offence can be said to be made out on the basis of the allegations made in the first information report. It is also not known who had sworn affidavit, if any, in support of the statements made therein. It is further well known that an admission can be withdrawn or explained away. (See AIR 1983 SG 462 ). 24. The learned court below on the basis of materials available on record held that there is no clear admission on the part of the defendants on as to invoke its Jurisdiction under Order XII, Rule b of the Code of Civil procedure. As indicated hereinbefore, jurisdiction conferred upon a court under Order XII, Rule 6 is discertionary one. 24. The learned court below on the basis of materials available on record held that there is no clear admission on the part of the defendants on as to invoke its Jurisdiction under Order XII, Rule b of the Code of Civil procedure. As indicated hereinbefore, jurisdiction conferred upon a court under Order XII, Rule 6 is discertionary one. It is well Anown that when a discretion has been exercised legally and validity, this Court normally does not exercise its revisional jurisdiction to interfere therewith. 25. From the perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the learned court below has considered all aspects of the matter and refused to pass a decree in terms of Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 26. Taking, thus, all facts and circumstances of the case into consideration it must be held that there is no merit in this civil revision application are the same is, accordingly, dismissed.-It is however observed that the learned court below in the faces and circumstances of the case should dispose of the suit expeditiously. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Revision allowed.