JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - What is challenged in this appeal is an order by which the trial court has refused to grant ad interim injunction to restrain the respondent, Zila Parishad from interfering in his right to transport cattle to and from the weekly cattle fair held in village Banat, in District Muzaffarnagar during the years 1990-91 to 1993-94. 2. The dispute erupted in this manner. On 9-1-1991 the Zila Parishad invited offers in sealed tenders by 15-1-1991 for grant of contract of loading and transporting cattle for a term of 1 year, 2 years and 3 years alongwith a security deposit of Rs. 25,000. These tenders were to be opened at 11 a.m., on 16-1-1991 in Shamli and could be rejected by the Chairman of Zila Parishad (District Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar) without assigning any reason. The notice inviting tenders also mentioned that a public auction will also be held on 16-1-1991 for grant of contract for a period of 3 years but only those who deposit a security of Rs. 25,000 could make bids in the auction. The person making the highest bid was required to deposit the amount payable for one year immediately after the conclusion of the bids, but deposit of that sum was only in the expectation of the bid being accepted by the Chairman who had reserved to himself the right to reject the bid without assigning any reason. 3. It is not disputed that in the auction held on 16-1-1991 the plaintiff made the highest bid of Rs. 18 lacs for three years and he deposited a sum of Rs. 6 lacs immediately thereafter. The Chairman however, refused to accept this bid and hence another auction was notified on 22-1-1991 fixing 4-3-1991 as the date of that auction. Alarmed by this turn of events, the plaintiff rushed to the Court for pre-empting the re-auction and filed a suit for permanent injunction on 23-2-1991. He also prayed for permanent injunction to restrain the Zila Parishad from interfering in his right to carry on the transport business on the ground of his highest bid in auction held on 16-1-1991 should be deemed to have been accepted and the said contract could not be re-auctioned on 4-3-1991. He also prayed for permanent injunction to restrain the Zila Parishad from interfering in his right to carry on the transport business on the ground of his highest bid in auction held on 16-1-1991 should be deemed to have been accepted and the said contract could not be re-auctioned on 4-3-1991. In substance, the ground of attack by the plaintiff was that the Zila Parishad having once settled the rights to transport cattle to the fair and plaintiff having complied with all the conditions which he was required to perform, the Chairman had no right to reject his bid. Inherent in this submission is the plea that the Chairman was bound to accept the highest bid as it had neither been rejected and communicated to him within a reasonable time nor there was any material for rejecting it. It is also pleaded that the action of the respondent was arbitrary and uninformed by reason. For all these reasons the legality of the order rejecting the bid is assailed. The appellant felt that he is armed with a direction authority on the point in the case of Zila Parishad Muzaffarnagar v. Udai Veer Singh, 1989 RD 51 : 1989 ALR (R) 42 which has been used as a sheet anchor of the arguments alongwith some other decisions on either side. 4. We first propose to look into the legal aspect debated before us and then consider 1989 Allahabad 64 in the light of the facts of this case. 5. Problem posed before us has two aspects. First relates to the right of the Government or other public authority to reserve to itself the right to accept or reject the highest bid made in an auction. Second concerns the circumstances which will vitiate the Government action in not accepting the highest offer made. 6. As for the former, the law is very clear and is by now well established. If the Government or other authority reserves to itself the right to have a final say in confirming or rejecting the highest bid struck in an auction either under any law or Rule or Bye-law or even under the conditions announced before the auction, then the bid is not final unless it is confirmed by the authority. If the Government or other authority reserves to itself the right to have a final say in confirming or rejecting the highest bid struck in an auction either under any law or Rule or Bye-law or even under the conditions announced before the auction, then the bid is not final unless it is confirmed by the authority. According to law laid down in the cases of Trilochan Mishra v. State of Orissa, 1971 SC 733; State of Orissa v. Hari Narayan Jaiswal, 1972 SC 1816 and State of U.P. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh, 1982 SC 1234, the Government is under no obligation to accept the highest bid and no right can accrue to the bidder merely because his bid happened to be the highest. The Government con for good and sufficient reason, reject the highest bid. This right can be exercised not only due to inadequacy of bid but for a variety of other good reasons. 7. Although the right to reject the highest bid may vest in the authority yet the further question in such cases is whether this can be done even where the action was actuated by irrelevant consideration or based on extraneous grounds? This has been very succinctly in Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, 1989 RD 51 in these words: "Let us put into focus the clearly demarcated approach that distinguishes the use and disposal of private property and socialist property. Owner of private property may deal with it in any manner he likes without causing injury to any one else. But the socialist or if that word is jarring to some, the community or further the public property has to be dealt with for public purpose and in public interest. The marked difference lies in this that while the owner of private property may permit him to dispose of his property for a song. On the other hand, disposal of public property partakes the character of trust in that in its disposal there should be nothing hanky panky and that it must be done at the best price so that larger revenue coming into the coffers of the State Administration would serve public purpose viz. the welfare State may be able to expand its beneficent activities by the availability of larger funds. the welfare State may be able to expand its beneficent activities by the availability of larger funds. This is subject to one important limitation that socialist property may be disposed at a price lower than the market price or even for a token price to achieve some defined constitutionally recognised public purpose, one such being to achieve the goals set out in Part IV of the Constitution. But where disposals for augmentation of revenue and nothing else, the State is under an obligation to secure the best market price available in a market economy. An owner of private property need not auction it nor is he bound to dispose it of at a current market price. Factors such as personal attachment, or affinity, kinship, empathy, religious sentiments or limiting the choice to whom he may be willing to sell, may permit him to sell the property at a song and without demur. A welfare State as the owner of the public property has no such freedom while disposing of the public property. A welfare State exists for the largest good of the largest number, more so when it proclaims to be a socialist State dedicated to eradication of poverty. All its attempt must be to obtain the best available price while disposing of its property because the greater the revenue, the welfare activities will get a fillip and shot in the arm. Financial constraint may weaken the tempo of activities. Such an approach serves the larger public purpose of expanding welfare activities primarily for which the constitution envisages the setting up of a welfare State." 8. The law as declared by Supreme Court in relation to matters where the Government is dealing with the public be it in giving of jobs, contracts, issue of quota or licence etc. the Government cannot act arbitrarily and at its sweet will and cannot deal with any person it pleases, unlike a private individual. All Government actions must therefore, conform to some rule or pattern to avoid arbitrariness and no State action should be based on irrational or irrelevant Consideration. If its action smacks of discrimination and departs from fairness it can be struck down unless shown to be governed by valid and rational principle. 9. All Government actions must therefore, conform to some rule or pattern to avoid arbitrariness and no State action should be based on irrational or irrelevant Consideration. If its action smacks of discrimination and departs from fairness it can be struck down unless shown to be governed by valid and rational principle. 9. The scope of judicial interference was enlarged to some extent in 1980 SO 1992 with these observations: "The Government cannot act in a manner which would benefit a private party at the cost of the State. Such an action would be both unreasonable and contrary to public interest." The Supreme Court also said: "The Government is not free like an ordinary individual and cannot choose to deal with anyone it pleases and can have no absolute or unfettered right in this regard. If the Government deals with anyone then it must do fairly and without discrimination or unfair procedure. If some one surreptitiously ingratiates himself through the back-door and corners all the undeserved benefit, the transaction will not meet courts approval and must be struck down." 10. The upshot of all these decisions is that to be upheld all Government action in dealing with public or in respect of public property or funds must be fair, reasonable, open and upright and should sub-serve public interest. If such action be guided by unfair and reasonable procedure or be shrouded in mystery or entered into secretly or it is not in public interest it will have to be struck down and cannot be sustained. We may here refer to two more cases. Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union Sindri v. Union of India, 1981 SC 344 and State of U.P. v. Shiv Charan Sharma, 1981 SC 1722. In these cases sale of Government property was involved and in that connection it was observed that as far as possible, sale ought to take place publicly when the intention is to get the best price. The vendors are not necessarily bound to accept the highest offer, but the public gets the satisfaction that the Government has put all its cards tin the table. Thus, public auction with open participation guarantees public interest being folly sub-served: "Thakkar, J. very aptly remarked in this connection more often than sot detriment to what belongs to "many", collectively, does not cause pangs to 'any' for no one is personally hurt directly. Thus, public auction with open participation guarantees public interest being folly sub-served: "Thakkar, J. very aptly remarked in this connection more often than sot detriment to what belongs to "many", collectively, does not cause pangs to 'any' for no one is personally hurt directly. That is why public officials and public-minded citizens entrusted with the care of 'public property' have to show exemplary vigilance." 11. This being the legal position, the question arises how was this right exercised in the case in hand? The appellants' submission is that after the fall of hammer and after deposit of the entire amount due for the first year of contract the bid made by him could not be rejected. This submission does not impress us at all. We have already adverted to a number of authorities from which a clear proposition of law emerges that where the Government or any other instrumentality of State reserves to itself the final right to accept or refuse a bid, such a right cannot be denied to it. The only precaution to be taken is that the refusal has not been actuated by any unfair, unreasonable or underhand means or considerations. 12. In the instant case, the conditions under which the auction sale had taken place clearly proclaimed that the bid would be subject to its acceptance by the chairman and he could reject it without even assigning a reason for it. Even the deposit of one year money was to be made only in the hope or expectation that the bid may be accepted. Thus, the plaintiff cannot claim any right merely because his bid happened to be the highest and until such time as the bid was not accepted or confirmed no rights could accrue to him. 13. For the appellants emphasis has been laid on a recent Division Bench decision of this Court, AIR 1989 All 64 , to press home the point that the sale is complete with the fall of hammer. That case however, had facts peculiar to itself. In that case the auction had been upheld only because its rejection was tainted with unfairness because a higher bid had been considered and finally accepted, surreptitiously and without notice to the initial highest bidder. That case however, had facts peculiar to itself. In that case the auction had been upheld only because its rejection was tainted with unfairness because a higher bid had been considered and finally accepted, surreptitiously and without notice to the initial highest bidder. In that case there was material to show how, after the highest bidder had complied with all the conditions, the villain made his entry from the back door, made a higher offer, and without even informing the former his bid was upset and re-auction ordered. Mala fides on the part of the authorities being writ large the court was prima facie satisfied the order rejecting the bid could not be sustained. The Bench observed thus: "In an auction by a public body cancelling the result of auction when the highest bidder has been made to act upon his obligations is unfair and illegal. More so, when a unilateral offer was secretly made after the close of a public auction. Public bodies conducting public auctions will lose their credibility and the conduct of public auction might lead to endless litigations when they will be upset without cause though held profitably, regularly and without defect." 14. Reference to Section 63 of the Sale of Goods Act was certainly made but that was just by way of an illustration in order to examine as to what is reasonable time. It may however be pointed out that provisions of that Act only apply to sale of "goods" as defined in Section 2. Right to transport cattle is certainly not goods, within the meaning of that Act. In the case of sale of goods the property in 'goods' (passes immediately on delivery of possession. Not so in the case of contract for transportation of cattle. 15. The proposition of law laid down in that case therefore cannot be applied to the facts of this case as we will presently see. That case on which so much reliance is placed, therefore, does not really help the appellants. 16. Coming now to the facts of the case in hand. 17. There is no dispute about facts upto the time first public auction was held on 16-1-1991 in which appellant had made the highest bid. There is no dispute also on the question that the appellant had completed all the formalities subject to confirmation of the bid by the Chairman. Coming now to the facts of the case in hand. 17. There is no dispute about facts upto the time first public auction was held on 16-1-1991 in which appellant had made the highest bid. There is no dispute also on the question that the appellant had completed all the formalities subject to confirmation of the bid by the Chairman. When the papers were put up before the Chairman alongwith recommendations in appellants favour, he sent for the records relating to auction held in earlier years as is apparent from the note date 25-1-1991. He then discussed the matter and thereafter rejected the bid and ordered re-auction by his order dated 10-2-1991. 18. The appellants attack the very genuineness of the proceedings. His contention is that pages 3 to 5 of the notings in respondents file have been changed. In feet, the bid had been accepted by the Chairman on 11-2-1991 but those sheets were removed and replaced by new sheets. The defendant had filed counter-affidavit in reply to plaintiffs application for ad interim injunction on 26-2-1991. The plaintiff immediately applied in the trial court for a direction to the defendant to file the entire auction file in Court as he apprehended that the file was being tampered with. This was done at 11 a.m. as appears from the endorsements made by defendants counsel while receiving a copy of this application. The same day the Court directed the defendant to produce the file for Courts' perusal the next day. Affidavits filed here show that plaintiff was permitted to take photo copies of notings in the file. The allegations of replacement of pages or of tampering have been stoutly denied. 19. Much effort was made to press this point but when considering the question of temporary injunction the Court is not required to give any findings. The Court has only to consider prima facie case and not to make an in-depth enquiry. Suffice it to say that this matter is yet to receive full consideration which must wait till parties have an opportunity to lead their evidence. At present, we do not find sufficient material for holding that the note sheets were false or had been replaced. Since the same had been brought before the court as directed, at this stage therefore we will prefer to rely on it. At present, we do not find sufficient material for holding that the note sheets were false or had been replaced. Since the same had been brought before the court as directed, at this stage therefore we will prefer to rely on it. This is of course subject to what may ultimately be established after full trial. That being so, we repel the appellants plea that the bid had been accepted on 11-2-1991. 20. It is next urged that there was no material at all before the District Magistrate even to conclude that the bid was inadequate. It is urged that although in the notes the Chairman records that he had discussed the matter but what actually was discussed is not known. In these circumstances, it would be fair to assume that there was no material at all before him to help him in coming to a conclusion about inadequacy of the bid. For these reasons, it is urged that the order of rejection was unreasonable and arbitrary. 21. On the contrary Sri Murlidhar submitted that it is not necessary that the material considered by the authority should be reflected in the order passed by it, if there is evidence to show the type of material which had been considered before passing the order. In the instant case it is evident from the photostat copies of the notings on the file that the Chairman had called for the entire file relating to earlier years as also the terms of auction in those years. This material was therefore available for consideration while passing the order on 10-2-1981. 22. In paragraph 6 of the counter-affidavit it has been pointed out (sic) right from 1966-67 there has been a continuous ascending tendency in the bids. If the bid accepted in 1986-87 was Rs. 3.945 lacs it had gone upto Rs. 6.28 lacs in the year 1990-91. For the period in question i.e. from 1991-92 to 1993-94, the highest bid of the plaintiff was Rs. 18 lacs which comes to Rs. 6 lacs for each of the three years. Obviously this is less than last year's highest bid. This material would certainly justify the rejection of plaintiffs bid, for two reasons. Firstly it was less than last year's bid and secondly it was against the rising trend of the bids accepted year after year. 18 lacs which comes to Rs. 6 lacs for each of the three years. Obviously this is less than last year's highest bid. This material would certainly justify the rejection of plaintiffs bid, for two reasons. Firstly it was less than last year's bid and secondly it was against the rising trend of the bids accepted year after year. It cannot, therefore, be said that the action of the Chairman was prima facie illegal, unjustified or against public interest. In fact as the re-auction itself proves the highest bid of Rs. 35 lacs was made for three years i.e. almost double of the plaintiff bid. 23. A half hearted attempt has also been made to challenge the order Dated 10-2-1990 that the same was passed due to some complaints of which no notice was given to the plaintiff. In other words the contention appears to be that the bid had been rejected not on the ground that it was inadequate but at the behest of a third party who had pulled the strings from behind without notice to the plaintiff. This appears to be a mere allegation because there is nothing on record to indicate that any complaint against the plaintiff had been made or there was any behind the scene manoeuvring in the matter. At this stage, we find no material to support plaintiffs contention in this regard. 24. Reliance on the decision of Udaibir Singh's case is also not justified because the facts of the case was totally different. Unlike Udaibir's case no surreptitious offer was made by any one. The parties have been relegated to fresh public auction in which plaintiff also had full opportunity of making his bid. There appears to be nothing which may be called arbitrary, unreasonable or against larger public interest. In fact the procedure followed is entirely in consonance with the various decisions of the Supreme Court even in those cases where the State action was held to be arbitrary or unreasonable in some way, the Court ordered re-auction in a well advertised public auction. 25. In view of the above we are of the opinion that the order passed by the court below should be sustained. The appeal has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs in this appeal. 25. In view of the above we are of the opinion that the order passed by the court below should be sustained. The appeal has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs in this appeal. Before parting with this appeal we wish to emphasise that the nature of the suit requires its early disposal and therefore, the trial court will make every endeavour to see that the suit is disposed of, as far as possible, by the end of this year and no unnecessary adjournments shall be asked by the parties nor the court grant them save for weighty reasons.