JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. These two Civil Revision Applications involving some interesting questions of law were referred to a Division Bench for hearing. 2. These applications having arisen out of the judgment dated 28.9.1989 passed by Shri V. Upadhyay, Subordinate Judge, First Court, Ranchi in Eviction Suit No. 7 of 1988, were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this judgment. 3. One Jaiprakash Jalan and Abhimanyu Jalan who are the petitioners in Civil Revision Application No. 46 of 1990 (R) filed the aforementioned suit for eviction against M/s. Rambilash Madan Gopal (Petitioner in Civil Revision No. 6 of 1990 (R) for its eviction on the ground of their personal necessity from the tenanted premises consisting of a two storied building situated over M.S. Plot Nos. 1967 and parts of 1968 and 1969 being holding no. 780 appertaining to Ward No. II of Ranchi Municipal Corporation at Kaprapatti, Main Road, Upper Bazar, Ranchi. 4. It is admitted that in the ground floor of suit premises, there is an open courtyard, bath room, kitchen, well, one godown, one shop room, one latrine, passage and staircase and in the first floor of the said premises there are four living rooms, varandahs and some open space. 5. The case of the plaintiffs before the court below was that they are joint owners of the suit premises and they had been living with their parents and youngest brother in a house belonging to their mother and the said brother who have been asking them to vacate the said house. 6. Plaintiff no. 1, who is an advocate allegedly owing to paucity of space had been finding difficulties to entertain his clients as also for the purpose of maintaining his Chamber and Library. It is further averred that they have also been experiencing difficulties to receive their friends and relatives who come to their place owing to paucity of space and accommodation. 7. It was further contended that the wife of the petitioner no. 1 was not pulling on well with her mother-in-law. 8. The plaintiffs further case is that the plaintiff no. 2 is also a student of law and being a prospective lawyer intends to have a library of his own. It was further contended that owing to paucity of space his marriage could not be finalised although he has attained marraigable age. 9. 8. The plaintiffs further case is that the plaintiff no. 2 is also a student of law and being a prospective lawyer intends to have a library of his own. It was further contended that owing to paucity of space his marriage could not be finalised although he has attained marraigable age. 9. The defendants who are petitioners in C.R. No. 6 of 1990 (R) obtained leave of the court to contest the suit and in its written statement inter alia denied the relationship of the landlord and tenant by and between the plaintiffs and itself. 10. In paragraph 10 of the application praying for leave to contest the suit as also in paragraph 15 and 16 of its written statement the defendant contended that its eviction from a portion of the suit premises would fulfil the requirement of the plaintiffs. 11. The defendants, in the written statement also denied and/or disputed the purported bona fide requirements of the plaintiffs as mentioned in the plaint. 12. The defendants further contended that the tenanted premises was let out to them in 1944 on a rental of Rs. 150/- only. Although, the fair rent of the suit premises was fixed at Rs. 90/- per month, but the same was illegally enhanced to Rs. 275/- per month from April, 1966 and was further enhanced to Rs. 300/- per month in December, 1969. The rent was again enhanced to Rs. 600/- from January, 1978 and to Rs. 1000/- per month from January, 1987. 13. It was further alleged that plaintiff no. 1 filed an application for determination of fail rent before the House Rent Controller, which was registered as BBC Case No. 114 of 1987 and although, the said application was withdrawn; by putting pressure upon the partners of the defendant, the plaintiff no. 1 got the monthly rent enhanced to Rs. 3000/- per month from January, 1988. 14. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs have again been coercing them to enhance the monthly rent to Rs. 6000/- per month, but as the defendants did not agree thereto, the said suit has been filed. 15. It was further contended that the suit premises are not at all suitable for residential purposes. 16. 3000/- per month from January, 1988. 14. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs have again been coercing them to enhance the monthly rent to Rs. 6000/- per month, but as the defendants did not agree thereto, the said suit has been filed. 15. It was further contended that the suit premises are not at all suitable for residential purposes. 16. It was further contended that the suit premises had all along been used for carrying on business, as it does not have any bathroom or kitchen nor are there any living rooms on the first floor. The defendants also contended that the suit premises is an old one. 17. The defendants further contended that the premises in which the plaintiffs are residing is a very big building and the same has sufficient accommodation therein. It was further contended that even the first floor thereof is lying vacant. 18. The defendants further contended that the plaintiff no. 1 has got a chamber with attached bathroom in the said premises. It was further contended that they have got a big building being Holding No. 1306 in Ward No. VI of the Ranchi Municipality and another building being Holding No. 1309 of Ward No. VI besides a house in Pakri Bazar, a house at Cart Sarai road which are vacant. 19. Before the learned court below, both the parties adduced their evidences. 20. The learned court below on the basis of the aforementioned pleadings of the parties framed the following issues for its decision :- "1. Is the suit as framed maintainable? 2. Have the plaintiffs got cause of action for the suit? 3. Are the plaintiffs joint owners and landlords of the suit premises ? 4. Do the plaintiffs require the suit premises reasonably and in good faith for their own use and occupation ? 5. Will the bonafide requirement of the plaintiffs be satisfied upon partial eviction of the defendants from the suit premises ? 6. Are the plaintiffs entitled to the reliefs of eviction of the defendants from the suit premises? 7. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of parties ? 8. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get the decree as claimed ?" 21. The learned court below took up issue no. 6. Are the plaintiffs entitled to the reliefs of eviction of the defendants from the suit premises? 7. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of parties ? 8. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get the decree as claimed ?" 21. The learned court below took up issue no. 3 at the outset and held that the plaintiffs are owners of the premises and they are not agent of the owners of the building for the purpose of collection of rent. The learned trial court, however, did not take into consideration the memorandum of partition which was executed in the year 1986 (Ext. 7) on the ground that the plaintiffs did not raise any plea of partition in the plaint. The learned court below however held that Ext. 7 aforementioned is admissible in evidence although it was not a registered instrument in view of a decision of the Supreme Court in Roshan Singh & ors. v. Zile Singh ors., reported in AIR 1988 SC 881 . 22. The learned court below in paragraph 20 of its judgment held that the plaintiffs have been able to prove the requirement of plaintiff no. 1 only to the extent that he being an advocate requires the suit premises for his chamber and library. The other grounds raised by the plaintiffs with regard to their personal necessity did not find favour with the learned trial court. 23. The learned court below, however, observed as follows :- "But, at the same time, I find that the landlord bas enhanced rent of the suit premises from time to time, the motive of the landlord appears to get the rent enhanced." 24. It. however, proceeded to hold that the requirement of plaintiff no. 1 to hold his chamber and library will be satisfied if the defendants are directed to vacate the first floor of the suit premises and carryon their business in the ground floor. 25. The learned court below decided issue no.7 in favour of the plaintiffs and held that the suit against the defendants without impleading its partners was maintainable. 26. The learned trial court also decided other issues in favour of the plaintiffs. 27. In short, the learned trial court held that the requirement of the plaintiffs will be satisfied if the defendants is directed to be evicted from the first floor of the building in question and thus decreed the suit in part. 26. The learned trial court also decided other issues in favour of the plaintiffs. 27. In short, the learned trial court held that the requirement of the plaintiffs will be satisfied if the defendants is directed to be evicted from the first floor of the building in question and thus decreed the suit in part. 28. Mr. N.K. Prasad, the learned counsel appearing on behalf or the petitioner in Civil Revision No. 6 of 1990 (R) raised the following contentions :- "(A) The requirement of two different plaintiffs being distinct and different; one suit for eviction was not maintainable. The learned counsel, in this connection, hall placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in Sri Chhedi Ram v. Smt. Pano Devi, reported in 1990, Vol. I, PLJR 240 ; (B) In view of the finding of fact arrived at by the learned court below to the effect that the plaintiff no. 1 requires the suit premises only for his library and chamber; the decree for eviction of the defendant-firm from the entire first floor must be held to be erroneous in law; (C) As the memorandum of partition (Ext. 7) was not considered by the learned court below in view of absence of pleading to that effect in the plaint, the requirement of the plaintiff no. 1 all one of the members of the joint family cannot be said to have been proved inasmuch as in absence of any proof of partition, the learned court below was bound to hold that the tenanted premises still belongs to the joint family and thus, the plaintiff no. 1 being not the owner of the suit premises, the suit on the ground of his personal necessity was not maintainable. In this connection, the learned counsel has relied upon a decision in M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1113 ; (D) In view of the findings of the learned court below to the effect that the motive of the plaintiffs was to enhance the rent, their requirement could not be said to be bona fide or reasonable within the meaning of Section 11 (1) (c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act)." 29. Mr. Mr. Prasad further railed a preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of Civil Revision No. 46 of 1990 (R) on the ground that in view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in Md. Jainul Ansari v. Md. Khalil, reported in 1990 (2) PLJR. 378 , only an appeal would lie from that portion of the judgment and decree whereby and whereunder the plaintiffs suit for eviction of the defendants in respect of the first floor has been rejected. 30. Mr. S.K. Chattopadhyay, the learned counsel appearing on' behalf of the petitioners in Civil Revision Application No. 46 of 1990 (R) and the opposite parties in Civil Revision No. 6 of 1990 (R) contended that the ratio of the Full Bench decision of 1990 (2) PLJR 378 is not applicable in this case inasmuch as it has not been held therein that an appeal will be maintainable even if the suit is decreed in part. 31. According to the learned counsel that in case of a partial eviction, only a revision in terms of Section 14 (8) of the Act will be a proper remedy and not an appeal inasmuch as, whereas from a portion of the decree, an appeal will lie but from another portion thereof, a civil revision would lie which may give rise to two inconsistent decrees. 32. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned court below could not refuse to take into consideration the memorandum of partition (Ext. 7) only on the ground that the plaintiffs did not plead the factum of partition in their plaint. 33. According to the learned counsel, had the deed of partition been taken into consideration, the learned court below could have found that the plaintiffs have been able to prove their requirement of the entire suit premises for the purpose of their residence. 34. In this connection the learned counsel contended that in the rejoinder to the application filed by the defendants seeking leave of the court to contest the suit, the plaintiffs categorically raised a plea of partition of the joint family properties. 34. In this connection the learned counsel contended that in the rejoinder to the application filed by the defendants seeking leave of the court to contest the suit, the plaintiffs categorically raised a plea of partition of the joint family properties. The learned counsel submitted that the rejoinder filed on behalf of the plaintiffs to the application for leave to contest the suit filed on behalf of the defendant should be considered to be 'a substantive pleading' and in that view of the matter the learned court below could not have refused to take into consideration the memorandum of partition (Ext. 7). 35. The learned counsel further submitted that in any event the defendant even in its written statement which was filed subsequent to the order granting leave to it to contest the suit for eviction, did not deny the factum of partition of the joint family properties by and between the plaintiffs and their co-sharers, although it became aware of the said contention of the plaintiffs. The learned counsel, therefore contended that absence of pleading of the factum of partition did not prejudice the defendant and thus, the learned court below should have taken into consideration the said memorandum of partition. The learned counsel, in this connection, relied in Bhim Singh v. Kan Singh, reported in AIR 1980 SC 727 and in Ram Sarup Gupta Bishnu Narain Inter College, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1242 . 36. It was next contended by the learned counsel that the pleadings of the parties should not be construed pedantically and in this connection the learned counsel has relied upon decision of the Supreme Court in Smt. Rajbir Kaur v. M/s. S. Chokosiri & Company, reported in AIR 1988 SC 1845 . 37. The learned counsel further contended that in view of the fact that admittedly the defendants have paid rent to the plaintiffs, they are estopped and precluded from challenging their title. In this connection, reference has been made to Syed Abdul Wahab v. Md. Sakman, reported in 1989 PLJR 587 . 38. It was further submitted that in any event, the learned court below had arrived at a finding of fact that the plaintiffs are the joint owners and thus, this Court should not interfere with the aforementioned finding of fact. 39. Sakman, reported in 1989 PLJR 587 . 38. It was further submitted that in any event, the learned court below had arrived at a finding of fact that the plaintiffs are the joint owners and thus, this Court should not interfere with the aforementioned finding of fact. 39. The learned counsel next submitted that it is not a case like Chhedi Ram's case (supra) where different plaintiffs acquired different portions of the tenanted premises by separate deeds and thus, not only their need in respect of portions of the suit premises were different but they became landlords in relation to the different portions of the tenanted properties only, whereas as in this case, the plaintiffs are joint owners of the properties in suit and they intend to live together, need of one must be considered to be a need of the other. 40. Mr. Chattopadhyay further submitted that the learned court below committed an error in holding that the suit premises was not required and/or fit for being used for residential purpose without taking into consideration the fact that it is always possible for the owners to make necessary additions and alterations to make it a habitable one. 41. Mr. Chattopadhyay next contended that the learned trial court in rejecting the case of the petitioners to the effect that they had not been able to prove their requirement for residential purposes, failed to take into consideration relevant materials and thus came to an erroneous conclusion. According to the learned counsel, if the evidences adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs are looked into, it would be evident that the plaintiffs have not only proved their bona fide requirement for the first floor but also proved their requirements of the ground floor. 42. It was further contended by Mr. Chattopadhyay that the finding of the learned court below to the effect that the plaintiffs intended to get the rental of the premises enhanced, is contrary to law, inasmuch as, once the requirement of the plaintiffs is found to be bonafide other considerations became wholly irrelevant. The learned counsel, in this connection, has relied upon a decision in Devindar Kumar Jain v. T.N. Indrani & ors, reported in 1987 (1) Rent Control Reporter 355 and in Sadhu Sharan Sahai v. National Seeds Corporation Ltd. reported in 1989 BBCJ 126 . 43. The learned counsel, in this connection, has relied upon a decision in Devindar Kumar Jain v. T.N. Indrani & ors, reported in 1987 (1) Rent Control Reporter 355 and in Sadhu Sharan Sahai v. National Seeds Corporation Ltd. reported in 1989 BBCJ 126 . 43. The learned counsel further contended that the defendants were bound to prove the purported plea raised by them to the effect that during the period January, 1988 (when the defendants agreed to pay monthly rent of Rs. 3000/- to the plaintiffs) and December, 1988 (when the suit for eviction was filed), the plaintiffs, at any point of time, put pressure upon the defendants to increase the monthly rent from Rs. 3000/- to Rs. 6000/- and in view of the fact that the defendants failed to prove the said plea, the question of the suit for eviction by the plaintiffs having been filed mala fide, does not arise. 44. It was further submitted that in paragraphs 6, 11 and 12 of the plaint, the plaintiffs have categorically stated that they have common interest in the properties and the suit premises are required by the plaintiffs and in reply whereof the defendants have merely raised a bald denial in relation thereto. In this connection, the learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, reported in AIR 1987 SC 558 . 45. The learned counsel has further drawn my attention to the effect that a supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the plaintiffs wherein it has pleaded that the purported grant of decree by the learned trial court in relation to the first floor of the building in question will be of no avail inasmuch as there is no separate entry in relation thereto. 46. The learned counsel next contended that this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may consider the pleadings of the parties and the evidences on record under Section 14 (8) of the said Act as an appellate court and for this purpose, it can also re-appraise the evidence. 46. The learned counsel next contended that this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may consider the pleadings of the parties and the evidences on record under Section 14 (8) of the said Act as an appellate court and for this purpose, it can also re-appraise the evidence. The learned counsel, in this connection, has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs Mohini Suraj Bhan v. Vinod Kumar Mittal, reported in AIR 1986 SC 706 , in Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v. Bhushan Ram, reported in 1989 PLJR 1188 and also a decision in Sadhu Sahai v. National Seeds Corporation Ltd., reported in 1989 BBCJ 126 . The learned counsel further submitted that the revisional jurisdiction is a part of the appellate jurisdiction. Reference has been placed by the learned counsel, in this connection, upon a decision in Abdul Ghani v. Md. Hadi Hussain, reported in 1990 (2) PLJR 113 . 47. It was further contended that in view of the fact that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 14 (8) of the Act is a part of this Courts appellate jurisdiction, in a given case this Court can also exercise its power conferred upon it under Order 41, Rule 22 read with Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and even if it be held that the Civil Revision No. 46 of 1990 (R) is not maintainable, this Court may consider the pleas raised by the plaintiffs in their Civil Revision application in terms of the aforementioned provisions. In this connection, reliance has been placed in The Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. v. S. Md. Samiullah Saheb & Co., reported in 1959 Madras 367, in Abdul Gaoor v. Mt. Wahidan Bibi, reported in AIR 1966 Patna 173 and in Mahant Dhangir v. Madan Mohan, reported in 1987 Supp. SCC 528. 48. Mr. N.K. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners, in reply, submitted that this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction cannot take recourse of the Order 41, Rule 22 read with Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. SCC 528. 48. Mr. N.K. Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners, in reply, submitted that this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction cannot take recourse of the Order 41, Rule 22 read with Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned counsel submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court in Shankar Ramchandra Adhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bupat, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1 , wherein an observation was made that the revisional jurisdiction of the court is as extension of its appellate jurisdiction was made in a different context and not for the purpose of exercising such powers which only an appellate court can exercise in view of the specific provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. 49. The learned counsel further contended that the defendants were not estopped from challenging the title from the plaintiffs only because they paid rent to them inasmuch as Section 116 of the Evidence Act applies only to a case of induction of a tenant by a landlord and not at a later stage. 50. The learned counsel further contended that the memorandum of partition (Ext. 7) was rightly not taken into consideration by the learned court below inasmuch as it is a settled law that no evidence is admissible which has not been pleaded. 51. With regard to the scope of this Court’s jurisdiction under Section 14 (8) of the Act, the learned counsel contended that this Court in exercise of is revisional jurisdiction cannot reappraise the evidences and its jurisdiction is only confined to the errors of law committed by the trial court. In this connection, the learned counsel has relied upon a decision in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Choudhary, reported in AIR 1963 SC 698 , in R.C. Spg. Wvg. Mills v. D.C. Mills, reported in 1967 SC 1344, in Dr. Hemchandra have Smt. Anjana Lal, reported in 1988 B.L.T. 45, 1987 PLJR 562, in Sri Chhedi Ram V. Smt. Pano Devi, reported in 1990 (1) PLJR 240 and in Ramesh Chandra Agrawal V. Bhushao Ram, reported in 1989 (2) B.L.T. 311. 52. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, as mentioned hereinbefore, the following questions arise for consideration by this Court :- (a) Whether the requirements of the plaintiff no. 1 and the plaintiff no. 2 being different, one suit for eviction was maintainable ? 52. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, as mentioned hereinbefore, the following questions arise for consideration by this Court :- (a) Whether the requirements of the plaintiff no. 1 and the plaintiff no. 2 being different, one suit for eviction was maintainable ? (b) Whether in absence of any pleading of partition raised on behalf of the plaintiffs, the learned court below could have held them to be a owner of the properties and consequently pass a decree for eviction of the defendants in view of the Explanation-I appended to Section 11 (1) (c) of the said Act? (c) Whether in view of the findings of the learned court below that the plaintiffs had a motive to enhance the rent from Rs. 3000/- to Rs. 6000/- per month, the suit for eviction filed by them purported to be on the ground of their personal necessity can be said to be bona fide or reasonable ? (d) Whether in any event in view of the findings of fact arrived at by the learned court below that the requirement of the plaintiff no. 1 only for a chamber and a library having been accepted, the learned court below could have granted a decree for eviction in respect of the entire first floor of the suit premises without taking into consideration the number of rooms required for the said purpose ? (e) Whether the learned court below in dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs in relation to the ground floor failed to take into consideration the relevant material brought on record and have granted a decree in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of the entire suit premises ? (f) Whether in view of the decision of this Court in Md. Jainul Ansari v. Md. Khalil, reported in 1990 (2) PLJR 378 , the Civil Revision No. 46 of 1990 (R) filed on behalf of the landlord is maintainable ? (g) Whether in the event it is held that the Civil Revision No. 46 of 1990 (R) was not maintainable, this Court can exercise its power under Order 41, Rule 22 read with Order 41; Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure for considering the grievances raised on behalf of the plaintiffs in Civil Revision No. 46 of 1990 (R) ? (h) What is the scope and effect of the revisional power of this Court under Section 14 (8) of the said Act? 53. Re. Question no. (a) ; Both the plaintiff have claimed that they are co-owner of the suit premises. By reason of an alleged deed of partition by and between the plaintiffs and other co-sharers, allegedly the suit premises was allotted to them. 54. In view of the fact, they have pleaded joint ownership and, that, it cannot be said that the requirements of plaintiff no. 1 and those of plaintiff no. 2 are different and as such one suit for eviction was maintainable. 55. The decision of this Court in Chhedi Ram v. Pano Devi, reported in 1990 Vol. I PLJR 240 relied upon by Sri Prasad was rendered absolutely in a different situation. In that case, three different persons purchased three different portions of one tenanted premises from the owners thereof and in that case one vendee had no connection with the others. Their requirements in respect of the portions of the tenanted premises purchased by them were distinct and different. In that situation, it was held that the maintainability of the suit was doubtful and in that view of the matter, the case was remanded to the trial court for consideration of the said issue along with various other issues. Such is not the position here. 56. The decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1981 SC 1113 relied upon by Mr. Prasad has also no application in them. In that case it was held that while the landlord by reason of a subsequent event namely a deed of partition entered into by and between him and co-sharers is not allotted the said premises, his requirement in relation thereto comes to an end. In the case in hand, such is not the position, inasmuch as the plaintiffs claimed themselves to have become exclusive co-owners in respect of the tenanted premises. 57. In this view of the matter, it has to be held that the suit for eviction filed by the petitioners jointly as against the defendant was maintainable. 58. Re. Question no. (b) : It is true that in the plaint, the plaintiffs did not plead the factum of partition. The learned court below as indicated hereinbefore, held that in absence of plea of partition, the deed of partition proved by the plaintiffs (Ext. 58. Re. Question no. (b) : It is true that in the plaint, the plaintiffs did not plead the factum of partition. The learned court below as indicated hereinbefore, held that in absence of plea of partition, the deed of partition proved by the plaintiffs (Ext. 7) could not be taken into consideration. 59. It is true that no evidence is admissible which has not been pleaded. However, it is also well known that if an evidence has been allowed to be adduced without a pleading and the parties are joint, in such situation the evidence in absence of pleadings may also be held to be admissible. In this case the learned court below adopted the procedure as laid down under section 14 of the Act. The defendant-petitioner filed an application for leave to contest the said suit. In the rejoinder filed by the plaintiffs to the said application, the plaintiffs categorically stated that they became the owners of the suit properties in view of the memorandum of partition entered into by and between them and their co-sharers. 60. The defendant filed its written statement after obtaining the leave of the court to contest the suit. In such a situation, it must be held that although the rejoinder filed on behalf of the plaintiffs to the application of the defendant seeking relief of the court to contest the suit may not be a substantive pleading, but thereby the defendant acquired sufficient knowledge with regard to the fact as to how the plaintiff a have been claiming exclusive ownership in respect of the properties in suit. 61. Despite the said knowledge, the defendants did not controvert the said plea in it written statement. 62. In such a situation, it must be held that the defendant cannot be said to have been prejudiced by absence of the plea of partition. 63. In this application, the plaintiffs have specifically pleaded that they were the co-owners in respect of the properties in suit. 64. In such a situation, it was permissible for the plaintiffs to prove the said fact by bringing on records the relevant evidence in support of the said plea. The deed of partition thus; could have been brought on records for the purposes of proving that the plaintiff's were owners of the properties. 65. 64. In such a situation, it was permissible for the plaintiffs to prove the said fact by bringing on records the relevant evidence in support of the said plea. The deed of partition thus; could have been brought on records for the purposes of proving that the plaintiff's were owners of the properties. 65. In Ram Swaroop Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College as reported in AIR 1981 SC 1242, the Supreme Court held as follows :- "Whenever the question about lack of pleading is raised the enquiry should not be so much about the form of pleadings, instead the Court must find out whether in substance the parties knew the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. It was further observed:- "that once it is found that inspite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal." 66. In Smt. Rajbir Kaur v. M/s. S. Chokosiri & Company reported in AIR 1988 S.C. 1845 , the Supreme Court held that as parties went to trial with full knowledge of the ambit of the case of each other the pleadings are required to be construed liberally. The Supreme Court in that case followed Ram Swaroop Gupta's case (supra) and observed "after all, the parties do not have the foresight of prophets and their lawyers the draftmanship of a Chalmers." 67. Reference in this connection may also be made to Bhim Singh v. Kan Singh reported in AIR 1980 SC 721. This aspect of the matter has also recently been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in N.P. Rao v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. as reported in 1990 B.B.C.J. page 149. 68. It is well known that a pleading particularly muffasil pleading, should not be construed pedantically. Reference in this connection may be made to Ganesh Sahu & ors v. Dwarika Sao & ors. reported in AIR 1991 Patna 1. Further there is no doubt that the defendants have admitted the plaintiffs as their landlords and in that view of the matter they are estopped and precluded from challenging their title. Reference in this connection may be made to Syed Abdul Wahab v. Md. Sakman (1989 P.L.J.R. 587). 69. reported in AIR 1991 Patna 1. Further there is no doubt that the defendants have admitted the plaintiffs as their landlords and in that view of the matter they are estopped and precluded from challenging their title. Reference in this connection may be made to Syed Abdul Wahab v. Md. Sakman (1989 P.L.J.R. 587). 69. There is no doubt as has been contended by Mr. Chattopadhaya that in terms of section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, a defendant is estopped from challenging the title of the landlord who inducted him as a tenant. Further the general plea of estoppel can be raised at all stages during the tenure of tenancy. 70. Taking thus all facts and circumstances of this case into consideration, in my opinion, the learned court below misdirected itself in not taking into consideration Ext. 7. 71. Re. Question No. (c) : There is no doubt that the learned court below has held that the plaintiffs have all along been enhancing the quantum of rent. It is admitted that in January, 1988 by reason of an agreement entered into by and between the parties, the rent was enhanced to Rs. 3000/- per month. However, the suit was filed in December, 1988. The defendants have raised a specific plea that even after enhancing the stipulated monthly rent to Rs. 3000/- per month from January, 1988 the plaintiffs wanted to enhance the rent further to Rs. 6000/- per month. However, the defendant was not able to prove the said plea. In absence of proof of such a plea the question of the suit having been filed by the plaintiffs malafide as against the defendant does not arise. 72. It is, thus, clear that the learned trial court misdirected itself in holding that the plaintiff's action in filing the suit was not bonafide, A suit filed by a landlord on the ground of his personal necessity is to be judged from the angle as to whether there is a reasonable and bonafide need in contradistinction to his desire. 73. There cannot further be any doubt that once it is held that the need of the landlord is bonafide and reasonable, the motive of the landlord becomes irrelevant. 73. There cannot further be any doubt that once it is held that the need of the landlord is bonafide and reasonable, the motive of the landlord becomes irrelevant. However, for the purpose of coming to the conclusion as to whether the requirement of the plaintiff is bonafide and reasonable or not, the Court is entitled to take into consideration the conduct of the parties including the fact as to whether the suit has been filed on a purported ground of personal necessity, although the real motive for the plaintiff was to enhance the rent. In the event if it is found that the plaintiff in truth and substance filed the suit for eviction only with a view to enhance the rent, there cannot be any doubt that such a suit must be dismissed on the ground that the requirement of the plaintiff was not bona fide. 74. In Devendra Kumar Jain v. T.N. Indrani 1987 Vol. 1 Rent Control Reports 355, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held that mere oral allegation that the respondent demanded enhanced rent by itself would not mean that his requirement was malafide. In Sadhu S. Sahai v. N.S.C. Limited reported in 1989 BBCJ 126 , a learned Single Judge of this Court has also considered this aspect of the matter. However, in this case, the learned court below itself has held that the requirement of the plaintiff in respect of the part of the suit premises is bonafide. 75. In this situation, in absence of any proof of the plea of the defendants to the effect that the plaintiffs in fact intended to enhance the stipulated monthly rent from Rs. 3000/- per month to Rs. 6000/-, it must be held that the suit filed by the plaintiffs cannot be held to be malafide. 76. As the decision in relation to the questions (d) and (e) formulated hereinbefore would depend upon the scope and effect of the revisional power of this Court under Section 14 (8) of the said Act as formulated in question no. (h) aforementioned, the said question may be decided before considering the questions nos. (d) & (e) aforementioned. 77. 76. As the decision in relation to the questions (d) and (e) formulated hereinbefore would depend upon the scope and effect of the revisional power of this Court under Section 14 (8) of the said Act as formulated in question no. (h) aforementioned, the said question may be decided before considering the questions nos. (d) & (e) aforementioned. 77. Re-Question No. (h) : Section 14 (8) of the said Act reads as follows :- "Special Procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on ground of bonafide requirement :- (8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery or possession of any premises made in accordance with procedure specified in this section: Provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the date of the order of eviction, the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying Itself that an order under the section is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit." 78. It is, therefore, to be seen as to what is meant by the term 'in accordance with law’. S. Roy, J. in Dr. Hemchandra Jha v. Smt. Anjana Lal (1988 BLT (Rep.) 45 : 1987 PLIR 582) held thus ;- "What is meant by 'according to law' ? Judgment according to law is not invariably the same thing as judgment according to the merit of the particular case from which the judgment flows. The hall mark of judgment according to law is conformity with a set of rules. Lord Devlin, Lord of Appeal in the book 'The Judge'. And what is meant by 'a set of rules? This means rules designed so as to advance justice in a normal case. What are the rules applicable to the present case? As in this case we are concerned with a suit for eviction from a budding filed by a landlord against the tenant, besides others the rules which shall apply are Code of Civil Procedure, Evidence Act and the Rent Act. If, therefore, there has been violation of any of the provisions of the procedural law which has resulted in miscarriage of justice or any mandatory provision of the Rent Act, if the finding is perverse, i.e. not supported by evidence, it must be held that the order impugned is not 'according to law." 79. If, therefore, there has been violation of any of the provisions of the procedural law which has resulted in miscarriage of justice or any mandatory provision of the Rent Act, if the finding is perverse, i.e. not supported by evidence, it must be held that the order impugned is not 'according to law." 79. In Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v. Bhushan Ram reported in 1989 PLJR 189 this court upon taking into consideration various decisions of the Supreme Court held :- "Such is not the position here. In terms of section 14 (8) of the Bihar Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Act a High Court is entitled to call for the records of the case for the purpose of satisfying itself that order under section 14 there is according to the law and pass such order in respect thereof as it may think fit and proper. The jurisdiction of the High Court therefore is evidently wider than the revisional power of this court as conferred upon it under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 80. In Chhedi Ram v. Smt Pano Devi and others reported in 1990 (1) PLJR 240 , this court upon taking into consideration the decisions of the Supreme Court in Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Md. Mirasheb Kadri & others (AIR 1987 SC 1987) and P.R. Krishnamchari Y. Lalitha Ammal reported in AIR 1987 SC 2048 held that the jurisdiction of the High Court is evidently wider than the revisional power of this court as conferred upon it under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 81. In this connection it may be mentioned that Mr. N.K. Prasad has submitted that for the purpose of considering the question as to whether a judgment is in accordance with law or not, the decisions rendered under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act would be relevant. In Hari Shankar and others v. Rao Girdhari Lal Choudhary ( AIR 1963 SC 698 ), the Supreme Court quoted with approval the judgment of Beaumont C.J. in Bell & Co. Ltd. B. Waman Hemraj 40 Bombay LR 125 (AIR 1938 Bom. 223) and held that scope of section 35 of the Berar and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 (38 of 1952 is, wider than that of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ltd. B. Waman Hemraj 40 Bombay LR 125 (AIR 1938 Bom. 223) and held that scope of section 35 of the Berar and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 (38 of 1952 is, wider than that of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held :- “The phrase 'according to law' refers to the decision as a whole, and is not to be equated to error of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the overall decision, which must be according to law which it would not be; if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. The section is thus framed to confer larger powers than the power to correct error of jurisdiction to which S. 115 is limited But, it must not be overlooked that the section in spite of its apparent width of language where it confers a power on the High Court to pass such order as the High Court might think fit is controlled by the opening words where it says that the High Court may send for the record of the case to satisfy itself that the decision is 'according to law'. It stands to reason that if it was considered necessary that there should be are-hearing, a right of appeal would be a more appropriate remedy, but the Act says that there is to be no further appeal." 82. In Malini Ayyappa Naicker v; Seth Manghraj Udhvdas, AIR 1969 SC 1344 , the, Supreme Court distinguished the phraseology 'decision contrary to law' and 'decision not according to law' in the following terms :- "A decision being 'contrary to law' as provided in section 100 (1) (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure is not the same thing as a decision being not 'according to law' as prescribed in the last proviso of section 75 (1) of the Act. The latter expression is wider in ambit than the former. It is neither desirable nor possible to give an exhaustive definition of the expression 'according to law'. The power given to the High Court under the 1st proviso to section 75 (1) of the Act is similar to that given to it under sec. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act." In that case also the Supreme Court followed Bell & Co.'s Case (supra) and Harishankar's case (supra). 83. The power given to the High Court under the 1st proviso to section 75 (1) of the Act is similar to that given to it under sec. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act." In that case also the Supreme Court followed Bell & Co.'s Case (supra) and Harishankar's case (supra). 83. From the decisions aforementioned there cannot be any doubt that the jurisdiction of this Court under section 14 (8) of the Act is wider than that of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 84. At this juncture, however, it will be profitable to note the decision of the Supreme Court in Rajbir Kaur"s case, 1988 SC 1845 (supra) wherein the Supreme Court held that even in a case of appeal, the appellate court would not normally interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the trial court on the basil of appreciation of evidence and the revisional court would be precluded to exercise its revisional jurisdiction by re-appreciating the evidences against a concurrent finding of fact. 95. However, as noticed hereinbefore Mr. Chattopadhyay strongly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Mohini Surajvan vs. B.K. Mittal and others., reported in AIR 1985 Supreme Court 706 as well as decision of this Court in Sadhu Sharan Sahai and another vs. National Seeds Corporation Ltd. and others 1989 B.B.C.J. 126. In Mohini Surajvan's case (supra) the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and the High Court upon considering that their approach to the main issue was not correct. In that case also it was held that the power of the High Court under section 15(5) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act was not akin to section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Sadhu Sharan Sahai's case (supra) a learned Single Judge of the court considered the evidence led on behalf of the plaintiff in extenso and held as follows :- "The evidence led on behalf of the plaintiffs as stated in the impugned judgment was placed in extenso before me. I feel that the plaintiffs have completely succeeded in establishing a case of bonafide personal necessity which could not be detracted in cross- examination. It was further argued that in civil revision reappraisal of evidence is not required. I feel that the plaintiffs have completely succeeded in establishing a case of bonafide personal necessity which could not be detracted in cross- examination. It was further argued that in civil revision reappraisal of evidence is not required. Firstly it is now wall settled that revisional jurisdiction under section 14 of B.B.C. Act does not operate within the same restrictions as an application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The scope is much larger and that apart the appraisal of evidence by the trial court was so utterly ridiculous that an interference is the only thing that is justified. It had no valid reasons to come to the finding it did in law or on fact." 86. There cannot be any doubt that a pure finding of fact can not be interfered by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 87. However, if the trial court in arriving at a finding of fact ignores relevant matters and bases its decision on irrelevant matters or on extraneous considerations evidently the High Court will have jurisdiction to interfere therewith. In such a case even a High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reference in this connection may be made to. Ajantha Transports v. T.V.K. Transports ( AIR 1975 SC 123 ); Binod Kumar Arora v. Smt. Surjit Kaur. AIR 1987 Vol. 2 Unreported Judgment S.C. 134 and Abdul Ghani v. Md. Hadi Hussain reported in 1990 Vol. 2 P.L.J.R. 113. 88. In Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao. v. Ashalata S. Guram reported in AIR 1987 SC 117 , the Supreme Court while considering the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, held as follows :- "It is true that in exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution the High Court could go into the question of facts or look into the evidence if justice so requires it; if there is any misdirection in law or a view of fact taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence. But the High Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to look into the fact in the absence of clear and cut down reasons where the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence. But the High Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to look into the fact in the absence of clear and cut down reasons where the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence. The High Court also should not interfere with a finding within the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal except where the findings were perverse and not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice. (See Trimbak Gangadhar Telang (supra). Except to the limited extent indicated above, the High Court has no jurisdiction. In our opinion, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case on the question that the High Court has gone into questions which depended upon appreciation of evidence and indeed the very fact that the learned trial Judge came to one conclusion and the appellate bench came to another conclusion is indication of the position that two views were possible in this case. In preferring one view to another of factual appreciation of evidence, the High Court transgressed its limits of jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution. On the first point, therefore, the High Court was in error." 89. Although, it is not possible to lay down exhaustively the situations where this Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 14 (8) of the Act, it is clear that this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under section 14 (8) not only can consider the questions which are permissible in terms of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India as also under Section 115 of the Code of Civil procedure but also in a case where the trial court has arrived at a finding of fact upon erroneous construction of a legal provision or acted contrary to law. This court can also exercise its jurisdiction in a case where the trial court misconstrued a vital document or committed a procedural error. 90. In a limited sense, therefore, it cannot, therefore, be said that in no case the court can look to the evidences on behalf of the parties, but its jurisdiction to consider the evidence brought on records would be only for the purpose of finding out as to whether the Court has failed to consider any material evidence or failed to arrive at a decision in accordance with law, or misdirected itself in law. 'According to law' means according to the principles of law. A judgment, therefore, which is not in terms of well settled principles of law; both procedural and substantive, would not be 'according to law' and this would be liable to be interfered by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 14 (8) of the said Act. But, in any case, it will not reappraise the evidence only for the purpose of reversing a pure finding of fact. 91. Re. Question nos. (d) and (e): Mr. N.K. Prasad has submitted that the learned trial court did not take into consideration as to what was the actual need of the plaintiff no. 1 for the purpose of having a chamber and library and without considering the said question proceeded to pass a decree for eviction in respect of the entire first floor which consists of four rooms. 92. Mr. S.K. Chattopadhyay appearing on behalf of the landlord, on the other hand, submitted that a decree for partial eviction was not maintainable in view of the fact that the proportionate rent had not been determined. Learned counsel further submitted that no passage has been given by the learned court below, to the plaintiffs for going to the flue floor as would be evident from a supplementary affidavit filed in this regard in this Court. It was further submitted that the learned court below misdirected itself in holding that the plaintiffs have not been able to prove their requirement for residential purposes on the ground that they are residing in the house of their father without considering the actual accommodation available to the plaintiffs as also without considering the fact that in view of the partition as evidenced by Ext. 7, the plaintiffs are required to have their separate residence inasmuch now they have been allotted share in respect of the building in question only. 93. Learned counsel further submitted that the learned trial court further misdirected itself in holding that the suit premises is not fit for residential purpose as it had all along been used for commercial purpose. In this connection, the learned counsel further submitted that a well, an angan and a latrine etc. are situated in the ground floor only and there is no toilet or other facilities in the first floor. 94. The contentions raised by the counsel for both the sides are well merited. In this connection, the learned counsel further submitted that a well, an angan and a latrine etc. are situated in the ground floor only and there is no toilet or other facilities in the first floor. 94. The contentions raised by the counsel for both the sides are well merited. In Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 558, the Supreme Court held as follows :- "It is well settled that though the Rent Act is a beneficial legislation, it must be read reasonably and justly. If more limitations are imposed upon the right to hold the property then it would expose itself to the vice of unconstitutionality. Such an approach in interpretation of beneficial statutes is not warranted. It is true that one should iron out the creases and should take a creative approach as to what was intended by a particular provision but there is always unless rebutted, a presumption as to constitutionality and the Act should be so read as to prevent it from being exposed to the vice of unconstitutionality." 95. In Arjun Khiamal Makhijani v. Jamnadas C. Tuliani and others reported in (1989) 4 Supreme Court Cases 612, it was held :- "When the Act contains provisions, some of which fall under the category of beneficial legislation with regard to the tenant and the others with regard to the landlord the assertion that even with regard to such provisions of the Act which fall under the purview of beneficial legislation for the landlord an effort should be made to interpret them also in favour of the tenant is a negation of the very principle of interpretation of a beneficial legislation on which reliance is placed on behalf of the tenants. The argument indeed is self defeating and only justifies the cynical proverb-Heads I win tails you lose. It is difficult to countenance the sentimental approach made by learned counsel for the tenants, for the simple reason that as pointed out in Latham v. R. Johnson and Nephew Ltd. sentiment is a dangerous will-of-the-wisp to take as a guide in the search for legal principles." 96. The said Act therefore, cannot be read as imposing a bar to occupying a premise by the landlord for residential purpose only because the same had been in use for commercial purposes earlier. The said Act therefore, cannot be read as imposing a bar to occupying a premise by the landlord for residential purpose only because the same had been in use for commercial purposes earlier. In terms of the provisions of the said Act although additions and alterations of the tenanted premises is by itself not a ground for eviction of the tenant but it cannot be said that although the plaintiffs have in respect thereof, after occupying the same, they cannot make additions and alterations so as to make that habitable. 97. In C.R. 660/89R (Chhedi Dental Clinic v. Parmanand Lal Verma) this court has considered this aspect of the matter and held that once the requirement for residential purposes is established, it is permissible for the landlord to make suitable additions and alterations for making the tenanted premises a habitable one. 98. The learned court below has failed to take into consideration that only because a person is residing with his father does not necessarily mean that he does not require the promises for his residence, particularly, when there has been a separation amongst the co-sharers. 99. In Smt. Pratibha Devi v. T.V. Krishnan, 1987 Vol. 1 Judgment Today page 764, the Supreme Court held that in considering the availability of alternative accommodation, the court has to consider whether such accommodation is available but also whether the landlord has legal right to such accommodation. 100. In terms of section 11 (1) (c) of the said Act, a mandate has been imposed upon the court to satisfy itself that the building is reasonably and in good faith required. Such a determination is possible when the court takes into consideration the facts pleaded by the parties and the evidences brought on records. The court while arriving at a decision is also required to consider that the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord or not. Bonafide means in good faith and genuinely. Bonafide need must be a genuine need for the landlord to occupy the premises. It is enough that he really means to occupy it; it must be necessary for him to occupy and such necessity must be genuine one. The expression 'reasonably required' is also relevant and, thus the same has to be judged according to the dictates of reason and not on any capricious view or on sentiment. It is enough that he really means to occupy it; it must be necessary for him to occupy and such necessity must be genuine one. The expression 'reasonably required' is also relevant and, thus the same has to be judged according to the dictates of reason and not on any capricious view or on sentiment. While judging the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff, his status, nature of work or vocation, status of his health and other similar factors would be relevant considerations. 101. It must also be borne in mind that in the proviso to section 11(1) (c) the Legislature in its wisdom has chosen to quality the word 'satisfy' by the expression 'substantially'. The lame has evidently been done with a view to keep the interest of the tenant protected by providing occupation to him of the building in part and granting to the landlord occupation to meet his requirement. 102. In Nasirul Haque v. Jitendra Nath Dey reported in AIR 1984 SC 1799 : 1984 PLJR (SC) 79, it was held :- "the trial court while recording its finding was of the view that the question of partial eviction should be considered in the light of the requirement of the landlord as deposed to by him. In doing so, the High Court failed to take into account the proviso to section 12 (1) (c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act of 1977, which in terms enjoins that what is necessary to be considered is the reasonable requirement of the landlord and whether it would be 'substantially' satisfied by evicting the tenant therefore, in the first instance, to determine the extent of the premises which the landlord reasonably required. Determine it objectively and not on the basis of his ipse dixit or his mere desire to occupy as much as he wants. But the Court has to furthermore apply a test as to whether such requirement, as the court considers reasonably will be substantially satisfied (not fully satisfied) by ordering partial eviction." 103. Determine it objectively and not on the basis of his ipse dixit or his mere desire to occupy as much as he wants. But the Court has to furthermore apply a test as to whether such requirement, as the court considers reasonably will be substantially satisfied (not fully satisfied) by ordering partial eviction." 103. In Smt. Sushila Devi v. Avinash Chandra reported in AIR 1987 SC 1150 , the Supreme Court held as follows :- "While the landlord is entitled to the beneficial enjoyment of his property, the law still insists as a measure of social necessity that the Court should be satisfied as to the genuineness of requirement of the landlord under section 14 (1) (e). It has to keep in view that there is acute shortage of housing accommodation in the metropolitan city of Delhi and, therefore, unless there is compelling necessity, there can be no order for eviction under law. S. 14 (1) (e) is meant to sub-serve a public interest and to strike a just balance between the competing needs of the landlord and the tenant. It is axiomatic that when a landlord applies for eviction a duty is cast on the Court to consider the question on merits on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties. Again there has to be in such cases an objective determination of the claim of the landlord." 104. Although in the context of the said Act, the court cannot enbark upon adjudication on an issue of comparative hardship the court while exercising its jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 11 (1) (c) of the said Act has also to take into consideration the needs and conveniences of both the landlord and tenant. It has, also to consider as to how best both the landlord and tenant can be accommodated in the same premises. 105. On the other band, learned court below passed a decree for eviction of the defendant from the entire first floor without taking into consideration the actual need of the plaintiff no. 1 for holding a chamber and library and without taking into consideration as to whether there is separate passage for going to the first floor or whether such a stair-case is possible to be constructed and other relevant considerations. 1 for holding a chamber and library and without taking into consideration as to whether there is separate passage for going to the first floor or whether such a stair-case is possible to be constructed and other relevant considerations. Learned court below further misdirected itself in not fixing proportionate rent which he was mandatorily required to do under section 11 (1) (c) of the said Act. 106. In Damadilal v. Parashram reported In AIR 1976 SC 2229 , it was held that it is well established that when a finding of fact is arrived at ignoring the relevant facts, such a finding is bad in the eye of law and the High Court then has jurisdiction in setting aside the finding of the lower appellate court and restore that of the trial court on the point. 107. Re. Question nos. (f) & (g) : In Md. Jainul Ansari v. Md. Khalil reported in 1990 (2) PLJR 378 , a Full Bench of this Court has interpreted section 14 (8) of the said Act. In that decision, this court overruled a Division Bench decision of this Court in Sri Udai Banerjee v. Shri P.B. Dutta reported in 1986 PLJR 950 holding that a revision at the instance of landlord in terms of section 14 (8) is not contemplated, in the event, the court dismisses the suit filed by the landlord on the ground of his necessity and/or on the ground of the expiry of the specified period of lease. It was held that only an appeal is maintainable as against such an order in terms of section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 108. In this case, as noticed hereinbefore, the suit has been decreed in part. By reason of the impugned judgment, learned court below upon taking recourse to the proviso to section 11 (1) (c) of the Act directed ejectment of the defendant only from the first floor of the tenanted premises. 109. Mr. Chattopadhyay learned counsel appearing in support of the Civil Revision Application no. 46 of 1990 R submitted that as the question as to whether a civil revision application will be maintainable from a part of the decree was not decided by the Full Bench in Md. Jainul Ansari's case (supra) the same requires a reconsideration. 109. Mr. Chattopadhyay learned counsel appearing in support of the Civil Revision Application no. 46 of 1990 R submitted that as the question as to whether a civil revision application will be maintainable from a part of the decree was not decided by the Full Bench in Md. Jainul Ansari's case (supra) the same requires a reconsideration. According to the learned counsel, in view of the Full Bench decision aforementioned a revision will lie at the instance of the landlord in the event a plea of bonafide requirement on the part of the plaintiffs is negatived in its entirety and not when the same is allowed in part. According to the learned counsel if it be held that an appeal would lie from one part of the decree at the instance of the landlord and a revision would lie from the other part of the decree at the instance of the tenant, there is a possibility of the inconsistent judgments being delivered in two different proceedings. 110. The Full Bench in Md. Jainul's case (supra) took into consideration the decision of the Supreme Court in Binod Kumar Choudhary v. Narain Debi Teneja : AIR 1980 SC 2012 and distinguished the said decision. S. Roy. J observed :- "In the main part of both the sub-sections under both the Acts, it has been provided that no appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession. Whereas, in Delhi Act in the proviso, the words used are 'an order' in the Bihar Act, the words are 'the order of eviction'. The Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Chowdhury (supra) held that 'order for recovery of possession of any premises' appearing in the main part of sub-section (8) of section 25B has to be construed in the context in which it appears as an order for deciding an application for recovery of possession of any premises. The Supreme Court, therefore, made contextual interpretation of the sub-section. It was of the opinion that although in the main section it has been provided that no appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery of possession, in view of the language used in the proviso all orders whether it be an order for recovery of possession or an order refusing the same passed by the Controller are revisable by the High Court. The orders covered by sub-section (8) will be all final order passed by the Controller under section 25B disposing of application filed by the landlord for recovery of possession. The Supreme Court noticed the proviso and observed as follows :- "The proviso, however, has to be read as a legislative measure carved out of the sub-section to which it is appended and the order mentioned therein has to be regarded as an order of the type which the sub-section speaks of i.e. an order for the recovery of possession of any premises made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure specified in this section." The same words may mean one thing in one context and another in a different context. This is the reason why the decisions on the meaning of particular word or collection of words found in other statutes are scarcely of much value in dealing with specific statute. It is important to notice that both in section 25B and 14 (8) proviso has been engrafted." The learned Judge thereafter considered the effect of the proviso appended to section 14 (8) and held that proviso appended to section 14 (8) should be read along with the principal provisions thereof. 111. Chief Justice Sohani in his concurring judgment held that an appeal from a decree dismissing a suit for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement would be competent because it is not barred by section 14 (8) of the Act. It was observed :- "If such an appeal is competent, then how can it be said that in a suit instituted under section 14 of the Act the landlord would have no remedy at all if the suit is dismissed and that such a result could not have been intended by the legislature ?" The learned Chief Justice upon distinguishing the decision of the Supreme Court in Binod Kumar Choudhary's case (supra) held :- "Under the Bihar Act, however, the proviso to section 14 (8) does not confer any right of revision on a person aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit for eviction. Therefore, if from the scheme of section 25B of the Delhi Act it could be held that sub-section (8) of section 258 of that Act was intended to be exhaustive of the rights of appeal and revision in relation to any proceedings held under that provision before a Controller, no such inference is possible under the corresponding provisions of the Bihar Act. The decision in AIR 1980 SC 2012 (supra) is, therefore, distinguishable on facts. In my opinion, therefore, as the right vesting in a plaintiff under section 96 of the Code to prefer an appeal from a decree dismissing his suit for eviction is not taken away by section 14 (8) of the Act, an appeal under section 96 of the Code cannot be held to be barred by virtue of section 13 of the Act." 112. However, the point raised by Sri Chattopadhyay was taken note of by me in paragraph 69 of that judgment which reads as follows: - "The anomaly sought to be pointed out by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in that case in my opinion is misconceived. In various suits where cross suits were filed or where different suits having different suit valuations are heard analogously, the same problem arises. In such matters, the courts are not powerless. In such an event either on an application filed by one of the parties the High Court may itself withdraw the appeal from the court of District Judge or may stay the hearing of the revision application pending disposal of the appeal by the first appellate court." 113. 'Decree' is defined under section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure as meaning :- "decree" means the formal expression of an adjudication which so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 144, but shall not include (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation : A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. Explanation : A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final." A suit can not only be decreed in part which means that the suit is dismissed in relation to the other part but in a suit two different decrees are possible to be granted. In such a situation from one part of the decree the remedy may be available to one party by way of appeal; whereas from another part of the decree the remedy for the other party may be by way of revision. 114. In Harakh Narain Singh and another v. Babban and others reported in AIR 1933 Allahabad 473, it was held that where the document described as the 'decree' contains adjudications regarding several items, each adjudication is a decree as defined in S. 2 (2) and the provisions of S. 98 should be applied with reference to the adjudication of each item. 115. In the event against a part of the decree, an appeal is filed by the landlord before a court subordinate to this court and a revision petition is filed by the tenant against another part in this Court, this court may if an application is filed in that regard either under section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Article 228 of the Constitution of India withdraw the appeal and decide both the appeal and the revision together. 116. If the appeal is filed in High Court, there will be no difficulty in hearing the said appeal and the revision application analogously. If, however, for some reason such a course of action is not resorted to, there cannot be any doubt that in that event if the issues to be decided with in the appeal by the District Judge and in the revision by the High Court are same, the decision rendered in one shall operate as res judicata in the other. 117. In Special Military Estates Officer v. Munivenkataramiah and another reported in (1990) 2 Supreme Court Cases 168 it was held: "It is settled law that the right of appeal is a substantive right conferred on a party by the statute. 117. In Special Military Estates Officer v. Munivenkataramiah and another reported in (1990) 2 Supreme Court Cases 168 it was held: "It is settled law that the right of appeal is a substantive right conferred on a party by the statute. The conferring of right of appeal is not circumscribed by the right being available at the time of the institution of the cause in the court of the first instance. The right of appeal in a given situation may already be available at the institution of the cause in the court of the first instance or may even be subsequently conferred. In either situation, without any distinction, such right is conferred by statute." In Jainul Ansari's case (supra) the Full Bench has categorically held that the landlord's right of appeal in terms of section 96 or 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not sought to be taken away by the Legislature in inserting the provisions, contained in Section 14 (8) of the said Act. 118. Section 14 (8) of the Act, thus, does not contemplate filing of any revision application at the instance of the landlord at all. In that view of the matter, only an appeal will be maintainable at the instance of the landlord where the suit has been dismissed in whole or in part. 119. Mr. Chattopadhyay submitted that in a case where an appeal is filed by the landlord, in the event the same is allowed, a tenant must be held to be entitled to file a second appeal which would lead to an analogous position. 120. The submission of Mr. Chauopadhaya is devoid of any merit inasmuch as this situation has also been considered by the Legislature. By reason of section 14 (8) of the Act, not only a first appeal but also a second appeal at the instance of the tenant is barred. In this situation if a decree for eviction is passed for the first time by the appellate court, the remedy of the tenant would be to file a revision application under the proviso to section 14 (8) of the Act and not a second appeal. 121. In this situation if a decree for eviction is passed for the first time by the appellate court, the remedy of the tenant would be to file a revision application under the proviso to section 14 (8) of the Act and not a second appeal. 121. As a revision at the instance of the landlord under section 14 (8) is not contemplated, at his instance even a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not be maintainable in view of the proviso appended thereto inasmuch as an appeal will be maintainable at the instance of landlord. In this view of the matter, it must be held following the Pull Bench decision in Jainul Ansari (supra) case that the revision application filed by the petitioner being Civil Revision No. 46/90R is not maintainable. 122. Re. Que. No. (g) : The question which now arises for consideration is that whether in such an event this Court will be powerless to grant any relief to the landlord in this case? 123. In this case, a counter affidavit has been filed by the landlord in C.R. No. 6/90R. Even the civil revision application filed by the petitioner can be treated to be an application under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 41 Rules 22 and 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure read thus :- "22. 123. In this case, a counter affidavit has been filed by the landlord in C.R. No. 6/90R. Even the civil revision application filed by the petitioner can be treated to be an application under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 41 Rules 22 and 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure read thus :- "22. Upon hearing respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred a separate appeal :-(1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree but may also state that the finding against him in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may also take any cross-objection to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal provided he has filed such objection in the Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow; Explanation: A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objection in respect of the decree in so far as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the Court on any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in favour of that respondent. (2) Form of objection and provision, applicable thereto : Such cross-objection shall be in the form of a memorandum, and the provisions of Rule 1 so far as they relate to the form and contents of the memorandum of appeal shall apply thereto. (3) Unless the respondent files with the object a written acknowledgement from the party who may be affected by such objection or his pleader of having received a copy thereof, the Appellate Court shall cause a copy to be served, as soon as may be after the filing of the objection, on such party or his pleader at the expense of the respondent. (4) Where, in any case in which any respondent has under the rule filed a memorandum of objection, the original appeal is withdrawn or is dismissed for default, the objection so filed may nevertheless be heard and determined after such notice to the other parties as the Court thinks fit. (5) The provisions relating to appeals by indigent persons shall, so far as they can be made applicable apply to an objection under this rule. 33. Power of Court of Appeal: The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by tile Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees: Provided that the appellate Court shall not make any order under Section 35-A in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order." 124. It is true that power under Order XLI Rules 22 and 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure can ordinarily be exercised by an appellate court. However, the Supreme Court in Shankar Ramchandra Abhankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1 held that the revisional jurisdiction is also a part of the appellate jurisdiction, in view of the fact that the revisional court like an appellate court is a superior court. It held thus - "Such a right was one of entering a superior Court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the Court below. Two things which were required to constitute appellate jurisdiction were the existence of the relation of superior and inferior court and the power on the part of the former to review decisions of the latter. In the well known work of Story on Constitution (of United States) Vol. Two things which were required to constitute appellate jurisdiction were the existence of the relation of superior and inferior court and the power on the part of the former to review decisions of the latter. In the well known work of Story on Constitution (of United States) Vol. 2, Article 1761, it stated that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and Corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted and does not create that cause. The appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of forms and. indeed, in any form in which the legislature may choose to prescribe. According to Article 1762 the most usual modes of exercising appellate jurisdiction, at least those which are most known in the United States, are by a writ of error, by an appeal or by some process of removal of a suit from an inferior tribunal. An appeal is a process of civil law origin and removes a cause, entirely subjecting the fact as well as the law to a review and a retrial. A writ of error is a process of common law origin, and it removes nothing for re-examination but the law. The former mode is usually adopted in cases of equity and admiralty jurisdiction; the latter in suits at common law tried by a jury. 6. Now when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the Court below. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. We do not therefore, consider that the principle of merger of orders of inferior Courts in those of superior Courts would be affected or would become inapplicable by making a distinction between a petition for revision and an appeal." 125. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by me in Abdul Ghani v. Md. Hadi Hussain, 1990 (2) PLJR 113 . 126. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by me in Abdul Ghani v. Md. Hadi Hussain, 1990 (2) PLJR 113 . 126. In Smt. Rajbir Kaur v. M/s S. Chokosiri and Company reported in AIR 1988 SC 1845 , the Supreme Court held that although revisional jurisdiction is a part of the appellate jurisdiction but the same cannot be equated with that of a full fledged appeal. However, those statements were made in the context of the power of a revisional court to reappraise the evidence. From what has been observed by the Supreme Court, it is clear that there is no bar in the revisional court's exercising its jurisdiction which would otherwise be permissible for it to do in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 127. The power to grant just relief to the parties without encouraging multiplicity of proceeding is inherent in the power of the court. The court may in a given circumstance and for the ends of justice, not only exercise such power which it feels proper and justified not only in terms of section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also taking recourse to the principles analogous to the provisions of Order XLI Rule 22 and Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 128. In the Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd. v. S. Mohammed Samiullah Saheb & Co. reported in AIR 1959 Madras 367, a learned Judge held :- "Even apart from that authority I would hold that as jurisdiction is given to this court under S. 115 CPC as an appellate jurisdiction the procedure followed by this court in regard to appeals would be attracted and therefore Or. 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. would apply to civil revision petitions and that there is no impediment in passing a decree against the second respondent for the amount in respect of which the first respondent is held entitled to." 129. In Abdul Galoor v. Wahidan Bibi reported in AIR 1966 Patna 173, Anant Singh, J. also held that Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies in proceeding under Section 115 thereof. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that in a given case, this court may exercise its jurisdiction under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure also, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 14 (8) of the said Act. 130. Mr. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt that in a given case, this court may exercise its jurisdiction under Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure also, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 14 (8) of the said Act. 130. Mr. N.K. Prasad, however, submitted that the said decisions are no longer applicable in view of the amendment in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by reason of Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 inasmuch as thereby in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 115, a revision would not be maintainable if an appeal lies against the order impugned either before the High Court or any court subordinate thereto. Mr. Prasad submitted that the court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction could, prior to 1916 Amendment Act exercise power under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure only when it could exercise the appellate power, meaning thereby when an appeal was also maintainable in the said court. The contention of Mr. Prasad is fallacious. Even before coming into force of Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, no revision was maintainable in the High Court if an appeal thereto lay. 131. The scope, object and purport of the provisions under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to do complete justice to the parties. Such a power will be readily invoked while the entire matter is to be remitted back to the court below for its reconsideration in order to do complete justice to the parties. 132. In Hashmatrai and another v. Tarachand and others reported in AIR 1979 Bombay 95, it was held;- "Ordinarily, an aggrieved party is expected to prefer an appeal for getting relief which was refused by the lower court. But there are certain exceptional circumstances which are contemplated by the Legislature and it is for that purpose that O. 41, R 33 Civil P.C. has made a provision which enables the appellate court to make such orders as the case may require. The power can be exercised notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree. It can also be used in favour of any of the respondents although they have not filed an appeal or cross-objection." 133. The power can be exercised notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree. It can also be used in favour of any of the respondents although they have not filed an appeal or cross-objection." 133. In Amar Prakash and another v. Smt. Parakashwati and another reported in AIR 1982 Delhi 143, it was held :- "The objection has no force O. 41 R 22 of the Civil P.C. as amended by Act 104 of 1976 enables a respondent not only to support the decree or order on the basis of finding given by the lower Court in her favour but also to contend that the finding against her in the Court below in respect of any issue ought to have been in her favour besides filing cross-objections." 134. The power of the Court under Order 41 Rule 33 C.P.C. has recently been considered by the Supreme Court in Mahant Dhangir and another Vs. Madan Mohan and others reported in 1987 Supl. Supreme Court Cases 528 thus :- If the cross-objection filed under Rule 22 of Order 41 C.P.C. was not maintainable against the co-respondent, the court could consider it under Rule 33 of Order 41 CPC. Rule 22 and Rule 33 are not mutually exclusive. They are closely related with each other. If objection cannot be urged under Rule 22 against co-respondent Rule 33 could take over and come to the rescue of objector. The appellate court could exercise the power under Rule 33 even if the appeal is only against a part of the decree of the lower court. The appellate court could exercise that power in favour of all or any of the respondents although such respondent may not have filed any appeal or objection. The sweep of the power under Rule 33 is wide enough to determine any question not only between the appellant and respondent, but also between respondent and co-respondents. The appellate court could pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. The appellate court could also pass such other decree or order as the case may require. The words 'as the case may require' used in Rule 33 of Order 41 have been put in wide terms to enable the appellate court to pass any order or decree to meet the ends of justice. What then should be the constraint? The appellate court could also pass such other decree or order as the case may require. The words 'as the case may require' used in Rule 33 of Order 41 have been put in wide terms to enable the appellate court to pass any order or decree to meet the ends of justice. What then should be the constraint? We do not find any. We are not giving any liberal interpretation. The rule itself is liberal enough. The only constraints that we could see may be these : That the parties before the lower court should be there before the appellate court. The question raised must properly arise out of the judgment of the lower court. If these two requirements are there, the appellate court could consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower court. It may be urged by any party to the appeal. It is true that the power of the appellate court under Rule 33 is discretionary. But it is a proper exercise of judicial discretion to determine all questions urged in order to render complete justice between the parties. The Court should not refuse to exercise that discretion on mere technicalities." Reference in this connection may also be made to Ganesh Ram v. Baikunthesh Prasad reported in AIR 1951 Patna 291 at page 293 and Panna Lal v. State of Bombay and others reported in AIR 1963 SC 1516 (Paras 11 to 14 and 21) 135. Even if the provisions of Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure as such are not applicable, in my opinion, the principles thereof are certainly applicable. In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply reported in AIR 1969 SC 1267 , the Supreme Court observed :- "Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the rules of procedure." The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction is not only a court of law but also a court of justice. It is, therefore, permissible for the court to pass such order or orders which may do complete justice to the parties. The term 'complete justice' is not an empty slogan. It is, therefore, permissible for the court to pass such order or orders which may do complete justice to the parties. The term 'complete justice' is not an empty slogan. Thus, a justice done to one party at the expense of the other cannot be said to be doing a complete justice. The High Court has the necessary power to adopt such principles of law which promotes good conscience. In this situation, it has to be held that although the revision application filed by the plaintiffs in C.R. 46/90R was not maintainable, the counter affidavit filed by them in Civil Revision no. 6/90R is also an application purported to be under section 14 (8) giving rise to Civil Revision no. 46/90R should be considered for the purpose of invoking Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 136. There cannot be, therefore, any doubt that this Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under section 14 (8) of the Act preferred by the tenant may, in a given case, also consider grant of appropriate relief in favour or the landlord. 137. The scope of Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been expanded by reason of Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976. Order XLI, Rule 33 was amended to cover cross-suits and also suit in which two decrees are passed. Law Commission in 65th report recommending amendment in Rule 33 observed :- "We are of the view that this rule should be amended or cover cross-suits and also a suit in which two decrees are passed. It is desirable in order to remove the defects caused by uncertainty in this behalf as regards res judicata." 138. The amendment in Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure was thus brought in with the purpose to do justice to all the parties. 139. Lord Reid in Black Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof Aschaffenburg Ag (1975) 1 All England Law Reporter 810 made the following pertinent observations :- "It has always been said to be important to consider the 'mischief', which the Act was apparently intended to remedy. The word 'mischief' is traditional. I would expand it in this way. 139. Lord Reid in Black Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof Aschaffenburg Ag (1975) 1 All England Law Reporter 810 made the following pertinent observations :- "It has always been said to be important to consider the 'mischief', which the Act was apparently intended to remedy. The word 'mischief' is traditional. I would expand it in this way. In 'addition to reading the Act you look at the facts presumed to be known to Parliament when the Bill which became the Act in question was before it, and you consider whether there is disclosed some unsatisfactory state of affairs which Parliament can properly be supposed to have intended to remedy by the Act." 140. The aforementioned observations were quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in M/s. Goodyear Ltd. v. State of Haryana reported in 1990 Vol. 2 SCC 71 at page 85 and in a recent Full Bench decision of this Court in M/s. Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi reported in 1990 vol. 2 P.L.J.R. 797. 141. It is, therefore, clear that full scope and effect has got to be given to the amendment carried out in Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure by reason of Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 keeping in view the recommendations of the Law Commission. In my opinion, the Court should exercise its power more readily while the entire matter is required to be remitted to the trial court for a fresh decision. In this view of the matter, we have not thought it fit and expedient to direct the plaintiffs/ petitioners to prefer an appeal against a part of the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. 142. Taking thus all facts and circumstances into consideration, I am of the view that the learned trial court should consider the merits of the entire suit afresh upon taking into consideration all relevant facts for the purpose of coming to the conclusion as to whether the tenanted premises can be used both by the plaintiffs and the defendant and eviction of a part of the tenanted premises shall fulfll the requirement of the plaintiffs. It may for the purpose of arriving at a just decision, permit the parties to adduce additional evidence. It may for the purpose of arriving at a just decision, permit the parties to adduce additional evidence. It may further appoint a Pleader Commissioner so that a detailed picture in respect of the entire suit premises may become possible to be placed in order to enable him to come to a just decision. 143. In the result, although Civil Revision no. 46/90R is dismissed as not maintainable, Civil Revision no. 6/90R is disposed of with the aforementioned observations and directions and the entire matter is remitted to the learned trial court for a fresh decision in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. The parties shall pay and bear their own costs. R.N. Sahay, J. - I agree.