S. R. BHARGAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS criminal revision gives rise to important question regarding limitation in enforcement of maintenance order passed under Section 488 of the Old Criminal Procedure Code. ( 2 ) FACTS are that on 31st July, 1972 City Magistrate, Meerut granted maintenance of Rs. 50/- per month w. e. f. 18th December, 1981 to the wife Smt. Ram Rati from her husband Brij Mohan sharma. This order was challenged in revision before Sessions Judge, Meerut. It was dismissed on 9th January, 1973. On 21st April, 1973 wife moved application before the City Magistrate for the enforcement of the maintenance order. Husband preferred revision in High Court and the operation of the maintenance order passed by the Magistrate was stayed. The City Magistrate noted the stay order and consigned the application for the enforcement. It was only on 2nd february 1977 that the High Court dismissed the revision preferred by the husband and discharged the stay order. ( 3 ) IT need not be forgotten that maintenance proceedings incorporated in Section 488 of the Old code and Section 125 of the New Code are essentially civil proceedings. Their object is to avoid vagrancy and destitution. Despite being civil in nature the proceedings have been incorporated in criminal Procedure Code only for providing speedy remedy. When the maintenance proceedings are essentially of civil nature it follows that the order of the High Court rejecting the revision on 2nd February, 1977 merged in the order of the Magistrate dated 31st July, 1972 granting maintenance to the wife. ( 4 ) IN the case of Matoli v. Smt. Rukmani (1978 Allahabad law Journal 860) a Division Bench of this Court clearly held that after the commencement of the new Code an application for enforcement of maintenance order passed under the old Code should be made only to a Judicial magistrate who alone is entitled to enforce the order. But on behalf of the wife this laws was ignored. The City Magistrate did not recall the record for pursuing the application of the wife dated 21st April, 1973 which he had consigned to record on account of stay order. On the other hand on behalf of the wife applications dated 313. 1977, 15. 7. 1977, 15. 11. 1977, 4. 12. 1987 and 7. 5. 1979 were moved before the City Magistrate for enforcement of the maintenance order. On the other hand on behalf of the wife applications dated 313. 1977, 15. 7. 1977, 15. 11. 1977, 4. 12. 1987 and 7. 5. 1979 were moved before the City Magistrate for enforcement of the maintenance order. On 30th June, 1979 the learned City Magistrate found that he had no jurisdiction to enforce the maintenance order. He could have at least proceeded with the application dated 21st April, 1973 and could have remitted the other applications to the Judicial Magistrate but on 30th June, 1979 he dismissed the application of the wife for enforcement of maintenance order with the direction that she should seek her remedy in proper Court. ( 5 ) ON 25th July, 1979 wife applied for enforcement of maintenance order of the City Magistrate referred to above, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. The learned Judicial Magistrate, dealing with this application took notice of the proviso of Section 125 (3) of the new Code and held that the recovery could be made only of the amount within a period of one year. Hence he concluded that the maintenance order was enforceable only for the period 26. 7,1978 to 25. 7. 1979. He concluded that enforcement of maintenance before 26. 7. 1978 has become time barred on account of the proviso of Section 125 (3) of the new Cr. P. C. ( 6 ) AGAINST this, wife went up in revision before the Sessions Judge who was of the view that the wife was prosecuting her remedy in wrong Court with due diligence and so she is entitled to all the arrears from the date of order of the Magistrate. ( 7 ) NOW the husband has come in revision to this Court. On behalf of the husband emphasis has been laid on the proviso of Section 125 (3) of the new Code and reference has also been made to large number of cases. For saving space only couple of them may be mentioned as Jagannath patra v. Purnamashi Saraf (AIR 1968 Orissa 35) and Ram Narain v. Smt. Manki (1972 AWR page 737 ). ( 8 ) IF the wife is not entitled to condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or exclusion of time devoted in wrong Court with due diligence under Section 14 of the Limitation act, the contention advanced on behalf of the husband must prevail. ( 8 ) IF the wife is not entitled to condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or exclusion of time devoted in wrong Court with due diligence under Section 14 of the Limitation act, the contention advanced on behalf of the husband must prevail. In the Full Bench case of azizul Haq Kausar Naquvi and Anr. v. The State (AIR 1980 Allahabad 149) this Court held that section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to. the petition under Section 96 (1) of Criminal procedure Code. The basis of this decision was Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. The Full bench was of the view that Sections 5 to 24 of the Limitation Act can be applied to proceedings even under the Criminal Procedure Code. In the earlier case of Matoli v. Smt. Rukmani (supra) a view was expressed that wife would be entitled to the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the case of Shitla Prasad v. Kishuni Devi (1981 Allahabad Law Journal 788) this Court followed the law laid down in the aforementioned Full Bench case and held that provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act are applicable to the proviso to Section 125 (3) Cr. P. C. ( 9 ) IT was vehemently argued- on behalf of the husband that the single Judges view expressed in the case of Shitla Prasad is not correct because the enforcement proceedings are not civil proceedings covered by Section 14 of the Limitation Act. I am unable to accept this contention. In my view both the maintenance proceedings and enforcement proceedings are civil in nature, with the only exception that in an enforcement under the Criminal Procedure Code the husband can not get benefit of Section 60 of the Civil Procedure Code. At any rate, if Section 14 is not applied, it is evident that the wife was pursuing her remedy with the diligence in wrong Court. Even if she did not move an application for condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the ground for condonation is patent and the Court is bound to exercise its powers under section 5 of the Limitation Act and condone the delay. Even if she did not move an application for condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act the ground for condonation is patent and the Court is bound to exercise its powers under section 5 of the Limitation Act and condone the delay. ( 10 ) HAVING considered the entire law on the subject, I am of the view that in the circumstances of the case the wife is entitled to all her arrears under the order of the City Magistrate. Revision has no force and is hereby dismissed. "stay order dated 5. 7. 1982 is discharged". .