Judgment :- ARUNACHALAM J. The petitioner is A-8 in C. C. No. 29 of 1985, pending on the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Madurai. At the instance of the respondent who is the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax (Assessment Range-I), Madurai, he along with nine others are being prosecuted for alleged commission of offences punishable under section 120B, section 192, section 196 and section 420 read with section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and section 276C(1) , 277 and 278 read with section 278B(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Some of the directors appear to have preferred along with the Company Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 4154 of 1985 (Geethanjali Mills Ltd. v. Thiruvengadathan 1989 (179) ITR 558, 1988 (74) CTR 115, 1989 (43) TAXMAN 1 , 1988 (74) CTR(Mad) 115) before this court for quashing the prosecution in the very same calendar case. The petitioner was not a party to the said petition. Janarthanam J., by his order dated September 9, 1988, refused to quash further proceedings holding that the questions raised may have to be canvassed and considered during trial, after evidence was brought on record. Mr. R. S. Jeevarathanam, learned counsel representing the petitioner, contended that the petitioner who was a nominee-director, cannot be considered on a part with the other directors, since he does not enjoy the privileges at the others do. He so submitted, on the basis of Government order, that the petitioner had not been expected to participate in the day-to-day administration or conduct of the business of the company, but as only responsible for the prompt payment of the installments of dues to the Government by Geethanjali Mills Ltd. He submitted that the appellant was made a nominee-director on May 26, 1978, and assumed office on August 23, 1978, and was relieved on February 20, 1981. He has retired from service on January 28, 1984. This prosecution was launched on March 18, 1985, in relation to the assessment year 1980-81, the period being January 1, 1979, to March 31, 1980. He has retired from service on January 28, 1984. This prosecution was launched on March 18, 1985, in relation to the assessment year 1980-81, the period being January 1, 1979, to March 31, 1980. He also contended that under section 30A of the Industrial Development Bank of India Act, 1964, if appointment of a director, as in the case of the petitioner has been made, such director will not incur any obligation or liability by reason only of his being a director or for anything dormer omitted to be done in good faith in the discharge of his duties as a director or anything in relation thereto. On those grounds, he would invite this court to quash the pending prosecution.On these contentions, I have heard Mr. Ramaswami K., learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. He countered the arguments stating that the contentions relate to pure questions of fact, appreciation of which cannot be undertaken in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. I have carefully considered the rival contentions. The effect of the Government order, appointing the petitioner as a nominee-director, will have to be considered on the basis of evidence to be brought on record. The prosecution/respondent should be given an opportunity to substantiate the allegations made in the complaint. The averments in the complaint do not seek to prosecute the petitioner merely on the ground that he was a nominee-director. The allegations show that the petitioner had entered into a conspiracy with the other accused and also wilfully abetted the first accused in the commission of the offences alleged. The complaint also shows that false bills numbering 263 were fraudulent made use of for the relevant assessment year. This is not a case where there are no prima facie allegations sufficient to put the petitioner of trial. The complaint also shows that the petitioner, along with others, was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. The petitioner will be are liberty to urge the contentions placed before me after evidence is adduced before the trial Magistrate. The difference between the nominee-director and any other director will again be a matter of evidence. The complaint also shows that the petitioner, along with others, was responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. The petitioner will be are liberty to urge the contentions placed before me after evidence is adduced before the trial Magistrate. The difference between the nominee-director and any other director will again be a matter of evidence. So far as section 30A of the Industrial Development Bank of India Act, 1964, is concerned, the words used therein "nothing done of omitted to be done in good faith in the discharged of his duties as director" * will again postulate the need to appreciate the evidence arriving at a conclusion. I am satisfied that no ground has been made at this stage to quash the pending prosecution. In that view, this petition shall stand dismissed.