JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioners have challenged the notice dated 29.12.1989, Annexure-A, issued by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise and Customs, Kota, calling upon petitioner No. 1 to show cause as to why tariff classification of the product New Sapan Dairy Special" may not be modified and approved under sub- heading 04.01.13 instead of 04.01.19 and as to why central excise duty may not be demanded from it for clearance already affected in the past from 7.8.89 onwards under section 11-A of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1944 Act") 2. Petitioner No.1 is engaged in the manufacture of various products and one of its products is called' New Sapan Dairy Special' (hereinafter to be referred as 'the New Product'). The Petitioners had commenced production of the New Product some time in September, 1989. The said product consists of the following ingredients : 1 Milk Fat Minimum 5% and above 2 Milk protein Minimum 27% and above 3 Carbohydrate 61% 4 Minerals 5% 5 Vitamin A 350 Ug per 100 grams 6 Vitamin D 1801.0. per 100 gms. 7 Moisture 2% The petitioners had filed a classification list on 4.9.1989 classifying the New Product under sub-heading 0401.19 of heading 04.01 of Chapter 4 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (hereinafter to be referred as the 1985 Act'). The respondent No. 3, namely, the Superintendent, Central Excise, Kota asked for certain information's vide letter dated 6.9.89. The petitioners furnished the requisite information's vide its letter dated 8.9.89. Respondent No. 3 directed the petitioners to pay central excise duty on the New Product at the same rate at which it was paying duty on Sapan Dairy Special. Respondent No. 3 also communicated to the petitioners that the classification list was being submitted to the respondent No. 2 for necessary action. The petitioner No. 1 reiterated its stand for classification under sub-heading 0401.19 and alternatively under sub-heading 0404.00 of heading 04.01 of Chapter 4 of 1985 Act instead of sub-heading 0401.13. Petitioner No. 1. also made a request vide its letter dated 28.9.89 that pending finalisation of the classification, it may be permitted to clear the goods at NIL rate of duty under sub-heading 0401.19. This clearance was allowed on 29.9.1989 in terms of Rule 9B subject to the execution of B-13 Bond along with bank guarantee. Petitioner No. 1. also made a request vide its letter dated 28.9.89 that pending finalisation of the classification, it may be permitted to clear the goods at NIL rate of duty under sub-heading 0401.19. This clearance was allowed on 29.9.1989 in terms of Rule 9B subject to the execution of B-13 Bond along with bank guarantee. The respondent No. 2 vide its letter dated 4.11.1989, Annexure-I granted final approval to the classification list dated 4.9.1989 and thus the New Product was classified under the sub-heading 0401.19. The petitioner No. 1 had submitted price list effective from 27.9.1989. The same was granted provisional approval by the respondent No. 2. Thereafter, the respondent No. 3 issued a letter dated 15.12.1989 calling upon the petitioners to give certain figures and documents relating to gate passes, quantity, cleared value in respect of the product in question as also the copies of petitioners' internal reports of quality control department. The records of the company were seized on 17.11.1989 by the Anti Evasion Wing of the Department of Collectorate of Customs and the sample of the New Product was sent for analysis to the Central Revenue Control Laboratories. Thereafter, the impugned notice dated 29.12.1989 was issued and the same was followed by corrigendum dated 11.1.1990. Now the petitioner No. 1 has been asked to pay duty amounting to 8,84,386.55 for the period between 7.9.1989 to 31.12.1989. 3. The respondents have filed reply to the writ petition. In that reply, the respondents have raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioners have rushed to the court against the show cause notice even without filing the reply. According to the respondents, no final order has been passed by the respondent No. 2. After such an order is passed, equally efficacious remedy is available to the petitioners under the 1944 Act by way of appeal. Thus the petitioners have come to this court without exhausting the remedies available to them under the statute. According to the respondents, they have got jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice in terms of the provisions of Section 11-A of 1944 Act read with Rule 173 B(5) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Rules'). Thus the petitioners have come to this court without exhausting the remedies available to them under the statute. According to the respondents, they have got jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice in terms of the provisions of Section 11-A of 1944 Act read with Rule 173 B(5) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Rules'). According to the respondents, the New Product of the petitioner No. 1 could only be classified under sub-heading 0401.13 because partially skimmed milk powder falls under the said sub-heading. It cannot be classified under residuary entry. There was a mistake in the classification of the product under sub-heading 0401.19. In fact, the petitioner No. 1 had not furnished the full particulars regarding the contents of the previous product and the new product and, therefore, the Department was justified in issuing show cause notice to the petitioner. 4. Shri S.S. Ray, Senior Advocate, who has argued the case on behalf of the petitioners, made five-fold submissions in support of the writ petition. In the first instance, he has argued that there is no provision for review or revision of the classification list once it has been finally approved by the competent authority. According to Shri Ray, the provisions of 1944 Act or the Rules do not confer any power on the proper officer to undertake a review of the classification list once it has been finalised after due inquiry. The second submission of Shri Ray is that the term 'proper officer' used in Rule 173 B(5) must be read as an Officer higher than the one who had approved the classification. According to him, the officer of the coordinate rank cannot recall or revise the classification made by his predecessor. Shri Ray then argued that the only course open to the departmental authorities is to take action under Section 35-E of 1944 Act for revision of the classification list. The next contention urged by Shri Ray is that even if the officer of the same rank had jurisdiction to disapprove the classification list approved earlier, this power can only be exercised on fulfilment of certain conditions. There must be good and cogent reasons for reopening of the classification list. In the absence of such reasons, it is not open to the successor authority to revise the classification finalised earlier. There must be good and cogent reasons for reopening of the classification list. In the absence of such reasons, it is not open to the successor authority to revise the classification finalised earlier. Lastly, Shri Ray submitted that while construction the provisions of 1944 Act and the Rules framed thereunder or 1985 Act, which are both taxing statutes, the description of the goods must be one, which is in consonance with the common parlance meaning or as the goods are understood popularly according to the trade names of the goods as is understood by traders, dealers and consumers should be accepted. He further submitted that in such matters, the provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules and the specification of the goods provided in the Indian Standard should be taken into consideration. Shri Ray further submitted that in the present case the notice is- sued by the respondent No.2 is wholly without jurisdiction and, therefore, this court should interfere instead of compelling the petitioners to face harassment of filing reply to the show cause notice and then of prosecuting remedies of appeal etc. provided under 1944 Act and the Rules framed thereunder. 5. Shri U.D. Sharma and Shri Sudhir Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand strenuously submitted that the notice issued by the respondent No. 3 is in conformity with the provisions of Section 11-A of 1944 Act and Rule 173B(5) of the Rules, They submitted that the modification envisaged by Rule 173-B(5) can be made for any good reason. The term proper officer used in Rule 173 B has to be given the same meaning in the various clauses of the Rule and there is nothing in the Rules to show that the same officer or a successor in office cannot exercise the powers conferred by Rule 173 B(5) of the Rules. They further argued that the provisions of 1985 Act and the various guidelines laid down therein clearly show that the New Product of the petitioner No. 1 is liabel to be classified under sub-heading 0401.13 and the respondent No. 2 had acted in conformity with law while issuing the impugned notices, According to the counsel for the respondents, the writ petition is wholly pre-mature. The petitioners have not chosen to file reply before the competent authority. The petitioners have not chosen to file reply before the competent authority. The order can be passed by the competent officer after hearing the petitioners and if they feel aggrieved by the order of the competent officer, they have a right of filing appeal etc. They submit that bye-passing of the statutory remedies should not be permitted by the Court. Learned counsel for the respondents further argued that the entries contained in Chapter- of 1944 Act are clear and therefore, no help can possibly be taken from the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules framed thereunder or the specification laid down by the Indian Standard Institute. 6. For deciding the first question, we may refer to the scheme of the provisions contained in Section 11-A of 1944 Act and Rule 173-B of the Rules. Section 11-A was inserted by the Amending Act No. 25 of 1978 and came into force from 17.11.1980. This section has been introduced in place of Rule 10, which dealt with the same subject matter earlier. This section relates to recovery of dues not levied or not paid or short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded. According to the provisions contained in Section 11-A(1), where any duty of excise has not been levied or paid or has been short levied or short paid or erroneously refunded, a Central Excise Officer may, within six months.from the relevant date, serve notice on the person chargeable with the duty, which has not been levied or paid or which has been short levied or short paid or to whom the refund has erroneously been made, requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amount specified in the notice; proviso and explanations are not very much relevant to the present case because admittedly in the present case, the notice has been is- sued within a period of six months. This provision confers wide power on a Central Excise Officer to issue notice whenever he finds that any duty or excise has not been levied or paid or short levied or short paid. The exercise of this power is not contingent on the fulfilment of any condition precedent. This provision confers wide power on a Central Excise Officer to issue notice whenever he finds that any duty or excise has not been levied or paid or short levied or short paid. The exercise of this power is not contingent on the fulfilment of any condition precedent. The object of Section 11-A (1) is clearly to initiate proceedings for recovery of the amount of duty where it has either not been levied or not been paid, either in whole or in part or where the duty already paid has been erroneously refunded. The safe- guard which has been provided to individuals or company or factory is that the action has to be initiated under Section 11-A(1) within a period of six months. The person to whom the notice is issued can satisfy the authority concerned that the notice is not warranted or is not justified because the duty has rightly been not levied or has been fully paid or that the refund is in conformity with law. Proviso to Section 11-A(1) extends the period of limitation by 5 years in cases of fraud, collusion or wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts or contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder with an intent to evade the payment of duty. The proviso to Section 11-A(1) is indicative of the fact that in normal cases also it is open to the competent authority to issue notice for levy of duty or for recovery of refund erroneously made. We cannot read any implicit restriction on the exercise of power which has been conferred on the competent authority by virtue of Section 11-A. 7. Rule 173-B provides that the assesses shall file a list of goods for approval of the proper officer. Once the assesses files a list under sub-rule (1) of Rule 173-B, the proper officer has to approve the list after such inquiry as he deems fit. Such approval may be made with modifications as are considered necessary by the proper officer. The assessee has to determine the duty payable on goods in- tended to be removed by him in accordance with such list approved by the proper officer. According to sub-rule 2(a), if delay is likely to be occasioned in the process of approval of the list, the procedure prescribed under Rule 9(B) for provisional assessment of goods can be followed. The assessee has to determine the duty payable on goods in- tended to be removed by him in accordance with such list approved by the proper officer. According to sub-rule 2(a), if delay is likely to be occasioned in the process of approval of the list, the procedure prescribed under Rule 9(B) for provisional assessment of goods can be followed. Sub-rule 3 provides that where assessee disputes the rate of duty approved by the proper officer, he may pay duty under protest.at the rate approved by such officer after giving intimation to that effect to such proper officer. Sub Rule (4) of Rule 173-B envisages an alteration in the list in certain contingencies. This provision is open to be used either by the Department or by the assessee. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 173-B provides that when dispute about the rate of duty has been finalised or for any other reason affecting rate or rates of duty, a modification of the rate or rates of duty is necessitated, the proper officer shall make such modification and inform the assesses accordingly. 8. Though not very happily worded, the language employed in this sub-rule is very wide. It takes within its compass all possible types of cases involving modification of rates of duty or matter affecting the rates of duties after the same have been finalised. As per the provisions of Rule 173B(2) assesses is to determine the duty to be paid by him after the approval of the list. Thus sub-rule (2) does not speak of finalisation of rate of duty but only speaks approval of list. None of the provisions of this Rule speaks of finalisation of the rate of duty. However, approval of the classification list and the rate of duty are interlinked. Therefore, a harmonious construction of the entire Rule 173B will have to be made so as to give effect to each provision. This is possible only if we interpret sub-rule (5) of Rule 173(B) as including within its ambit the change of approved list because modification in the rate of duty is ordinarily possible only if the approved list is modified from one tariff item to another tariff item. If sub-rule (5) of Rule 173-B is not so interpreted, it would become unworkable. If sub-rule (5) of Rule 173-B is not so interpreted, it would become unworkable. Even otherwise, when rate of duty is dependent on the approved list, power of modification in the rate of duty would include power to modify the classification of the list. 9. Therefore, in our opinion, Rule 173-B(5) comprehends within itself change of the classification list after it has been approved. The argument of Shri Ray that after finalisation of list it cannot be altered even if the goods have been erroneously classified and only remedy available is the one provided in Section 35-E is not tenable for the simple reason that there cannot be any estoppel against law. A particular type of goods are by law required to be classified under a particular tariff item and any mistake or error in classification of such goods cannot deprive the proper officer of the authority to classify the item correctly by rectifying the error or correcting the mistake in classification. The modification envisaged by Rule 173 B (5) would include such rectification. The only safeguard which must be read inherent in the exercise of power under this rule is that in case modification of list is likely to affect a person adversely, he/it must be given a proper notice by the proper officer before effecting such modification or change. The proper officer would be exercising quasi judicial function in such eventuality and, therefore, he shall have to act in conformity with the principles of natural justice. The requirement of compliance with the principles of natural justice will have to be read as implicit in the exercise of power of modification by the proper officer. Of course, what particular procedure is to be adopted by the proper officer in a given case after issuing notice will certainly depend on the facts of each case and is likely to differ from case to case. Thus our conclusion on this aspect of the matter is that proper officer has power to effect modification in the classification list, after it has been finalised and there is nothing in law which stops the proper officer from exercising this power. Of course, if the modification is likely to affect a person, he/it is entitled to a prior notice and opportunity of making representation. Of course, if the modification is likely to affect a person, he/it is entitled to a prior notice and opportunity of making representation. Therefore the notice issued under Rule 173(B) (5) read with Section 11-A of 1944' Act by respondent No. 2 is not vitiated on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 10. In Shyam Sunder U. Nichani v. Assistant Collector, 1985(22) E.L.T. 751 , Karnataka High Court has held that withdrawal of approval does not amount to review by the same officer and, therefore, such action if taken with reference to Section 11-A of 1944 Act cannot be held to be without jurisdiction. 11. In Chajay Industries P. Ltd. v. Union of India and others, 34 E.L.T. 571 , a Division Bench of the Gujrat High Court held that change in the classification list after giving an opportunity is permissible. 12. In Elson Machines (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1988(4) JT 549 , the Supreme Court repelled the argument that once classification list had been approved earlier, the authorities were estopped from taking different view. The Supreme Court held that there cannot be any estoppel against law. 13. In Plasmac Machine Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay, 1990(4) JT 549 , this view has been reiterated in the following words : "The appellants contention that the department having earlier approved the classification of Tie Bar Nuts under tariff Item 68 has no justification for its revision is, to our mind, not tenable inasmuch as there could be no estoppel against a statute. If according to law Tie Bar Nuts fall within tariff Item 52 the fact that the department earlier approved their classification under tariff Item 68 will not estop it from revising that classification to one under tariff Item 52." 14. In Union of India v. Madhumilan Syntex Pvt. Ltd, AIR 1988 SC 1236 , the Supreme Court held that before any demand was made on any person chargeable in respect of non- levy or short levy or under-payment of duty, a notice requiring him to show cause why he should not pay the amounts specified in the notice must be served on him. Thus the Supreme Court had impliedly accepted the position that demand can be raised after giving notice to the affected party. Some-what similar view has been taken in Tata Iron and Steel Com. Thus the Supreme Court had impliedly accepted the position that demand can be raised after giving notice to the affected party. Some-what similar view has been taken in Tata Iron and Steel Com. Ltd. v. Union of India and others, AIR 1988 C 1269 . A number of decisions rendered by the Tribunals have been cited before us in which view has been taken that change in he classification list is permissible under Rule 173-B (5) after notice to the affected party. 15. The decision of the Supreme Court in Kuntesh v. Management, H.K. Mahavidyalaya Sitarpur, AIR 1987 SC 2186 , relied upon by Shri Ray in support of his plea that the proper officer has no right to review a classification list once it has been finalised or approved, contains a well established principle that a quasi judicial authority cannot review its own unless power of review is expressly conferred on it by the statute, under which it derives its jurisdiction. This proposition of law is undoubtedly well settled but it has no application in the scheme of Section 11-A and Rule 173-B in which the proper officer has been conferred with a power to modify the list after it has been finalised. The other case referred to by Shri Ray is that of Ajanta Iron and Steel Co. (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and others, 1986(23) E.L.T. 328 . In that case, the Division Bench of Delhi High Court took the view that the classification list once approved cannot be disapproved by another Assistant Collector, and that also after a long period. In that case, the classification list was approved by the Assistant Collector under Item 26AA. Thereafter, a show cause notice was issued. The Court held that the classification list is not open to be disapproved after it had been approved by the competent authority. From a perusal of the aforesaid judgment, we do not find any discussion either with reference to section 11-A or Rule 173-B(5). No reasons have been given in the said judgment for holding that the classification list cannot be disapproved by a proper officer. From a perusal of the aforesaid judgment, we do not find any discussion either with reference to section 11-A or Rule 173-B(5). No reasons have been given in the said judgment for holding that the classification list cannot be disapproved by a proper officer. The Judgment is totally silent on the questions which have been raised in the present case and with great respect we are unable to follow the view taken by Delhi High Court, which is contrary to the view taken by the Supreme Court in Elson Machine's case and Plasmac Machines' case. 16. We are not at all impressed by the submission of Shri Ray that an Officer of the coordinate rank or an officer who succeeded the proper officer who had approved the classification or the same officer who had approved the classification is not entitled to take action under Rule 173-B(5). This argument cannot be supported on any justifiable ground. From a bare perusal of the Rule 173-B, it is to be noticed that the term 'proper officer' has been used in various parts of Rule 173-B and there is no reason to assign different meaning to this term in Rule 173-B than the one given in the other sub-rules. The term 'proper Officer' cannot be read as Higher Officer than proper officer as is sought to be urged by Shri Ray on behalf of the petitioners. 17. The next argument of Shri Ray is that the power under Rule 173-B(5) can only be exercised on the fulfilment of certain conditions or the existence of certain conditions. Shri Ray has strongly relied upon the observations made by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Union of India, 1981(8) E.L.T. 328 . 17. The next argument of Shri Ray is that the power under Rule 173-B(5) can only be exercised on the fulfilment of certain conditions or the existence of certain conditions. Shri Ray has strongly relied upon the observations made by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Union of India, 1981(8) E.L.T. 328 . In that case, the Division Bench held that the Department should not be permitted to take different stand unless there is any good or cogent reason for the change in view e.g., if facts are different or if further facts are brought on record or if the process of manufacture has changed or if relevant entries in the tariff have undergone a modification or if, subsequent to the earlier decision there has been the pronouncement of a High Court or the Supreme Court, which necessitates reconsideration of the issue, it can hardly be doubted that the department can take a different view and have the matter agitated right up to the Supreme Court, if necessary. But when there is no change at all and when the position is exactly the same, legally and factually, as it was on the earlier occasion then we think that the department should be restrained from capriciously changing its stand and inflicting unnecessary proceedings and hardship upon the assesses. The Court further observed that the rule of natural justice does not allow the same authority or the one subordinate to him to review his earlier view arbitrarily. After the earlier decision taken by the assessing authority is wrong, it is open to the higher authority to review the same under the Act and to state the correct position, but if this has not been done, or if the revisional authority has taken a view in favour of the assessee for the earlier period, fresh proceedings cannot be launched against the assessee merely because the department later thinks that the previous decision was untenable or fresh decision be obtained. In such cases, the department would have remedy of annunciating its views in other cases where its hands are not so tied and eventually if the High Court or the Supreme Court approves its view, that would enable the department to apply those views where the earlier view was taken. In such cases, the department would have remedy of annunciating its views in other cases where its hands are not so tied and eventually if the High Court or the Supreme Court approves its view, that would enable the department to apply those views where the earlier view was taken. This would not prejudice the case of the assessee, but would be a harmonious recopoiliation (sic reconciliation) between the two well established positions. 18. That case arose out of a notice issued by the Assistant Collector, Kota after some assessment had been made in the case of that petitioner, Section 11-A or for that reason, Rule 10-A has not been discussed by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in that case. Moreover, the restrictions which have been en- visaged by the Division Bench of the High Court in that case are not exhaustive in so far as the question of exercise of power under Rule 173-B is concerned. In addition to that, in the facts of that particular case, the matter had been decided at the stage of revision by the Central Government regarding non-payment of excise duty on particular part of the goods. Regarding same matter, the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, Kota had issued notice. In our view opinion, the view of Delhi High Court to the extent that the same officer cannot revise his earlier views because that would be contrary to the natural justice, cannot be accepted. Of-course, if in a given case, the Tribunal or the court finds that modification or change made by the proper officer is arbitrary, capricious or is perverse, certainly the order passed by the proper officer will be quashed. However, the broad proposition that only on a change of facts or of the legal position, modification can be done, cannot be accepted as correct law. In our view, even in cases of mistake or in cases where it is found that the classification is contrary to the statutory provisions, the proper officer has a power to effect modification or change in the classification list suo mote. 19. The argument with reference to the availability of power of revision only under section 35 E is clearly untenable. The power conferred by Section 35-E to the various authorities is revisional power which can be exercised by the competent authority on its own motion. 19. The argument with reference to the availability of power of revision only under section 35 E is clearly untenable. The power conferred by Section 35-E to the various authorities is revisional power which can be exercised by the competent authority on its own motion. Section 35 E(2) authorises the Collector of Central Excise to call for and examine the record of any proceedings under which the adjudicating authority subordinate to him has taken any decision or passed an order under the Act for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any such decision or order and may, by order direct such authority to apply to the Collector (Appeals) for determination of such points arising out of the decision or order as may be specified by the Collector of Central Excise in his order. The power exercisable under Section 35-E(2) by the Collector, Central Excise is quite distinct and independent than the power of modification, which vests with the Proper Officer under Rule 173-B(5) of the Rules. If the argument of-exclusion of the power of modification of the classification list under rule 173-B(5) is accepted because of the revisional power of the Collector, Central Excise under Section 35-B, the provisions of Rule 173-B(5) will be rendered redundant and this, in our view, is not permissible or warranted. As already noticed by us, the rates are dependent on the approval of classification list and if it were to be held that power of modification of classification is not available under Rule 173 B(5), obviously, the power of modification of rates after they have been finalised would be considerably nullified. Thus the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding applicability of Section 35-E for exclusion of Rule 173-B(5) in the matter of modification of the classification list cannot be accepted. 20. Having held that the Proper Officer has jurisdiction to effect modification or change in the classification list, the question now arises as to whether the notice dated 29.12.1989 issued by the Respondent No. 2 should be quashed. Argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the New Product of the petitioners fall within the tariff entry 0401 (Sub heading 0401.19) or in any case under tariff entry (4(4.00 of Part 4 of the Schedule appended to 1985 Act'. Argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the New Product of the petitioners fall within the tariff entry 0401 (Sub heading 0401.19) or in any case under tariff entry (4(4.00 of Part 4 of the Schedule appended to 1985 Act'. It was also argued that for the purpose of interpretation of tariff entries, the product should be assigned meaning with reference to provisions of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Indian Standards. Reference was also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Collector of Central Excise v. Krishna Carbon Papers Co., Kanpur, (1988) 370 E.L.T. 480 . 21. On the other hand, Shri U.D. Sharma and Shri Sudhir Gupta made detailed reference to the provisions of 1985 Act, Rules for interpretation of the excise tariff and part IV of the Schedule. Their particular emphasis was on the provisions of Rule 2,3,4, of the Rules for Interpretation of Excise Tariff and the provisions of Note-I in Chapter 4 of the Schedule appended to 1985 Act. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that the skimmed milk, butter of all types (partial or whole) except the one for preparing feeding infants would be covered by sub-heading 0401.13 and there was no reason to treat it sunder Entry 0401.19 which related to residuary item under heading 0401 or under heading 04.04 which relate to other diary products. Learned counsel for the respondents invited out attention to the case of Rackitt and Colkun of India Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (1985(22) E.L.T. 222) , in support of their submission that when tariff items are clear with reference to the Rule Interpretation and the particular product falls under specific item, there is no reason to take help of the provisions contained in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act or the Indian Standard laid down by the Indian Standard Institute or to take into consideration the trade name of the goods. Learned counsel for the respondents strenuously submitted that this court need not decide the controversy on merits at this stage. The petitioners have challenged the show-cause notice. Once the court holds that the notice is not without jurisdiction, the proper authorities under the Act of 1944 should be left the controversy on merits. Learned counsel for the respondents strenuously submitted that this court need not decide the controversy on merits at this stage. The petitioners have challenged the show-cause notice. Once the court holds that the notice is not without jurisdiction, the proper authorities under the Act of 1944 should be left the controversy on merits. If the petitioners feel aggrieved against such decision of the proper authority, they have a statutory remedy of appeal available under the Act of 1944 and the Rules framed thereunder. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, when the effective alternative remedy is available to the petitioners, this court must not invoke extra-ordinary jurisdiction. 22. After careful consideration of the rival submissions of the parties we think that it will not be proper to express opinion on the merits of the classification to the New Product of the petitioners under a particular heading or sub-heading in Chapter 4 of the Schedule appended to 1985 Act. Expression of opinion on this aspect would pre-judicially affect the case of either of the parties. In our considered opinion, an equally effective and efficacious remedy is avail- able to the petitioners under 1944 Act. This court will not ordinarily interfere in such matters unless an aggrieved party has exhausted alternative remedies avail- able under the Statute. Most of the taxing statutes contains a complete code containing machinery for deciding the disputes relating to levy and collection of tax or imposition of penalties. Hierarchy of authorities are provided and even Tribunals have been constituted for adjudication of disputes in such matters. This court cannot substitute itself in place of various authorities and the Tribunals constituted under the Act. The Supreme Court as also this Court has time and again held that this court should not interfere in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, when the aggrieved person has an effective alternative remedy available under a particular statute by way of appeal or revision for redressal of his grievance. 23. In M/s Shikha Foot-wear v. Commissioner of Central Excise, SB Civil Writ petition No. 4203/85 , decided on December 18, 1990 by one of us (GS. 23. In M/s Shikha Foot-wear v. Commissioner of Central Excise, SB Civil Writ petition No. 4203/85 , decided on December 18, 1990 by one of us (GS. Singhvi, J.) reference has been made to the decisions of The Supreme Court in Titaghur Paper Mills Company Ltd. v. State of Orissa, 1983(2) SCC 433 , Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 33 , and of this court in Jaipur syntex Ltd. v. Union of India and others, SB Civil Writ Petition No. 626/86 D/d. 19.7.1986 , Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, DB Civil Special Appeal No. 254/86. D/d. 19.9.1986 , National Engineering Industry v. Union of India, DB Civil Writ Petition No. 1/87 D/d. 30.6.1987 , Central of India Machine Manufacturing Company Ltd. v. Union of India and ors., DB Civil Writ Petition 1121/82, D/d. 27.10.1990 , and after a detailed consideration, it has been held that there is no warrant for exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this court at the stage of show cause notice or where the remedy of appeal or revision is available to the party concerned. We do not consider it necessary to repeat what has been held by the Supreme Court and various High Courts in these cases referred to here in above. Suffice it to say, that there is a consistent view of this court that in such like matters it should be left to the Officer/authorities under the Act and hierarchy of the Tribunals to have their say and adjudicate the disputes finally. We do not find any reason to take a different view in the matter. The petitioners would be free to raise all objections against the show cause notice. The Proper Authority will decide the objections of the petitioners objectively wholly uninfluenced by the observations of this court in the present judgment. Then the petitioners will have a right of appeal under the provisions of 1944 Act. We do not think that we should interfere in the exercise of our extra-ordinary jurisdiction. 24. Consequently, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.Petition dismissed. *******